Wal-Mart, Inc. and Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust v. Marshall County Board of Review a/k/a Board of Review of Marshall County

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1964
Filed April 1, 2026

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Walmart, Inc. and Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust,
Plaintiffs–Appellants,
v.
Marshall County Board of Review a/k/a Board of Review of Marshall
County,
Defendant–Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County,
The Honorable Amy M. Moore, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Paul D. Burns and Olivia A. McGovern of Bradley & Riley PC, Iowa City,
attorneys for appellants.

Jamie L. Cox, Frank W. Pechacek, Jr., and Paul S. Wilson of Willson &
Pechacek, P.L.C., Council Bluffs, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Chicchelly, J.

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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

We filed our opinion in this appeal on February 11, 2026, but then
granted the appellants’ petition for rehearing. That opinion is vacated, see
Iowa R. App. P. 6.1204(5)(c), and replaced by this one.

Walmart, Inc. and Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust (collectively
“Walmart”) appeal the district court’s ruling upholding the Marshall
County Board of Review’s (“Board”) 2023 property tax assessment.
Walmart argues the district court erred when it (1) accepted an appraisal
which assumed the store was leased when it was owner-occupied, and
(2) found the Board’s appraisal more credible than Walmart’s. Upon our
review, we affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The property subject to this appeal is Walmart’s 24.7-acre site located
at 2802 South Center Street, Marshalltown, on which sits a 214,323 square-
foot Walmart store. The store was constructed in 1996, and a 6,006 square-
foot “garden center” was added in 2002.

On January 1, 2023, the Marshall County Assessor imposed a
$13,323,780 property tax assessment on the property. Walmart contested the
assessment to the Board requesting a reduction in value to $8,332,680. The
Board denied Walmart’s request and upheld the Assessor’s assessment.
Walmart appealed to the district court.

At trial, both parties presented expert evidence regarding the appraisal
of the property. Walmart presented testimony from Christopher Jenkins, and
the Board presented testimony from Mark Kenney. The district court also
received the report of an additional expert from Walmart, Peter Helland, but
Helland did not testify. Kenney and Helland utilized the comparable sales,

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income, and cost methods when calculating their value. Jenkins only utilized
the comparable sales method. After considering all the evidence, the district
court affirmed the Board’s property tax assessment. Walmart now appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review an appeal of a tax protest de novo. Wellmark, Inc. v. Polk
Cnty. Bd. of Rev., 875 N.W.2d 667, 672 (Iowa 2016); see also Dolphin
Residential Coop., Inc. v. Iowa City Bd. of Rev., 863 N.W.2d 644, 647 (Iowa
2015) (“[A]ppeals from decisions of the local board of review are triable in
equity . . . , and our review is de novo . . . .”). “[W]e give weight to the
[district] court’s findings of fact, [but] we are not bound by them.” Iowa R.
App. P. 6.904(3)(g); Boekeloo v. Bd. of Rev., 529 N.W.2d 275, 276 (Iowa 1995).
“We are especially deferential to the court’s assessment of the credibility of
witnesses.” Boekeloo, 529 N.W.2d at 276.

DISCUSSION
A taxpayer may challenge the assessed value of property. Iowa Code
§ 441.37(1) (2023); Soifer v. Floyd Cnty. Bd. of Rev., 759 N.W.2d 775, 779
(Iowa 2009). Iowa Code section 441.21(3)(b)(2) states:
For assessment years beginning on or after January 1, 2018, the
burden of proof shall be upon any complainant attacking such valuation as
excessive, inadequate, inequitable, or capricious. However, in protest or
appeal proceedings when the complainant offers competent evidence that
the market value of the property is different than the market value
determined by the assessor, the burden of proof thereafter shall be upon
the officials or persons seeking to uphold such valuation to be assessed.

Section 441.21(1)(a) provides that “[a]ll property subject to taxation
shall be valued at its actual value.” In general, “[t]he actual value of all
property subject to assessment and taxation shall be the fair and reasonable
market value of such property.” Iowa Code § 441.21(1)(b)(1); accord Soifer,

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759 N.W.2d at 778 (noting the actual value of property is its “fair and
reasonable market value”).

The legislature has defined “market value” “as the fair and reasonable
exchange in the year in which the property is listed and valued between a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy
or sell and each being familiar with all the facts relating to the particular
property.” Iowa Code § 441.21(1)(b)(1); accord Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Polk Cnty. Bd. of Rev., 983 N.W.2d 37, 41 (Iowa 2022). Finding the fair market
value of property through comparable sales is the “preferred method” of
valuation. See Wellmark, 875 N.W.2d at 679; Compiano v. Bd. of Rev., 771
N.W.2d 392, 398 (Iowa 2009) (“The legislative scheme for the valuation of
real estate for purposes of assessing taxes begins with the market-value
approach, based on ʻcomparable sales of other properties.’” (citation
omitted)).

I. Appraisal Methodology

Walmart first argues the district court erred when it accepted the
Board’s appraisal (done by Kenney) because it valued the property as if it
were leased when it is owner-occupied. A panel of our court previously
addressed this argument from Walmart in another tax protest case. There,
our court reasoned:
Walmart argues Kenney’s methodology is flawed because its store
was owner-occupied and Kenney did not “remove the independent value
these leases contributed to the sale prices” of the comparables. The Board
responds that methodology is an appropriate way to value “the property as
it was,” unlike what it says is the “dark store theory of valuation”
employed by Walmart’s experts. . . . We don’t need to get too far into the
weeds on what looks like a hotly contested issue in the appraisal industry
because neither section 441.21 nor case law prohibits the use of vacant or

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leased properties as comparables, so long as suitable adjustments are made
to take the status of the property into account.

Walmart, Inc. v. Dallas Cnty. Bd. of Rev., No. 21-1831, 2023 WL 2670039, at
*4 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2023) (citations omitted).

So, we confine our review to whether Kenney made the necessary
adjustments to his valuation. See Walmart, Inc. v. City of Davenport Iowa Bd.
of Rev., No. 21-1018, 2023 WL 1808504, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2023)
(“Where the property is subject to a lease, an appraiser may make an
adjustment to reflect the effect of the lease on the value of the property.”).
Walmart contends Kenney did not by pointing to instances during cross-
examination where he acknowledged adjustments were not made. But on our
de novo review, we find both Kenney’s report and testimony indicate he did
make the necessary adjustments.

When describing his methodology for finding comparable sales,
Kenney testified to a series of adjustments he utilized:
First we start with the ownership interest adjustment; financing
adjustment, if it is required; conditions of sale adjustment and market
conditions adjustment, as far as what we consider to be, what we call,
transactional adjustments.

Then we have other adjustments which would be more of a physical
nature: Location; building size; age; condition; construction quality;
access; visibil[i]ty; parking; economic characteristics; and building
coverage ratio, which is kind of a land adjustment, land-to-building
adjustment.

Kenney then discussed specific adjustments made in this case—as
outlined in his report—including ownership interest and financing for each
comparison property. And we find Kenney’s report is replete with evidence
of these adjustments. In one instance, the report states, “After the sales have
been analyzed, they were adjusted for measurable differences.” The

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adjustments outlined in the report included: real property rights conveyed,
financing terms, conditions of sale, market conditions, legal encumbrances,
and other characteristics. The report expressly discusses the impact of a
lease and the necessary adjustments for each comparison property.
Immediately following, the report outlines the adjustment made to each
comparison property in the report.

So, we agree with the district court’s summary of these adjustments:
All eight properties were subject to leases; seven of the properties were
also Walmart stores. Kenney determined that seven of the eight properties
were leased below market rent and afforded upward adjustments in price
per square foot ranging from 5% to 20% to account for this factor. One
property was leased at market rent and Kenney did not apply any lease
adjustment for this property. In addition to adjustments for leases, he also
adjusted the price per square foot based upon other characteristics
including location, building size, age/condition, parking, and economic
characteristics.

And based on our de novo review, we conclude the district court did not err
in accepting Kenney’s valuations and adjustments. See Walmart, Inc., 2023
WL 2670039, at *4–6.

II. Expert Credibility

Next, Walmart argues the district court erred in finding Kenney more
credible than their experts. The district court had a front row seat to the
battle of the experts in this case. And both parties have attacked the
methodology and credibility of the other’s expert witnesses. But “the trial
court is in a much better position to weigh the credibility of the witnesses
than we are, and we will give weight to the trial court’s decision on credibility
even in a de novo review.” Excel Corp. v. Pottawattamie Cnty. Bd. of Rev., 492
N.W.2d 225, 229 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992).

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We have already rejected Walmart’s argument that using Kenney’s
expert valuation was erroneous. And the district court made well-reasoned
credibility findings:
[T]he court finds that Helland’s and Jenkins’ appraisals are
considerably less reliable and credible. The majority of Helland’s
comparable sales were vacant at the time of sale. As previously noted,
“neither section 441.21 nor case law prohibits the use of vacant or leased
properties as comparables. . . ” . . . However, an appraisal should not use
only vacant properties. . . .

Helland used a number of “abnormal” sales in his comparables.
He also used several change-of-use sales without factoring this into his
valuations. Helland’s use of a high number of vacant sales, use of abnormal
sales, and use of change-of-use sales as his comparable sales negatively
impacts the court’s assessment of his appraisal.

Unlike Helland, Jenkins did not use any vacant sales or “change-
of-use” sales. However, as previously noted, six of Jenkins’ eight
comparable sales involved abnormal or irregular sales. This significantly
impacts the reliability of Jenkins’ overall appraisal and valuation of the
subject property per the sales approach. Overall, the court found that
Helland and Jenkins both utilized less reliable comparable properties than
the ones relied upon by Kenney, which renders their valuations less
credible.

After a thorough and thoughtful review of the experts’ appraisals,
and in considering their choices of comparable sales and the adjustments
made, the court finds that Kenney’s appraisal provides the more credible
determination of the property’s market value. The court further finds that
Kenney’s appraisal comports with the statutory parameters and is
competent evidence of the subject property’s value.

Based on our de novo review of the record and giving the proper
deference to the district court’s credibility findings, we find the district court
did not err in finding Kenney’s expert valuation to be the most credible.

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CONCLUSION
Based on our de novo review, we find the district court did not err in
accepting the methodology of the Board’s expert witness. And we find no
error in the district court finding the Board’s expert more credible than
Walmart’s experts. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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