Estate of John K. Freiburger v. Phil Mausser

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-1425
Filed November 13, 2025

ESTATE OF JOHN K. FREIBURGER,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

PHIL MAUSSER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County,

Monica Zrinyi Ackley, Judge.

A defendant appeals a bench trial ruling finding him liable for unjust

enrichment. AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

Alyssa M. Carlson of O’Connor & Thomas, P.C., Dubuque, for appellant.

Jordan H. Fox of Kintzinger, Harmon Konrardy, P.L.C., Dubuque, for

appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and

Chicchelly, JJ.
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BADDING, Judge.

Janice Freiburger brought this suit against Phil Mausser on behalf of her

husband’s estate. She seeks to collect a debt for ten loads of hay that her husband

allegedly delivered to Mausser nine months before his death. The only record of

the transaction was a series of truck scale tickets that Janice found in her home

after her husband passed away. At trial, Mausser admitted to receiving five loads

of hay, but he denied owing any payment. The district court found Mausser liable

for unjust enrichment as to all ten loads.

On appeal, Mausser challenges the admission of the scale tickets and the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s award. We reject the evidentiary

challenge but grant partial relief on the merits based upon our de novo review of

the record. While we agree with the district court’s award as to the undisputed hay

deliveries, the evidence linking the other loads to Mausser is too conjectural to hold

him liable. We accordingly vacate the judgment against Mausser for those loads

and remand for entry of a corrected judgment.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

John Freiburger was a Dubuque County hay farmer. Phil Mausser was one

of John’s customers. In June 2022, John died unexpectedly, leaving his wife,

Janice Freiburger, to wind down the hay operation. John typically asked his buyers

to pay for their hay at the time of delivery, but he sometimes sold on credit. As

executor of her husband’s estate, it was Janice’s job to settle the open accounts.

In the months after John’s death, Janice unearthed two sets of truck scale

tickets stowed in different areas of her home. The first set of tickets, which Janice

found in a kitchen desk drawer, listed five loads of hay weighed in September and
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October 2021. Each of them referenced “Freiburger” and “Mausser” in a line

designated “company.” The second set of tickets, which Janice found in a

bedroom drawer, listed another five loads weighed in August and September. Only

John’s name was listed on the company line for those tickets.

Janice recalled her husband mentioning he “sold some hay to Phil” in the

fall of 2021. She concluded that all ten scale tickets showed unpaid deliveries to

Mausser. So, Janice drew up a pair of invoices requesting payment of $7300.80

for the kitchen desk hay and $6889.92 for the bedroom drawer hay. She reached

these totals by multiplying the net weight of each load by $120 per ton.1 Although

John’s prices had varied based on the quality of his hay crop and market

conditions, Janice considered $120 a fair rate for Mausser because that is what

another customer had paid for John’s hay.

When Janice first approached Mausser about the scale tickets, he initially

denied receiving any hay. But at trial, Mausser acknowledged receiving seven

loads of moldy hay in fall 2021, two of which he paid for at the time of delivery and

five of which he accepted free-of-charge to help John clear out his hay shed.

Mausser testified that he “never asked [John] for one load” because he “didn’t need

the hay.” Nevertheless, after Janice sent the invoices, Mausser mailed her two

checks totaling $4364.10—just to “get it over with.” The checks were inscribed

with the words “payment in full” and referenced five loads of hay in their memo

lines. Janice declined to accept them.

1 Because the scale tickets showed the gross weight of the loads, Janice asked

her son, Matt Freiburger, to weigh the truck and trailer they recalled John using for
his deliveries. Janice subtracted those weights from the scale ticket figures to
determine the net weight of the hay.
4

In November 2023, Janice filed an expedited civil action on behalf of John’s

estate seeking to collect on the unpaid invoices. She asserted claims for breach

of contract and unjust enrichment. Following a one-day bench trial, the district

court rejected the breach-of-contract claim, finding insufficient evidence of an

agreed-upon purchase price. But the court found in favor of Janice on her claim

for unjust enrichment. The court concluded that Mausser had received the hay

shown on all the scale tickets, that it was of sufficient quality to convey a benefit,

and that allowing Mausser to keep the hay without payment would be unjust. Citing

the trial testimony of other farmers that “$120.00 per ton is a reasonable price,” the

court entered judgment against Mausser for $14,190.72.

Mausser appeals, challenging the district court’s admission of the scale

tickets at trial and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Janice’s claim for

unjust enrichment.

II. Standard of Review

Hearsay rulings are reviewed for correction of legal error. Borst Bros.

Constr., Inc. v. Fin. of Am. Com., LLC, 975 N.W.2d 690, 697 (Iowa 2022). “If a

court’s factual findings with respect to application of the hearsay rule are not

‘clearly erroneous’ or without substantial evidence to support them, they are

binding on appeal.” State v. Long, 628 N.W.2d 440, 445 (Iowa 2001)

(citation omitted).

As for Mausser’s merits challenge, both parties assert that our review is de

novo because unjust enrichment is an equitable claim. But “review of a decision

by the district court following a bench trial depends upon the manner in which the

case was tried to the court,” not necessarily the nature of the claim. Carroll Airport
5

Comm’n v. Danner, 927 N.W.2d 635, 642 (Iowa 2019) (citation omitted).

Throughout most of the trial, the parties lodged—and the court ruled on—

objections to the admission of evidence. See Dix v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, Inc.,

961 N.W.2d 671, 680 (Iowa 2021) (noting rulings on evidentiary objections are the

“hallmark of a law trial” (citation omitted)). This resulted in frequent interference

with the testimony. However, before the close of evidence, the district court invited

both parties to supplement the record on the unjust enrichment claim.

Because the court provided the parties with an opportunity to present

evidence excluded by its rulings, and because neither party claims they were

prevented from introducing relevant evidence, it is appropriate to review the unjust

enrichment claim de novo. See Passehl Est. v. Passehl, 712 N.W.2d 408, 414 n.6

(Iowa 2006). Even on de novo review, “we give weight to the factual findings of

the district court, especially with respect to determinations of witness credibility.”

Danner, 927 N.W.2d at 642–43 (citation omitted); see also Hora v. Hora, 5 N.W.3d

635, 645 (Iowa 2024) (reviewing what a de novo review entails).

III. Analysis

A. Hearsay Evidence

At trial, Mausser objected to the scale tickets on hearsay grounds, among

others. The court overruled Mausser’s objection under the business records

exception in Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.803(6). Mausser challenges that ruling on

appeal. He argues the scale tickets are “textbook hearsay” and that Janice failed

to lay the necessary foundation for the business records exception to apply.

Out-of-court statements are generally inadmissible when offered to prove

the truth of the matter asserted. Iowa Rs. Evid. 5.801(c), 5.802. But there are
6

“numerous exceptions to the hearsay rule.” State v. Veverka, 938

N.W.2d 197, 199 (Iowa 2020). One is the familiar business-records exception,

which permits admission of hearsay records describing an “act, event, condition,

opinion, or diagnosis” where the following elements are met:

(A) The record was made at or near the time by—or from
information transmitted by—someone with knowledge;
(B) The record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted
activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether
or not for profit;
(C) Making the record was a regular practice of that activity;
(D) All these conditions are shown by the testimony of the
custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification that
complies with rule 5.902(11) or rule 5.902(12) or with a statute
permitting certification; and
(E) The opponent does not show that the source of
information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a
lack of trustworthiness.

Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(6). The burden is on the proponent of the record to show

these requirements are satisfied. S.K. ex rel. Tarbox v. Obstetric & Gynecologic

Assocs. of Iowa City & Coralville, P.C., 13 N.W.3d 546, 555 (Iowa 2024).

The parties agree that the scale tickets were hearsay evidence. They were

offered to prove the amount of hay Mausser received from John. The only dispute

is whether Janice—who introduced the tickets through her own testimony—

satisfied the prerequisites for admission under rule 5.803(6).2 Mausser points out

that no witness with “personal knowledge of the record-keeping system and the

2 We note that, in expedited civil actions, our rules allow the court to admit hearsay

records “notwithstanding the absence” of foundational testimony if, among other
things, the proponent gives notice of intent to introduce the document at least
ninety days before trial and the document “appears to fall within [the business
records exception].” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.281(4)(g)(2). Although this case was tried
as an expedited civil action, neither party addresses the more relaxed standard for
admission of documentary evidence. We accordingly apply the criteria set out in
Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.803(6).
7

creation of these records” appeared at trial. He argues Janice’s testimony fails to

establish that the ten scale tickets were made when the loads were weighed,

recorded by someone with knowledge, or made and kept in the ordinary course of

business.

The Iowa Supreme Court has made it clear that “the specific person who

created the record in the course of business need not testify to lay the foundation

for the business records exception.” State v. Reynolds, 746 N.W.2d 837, 843

(Iowa 2008). While a “qualified witness” must explain the record-making process,

they need only show the record was generated “in the course of . . . business, at

or reasonably near the time, using standard procedures that reasonably indicate

the trustworthiness of the information.” Id. Personal knowledge of the particular

record is not required. See State v. Propps, 376 N.W.2d 619, 621 (Iowa 1985).

This is because the purpose of the rule 5.803(6) elements is not to authenticate or

identify hearsay evidence, but to ensure it bears the “reliability and trustworthiness

usually associated with business records.” Id. at 620.

Janice testified that her husband “always sold [hay] by the ton,” that he

regularly visited a truck stop on Highway 20 to weigh his hay, and that he received

a scale ticket for each load. She knew the tickets “would indicate [the] time, the

date, how much the load weighed, and who weighed it, and who owned the hay.”

And she recognized the disputed exhibits as scale tickets when asked about them

at trial. Although Janice was not present when the tickets were created, her

familiarity with John’s hay-weighing procedures makes her a qualified witness to

lay foundation for these records. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(6)(D); McKenney v.

Iowa Physicians Clinic Med. Found., No. 24-0651, 2025 WL 1704722, at *5 (Iowa
8

Ct. App. June 18, 2025) (finding a medical secretary was a “qualified witness,”

despite her unfamiliarity with the contents of a proffered record, where she was

“informed on how the medical records were stored and used” in her clinic); United

States v. Collins, 799 F.3d 554, 584 (6th Cir. 2015) (noting the meaning of “another

qualified witness” under the identically worded Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6)

“should be given the broadest interpretation” (citation omitted)).

Mausser counters that the scale company—not John Freiburger—was the

“actual source of the records,” and so Janice’s testimony about her husband’s

business practices failed to meet the elements of rule 5.803(6). He likens this case

to Reynolds, where the supreme court declined to extend the business records

exception to a set of Federal Reserve error reports informing a bank that its

customer cashed fraudulent money orders. 746 N.W.2d at 842–43. A bank

employee testified that the bank received, maintained, and relied upon the Federal

Reserve reports in its normal course of business. Id. at 842. But the supreme

court found that evidence fell short:

Here, there is no testimony from anyone with knowledge of how the
Federal Reserve error reports were generated. . . . Bank employees
were unable to, or at least did not, independently determine that the
money orders were counterfeit; the bank relied exclusively on the
Federal Reserve to make that determination. There is no evidence
in the record either as to how the Federal Reserve determined the
money orders were counterfeit, or how the error reports were made.

Id. at 843. The court “acknowledge[d] the possibility the Federal Reserve records

were created through a fully automated and reliable process involving no human

declarant.” Id. But because there was “no evidence in the record from any person

with knowledge as to how the Federal Reserve error reports were created,” it found

the hearsay exception unsatisfied. Id.
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Janice did not testify to the mechanics of the truck scale or the process by

which the tickets were prepared. But unlike in Reynolds, the record here is

sufficient to ensure that the scale tickets were created by an automated, reliable

process. Iowa law requires most commercial truck scales to be equipped with a

“type-registering weigh beam, a dial with a mechanical ticket printer, an automatic

weight recorder, or some similar device which shall be used for printing or

stamping the weight values on scale tickets.” Iowa Code § 215.19. It is clear from

the face of the tickets that they were printed by such a device. And while that does

not account for the names listed in the company lines, Janice testified that those

details would have been supplied by her husband.3 Each ticket also bears a

weighmaster’s certificate attesting to the accuracy of the information recorded.

See Iowa Code § 214.7 (“Weighmasters are required to make true weights . . . and

give, upon demand, to any person having weighing done, a certificate showing the

weight, date, and for whom weighed.”).

We conclude Janice’s testimony established that the information on scale

tickets was either registered by the scale or supplied by John; that the tickets were

generated at the time the loads were weighed; and that they were created and

maintained in the ordinary course of business. Iowa R. Evid. 5.803(6)(A)–(C); see

also Pruisner v. Ballhagen, No. 14-1431, 2015 WL 5965154, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App.

Oct. 14, 2015) (finding a hog farmer’s weight logs were properly admitted under

3 Although Mausser successfully objected to Janice’s testimony about the source

of the “company” information, the court is not bound by the rules of evidence when
determining preliminary questions of admissibility. Iowa R. Evid. 5.104(a).
10

the business records exception). Thus, the district court did not err in admitting

the challenged exhibits under the business records exception in rule 5.803(6).

B. Unjust Enrichment

Mausser also challenges the district court’s award of $14,190.72 in

damages for unjust enrichment. At trial, Janice argued she was entitled to recover

the value of the hay deliveries evidenced by the scale tickets from her kitchen desk

and bedroom drawers. She alleged Mausser received, but never paid for, ten

loads of marketable “first crop” hay worth at least $120 per ton.4 Mausser contends

Janice proved neither the quality nor quantity of hay at issue. He also claims she

failed to prove a basis for the $120 rate.

“Unjust enrichment occurs when one party is enriched at the expense of the

other under unjust circumstances.” Bradshaw Renovations, LLC v. Graham, 20

N.W.3d 479, 487 (Iowa 2025). To recover on this theory, the plaintiff must show

“(1) enrichment of the defendant, (2) at the expense of the plaintiff, (3) under

circumstances that make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit.” Behm v.

City of Cedar Rapids, 922 N.W.2d 524, 577 (Iowa 2019). Among other possible

remedies, a prevailing plaintiff may collect damages in an amount equal to the

value of the inequitably retained benefit. Iowa Waste Sys., Inc. v. Buchanan Cnty.,

617 N.W.2d 23, 30 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000).

Janice’s claim rests on a tenuous set of facts. She testified that John sold

his hay on a handshake basis and kept track of his sales in his head. She also

4 One of John’s hay customers explained that first crop hay was typically lower

quality than second or third crop hay. “Waterway hay”—which is the kind that
Mausser said he received—was the lowest quality of hay that John sold.
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conceded that she was never part of the conversations between her husband and

Mausser. Yet she recalled John telling her that he sold some hay to Mausser in

fall 2021. Because the kitchen desk scale tickets referred to Mausser by name,

Janice surmised that John kept them to document an outstanding debt. As for the

bedroom drawer tickets, Janice assumed that hay also went to Mausser “because

he was the only one that got hay delivered to him by my husband.” Janice did not

testify about why she concluded the hay deliveries remained unpaid when she

invoiced Mausser.

John’s son, Matt Freiburger, testified that he overheard a conversation

between his father and Mausser sometime in the fall of 2021. Matt did not hear all

the details, but he “could read between the lines that [Mausser] was looking for an

opportunity to feed his cows.” He gathered that “Phil needed hay, and my old man

had some hay for sale.” Matt recalled that John’s shed, at that time, was full of

“nice dry first crop hay.” He loaned his father a pickup and trailer for the delivery.

Matt testified that Mausser received “most of” the first-crop hay that his father

harvested in 2021.

Mausser conceded that he received some hay from John in fall 2021. But

on Mausser’s recollection, it was seven loads of moldy, year-old hay, which John

brought because “[h]e needed some room in his shed” and “he couldn’t get rid of

[it] someplace else.” He alleged the hay was too wet and “hot” for either farmer to

store and that he “didn’t need the hay” in the first place. According to Mausser,

John accepted $36 per bale for the first two loads but declined payment for the

rest. He testified that John never asked for money when they saw each other after

the hay deliveries. When questioned about the checks he sent to Janice, Mausser
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explained that he offered “exactly what I paid for the first two loads,” reasoning the

$36 per-bale rate “was more than fair.”

On rebuttal, Janice alleged that John “wouldn’t waste his time” weighing

low-quality hay. She suggested that Mausser was recalling a different transaction

with her husband. The district court credited the Freiburgers’ version of events,

finding Mausser’s allegation that John delivered “throw away” hay lacked

credibility.

We owe deference to the court’s credibility finding. Danner, 927 N.W.2d

at 642–43. And Mausser’s allegations are indeed dubious. He initially alleged that

he received no hay from John in fall 2021, but he later contradicted that account

by acknowledging he received low-quality hay. And although Mausser asserts that

hay was a gift, he offered payment to Janice. Mausser’s wife, Phyllis, also testified

that Mausser tried to pay John before he died. These shifting positions call

Mausser’s truthfulness into doubt. What’s more, there is no dispute that John

weighed at least five loads that Mausser agreed he received. As Janice

emphasized, it would make little sense to weigh a valueless product—the more

plausible explanation is that John’s hay was marketable. Mausser would be

unjustly enriched if allowed to keep that hay without payment.

That said, while we reject Mausser’s argument about the quality of the hay

he received, we agree the record is insufficient to hold Mausser liable for the

quantity of hay Janice claims. Mausser admits that he received the five loads of

hay shown on the scale tickets from the kitchen desk. And it is undisputed he

never paid for that hay. But Mausser denies receiving the five loads of hay from
13

the bedroom drawer tickets.5 Those tickets, unlike their counterparts, make no

reference to Mausser.

To link the bedroom drawer hay to Mausser, the district court credited

Janice’s assertion that Mausser was the only customer to whom John delivered

hay. However, the record was far from clear on this point. Other parts of Janice’s

testimony were equivocal about which, if any, of John’s customers received hay

by delivery. More than once, her attorney had to prompt her response. Another

farmer, Joseph Riniker, testified that “John delivered some hay if it was close by”

and that these deliveries were not particularly rare.

Even assuming that Mausser was the only farmer who received personal

deliveries from John, it does not necessarily follow that the bedroom drawer tickets

were from deliveries to Mausser. Matt Freiburger suggested it was his father’s

“common practice” to weigh the hay he sold to other customers. Hay-buyer Neil

Spoden explained that when he purchased John’s product, he weighed it himself

and then returned the scale ticket to John. Yet another farmer, William Lansing,

mentioned a similar procedure. This testimony cuts against the court’s conclusion

that the bedroom drawer tickets were attributable to Mausser. All told, the

evidence is too conjectural to find Mausser received those five loads of hay. We

accordingly reverse the district court’s entry of judgment for the scale tickets Janice

found in her bedroom drawer.

5 While Mausser referenced two other loads of hay, he claimed that he paid for

those loads. Janice agreed, testifying that Mausser purchased and paid for
waterway hay “before any of those scale tickets were written out.”
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This leaves us with the value of the undisputed hay that Mausser received,

as documented by the scale tickets from the kitchen desk drawer. Mausser argues

that Janice’s demand for $120 per ton was “a purely subjective number based on

a single conversation with another farmer.” We disagree. The market value of an

inequitably retained benefit is an appropriate measure of damages for a claim of

unjust enrichment. See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment

§ 49 (A.L.I. 2011); Iowa Waste Sys., 617 N.W.2d at 30. Multiple farmers testified

at trial that $120 per ton was a reasonable price for first-crop hay in fall 2021.

Lansing testified that he has spent as much as $250 to $350 per ton. While

Mausser argued that moldy bales would be worth far less than $120 per ton, he

offered nothing to rebut Janice’s proof of the market value of quality hay. The

evidence supports the district court’s award as to the kitchen desk hay.6

IV. Conclusion

In sum, we reject Mausser’s evidentiary challenge, vacate the award as to

the hay deliveries from the scale tickets that Janice found in the bedroom drawer,

and remand this case for entry of judgment for $7300.80, reflecting the market

value of the hay documented by the scale tickets from the kitchen desk.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

6 Mausser also contends that Janice’s invoices were skewed by faulty math and

an inaccurate truck-and-trailer weight. But these challenges also fall short. The
mathematical discrepancies highlighted by Mausser amounted to less than a
dollar. And although Matt Freiburger testified the truck and trailer weighed roughly
500 pounds lighter than Janice figured into her bills, such an error would mean
Janice’s invoices underestimated the net weight of the delivered hay.