Leonard E. Harris, Jr. v. Brushinta L. Finley

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-2059
Filed January 28, 2026
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Leonard E. Harris, Jr.,
Petitioner–Appellee,
v.
Brushinta L. Finley,
Respondent–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County,
The Honorable Amy Zacharias, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Brushinta L. Finley, Kenosha, Wisconsin, self-represented appellant.

Helen Broadway-Savage of Savage Law, LLC, Council Bluffs,
attorney for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., Badding, J., and Vogel, S.J.
Opinion by Tabor, C.J.

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TABOR, Chief Judge.
Brushinta Finley appeals the denial of her motion to set aside the
default judgment in a custody matter. Because the district court properly
found that she failed to show good cause, we affirm.

I. Facts and Background Proceedings

Finley and Leonard Harris share a son, born in 2014. Finley now lives
in Wisconsin, while Harris and their son live in Iowa. In spring 2024, Harris
registered a 2022 Wisconsin custody order in the Iowa district court, along
with a petition to modify its terms. Finley registered with the Iowa electronic
document management system (EDMS) and received notice of the
proceedings.

In July 2024, the parties attended a telephonic trial scheduling
conference, and the court ordered a telephonic pretrial conference set for
December 2,1 warning the parties: “FAILURE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
PRE TRIAL CONFERENCE WILL RESULT IN A DEFAULT
JUDGMENT . . . .” The court also set Harris’s contempt action, alleging
Finley’s failure to pay her son’s medical costs, to be heard at the same time.

Finley didn’t appear for the pretrial conference on December 2. Later
that day, the court entered a default judgment awarding Harris custody,
ordering Finley to pay monthly child support, and granting Finley supervised

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At first, the court set the pretrial conference for December 12 but entered a nunc
pro tunc order correcting the date to December 2. Finley makes passing reference to
confusion about the dates, but the record supports the district court’s conclusion that
there is no question she had notice of the correct date. To the extent this relates to Finley’s
due process claim, we find her briefing is too vague and underdeveloped to address it. See
Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 521 N.W.2d 685, 691 (Iowa 1994) (“[Appellant’s]
random mention of this issue, without elaboration or supportive authority, is insufficient
to raise the issue for our consideration.”).

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visitation. Just before midnight, Finley moved to set aside the default
judgment, asserting she was unable to attend the hearing because she was
sick. Around 1:30 a.m., Finley moved for relief from the child support order.

The court set a hearing on her motion to set aside. Finley appeared
and asserted she was hospitalized the night of December 2. The court
allowed Finley to file documents after the hearing, and Finley filed a medical
record and letters from providers.

Finding that evidence insufficient to show good cause, the court
declined to set aside the default judgment. Finley moved to amend and
enlarge the denial, but before the court ruled, she filed her notice of appeal,
divesting the district court of jurisdiction to hear all but collateral matters.
This appeal ensued.

II. Standard of Review

We review a ruling on a motion to set aside default judgment for abuse
of discretion. Brandenburg v. Feterl Mfg. Co., 603 N.W.2d 580, 584 (Iowa
1999). A court abuses its discretion if there is a lack of substantial evidence
to support its ruling. Id. But if supported by substantial evidence, the court’s
factual findings are binding. Id. We view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the court’s ruling. Id.

III. Discussion

Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.977 (2024) provides: “On motion and
for good cause shown, . . . the court may set aside a default or the judgment
thereon, for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or
unavoidable casualty.” The party seeking relief must file the motion
“promptly after the discovery of the grounds thereof, but not more than 60
days after entry of the judgment.” Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.977. The movant bears

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the burden to prove good cause. No Boundry, LLC v. Hoosman, 953 N.W.2d
696, 700 (Iowa 2021). “Good cause is a sound, effective, and truthful reason.
It is something more than an excuse, a plea, apology, extenuation, or some
justification, for the resulting effect.” Id. (quoting Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co. of
Omaha v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 513 N.W.2d 750, 754 (Iowa 1994)).

The district court found Finley failed to meet her burden to show a
medical emergency furnishing good cause. As the court emphasized, she
didn’t provide “any proof of [her] medical emergency or that she required
medical attention” on December 2. And the court found it “unbelievable”
that Finley was too sick to participate in a telephone hearing but was able to
file two motions while hospitalized that night.

In her motion to set aside judgment, Finley alleged that “she was
dealing with serious health issues” on December 2. She elaborated: “While
in cold weather conditions I became extremely ill with a stomach virus,
fatigue, along with previous heath conditions, dealing with excruciating pain,
and was temporarily bedridden to recover.” She later asserted that despite
her condition she “made efforts to participate in the proceedings by accessing
a laptop to file motions” on EDMS. She also reported being discharged from
the hospital on December 3.

When the court provided opportunities for Finley to give proof of her
hospitalization, she submitted a screenshot from an online patient portal
showing a test sample collected December 3 at 4:40 a.m.,2 a letter showing

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The results show a higher-than-normal level on a “D-DIMER” test, which
Finley asserts is related to thrombosis and blood clots. Finley does not explain how this
test result relates to any symptoms or conditions that would have prevented her from
attending the telephonic conference.

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she sees a rheumatologist, and a letter from a hospital emergency department
stating she “was seen and treated on” December 3.

True, those documents verify that Finley received treatment on
December 3. But missing is any connection to her condition on December 2.
Her evidence didn’t prove that she was too sick to attend a telephone
conference that morning. The evidence that she was “discharged”
December 3 might support an inference of a medical emergency beginning
the day before. But the letter from the emergency department showed only
that she “was seen and treated” on December 3 with no corroboration that
she was hospitalized on December 2.

In sum, Finley’s evidence did not supply a “sound, effective, and
truthful reason” for missing the telephone conference. Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co. of
Omaha, 513 N.W.2d at 754. Rather, this record substantially supports the
court’s findings of fact. Thus, we find no abuse of its discretion in concluding
Finley did not show good cause to set aside the default judgment.

Finley raises several other issues in her opening brief, including that
the default judgment conflicts with a Wisconsin restraining order and that
Harris failed to properly register the foreign support order. The district court
did not address those claims in denying her motion to set aside the default
judgment. Finley then flagged those and other issues in her motion to amend
and enlarge, but the district court did not rule on them before she filed her
notice of appeal. So those issues are not preserved for our review. Meier v.
Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002).

And Finley raises still more issues in her reply brief: a lack of evidence
to support facts discussed in Harris’s appellee’s brief, an objection to hearsay
evidence supporting the default judgment, and a lack of evidence for the child

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support award. Harris moved to strike the reply brief as containing new
issues, and Finley resisted. The supreme court ordered the motion to strike
be submitted with the appeal.

Because Finley’s reply brief is a mixed bag, we grant Harris’s motion
to strike in part and deny it in part. Because new issues cannot be raised for
the first time in a reply brief, we decline to address Finley’s claims on hearsay,
child support, and other matters not raised in her opening brief. See Figley v.
W.S. Indus., 801 N.W.2d 602, 608 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011). But because Finley
properly responds to Harris’s request for an award of appellate attorney fees,
we preserve that portion of the reply brief.

Turning to Harris’s request, we may award reasonable attorney fees to
the prevailing party on appeal. See Iowa Code § 600B.26. That decision rests
in our discretion. In re Marriage of Kisting, 6 N.W.3d 326, 338 (Iowa Ct. App.
2024). We consider the parties’ financial positions relative to each other, the
merits of the appeal, and whether one party was required to defend the
district court’s decision on appeal. See id. Although Harris prevailed and was
required to defend the judgment, our “controlling consideration[]” is the
parties’ relative economic conditions. In re Marriage of Michael, 839 N.W.2d
630, 639 (Iowa 2013). Finley is unemployed and behind on child support and
other expenses. Harris is employed and has the greater ability to pay. Thus,
we decline his request.

AFFIRMED.

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