In re the Marriage of Wilson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-0951
Filed January 28, 2026
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In re the Marriage of Katie Anne Wilson and Jamie Lee Wilson
Upon the Petition of
Katie Anne Wilson,
Petitioner–Appellee,

And Concerning
Jamie Lee Wilson,
Respondent–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
The Honorable Jeanie K. Vaudt, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Jessica A. Millage of Flanagan Law Group, PLLC, Des Moines,
attorney for appellant.

James R. Hinchliff of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese, P.C.,
West Des Moines, attorney for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Langholz, J.

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LANGHOLZ, Judge.

Katie and Jamie Wilson dissolved their nine-year marriage in 2021.
About two years later, the parties’ efforts at joint physical care proved
challenging. The children were constantly shuffled between homes—
interfering with their schoolwork and precluding a stable home environment.
Jamie struggled to get their daughter to school on time—resulting in a weekly
pattern of tardiness. Most significantly, Jamie was convicted of operating
while intoxicated—his third OWI—and concealed the conviction from Katie
despite continuing to drive the children. So Katie petitioned to modify the
decree, seeking to place the children in her physical care rather than joint
physical care. The district court agreed, and Jamie appeals.

On our de novo review, giving due deference to the district court in
this close case, we affirm. We find Jamie’s criminal conviction—and its
impact on Jamie and Katie’s ability to effectively coparent because of his
concealment—qualifies as a substantial change in circumstances warranting
modification. We also agree that the modification is in the children’s best
interests. Our review of the record confirms that the children were not
thriving under a joint schedule that ferried them between homes almost daily,
and we believe the children are best served by consistent and stable time in
Katie’s physical care during the school week. Finally, given the relative
closeness of the merits and the parties’ respective abilities to pay, we decline
Katie’s request for appellate attorney fees.

I. Factual Background and Proceedings

Katie and Jamie married in 2012 and share three children—two boys
and a girl.1 In 2021, the couple divorced. The dissolution decree placed the

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They were sixteen, twelve, and eight years old as of the modification hearing.

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children in the parents’ joint physical care, implementing a 2-2-3 parenting
schedule with alternating weekends.2 At the time, Katie lived in Chariton and
Jamie lived in Knoxville, twenty-seven miles—and roughly a thirty-minute
drive—apart in rural southern Iowa.

At first, the children attended school in Chariton and Jamie’s
stepfather would pick up the children on Jamie’s parenting days that fell on
school days and bring them to and from Knoxville. By August 2021, both
parents had moved to Des Moines—now living about ten miles, though
normally still a twenty-five-minute drive, apart. After the moves, the parents
briefly adjusted their schedule to have the children stay with Katie during the
school week to ease the children’s transition to new schools. But by
November, the parents reverted to the original 2-2-3 plan.

After moving to Des Moines, Jamie struggled to timely take the
children to and from school. During the 2022–2023 school year, the daughter
was tardy once or twice a week. The boys’ grades also dipped, and Katie
believed Jamie was not spending adequate time with them on their homework
during his evenings. And Jamie’s work schedule made it difficult to pick up
the children after school, so they went to Katie’s home each day, which is
close to their schools.3 Katie’s work schedule, conversely, was flexible and
allowed frequent remote work or time off if the children needed to be picked
up or stay home sick.

Jamie had care of the children Monday and Tuesday night; Katie on Wednesday
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and Thursday night; and the parties alternated care on Friday through Sunday nights.
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After Katie petitioned to modify the decree in March 2023, Jamie began making
more of an effort to pick up the children from school on his parenting days. And in
November, Jamie switched jobs to a position that provides greater flexibility and remote
work options.

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Katie also developed concerns about Jamie’s use of parenting time and
engagement with the children. According to Katie, Jamie did not attend
parent-teacher conferences until early 2023, nor did he attempt to use the
children’s school portals to keep up with their assignments until around
December 2023. He almost never scheduled or took the children to their
healthcare appointments. And at times, Jamie left the older boys alone
overnight with his roommate.

Most seriously, in February 2022, Jamie consumed alcohol, drove his
car into a light post, and then tried to flee the scene on foot. After an officer
apprehended him, his blood alcohol content was twice the legal limit and he
tested positive for marijuana metabolites. He later pleaded guilty to operating
while intoxicated (his third such offense), served nine days in jail, and was
placed on probation for two years. Jamie’s OWI occurred during his
parenting weekend with the children, although they were with Jamie’s
mother at the time. And Jamie withheld all of this from Katie. She only
learned of the conviction months after the fact while buckling the daughter
into Jamie’s car and noticing an Intoxalock—a device that requires a breath
sample before starting the ignition.

After the OWI, Katie felt the “trust” between the two parents had
been “damaged” and that it undermined their ability to communicate. In
support, Katie provided text messages showing some instances of rude or
condescending comments. Later, the older son stopped participating in the
father’s parenting time.

Katie petitioned to modify the dissolution decree in March 2023. She
pointed to the frequent shuttling between homes after school, the children’s
tardiness and academic struggles, Jamie’s late pick-ups of the children, and
Jamie’s OWI as circumstances warranting a change in physical care.

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After a one-day hearing in January 2024, the district court modified
the decree. The court concluded “Jamie’s third historical OWI conviction,
together with his knowing concealment of information from Katie which
affected their coparenting relationship, constitutes a material and substantial
change in circumstances whether viewed in isolation or together with the
issues related to the children’s school performance, attendance, and travel.”
It also found that modification best served the children as it would “provide
the children with stability in one home during the school year to focus on
their growth.” And so, it placed the children in Katie’s physical care with
visitation for Jamie scheduled every other weekend and increased in the
summer. Jamie unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration and now appeals.4

II. Physical Care

We review a district court’s decision to modify the physical-care-
provisions of a dissolution decree de novo. See In re Marriage of Harris,
877 N.W.2d 434, 440 (Iowa 2016); Iowa R. App. P. 6.907. Still, we give the
district court’s factual findings “weight and defer especially where the
credibility of witnesses is a factor in the outcome.” Hora v. Hora, 5 N.W.3d
635, 645 (Iowa 2024) (cleaned up). We do so “because the district court has
a front-row seat to the live testimony, viewing the demeanor of both the
witness as she testifies and the parties while they listen, whereas our review
is limited to reading black words on a white page of a sterile transcript.” Id.
And we recognize that this “greatly help[s]” the district court “in making a
wise decision.” In re Marriage of Vrban, 359 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Iowa 1984)
(cleaned up); see also In re Marriage of Reed, No. 09-0029, 2009 WL 4122884,

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The court’s order made other changes to the dissolution decree, but Jamie only
challenges the physical-care provision.

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at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2009) (“In close cases such as this, we give
careful consideration to the district court’s findings.”).5

To modify a dissolution decree, a party must first show that there has
been a substantial change in material circumstances. See In re Marriage of
Frederici, 338 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1983). The substantial change “must be
more or less permanent, not temporary,” not contemplated by the original
decree, and relate to the children’s welfare. Id. The parent seeking
modification must also “prove an ability to minister more effectively to the
children’s well-being.” Dale v. Pearson, 555 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1996). This is a heavy burden because “once custody of children has
been determined, it should be disturbed only for the most cogent reasons.”
Id. As always, our main consideration is the best interest of the children. Id.;
see also In re Marriage of Winnike, 497 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

Substantial Change in Circumstances. Jamie argues that Katie’s
proffered bases for modification do not rise to the level of a substantial change

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At the close of evidence, the district court requested proposed orders from the
parties. Jamie argues that the court’s modification order “cite[s] the same caselaw with
no deviation” from Katie’s proposed order, gave “complete deference” to her proposed
factual findings, and “adopt[ed] verbatim every substantive request of Katie’s on the
terms of the modification, with the singular exception of the addition of a midweek visit
for Jamie every other week.” So he asks us to review the order with “heightened scrutiny.”
See NevadaCare, Inc. v. Dep’t Hum. Servs., 783 N.W.2d 459, 465 (Iowa 2010) (reasoning
that while “the district court’s verbatim adoption of [one party’s] proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law” does not require “a higher standard of review,” it means an
appellate court must “scrutinize the record more closely and carefully”). But here, the
proposed orders are not in the record—they were not filed in the docket when submitted
to the court, and Jamie did not attach the proposed orders to his 1.904(2) motion or
otherwise ensure they were before us. Without the orders, we cannot determine whether,
or to what degree, the court’s order mirrored Katie’s proposed order. We thus proceed
with our normal scrutiny in performing de novo review.

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in circumstances. But on our de novo review, we agree that the totality of
Jamie’s OWI, his failure to disclose it, and the resulting impact on Jamie and
Katie’s coparenting relationship constitutes a qualifying change.

“Criminal conduct and alcohol abuse can constitute a substantial
change in circumstances.” Moellers v. Sindelar, No. 14-1361, 2015 WL
1546464, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2015). While Jamie’s OWI was his first
since 2010, it was his third OWI in his life. Jamie insists that he has engaged
with treatment and abstained from alcohol since then. But his repeated OWI
convictions show that he continues to struggle with maintaining lasting
sobriety in a way that is not merely temporary. Indeed, the nature of this new
offense is concerning—he drove under the influence of alcohol and
marijuana, crashed his car, and tried to flee the scene.

We are also troubled that this occurred during Jamie’s parenting
weekend—even if he had left the children with their grandmother at the time.
All the more because the original decree required substantial windshield time
for the children during the evenings. So Jamie’s conviction relating to his
ability to safely operate a vehicle is a particularly relevant circumstance here.
Cf. In re Marriage of Zabecki, 389 N.W.2d 396, 398 (Iowa 1986) (“A parent’s
moral misconduct is a serious consideration in custody determinations.”).

And perhaps most important, Jamie failed to inform Katie of his arrest,
conviction, stay in jail, or driving restrictions. She only learned about any of
this significant information affecting their children because she stumbled
upon the Intoxalock device in Jamie’s car when buckling up their daughter.
So it is no surprise that Katie testified that her trust in Jamie was “damaged.”
“A lack of trust poses a significant impediment to effective co-parenting.” In
re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 698 (Iowa 2007). As does the failure
of the spouses to effectively communicate. See id. We thus agree that Jamie’s

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withholding of this information from Katie further, and more or less
permanently, undermines the parties’ ability to co-parent. Katie has shown a
qualifying substantial change in circumstances.

Children’s Best Interests. Jamie next argues that even if Katie
demonstrated a qualifying change in circumstances, the children are best
served by joint physical care and both parents are capable caregivers. But
again, we agree with the district court that the children are best served in
Katie’s physical care.

The 2-2-3 schedule had the children ferried between school activities
and each parents’ house nearly every evening. The constant travel proved
challenging for the children, preventing them from being settled for extended
periods or completing homework. And the children’s statements to the
court—made through counsel at the Iowa Center for Children’s Justice—
largely reflect a desire for less travel and a more stable placement. Indeed, the
older son wished for primary care with Katie, the middle son asked for school
days with Katie and alternating weekends with each parent, and the youngest
daughter asked for equal time with both parents but in “longer chunks” to
reduce the back-and-forth transport.

Given the children’s need for more focused afterschool time to
complete their assignments, their increased extracurricular activities, Katie’s
proximity to their schools, and Katie’s role as the primary overseer of the
children’s appointments and schooling, we believe the district court’s
schedule creating a consistent placement in Katie’s care best serves the
children. See Rolling v. Hoffman, No. 14-0102, 2014 WL 2600315, at *2 (Iowa
Ct. App. June 11, 2014) (“In custody modification cases, stability is the trump
card.”). And while we acknowledge the reduction in parenting time for
Jamie, “[p]hysical care issues are not to be resolved based upon perceived

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fairness to the spouses, but primarily upon what is best for the child.” Hansen,
733 N.W.2d at 695.

III. Appellate Attorney Fees

Finally, Katie asks for an award of appellate attorney fees. In a
dissolution modification proceeding, we “may award attorney fees to the
prevailing party in an amount deemed reasonable.” Iowa Code § 598.36
(2023). And in exercising that discretion, “we consider the needs of the party
seeking the award, the ability of the other party to pay, and the relative merits
of the appeal.” In re Marriage of Ficken, 989 N.W.2d 669, 674 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2023) (cleaned up). Considering the relative closeness of the merits and
the financial statuses of both parties, we decline to award Katie appellate
attorney fees.

AFFIRMED.

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