In re the Detention of Sanders

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-2006
Filed April 1, 2026
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In re Detention of Dylan Larence Sanders,

Dylan Larence Sanders,
Respondent–Appellant.
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Appeal from Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County,
The Honorable Craig M. Dreismeier, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Wendy S. Samuelson, Assistant State Public Defender,
Special Defense Unit, Des Moines, attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, Anagha Dixit (until withdrawal) and
Nicholas E. Siefert, Assistant Attorneys General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., and Badding and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Badding, J.

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BADDING, Judge.

When explaining why he committed a sexually violent offense against
a twelve-year-old girl, Dylan Sanders said, “At the time I just wanted to do
what I wanted to do.” Sanders was diagnosed by two licensed psychologists
with impulse control and conduct disorder. Although the psychologists
agreed on Sanders’ diagnosis, they disagreed on whether he met the criteria
for commitment as a sexually violent predator under Iowa Code chapter
229A (2023). Faced with these conflicting opinions, the district court found
the State’s expert was more convincing and granted the committal petition.

On appeal from that judgment, Sanders challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting the district court’s determination that he is a
sexually violent predator. Deferring to the court’s choice between the
competing expert opinions, we affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

In the fall of 2017—over the course of one week—Sanders had sexual
contact with three female minors: R.B., C.H., and S.B. Two of the children
were eleven years old; the other was twelve. Sanders was twenty-one. He
was convicted of third-degree sexual assault on a child for an offense that
occurred in Nebraska and two counts of lascivious acts with a child for the
offenses in Iowa. Sanders was sentenced to prison in 2019.

While serving that sentence, Sanders had five to ten sexual partners
and engaged in at least twenty consensual sexual encounters with them. He
was disciplined for several of these encounters because the prison prohibited
sexual contact between inmates. Sanders also had a substantiated complaint
under the Prison Rape Elimination Act for “sexually licking his lips” toward
another inmate and telling him, “I’ll knock you out and suck you off.”

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Sanders’ first attempt at sex offender treatment was in November
2021. He was removed from the program three months later after he had his
cellmate touch his genitals. He restarted the program in August 2022 and
completed it in January 2023. During the treatment, Sanders disclosed a
sexual history dating back to when he was ten years old and continuing
through his incarceration at age twenty-one that included sexual activity with
animals and other minor victims—male and female.

In December 2023, as Sanders’ discharge date approached, the State
filed a petition to have him confined as a sexually violent predator under Iowa
Code chapter 229A. At a bench trial the next year, each side presented
evidence from licensed psychologists with experience in evaluating sexually
violent predators. The State called Dr. William Schmitt, while Sanders
called Dr. Luis Rosell. Dr. Schmitt diagnosed Sanders with “other specified
disruptive, impulse-control, and conduct disorder,” which is characterized
by “problems in the self-control of emotions and behaviors.” Dr. Rosell
agreed with that diagnosis. But from there, the experts parted ways. Dr.
Schmitt testified that Sanders had a mental abnormality that made him
“more likely than not to commit a sexual violence in the future.” Dr. Rosell
disagreed, focusing on Sanders’ more recent behavior and response to sex
offender treatment. He also challenged Dr. Schmitt’s risk assessment
methodology.

After considering all the evidence, the district court agreed with Dr.
Schmitt’s opinion and found the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that Sanders was a sexually violent predator. The court granted the State’s
petition and ordered Sanders to be committed under Iowa Code section
229A.7(5)(b). Sanders appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting that decision.

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II. Standard of Review

We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for the
correction of errors at law. In re Det. of Swanson, 668 N.W.2d 570, 574 (Iowa
2003). The district court’s findings are binding on us if they
are supported by substantial evidence upon which a “rational trier of fact
could conceivably find the defendant is a sexually violent predator beyond
a reasonable doubt.” To determine whether the evidence was substantial,
we consider the entirety of the evidence presented in a “light most
favorable to the State, including all legitimate inferences and presumptions
which may be fairly and reasonably deduced from the record.” Evidence
is not substantial if it raises only suspicion, speculation, or conjecture.

Id. (cleaned up).

III. Analysis

To succeed on its petition to civilly commit Sanders, the State was
required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he is a sexually violent
predator. Iowa Code § 229A.7(5); In re Det. of Pierce, 748 N.W.2d 509, 512
(Iowa 2008). A person is a sexually violent predator if the person (1) “has
been convicted of a sexually violent offense”; (2) “suffers from a mental
abnormality”; and (3) the mental abnormality makes the person “more likely
than not to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if
not confined in a secure facility.” Pierce, 748 N.W.2d at 512; see also Iowa
Code § 229A.2(15) (defining “sexually violent predator”). Sanders contests
the State’s proof of the second and third elements.

For the second element, Iowa Code section 229A.2(8) defines a
“mental abnormality” as “a congenital or acquired condition affecting the
emotional or volitional capacity of a person and predisposing that person to
commit sexually violent offenses to a degree which would constitute a

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menace to the health and safety of others.” “To prove such a condition
exists, the State must show the respondent has ʻa serious difficulty in
controlling behavior.’” In re Det. of McFadden, No. 23-1935, 2024
WL 5153703, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2024) (quoting In re Det. of
Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003)).

Relying on his expert’s opinion, Sanders claims that his condition did
not affect his volitional capacity because “he had no other record of criminal
offenses other than his sex offenses” and because he “did not act out in a
violent manner in prison.” Sanders points to Dr. Rosell’s testimony that
although Sanders had “problematic behavior” in the past, the behavior did
not continue in prison, where “he basically interacted with males in a
consensual manner.”

Dr. Schmitt disagreed. He testified that Sanders has “had a problem
controlling his impulses over the years. That’s primarily come out in terms
of his sexual offending in the community as well as his sexual activity in
prison.” Even though Sanders’ sexual activity in prison was consensual, Dr.
Schmitt stated “it’s still breaking the rules. So that’s how I still see it as a
problem with him controlling his impulses.” Dr. Schmitt explained that if
volitional capacity is understood “to represent one’s decision making and
behaviors based on decisions,” then “certainly, Mr. Sanders has shown he
has made bad decisions, made bad choices, and acted on those both in the
community and in prison creating victims and affecting those people and also
affecting himself over and over again.”

The district court agreed with Dr. Schmitt, finding that the record
showed Sanders’ “difficulties with self-control are often in the area of sexual
behaviors.” The court noted Sanders’ “impulsiveness and limited self-
control in his criminal offenses is . . . plainly evident,” citing his statements

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to the experts “that he did not plan to have sex with R.B. and that he just
wanted to meet her, but that the interaction just progressed from talking to
sex.” With C.H., Sanders told Dr. Schmitt that the sexual contact “just
happened” and that he “was not thinking.” Summing up his behavior,
Sanders said, “I just wanted to get my rocks off, honestly.” He repeated that
statement at the commitment hearing and explained, “I wanted to do what I
wanted to do at the time.”

“Because this issue essentially turned on a judgment of credibility
between two experts with different opinions, we give weight to the district
court’s judgment.” In re Det. of Barnes, 689 N.W.2d 455, 461 (Iowa 2004);
accord In re Det. of Stenzel, 827 N.W.2d 690, 702 (Iowa 2013) (noting “that
the fact finder was free to accept the testimony of the State’s expert instead”
of the respondent’s in determining the mental abnormality question). That
judgment is supported by substantial evidence in the record, including
Sanders’ own statements and his behavior before and during his
incarceration.

Having found sufficient evidence of a mental abnormality, we turn to
the third element: whether that condition made Sanders more likely than not
to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses if not
confined. Sanders’ challenge to this element fares no better, as it again
depends on the district court’s choice between conflicting expert opinions.

Dr. Schmitt used two actuarial assessments to calculate Sanders’ risk
of reoffending—the Static-99R and the VRS-SO. See Pierce, 748 N.W.2d at
513 (“An actuarial assessment provides an ʻempirically measured rate of
recidivism among a group of sex offenders who share a set of characteristics
with the subject of the evaluation.’” (citation omitted)). He testified Sanders
scored a 7 on the Static-99R, which examines “historical or static factors that

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. . . don’t change over time.” That score placed Sanders in the “well above
average” risk category—the highest category available under the instrument.
Although Dr. Rosell scored Sanders one point lower on the same assessment,
that score still landed him in the same risk category.

Under the VRS-SO, which Dr. Rosell did not use, Sanders scored in
the “moderate” range of 36 out of 51. Dr. Schmitt testified the VRS-SO
examines “changeable risk factors where people can get better, worse, or stay
the same” and can be combined with the Static-99R to generate a “more
comprehensive risk assessment.” Based on these assessments, and using a
multiplier to account for undetected offenses, Dr. Schmitt estimated
Sanders’ lifetime recidivism risk at 58 percent. From there, he concluded
that Sanders’ mental abnormality predisposed him to commit future sexually
violent acts, exceeding the “more likely than not” threshold.

Dr. Rosell disagreed with Dr. Schmitt’s use of extrapolation and
multipliers to arrive at Sanders’ lifetime risk assessment. He also gave more
weight to Sanders’ completion of sex offender treatment and his time in
prison, explaining Sanders “had eight years to figure out that you cannot
engage in sexual behavior with teenage girls, especially, that young.”
According to Dr. Rosell, Sanders is “a different person than when he was last
in the community.” But, as Dr. Schmitt testified, Sanders “had no access to
kids or minors over the last eight years.” See In re Det. of Willis, 691 N.W.2d
726, 729 (Iowa 2005) (“The absence of sexually predatory acts in a setting of
secure confinement does not paint the same picture as the absence of such
acts in a normal life situation.”). Dr. Schmitt was also concerned with
Sanders’ lack of insight into the connection between his known “triggers”—
alcohol, minors, pornography, and social media—and his sexual offenses.

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Without that insight, Dr. Schmitt doubted Sanders’ ability to manage those
risk factors in the community.

The district court thoroughly addressed these concerns, emphasizing
that regardless of their differences, both experts placed Sanders in the well
above average risk category in their Static-99R score.
Regarding the measures employed, there is no dispute that Sanders
is in the well above average risk of recidivism category using the Static-
99R. While the determination of whether use of the VRS-SO should be
used is outside the Court’s expertise, the factors identified by Dr. Schmitt
as being of issue of Sanders certainly seem to be appropriate. Dr. Schmitt
specifically noted that Sanders stated he acted out sexually to cope with
negative feelings and that Sanders gravitated toward younger people to
meet his intimacy needs. Dr. Schmitt also expressed concerns about
Sanders’s release plans based upon his observations of cognitive
distortions and lack of insight. The Court agrees with Dr. Schmitt’s
opinions and shares his concerns.

As a final matter regarding Sanders’s likelihood of recidivism, he
was asked by both experts what he believed his likelihood of committing a
future sexual offense on a scale of zero to ten with zero being very low and
ten being very high. With Dr. Rosell on February 2, 2024, Sanders stated
zero and that he had realized his poor choices and learned about his risk
factors. This self-rating was only a few weeks after he completed sexual
offender treatment when presumedly, Sanders’s insight would be at its
peak. It is troubling to the Court that Sanders thought he was not at risk
at all despite the knowledge he had gained from treatment about himself
and his risk factors. Then, about a month later on February 29, 2024,
Sanders rated his likelihood as a three to Dr. Schmitt. When Dr. Schmitt
asked why not zero, Sanders responded that he wanted to attend Aftercare
and stated he turns to alcohol when stressed. It is unclear what prompted
this change in rating, but it suggests to the Court that Sanders’s insight
may be inconsistent and unreliable.

The third element does not require conclusive evidence that
Sanders will engage in future sexually violent offenses, just that there is a
more-than-not likelihood that Sanders will engage in further acts of sexual
violence. Having considered the actuarial measures, the opinions of the

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experts, and Sanders’s testimony, the Court finds beyond a reasonable
doubt that Sanders’s mental abnormality makes him more likely than not
to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses, if not
confined in a secure facility.

This reasoning is sound and supported by substantial evidence. More
than anything, it simply appears the district court found the testimony of Dr.
Schmitt to be more persuasive. That was within the court’s purview as the
finder of fact. See Stenzel, 827 N.W.2d at 702; see also State v. Brimmer, 983
N.W.2d 247, 256 (Iowa 2022) (stating that it is the factfinder’s role “to
resolve conflicts in the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to
determine the plausibility of explanations, or to weigh the evidence” (citation
omitted)). Upon viewing the record in the light most favorable to the State,
we conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s determination that
Sanders was more likely than not to reoffend if released.

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s order finding that
Sanders is a sexually violent predator.

AFFIRMED.

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