In re the Marriage of Harland

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 25-0117
Filed December 3, 2025

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF ANDREW MARK HARLAND
AND ALYSSA KATHLEEN HARLAND

Upon the Petition of
ANDREW MARK HARLAND,
Petitioner-Appellant,

And Concerning
ALYSSA KATHLEEN HARLAND,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Michael Jacobsen,

Judge.

An ex-husband appeals the spousal support, physical care, and visitation

provisions in the dissolution decree. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND

REMANDED.

Andrew B. Howie and Meredith Eck of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud &

Weese, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellant.

Elizabeth Kellner-Nelson of Kellner-Nelson Law Firm, P.C., West Des

Moines, for appellee.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Greer and Buller, JJ.
2

TABOR, Chief Judge.

Andrew (Andy) Harland challenges the custody and spousal support

provisions in the decree dissolving his marriage to Alyssa Harland. He contends

the district court should have granted him physical care of their two sons or, in the

alternative, given him more parenting time. He also disputes the amount and

duration of the spousal-support award.

Because Alyssa has taken the lead in meeting the boys’ everyday needs,

we affirm the order granting her physical care. We also find the visitation schedule

(Wednesday nights and every other weekend) provides the children with maximum

continuing contact with their father while maintaining their routines. As for spousal

support, we modify the duration of the award to seven years and add a clause to

terminate the obligation upon either party’s death or Alyssa’s remarriage.

I. Facts and Prior Proceedings

Andy and Alyssa wed in November 2008. They had been married just under

sixteen years as of the dissolution trial. Andy was forty-four and Alyssa was forty-

two at the time of trial; both were in good health. They have two children, C.M.H.

(born in 2013) and J.A.H. (born in 2016). The boys attend public school in Perry,

where both parents live.

Both Andy and Alyssa have their bachelor’s degrees. But their work

histories differ significantly. Andy owns and operates ACE hardware stores in

Perry, Boone, and Jefferson. The trial record shows that his three-year average

income was $623,583.96. By contrast, Alyssa dedicated most of her time to caring

for the boys during the marriage. Before the marriage, Alyssa was employed as a
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private school teacher in California for one year.1 She then started sales work for

Mary Kay Cosmetics. In the early years of their marriage, she also worked part

time for a transportation company and a retirement home. After they had their first

child, Alyssa quit working outside the home and sold Mary Kay Cosmetics full-time.

Her success in cosmetic sales peaked in 2017 when she earned a pink Cadillac2

and turned a net profit of $15,064.3 Her sales were much lower from 2020 through

2023.4 She also had been on the payroll at the ACE hardware stores until Andy

filed for divorce. Alyssa testified that her intent was to remain a stay-at-home mom

and “if there was room for career or whatever, then [she] would explore that after.”

The record showed that eleven-year-old C.M.H. and eight-year-old J.A.H.

were “extremely resilient” as they weathered their parents’ separation. The boys

attended therapy to help them with the transition. And they were bonded and

comfortable with both parents. But the Child and Family Reporter (CFR) assigned

by the court found that “the boys look primarily to Alyssa for emotional support,

when they need something.” The CFR also recognized that Andy was involved in

the boy’s lives. For example, he coached their baseball teams, and the ACE

hardware stores sponsored the teams.

1 That job did not require a license, and she was not qualified to teach in Iowa.
2 A pink Cadillac is indicative of success at Mary Kay Cosmetics. The company
leased the car to Alyssa for two years with the option to buy. She and Andy bought
the Cadillac at the end of the lease.
3
As Andy points out in his brief, Alyssa’s gross sales in 2017 were $71,582.
4 Andy and Alyssa provided diverging explanations for the fall-off. Andy testified

that Alyssa was “obsessed with the End Times . . . that Christ’s return was coming,
and she decided that working [for] Mary Kay didn’t matter.” But Alyssa attributed
her reduced earnings to post-Covid industry changes.
4

After separating, Andy and Alyssa struggled to communicate. On several

occasions, when coordinating their children’s schedules or planning transportation,

communication broke down. Both parties blamed the other for the breakdowns,

including an incident where C.M.H. ended up at his baseball game without his

uniform shirt. Discussing that example, the district court observed that “[i]t appears

that Alyssa attempted to accommodate Andy and the baseball schedule,” but Andy

saw the mix-up as another instance of Alyssa refusing to coparent.

As far as attending to the children’s day-to-day needs, that role historically

fell to Alyssa. She stayed at home with the children while Andy managed the

hardware shops. She typically got the boys ready for school, but once they began

attending separate schools, Andy helped with transportation. Alyssa testified that

since he filed for divorce, Andy has taken on a larger role with the children. But

she doubted whether that level of participation would continue. The CFR credited

both parents’ contributions but concluded that Alyssa is better suited to care for

the children’s long-term needs.

The trial occurred in October 2023. Each parent agreed to joint legal

custody but asked for physical care. The district court found that it was in the

children’s best interests to grant Alyssa physical care. The court also ordered

Andy to pay $3086 per month in child support for two children, which would be

reduced to $2212 when C.M.H. turned eighteen.

On the economic side, the court divided the marital assets, awarding Alyssa

the marital home debt-free, her Cadillac debt-free, several bank accounts, and all

the retirement accounts, as well as a $1,200,000 equalization payment. Andy

received his three ACE hardware stores, a boat and trailer, and the obligation to
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make the equalization payment. For spousal support, Andy proposed that he pay

Alyssa $2000 per month for three years. Alyssa requested $10,000 per month for

ten years.5 The district court awarded spousal support in the amount of $8000 per

month for ten years to correspond with the time their children will be in school.

Andy appeals the physical care and spousal support provisions.

II. Analysis

A. Scope and Standard of Review

Dissolution of marriage proceedings are equitable actions. Iowa Code

§ 598.3 (2023). So our review is de novo. In re Marriage of Gust, 858

N.W.2d 402, 406 (Iowa 2015). Although we review de novo, “[w]e give weight to

the findings of the district court, especially to the extent credibility determinations

are involved.” In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 690 (Iowa 2007).

On spousal support challenges, we build in “considerable latitude” for the

district court’s discretion. Id. We avoid undue tinkering with those awards. In re

Marriage of Sokol, 985 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Iowa 2023). But the district court’s

findings are not binding on appeal. In re Marriage of Schenkelberg, 824

N.W.2d 481, 484 (Iowa 2012). We modify a spousal support award when it does

not achieve equity. Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 406.

5
In her requested relief she asked that the $10,000 be separate from child support.
But at trial, counsel asked Alyssa: “So to be clear, I think your alimony request is
$10,000 a month, but your goal is, whatever child support and alimony is, you need
$10,000. It’s not like you’re asking for $15,000 a month; correct?” Alyssa
answered: “Correct.”
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B. Physical Custody and Parenting Time

Physical Care. The parents agreed that joint physical care would not work

given their communication difficulties; both asked that physical care be placed with

them. The district court awarded physical care to Alyssa. Andy contests that

award on appeal.

After determining shared care is not in the children’s best interests, “the

court must next choose which caregiver should be awarded physical care.”

Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 700. “The best interests of the children is the first and

governing consideration in determining the primary care giver of the children.” In

re Marriage of Walton, 577 N.W.2d 869, 871 (Iowa 1998). The court gives

considerable weight to the factors of continuity, stability, and approximation.

Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 700. “Stability and continuity factors tend to favor a spouse

who, prior to divorce, was primarily responsible for physical care.” Id. at 696. But

just because a parent was the primary caretaker before separation does not

guarantee an award of physical care. In re Marriage of Kunkel, 546 N.W.2d 634,

635 (Iowa 1996).

In awarding Alyssa physical care, the district court noted:

Alyssa has been the primary care parent for the parties’ children
throughout the marriage. Andrew has taken on a larger role since
the filing of the Petition, however, that does not change the fact that
Alyssa has been the primary care parent. It is the children’s best
interest that Alyssa be awarded primary care of C.M.H. and J.A.H.
subject to Andrew’s parenting time.

Andy faults the court for limiting its consideration to the caregiving history in

finding that physical care with Alyssa served the children’s best interests. Andy’s

main grievance is Alyssa’s inability to coparent, alleging her “lack of flexibility,
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refusal to communicate, and lack of support for his relationship with the children.”

Andy argues that he would better facilitate the children’s relationship with the non-

physical care parent. He also points to his flexibility as a store owner to set his

own schedule and care for his children.

After reviewing the record, we find no reason to upend the district court’s

decision. Neither parent has been a model for good communications. Both

parents accuse the other of being inflexible. But the record does not support

Andy’s prediction that Alyssa will not support his relationship with the boys. She

has already been doing so. For example, when Andy had to be out of town, she

agreed to switch parenting days. When provided notice, Alyssa has allowed the

children to spend time with Andy’s family during her parenting time.

And it is important to maintain consistency for the boys. Without question,

Alyssa has been the parent focused on the children’s everyday needs. She helps

them get ready for school, makes their lunches, cooks them dinner while Andy is

working, and puts them to bed. True, Andy has been more involved since filing for

divorce. But that doesn’t change our best-interests analysis. From our de novo

review of the record—including the CFR’s recommendation—we reach the same

conclusion as the district court. Awarding physical care to Alyssa was in the

children’s best interests.

Parenting Time. Having affirmed the physical-care award, we turn to Andy’s

request for more parenting time. The schedule in the decree gives Andy visitation

every Wednesday evening and every other weekend.

Courts must grant “liberal visitation rights where appropriate” to assure

children have “the opportunity for the maximum continuing physical and emotional
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contact with both parents.” Iowa Code § 598.41(1)(a). But visitation should not be

“unduly disruptive.” In re Marriage of Bevers, 326 N.W.2d 896, 899 (Iowa 1982).

The current schedule provides ample contact between Andy and his sons while

not unduly disrupting the boys’ lives. Andy admitted at trial that J.A.H. gets

homesick during long visits and asks to call Alyssa. Given these circumstances,

expanding Andy’s parenting time would not be in the children’s best interests.

C. Spousal Support

Amount and Duration. Iowa now recognizes four forms of spousal support:

rehabilitative, reimbursement, traditional, and transitional. Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at

185. Describing its award as a hybrid of all four varieties, the district court ordered

Andy to pay Alyssa spousal support of $8000 per month for ten years. Andy

challenges that order, asserting that his obligation is too high and too long,

considering the amount of property that Alyssa received in the decree. He also

contends that Alyssa has a greater earning capacity than acknowledged by the

district court: “[s]he is in good health and there is nothing preventing her from

working except her voluntary choice not to.” Andy insists that she does not qualify

for traditional or reimbursement alimony. Instead, Andy asks us to find that a

hybrid award of $2000 per month for three years is appropriate for transitional and

rehabilitative purposes.

Awarding spousal support is a matter of discretion and depends on the facts

of each case. In re Marriage of Mann, 943 N.W.2d 15, 20 (Iowa 2020). In making

this decision, we consider these statutory factors:

a. The length of the marriage.
b. The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.
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c. The distribution of property made pursuant to section
598.21.
d. The educational level of each party at the time of marriage
and at the time the action is commenced.
e. The earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance,
including educational background, training, employment skills, work
experience, length of absence from the job market, responsibilities
for children under either an award of custody or physical care, and
the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or
training to enable the party to find appropriate employment.
f. The feasibility of the party seeking maintenance becoming
self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that
enjoyed during the marriage, and the length of time necessary to
achieve this goal.
g. The tax consequences to each party.
h. Any mutual agreement made by the parties concerning
financial or service contributions by one party with the expectation of
future reciprocation or compensation by the other party.
i. The provisions of an antenuptial agreement.
j. Other factors the court may determine to be relevant in an
individual case.

Iowa Code § 598.21A(1).

“The goal in awarding alimony is to do equity.” In re Marriage of Pazhoor,

971 N.W.2d 530, 541 (Iowa 2022). We also recognize that “institutional deference”

to the district court’s determination weighs against “undue tinkering” with a spousal

support award. Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 182. But here we find a failure to do equity

that requires an adjustment to the spousal support award.

To start, the four types of spousal support awards serve different purposes.

See generally Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d at 543−45. Granted, hybrid awards are

allowed. In re Marriage of Becker, 756 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Iowa 2008) (“[T]here is

nothing in our case law that requires us, or any other court in this state, to award

only one type of support.”). But it is incongruous to find all four types are warranted

in one case. After reviewing the record, we agree with Andy’s assessment that
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reimbursement and traditional spousal support are not warranted. Instead, it is

appropriate to award Alyssa rehabilitative spousal support.6

First, Alyssa is not entitled to reimbursement alimony. That category is

based on “economic sacrifices made by one spouse during the marriage that

directly enhance the future earning capacity of the other.” In re Marriage of

Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59, 64 (Iowa 1989). It is most appropriate when the spouse

who contributed to the other’s earning capacity “cannot otherwise be compensated

for their contributions.” Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d at 544. It is typically awarded when

one spouse supported the other through educational endeavors during a short-

term marriage. See In re Marriage of Probasco, 676 N.W.2d 179, 186 (Iowa 2004)

(neglecting to award reimbursement alimony because it was not a short-term

marriage and “neither [spouse] contributed to the education of the other”); see also

Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d at 545 (contrasting In re Marriage of Lalone, 469 N.W.2d

695, 697 (Iowa 1991), where the court did not award reimbursement alimony, with

Francis, 422 N.W.2d at 61, 64–66, where the court found it proper).

Here the district court found reimbursement alimony was appropriate

“because Alyssa’s economical sacrifice during the marriage directly enhanced

Andy’s future earning capacity through the ACE Hardware stores he owns.” But

Alyssa didn’t make the type of sacrifice warranting reimbursement; she worked at

Mary Kay Cosmetics before marriage and did not give up that career during the

marriage. In fact, her most successful sales year was when she was married. As

6 We are hesitant to embrace Andy’s view that “Alyssa’s short-term need justifies

a hybrid of transitional and rehabilitative alimony.” As our supreme court has
explained: “Transitional spousal support and rehabilitative spousal support are
separate and distinct and serve different purposes.” Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 187.
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far as education goes, Alyssa did not support Andy through any educational

endeavor to contribute to his future earning capacity. Andy received his bachelor’s

degree in business administration before they married. For these reasons, an

award of reimbursement alimony was inappropriate.

Next, we turn to traditional spousal support, which is typically awarded in

marriages lasting twenty or more years. Traditional alimony permits the “recipient

spouse to maintain the lifestyle to which he or she became accustomed.” Sokol,

985 N.W.2d at 185. “The duration [of traditional spousal] support should

correspond with need.” Id. So it is usually “payable for life or for so long as the

dependent is incapable of self-support.” Francis, 442 N.W.2d at 64.

Here, the district court found traditional alimony was appropriate because

of the “substantial difference” between the parties’ earning capacities and “to allow

Alyssa to continue to live at the same standard of living that she enjoyed during

their marriage.” Andy argues that they were married for less than sixteen years

and that Alyssa can support herself. Alyssa points out that our courts have

awarded traditional spousal support in shorter marriages.

It’s true that our courts sometimes award traditional spousal support when

a marriage has lasted for less than twenty years. But those awards are not the

norm, especially when the spouse seeking support can become self-supporting.

See In re Marriage of Witherly, 867 N.W.2d 856, 860 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015)

(affirming a traditional award of spousal support because there “was scant

evidence she could become self-supporting in the near term” but reducing the

amount after five years when she could recover her earning capacity). The instant

facts don’t support an exception. Alyssa has her college degree and has worked,
12

at least part-time, in different ventures during the marriage. While her earning

capacity may be more limited than Andy’s, her sales skills and other assets show

that she can become self-supporting in the not-so-distant future.

From that premise, we find that rehabilitative spousal support best fits

Alyssa’s situation. Her needs go beyond solving a “short term liquidity crunch.”

Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 181 (explaining that transitional spousal support is

appropriate when a spouse with earning capacity needs “short-term financial

assistance to transition from married to single life”). On the other hand,

rehabilitative alimony supports “an economically dependent spouse through a

limited period of re-education or retraining” to help them become self-sufficient. Id.

at 186 (citation omitted).

When reviewing Alyssa’s award, we find that the ten-year duration does not

align with the limited purpose of rehabilitative support. On the flipside, we find that

Andy’s proposal of $2000 per month for three years is too low and too short to

allow Alyssa to become self-sufficient. Instead, we find it equitable to end the

$8000 monthly stipend after seven years. See Witherly, 867 N.W.2d at 859

(finding that “hallmarks of rehabilitative alimony” are self-sufficiency and a definite

end to the award). That duration balances Alyssa’s parenting duties while the boys

are still young with her ability to seek education or training for a career as they

become more independent as teenagers.

Termination of Spousal Support. Andy also asks us to modify the spousal

support award to terminate upon either party’s death or Alyssa’s remarriage.

“[A]limony is presumed to automatically terminate upon the death of the recipient

spouse.” In re Marriage of Wendell, 581 N.W.2d 197, 199 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998).
13

And subsequent remarriage “shift[s] the burden to the recipient to show

extraordinary circumstances to justify its continuation.” Id. (citation omitted); see

also In re Marriage of Ales, 592 N.W.2d 698, 704 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999) (“[A] change

in status, like remarriage, may alter the support picture and warrant a modification

of rehabilitative alimony”). For these reasons, it “is common in Iowa for alimony

provisions in a decree for dissolution of marriage to include conditions providing

for alimony to automatically terminate . . . upon death or remarriage of the recipient

spouse.” Id. We find termination upon either party’s death or Alyssa’s remarriage

appropriate here, so we modify the decree to include those conditions.

D. Appellate Attorney Fees

Lastly, Alyssa requests $6000 in appellate attorney fees. We do not award

appellate attorney fees as a matter of right. In re Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d

242, 255 (Iowa 2006). Instead, any award rests in our discretion. Id. In exercising

that discretion, we consider “the needs of the party seeking the award, the ability

of the other party to pay, and the relative merits of the appeal.” Id. (citation

omitted). We find an award is merited given Alyssa’s need and Andy’s ability to

pay. But we note that Andy was partially successful in his appellate challenges.

In balancing those factors, it is appropriate to award Alyssa three-quarters of the

reasonable and necessary fees she incurred on appeal. Because we do not have

an attorney fee affidavit filed on her behalf to determine the amount of such fees,

we must remand for the district court to make that decision. See In re Marriage of

Heiar, 954 N.W.2d 464, 473–74 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020).

We assess the costs of the appeal to Andy.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED.