State of Iowa v. Devin Michael Toler Sr.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1858
Filed February 11, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Devin Michael Toler Sr.,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County,
The Honorable David P. Odekirk, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye, Assistant
Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Olivia D. Brooks, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Badding, P.J., and Buller and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Sandy, J.

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SANDY, Judge.

This appeal arises from a jury’s verdict finding Devin Toler guilty of
child endangerment causing bodily injury to his infant son. The case does not
turn on eyewitness testimony or a single catastrophic act. Instead, it rests on
medical evidence, circumstantial proof, and the jury’s assessment of
competing explanations for a series of injuries suffered by a medically fragile
child while in Toler’s care. After careful review of the record, we conclude
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Toler’s motion for
new trial, overruling his claims of prosecutorial error, imposing sentence, or
entering a no-contact order. We therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS & PROCEDURAL POSTURE
D.T. was born in September 2023 to Whitley Waggenhoffer and Devin
Toler. He is Waggenhoffer’s third child and Toler’s first. Shortly before his
birth, medical providers identified congenital kidney and heart conditions
that required delivery at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics.
Following his birth by caesarean section, D.T. remained in the neonatal
intensive care unit for approximately three weeks due to these conditions and
related complications.

After discharge, D.T. required frequent medical monitoring and
follow-up care, including cardiology appointments and a balloon
valvuloplasty procedure in mid-October 2023. Shortly after that procedure,
D.T. was re-hospitalized due to discoloration and swelling in his left leg, as
well as gastrointestinal symptoms associated with anticoagulant therapy.
Imaging performed during this hospitalization revealed a fracture to D.T.’s
left femur, prompting consultation with the University of Iowa Child
Protection Team. At that time, medical providers could not conclusively
determine whether the femur fracture resulted from accidental manipulation

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during medical care or from another source. D.T. was discharged again near
the end of October. Follow-up visits that month noted no developmental
concerns, though the cause of the femur fracture remained under
investigation.

During the periods when D.T. was not hospitalized, Waggenhoffer was
his primary caregiver and managed his medical appointments. Toler worked
outside the home. Waggenhoffer testified that between late October and early
November 2023, she left D.T. alone with Toler on two or three occasions,
each lasting less than ninety minutes. During these outings, Toler contacted
her repeatedly, expressing difficulty soothing the child and asking her to
return home. Waggenhoffer testified that on one occasion after returning
home, she observed scratches near D.T.’s ear that were not present when she
left. Toler attributed the marks to self-scratching. Waggenhoffer later
acknowledged uncertainty regarding the length of D.T.’s fingernails and
whether the marks worsened overnight. She also testified that she once
observed Toler pressing on D.T.’s eyes while attempting to feed him, though
she could not quantify the amount of pressure applied.

On November 5, 2023, after returning home from one of her outings,
Waggenhoffer noticed bleeding and bruising inside D.T.’s mouth while
attempting to feed him. Toler suggested the injuries may have been caused
by a pacifier. Following medical advice, Waggenhoffer brought D.T. to Allen
Hospital, where providers conducted additional examinations and imaging.
A skeletal survey and physical examination revealed multiple injuries,
including an ulnar fracture near the elbow, a rib fracture, a fractured toe, and
the previously identified femur fracture. Providers also documented
subconjunctival hemorrhages in both eyes, abrasions in the mouth, a torn
frenulum, and scabbing near the ear. The injuries appeared to be in varying

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stages of healing. Based on the totality of the findings, medical providers
suspected non-accidental trauma, and D.T. was transferred to the University
of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics for further evaluation.

Dr. Roy Zhou of the Child Protection Team reviewed D.T.’s medical
history, imaging, and laboratory studies and conducted an independent
examination. He testified that although some injuries—particularly the
femur fracture—could not be conclusively attributed to a specific cause, the
overall pattern of injuries was traumatic and not explained by D.T.’s
underlying medical conditions or by an accidental mechanism consistent
with the history provided. Dr. Zhou testified that he could not diagnose child
abuse as a medical determination but concluded that the injuries lacked a
compatible accidental explanation.

Law enforcement and child-welfare investigators interviewed both
parents. Toler denied causing harm to D.T. and attributed the observed
injuries to self-scratching, feeding implements, or unknown causes. He stated
that D.T. did not appear unusually fussy or injured while in his care.
Investigators noted inconsistencies between explanations offered at different
times, though no direct eyewitness testimony established the precise
mechanism or timing of each injury.

The State charged Toler with child endangerment—multiple acts, a
class “B” felony, and child endangerment causing serious injury, a class “C”
felony. At the close of the State’s case, the district court instructed the jury
only on the multiple-acts count and its lesser-included offenses. The jury
found Toler guilty of child endangerment causing bodily injury, a class “D”
felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 726.6(6) (2023).

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The district court imposed an indeterminate five-year term of
incarceration and suspended the fine and surcharge. At the same sentencing
hearing, the court revoked Toler’s deferred judgment in an unrelated case
and imposed concurrent sentences. The court also entered a five-year no-
contact order prohibiting contact between Toler and D.T., finding such
contact posed a threat to the child’s safety .

Toler appealed. He challenges the weight of the evidence, portions of
the State’s closing argument, the sentencing court’s consideration of alleged
unproven conduct, and the scope and duration of the no-contact order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The denial of a motion for new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
State v. Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, 559 (Iowa 2006). We also review claims of
prosecutorial error for an abuse of discretion. State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801,
810 (Iowa 2017). “Our review of a sentence imposed in a criminal case is for
correction of errors at law.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724
(Iowa 2002). Yet, when a sentence is within the statutory limits, we review it
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Gordon, 921 N.W.2d 19, 24 (Iowa 2018).
An abuse of discretion is found when “the district court exercises its
discretion on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or
unreasonable.” Id. (citation omitted). Lastly, “[a] challenge to the
reasonableness of a no-contact order is reviewed for an abuse of the trial
court’s discretion.” State v. Lynch, No. 20-0075, 2021 WL 2453362, at *2
(Iowa Ct. App. June 16, 2021).

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DISCUSSION
I. Weight of the Evidence.

Toler contends the jury’s verdict is contrary to the weight of the
evidence and that the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion for new trial. We disagree.

A motion for new trial based on the weight of the evidence is governed
by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(2)(b)(6). A verdict is contrary to
the weight of the evidence only when a greater amount of credible evidence
supports a different outcome than the one reached by the jury. State v. Ary,
877 N.W.2d 686, 706 (Iowa 2016). This standard permits the court to
consider the credibility of witnesses, but it is also a demanding one—relief is
appropriate only in the extraordinary case where the evidence preponderates
heavily against the verdict such that a miscarriage of justice may have
occurred. Id.; State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 135 (Iowa 2006). In ruling
on such a motion, the question is not whether the evidence was sufficient to
support the verdict; rather, the court must determine whether more credible
evidence supports an alternative verdict. Ary, 877 N.W.2d at 706.

The district court applied the correct standard and concluded the
verdict should stand and the record supports that determination. The State
presented evidence that D.T., a medically fragile infant, suffered multiple
injuries in varying stages of healing, including fractures to the femur, ulna,
ribs, and toe, as well as oral injuries, subconjunctival hemorrhages, and
abrasions. Medical providers testified that, although not every injury could
be conclusively attributed to a precise mechanism, the overall pattern of
injuries was traumatic and inconsistent with accidental explanations or D.T.’s
underlying medical conditions. Dr. Zhou testified the injuries lacked a
compatible accidental explanation based on the history provided.

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The jury also heard evidence regarding Toler’s access to and care of
D.T. during relevant time periods, including testimony that Waggenhoffer
left the child alone with Toler on multiple occasions, after which she
observed injuries not previously present. While Toler offered explanations
suggesting accidental causes or self-inflicted injury, the court was free to
weigh those explanations against the medical testimony, the timing of the
injuries, and the evidence of repeated unexplained trauma. See State v. Ernst,
954 N.W.2d 50, 60 (Iowa 2021) (“While the weight-of-the-evidence standard
allows the district court to make its own credibility determinations, a district
court may grant a motion for new trial based on the weight of the evidence
‘only if more evidence supports the alternative verdict as opposed to the
verdict rendered.’ The question for the court is . . . whether ‘a greater amount
of credible evidence’ suggests the verdict rendered was a miscarriage of
justice.” (citations omitted) (alteration in original)); accord Powers v. State, 911
N.W.2d 774, 782 (Iowa 2018) (“In assessing a motion for new trial, the judge
examines the weight of the evidence offered in the criminal trial, which
includes a weighing of the credibility of the complaining witness.”).

To be sure, the case did not include eyewitness testimony identifying
the precise moment or mechanism by which each injury occurred. But the
court was entitled to credit the medical evidence, the circumstantial evidence
concerning Toler’s access to the child, and the inconsistencies in the
explanations offered. This is not the exceptional case where the evidence
preponderates heavily against the verdict. See Ary, 877 N.W.2d at 706–07.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new
trial, and we affirm on this issue.

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II. Prosecutorial Error.

Toler argues the State committed prosecutorial error during rebuttal
in its closing argument by mischaracterizing the evidence and urging the jury
to consider a “power and control” dynamic between Toler and
Waggenhoffer. He contends the argument invited speculation beyond the
record and denied him a fair trial. We disagree.

To obtain relief, a defendant must establish both misconduct and
resulting prejudice—meaning the challenged conduct so infected the trial
with unfairness as to deny due process. Plain, 898 N.W.2d at 818. Reversal is
warranted only in exceptional cases.

Prosecutors are afforded considerable latitude in closing argument. Id.
They may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence and respond to
defense theories, so long as they do not misstate the record or invite the jury
to rely on matters outside the evidence. Id.

Even assuming without deciding that the State’s comments during
closing argument approached the outer limits of advocacy, Toler cannot
demonstrate prejudice. The remark was isolated and brief, the jury was
properly instructed that closing arguments are not evidence, and we presume
the jury followed those instructions. See id. The overall corpus of evidence
was extensive. Moreover, the jury’s verdict—convicting Toler only of a
lesser-included offense—reflects careful deliberation rather than an
emotional or inflammatory response. Because the State’s argument did not
prejudice Toler, the district court did not abuse its discretion in overruling
the objection.

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III. Consideration of Unproven Conduct at Sentencing.

Toler claims the court improperly considered the “details from the
complaints filed in his previous convictions” that were included in the PSI,
and those details are unproven conduct. At sentencing the court explained:
The Court has considered the request for deferred judgment today, and
considering the factors set forth in the Iowa Code, namely in this case the
nature of this crime, the information set forth in the presentence
investigation report concerning [Toler]’s history, which does include a
history of violence, the Court bases its finding that deferred—a deferred
judgment is not appropriate in this case and I will deny the request for
deferred judgment. The Court, knowing of no legal reason why judgment
shouldn’t be pronounced today, it is hereby ordered and adjudged that
[Toler] is guilty of the lesser-included offense of child endangerment
causing bodily injury, a Class D felony, in violation of Iowa Code Section
726.6(6). In pronouncing judgment and sentence today, the Court has
considered the factors set forth in the Iowa Code, I have considered the
arguments of counsel and their recommendations today, the information
set forth in the presentence investigation report and its recommendations,
the impact statements which were attached thereto, [Toler]’s statements
today on the record, again, the nature of the offense, [Toler]’s age, prior
record, employment, family circumstances, all of which was set forth in
the PSI that I have referenced. In considering the sentencing options today
available to the Court, the Court determines that the sentence which
would provide the maximum opportunity for rehabilitation for Mr. Toler
and for the protection of the community from further offenses by [Toler]
and others is that as recommended by the State. I therefore will sentence
[Toler] to a term of imprisonment not to exceed five years. The $1,025 fine
and 15 percent surcharge will be suspended.

The court’s statement that Toler’s criminal record “does include a
history of violence” is supported by Toler’s criminal convictions alone.
Indeed, he was convicted of domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury—a
crime that is inherently violent. Nothing in the court’s remarks indicates it
relied on disputed allegations or unproven conduct. The court did not
reference factual allegations from charging documents, dismissed counts, or

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unadjudicated conduct. Nor did it cite the narrative details underlying prior
offenses. Instead, the court permissibly characterized Toler’s criminal
history based on established convictions reflected in the PSI.

Iowa law draws a clear distinction between impermissible reliance on
mere accusations and permissible consideration of a defendant’s criminal
history as reflected in convictions. See State v. Witham, 583 N.W.2d 677, 678
(Iowa 1998) (holding a sentencing court may not consider an unproven or
unprosecuted offense unless the facts before the court show the defendant
committed the offense or the defendant admits it). Toler points to the
inclusion of complaint narratives in the PSI, but the mere presence of such
information does not establish improper reliance. As Witham makes clear,
error arises only when the record affirmatively demonstrates the court relied
on unproven or unprosecuted conduct in imposing sentence. Id. at 679 n.1.
This record contains no such indication.

IV. No-Contact Order.

Toler contends the district court abused its discretion by imposing a
five-year no-contact order prohibiting contact with his infant son, D.T. We
disagree.

Iowa Code section 664A.5 authorizes a sentencing court, upon the
defendant’s conviction for a qualifying offense, to impose a no-contact order
for up to five years. The statute does not require an express finding that the
defendant continues to pose a threat to the victim; the conviction itself
supports the court’s authority to act. Lynch, 2021 WL 2453362, at *4. The
court was not required to accommodate speculative reunification efforts or

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fashion a lesser restriction. See id. at 3. Because the five-year no-contact order
was authorized by statute the district court did not abuse its discretion.

AFFIRMED.

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