State of Iowa v. Kari Irene Buckley

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
_______________

No. 25-0073
Filed January 28, 2026
_______________

State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Kari Irene Buckley,
Defendant–Appellant.
_______________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Osceola County,
The Honorable Charles Borth, Judge.
_______________

CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED, AND
REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
_______________

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Allison Linafelter, Assistant
Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit (until withdrawal) and
Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorneys General, attorneys for appellee.
_______________

Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
Opinion by Greer, P.J.

1
GREER, Presiding Judge.

Kari Buckley appeals her convictions for possession of a controlled
substance and the habitual offender sentencing enhancement. She claims
(1) the State failed to prove by sufficient evidence that she constructively
possessed methamphetamine and marijuana found in a shared bedroom and
(2) the district court imposed an illegal sentence because she did not validly
stipulate to any habitual-offender-predicate convictions and the State failed
to meet its burden to prove her prior convictions. Buckley also asserts that
the State should not have another chance to prove her habitual-offender
enhancement if the matter is remanded.

The State concedes that the district court did not perform the required
colloquy with Buckley for her to stipulate to her prior convictions but
contends the case should be remanded to correct the procedural error so the
court can conduct a full colloquy related to the habitual-offender
enhancement. We agree. And as to the sufficiency of the evidence, we find
the State proved constructive possession. Thus, we affirm the convictions,
vacate the sentence, and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

In June 2023, law enforcement executed a search warrant at Buckley’s
mother’s home, where Buckley was residing, in relation to a theft
investigation. Law enforcement identified Buckley and her paramour, Joey
Daggett, as suspects in the investigation. Buckley stayed in a room in her
mother’s basement.

During the search, neither Buckley nor Daggett were present at the
residence. Buckley’s relationship with Daggett was thought to be “an on-
again-off-again situation,” and although he stayed with her on occasion, it

2
was unclear if he was residing with her at the time of the search. Law
enforcement searched the residence, including Buckley’s bedroom. There,
they found a marijuana vape cartridge and an eyeglasses case that contained
syringes, a white crystalline substance, and drug paraphernalia for
consuming methamphetamine. A field test was positive for
methamphetamine, and later testing revealed that the items were positive for
methamphetamine and marijuana.

The eyeglass container and marijuana vape cartridge were found on
top of a dresser beside the bed. Additionally, items considered typically
feminine were on the dresser such as pink lip balm, pink fishnet stockings,
clear nail polish, hair ties, women’s deodorant, dry shampoo, and makeup.
Non-gendered items were intermixed with the typically feminine items
including: a water bottle, tacks, hand lotion, writing utensils, and a knit hat.
Police also found Buckley’s insurance card on the same dresser. Other
identifying items were found elsewhere in the room, including her state-
benefits card and a piece of mail addressed to her. In the room, police also
found a legal document pertaining to Daggett.

Buckley was charged with count I possession of a controlled
substance, methamphetamine, third offense, as an habitual offender, in
violation of Iowa Code sections 124.401(5) and 902.8 (2023), and count II
possession of a controlled substance, marijuana, third offense, in violation of
Iowa Code sections 124.401(5) and 902.8.1 The trial information alleged the
habitual-offender enhancement for two prior felony convictions.

1
Buckley was additionally charged and convicted of possession of drug
paraphernalia, a simple misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.414. This
conviction is not a part of this appeal.

3
In September 2024, the court held a bench trial. Testimony revealed
that Buckley had tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana on
March 15, 2023, and again on June 26. Buckley’s trial counsel objected to
testimony about Buckley’s prior drug use and claimed she would “stipulate
to her prior drug convictions.” The trial court asked for clarification.
THE COURT: I just want to be clear, [Defense Counsel]. Is your
client conceding or stipulating that she knows what methamphetamine and
marijuana are?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well—

THE COURT: The knowledge element?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: —yeah, I mean, I have to look at for sure
what her prior convictions are. If her prior conviction is possession of
methamphetamine, then—then yes. If so, she would stipulate to knowing
what THC and meth are. If her prior convictions are meth, she’ll stipulate
to those prior convictions.

The trial court sustained the objection to Buckley’s other criminal
conduct and the State continued to present evidence. After Buckley rested,
the trial court asked Buckley’s counsel about the stipulation and counsel
answered in the affirmative. There was no further discussion between the
court and Buckley about her stipulation to past convictions. The State then
submitted evidence of Buckley’s prior convictions including two
misdemeanor convictions for marijuana, one felony conviction for
methamphetamine, and a list of her criminal history.

The court found Buckley guilty of both counts as an habitual offender
and scheduled a sentencing hearing. Buckley filed a motion in arrest of
judgment and motion for new trial. At the sentencing hearing, Daggett
testified that he resided in the basement bedroom with Buckley at the time of
the search claiming, “I lived there full time. I was there every day.” Daggett

4
asserted that he was aware of, owned, and brought the methamphetamine
and marijuana into the room. When asked if Buckley was aware of the drugs
he answered: “No. Absolutely not. No. At that point in our relationship,
she—I hid all of my drug use from her because, you know, she was clean and
just got out of prison and I didn’t want to disrupt that.” Daggett testified that
he had pled guilty to possession of the drugs the prior month and the State
knew that he claimed sole possession. He explained that his items were
intermixed with Buckley’s on the dresser.

After considering Daggett’s testimony, the court concluded its
“verdicts were not contrary to the weight of the evidence” under the
constructive possession prong nor could Daggett’s testimony “be considered
newly discovered evidence as to warrant the grant of a new trial.” After the
sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Buckley to two, fifteen-year terms of
incarceration to run concurrently. Buckley appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

We review insufficient evidence claims “for correction of errors at
law.” State v. Copenhaver, 844 N.W.2d 442, 449 (Iowa 2014). In conducting
our review, we will not disturb the factfinder’s guilty verdict “if there is
substantial evidence to support the finding.” State v. Robinson, 859 N.W.2d
464, 467 (Iowa 2015). “Evidence is substantial when the quantum and
quality of evidence is sufficient to convince a rational fact finder that the
defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Banes, 910 N.W.2d
634, 637 (Iowa Ct. App. 2018) (cleaned up). We do not resolve conflicts in
the evidence, decide the credibility of witnesses, or weigh the evidence—
those decisions are for the factfinder. See State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 758,
761 (Iowa 2006). Instead, we consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, “including all reasonable inferences that may be

5
fairly drawn from the evidence.” Banes, 910 N.W.2d at 637. We consider all
evidence, “not just that of an inculpatory nature.” State v. LuCore, 989
N.W.2d 209, 215 (Iowa Ct. App. 2023).

We also review questions of statutory interpretation for correction of
errors at law. State v. Coleman, 907 N.W.2d 124, 134 (Iowa 2018).

III. Analysis.

On appeal, Buckley argues that (1) there is insufficient evidence to
prove constructive possession of the drugs and (2) the district court imposed
an illegal sentence because there was no valid stipulation to any habitual-
offender-predicate convictions and the State failed to meet its burden to
prove her prior convictions. We turn to her first claim.

A. Constructive Possession. Buckley argues there is not sufficient
evidence to prove her convictions. Specifically, that the evidence was
insufficient to show “Buckley’s knowledge or right to control the contraband
found in the bedroom she shared with Daggett.” Possession of a controlled
substance can be either actual2 or constructive. State v. Cashen, 666 N.W.2d
566, 569 (Iowa 2003). These convictions turn on whether Buckley had
constructive possession of the methamphetamine and marijuana.
“Constructive possession exists when the evidence shows the defendant has
knowledge of the presence of the controlled substance and has the authority
or right to maintain control of it.” State v. Reed, 875 N.W.2d 693, 705 (Iowa

2
“A defendant can be in actual possession of a controlled substance when the
controlled substance is found on the defendant’s person or when substantial evidence
supports a finding it was on the defendant’s person at one time.” State v. Jones, 967
N.W.2d 336, 341 (Iowa 2021).

6
2016) (cleaned up). Whether constructive possession exists “turns on the
peculiar facts of each case.” State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72, 79 (Iowa 2002).

We consider several factors to determine whether a defendant
constructively possessed contraband in a jointly occupied space including:
(1) incriminating statements made by a person; (2) incriminating actions
of the person upon the police’s discovery of a controlled substance among
or near the person’s personal belongings; (3) the person’s fingerprints on
the packages containing the controlled substance; and (4) any other
circumstances linking the person to the controlled substance.

Reed, 875 N.W.2d at 706 (citation omitted).

In this case, only the fourth factor is implicated. The fourth factor
includes relevant direct and circumstantial evidence. Id. We must
“determine whether all of the facts and circumstances, including those not
listed above, allow a reasonable inference that the defendant knew of the
drugs’ presence and had control and dominion over the contraband.”
Cashen, 666 N.W.2d at 571. “The evidence must raise a fair inference of guilt
and do more than create speculation, suspicion, or conjecture.” Id. at 569
(citation omitted). We jointly address the sufficiency of the evidence
regarding Buckley’s possession of methamphetamine and marijuana.

Here, items containing the methamphetamine and marijuana were
found in a bedroom located in the basement of her mother’s home, where
Buckley was known to reside. The contraband was discovered on top of a
bedside dresser in Buckley’s bedroom and was located on the same dresser
as her insurance card. In the room police also found other identifying
information of Buckley’s, including her state-benefits card and mail
addressed to her. Other items typically associated with females were found
in proximity and included pink lip balm, pink fishnet stockings, clear nail

7
polish, hair ties, women’s deodorant, dry shampoo, and makeup. The
district court found that “[t]hese circumstances provide a reasonable
inference that Buckley knew of the presence of the controlled substances and
had the power to exercise dominion and control over them.” We find that the
district court’s determination is supported by substantial evidence.

The district court found that Buckley’s positive drug tests for
methamphetamine and marijuana less than two months prior and a few weeks
after police found the contraband bolstered the inference that she was in
possession of the drugs. Buckley asserts that “it is improper to impute
constructive possession based on such a slim factual record and a previous
history of drug use.” But here the drugs were found in Buckley’s shared
bedroom, and in addition the drugs were near Buckley’s insurance card and
feminine products. Contrast Webb, 648 N.W.2d at 79 (finding no possession
when none of the items were “items found near or among Webb’s personal
belongings”) with Reed, 875 N.W.2d at 707 (finding possession in part because
the drugs were found in the defendant’s shared bedroom near an item that
was presumably the defendant’s). Likewise, evidence of positive tests
established that Buckley used marijuana and methamphetamine, which went
towards her knowledge that the drugs and the associated paraphernalia found
in the room where she resided were associated with illicit substances. Even
without considering Buckley’s drug use, we find that the record shows that
the State provided sufficient evidence to prove she had possession of the
methamphetamine and marijuana.

Buckley claims “[t]he speculative nature of the facts in this case means
that, even viewed in the light most favorable to the State, there is not
sufficient evidence of Buckley’s knowledge or right to control the contraband
found in the bedroom she shared with Daggett.” The record is unclear if

8
Daggett also resided in the home at the time the contraband was found. Even
if we considered that Daggett jointly occupied the room at the time the drugs
were found, at most, the record shows that Daggett jointly occupied the
room—the record does not indicate that Daggett solely possessed the
methamphetamine and marijuana. Contra Bash, 670 N.W.2d at 139 (holding
the insufficient evidence to prove possession when “the box containing
marijuana was located on the [defendant’s] husband’s side of the bed with his
personal effects. Additionally, there was no evidence that the defendant
shared any ownership of the box or the marijuana in it or had any right to
control either.”). Unlike the defendant in Bash, here the methamphetamine
and marijuana were found among Buckley’s insurance card and other effects
that could reasonably be attributed to her.

These additional circumstances link the contraband to Buckley and
show that she had knowledge of the presence of the methamphetamine and
marijuana, knew what the drugs looked like because of her usage, and had the
authority or right to maintain control of the substances. Legal paperwork
from Daggett was found in the room, but testimony did not reveal where in
the room the paperwork was found and no effects on the dresser where the
contraband was found presumably belonged to Daggett. Accordingly, we find
the State provided sufficient evidence to prove that Buckley constructively
possessed the methamphetamine and marijuana.

B. Habitual Offender Enhancement. Buckley argues, and the State
concedes, that the “district court conducted an improper stipulation
colloquy.” Referred to as the “Harrington colloquy,” the court “must ensure
that the admission [in a stipulation related to the sentencing enhancement] is
voluntary and intelligent and that the defendant understands the
ramifications of an habitual offender adjudication.” State v. Harrington, 893

9
N.W.2d 36, 45 (Iowa 2017) (cleaned up); see also State v. Smith, 924 N.W.2d
846, 851–52 (Iowa 2019). Along with these requirements, the court must also
inform the defendant that “prior felony convictions are only valid if obtained
when the [defendant] was represented by counsel or knowingly and
voluntarily waived the right to counsel.” Harrington, 893 N.W.2d at 45.

When a defendant faces an habitual offender enhancement, a two-
stage trial procedure is imposed. Id. at 44. First, the State must obtain a
guilty verdict to the offense charged. Id. Second, the defendant will have the
opportunity to affirm or deny the prior convictions. Id. If the defendant
affirms the convictions “then the case proceeds to sentencing.” State v.
Kukowski, 704 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Iowa 2005). “The rights at stake in a
habitual offender proceeding are significant and are often of the same
magnitude as in the case of a plea of guilty.” Harrington, 893 N.W.2d at 42
(cleaned up). A guilty-plea-like proceeding is required before stipulated prior
convictions can support enhanced penalties. See id. at 45–47 (listing the
requirements and steps involved during the habitual offender enhancement
colloquy); Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(8)(a).

If the defendant denies the allegations, the case proceeds to the second
trial. Kukowski, 704 N.W.2d at 692. Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure
2.19(8)(b) and (c) guides the second trial. But, if the defendant admits the
allegations, rule 2.19(8)(a) guides the process and the court must establish a
factual basis, confirm the defendant’s admission is knowing and voluntary,
and inform the defendant of several effects of this enhancement including the
nature and elements of the habitual enhancement, maximum and minimum
punishment, and that they are waiving the right to trial.3

3
Under Rule 2.19(8)(a), the court shall inform the defendant:

10
In this case, Buckley was charged with two counts of possession of a
controlled substance and an habitual offender enhancement under Iowa
Code section 902.8.4 The district court order notes a colloquy on the record

(1) Of the nature and elements of the enhancement.
(2) That the prior convictions must have been obtained when the
defendant was represented by, or waived the right to, counsel.
(3) Of the maximum and minimum possible punishment resulting
from the enhancement.
(4) That by affirming that the defendant is the person previously
convicted, the defendant waives the right to a trial by jury, the right to the
assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses,
and the right against self-incrimination.
(5) That the defendant's affirmation means no trial will be held on
whether the defendant is the person previously convicted.
(6) That the State is not required to prove the prior convictions
were entered with counsel if the defendant does not first raise the claim.
(7) That any challenges to the increased sentence resulting from
the prior convictions must be raised in a timely motion in arrest of
judgment and failure to raise such challenges shall preclude the right to
assert them on appeal.
Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.19(8).
4
Under Iowa Code section 902.8,
An habitual offender is any person convicted of a class “C” or a
class “D” felony, who has twice before been convicted of any felony in a
court of this or any other state, or of the United States. An offense is a
felony if, by the law under which the person is convicted, it is so classified
at the time of the person's conviction. A person sentenced as an habitual
offender shall not be eligible for parole until the person has served the
minimum sentence of confinement of three years.

11
but the record reveals that no such colloquy with the defendant occurred.
When a district court fails to hold a Harrington colloquy, the remedy is to
vacate only the enhancement and remand for colloquy or trial on whether the
defendant qualifies as an habitual offender. Coleman, 907 N.W.2d at 148
(“We therefore vacate the sentence imposed that included the sentencing
enhancements and remand for further stipulation proceedings to allow the
State to establish the appropriate factual basis and for resentencing.”).

Yet, we note that Buckley argues that while cases with invalid habitual-
offender stipulations are normally vacated “and remand[ed] for further
proceedings consistent with the stipulation requirements of Harrington, or”
for a second trial to determine whether the defendant qualifies as an habitual
offender, here, the State already attempted and failed to prove Buckley’s
prior felony convictions. Buckley asserts that the State failed to meet its
burden to prove the prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Kukowski, 704 N.W.2d at 691. The district court found that based on “her
affirmation, along with State’s [e]xhibits, . . . the court finds beyond a
reasonable doubt that Buckley has been convicted twice before of a drug-
related offense and has twice before been convicted of a felony offense.” But
the exhibits from the State only included one certified felony conviction of
Buckley, short of the two felony convictions required by the statute. See Iowa
Code § 902.8.

Because of this shortcoming, Buckley argues that the court imposed
an illegal sentence and State v. Gordon prohibits the State from presenting
additional evidence on remand. 732 N.W.2d 41, 43–44 (Iowa 2007) (“An
illegal sentence is one that is not permitted by statute.” (citation omitted));
see Iowa Code § 902.8. True, Gordon addressed an illegal sentence because

Iowa Code § 902.8.

12
“the two burglary convictions the state identified to support habitual-
offender status were committed on the same date, which, under our caselaw,
could not support the habitual-offender enhancement.” State v. Chapman,
944 N.W.2d 864, 877 (Iowa 2020) (discussing the application of Gordon). But
unlike the situation here, Gordon did not involve an “error in the district court
proceeding that would entitle the State to a new hearing.” Id. (citation
omitted).

To that point, the State argues this case involves a procedural defect in
the proceedings such that the case should be remanded for further
proceedings. “Procedurally defective sentences” involve the court’s abuse
of discretion which includes failing to follow requirements established by
statute or case law. See State v. Chawech, 15 N.W.3d 78, 84 (Iowa 2024)
(listing examples of illegal and procedurally defective sentences). Upon our
review, we agree with the State’s characterization. The State attempted to
provide evidence of the prior convictions after Buckley’s counsel claimed she
would stipulate to the offenses. At trial before resting the State addressed the
court and claimed it “would, before resting, provide to the Court the certified
copies of the defendant’s prior felony convictions. [The State] know[s] the
defendant has stated that she is going to stipulate to those, but [the State]
would provide those to the Court just out of convenience and simplicity’s
sake.”

The State contends that it has not already had a “bite at the apple”
arguing it “offered four supplemental exhibits outlining Buckley’s previous
convictions, but this was not an attempt to conduct a second enhancement
trial.” Under this record, we cannot know if Buckley will stipulate to
previous convictions or seek a trial on the enhancement issue. And unlike
Gordon, here there was not an opportunity for the State to fully provide proof

13
of Buckley’s prior conviction. The evidence from the State was out of
caution and not in response to Buckley’s denial of her prior felony
convictions. The appropriate remedy for an improper colloquy is to vacate
the sentence and to remand for the defendant to stipulate with a proper
colloquy or for a second trial to determine whether the defendant is an
habitual offender. Coleman, 907 N.W.2d at 148.

Consistent with Harrington, we affirm Buckley’s convictions but
vacate the sentence and remand for either a new stipulation colloquy
consistent with the requirements of Harrington or a trial on the prior
convictions. See Smith, 924 N.W.2d at 853.

IV. Conclusion.

We affirm Buckley’s convictions because there was sufficient evidence
to find that she had constructive possession of the controlled substances. We
vacate the sentence and remand for further proceedings because the district
court failed to perform a colloquy as required under Iowa Rules of Criminal
Procedure 2.19(8). See Harrington, 893 N.W.2d at 45–47.

CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED, AND
REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

14