State of Iowa v. Inez Nicholas Luna

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0726
Filed April 29, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Inez Nicholas Luna,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Page County,
The Honorable Craig M. Dreismeier, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, Theresa R. Wilson, Assistant
Appellate Defender, and Kyle Kopf (until withdrawal), Student Legal
Intern, attorneys for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Ahlers, P.J., and Buller and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Sandy, J. Partial Dissent by Ahlers, P.J.

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SANDY, Judge.

This appeal arises from a course of conduct that began with Inez
Luna’s private communications with a fourteen-year-old minor and
progressed to secrecy, attempted isolation, and ultimately a physical advance.
The district court was entitled to view that progression not as accidental or
misunderstood, but with requisite specific intent. Luna challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting that finding, as well as the court’s
decision to impose incarceration and the legality of the suspended fines. On
this record, the evidence was substantial, the sentencing decision was
reasoned and grounded in proper factors, and the legal challenge is foreclosed
by precedent. We affirm.

BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
The State charged Luna with one count of enticing a minor and two
counts of assault following acts occurring in May 2024 in Page County. The
charges arose from Luna’s interactions with T.A., a fourteen-year-old minor.

The record reflects that Luna began communicating with T.A. through
the Snapchat application on or about May 2, 2024, coinciding with T.A.’s
birthday. Over the course of several days, Luna initiated and continued a
series of messages with T.A. that included personal questions, compliments
regarding her appearance, and requests that she delete their
communications. On May 9, Luna asked T.A. to go for a drive with him and
suggested she should not tell anyone about it. That outing did not occur. Luna
sent additional messages in the ensuing days, including inquiries about T.A.’s
clothing and statements referring to their relationship as a “secret.”

During the weekend of May 17, T.A. stayed at Luna’s home for a
sleepover. While T.A. and Luna were briefly in a bedroom alone, Luna pulled

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T.A. closer, placed his hand on her chin, and asked her for a kiss. T.A.
declined, and no kiss occurred. The following day, while T.A. was on a
staircase in the home, Luna struck her buttocks with an open hand and told
her to “move.”

Following that weekend, T.A. disclosed Luna’s conduct to several
people and law enforcement. Law enforcement obtained the Snapchat
messages that had been preserved. The State subsequently filed a trial
information on July 17, charging Luna with one count of enticing a minor and
two counts of assault causing bodily injury.

The case proceeded to a bench trial in January 2025. Luna waived his
right to a jury trial both in writing and on the record. At trial, the court
received exhibits, including the Snapchat communications, and heard
testimony from T.A. and other witnesses. Luna moved for judgment of
acquittal at the close of the State’s evidence and renewed the motion at the
close of all evidence; the court reserved ruling and later denied the motion in
its written order.

Following trial, the district court found Luna guilty of enticing a minor,
in violation of Iowa Code section 710.10(2) (2024), and two counts of assault
in violation of section 708.2(7). In April, the court sentenced Luna to an
indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed five years on the
enticement conviction and ten days on each assault conviction, with all
sentences to run concurrently. The court imposed fines on each count but
suspended those fines. The court also entered a no-contact order and
determined Luna did not have the reasonable ability to pay category “B”
restitution.

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Luna appeals from his convictions and sentences, challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the enticement conviction, the district
court’s exercise of sentencing discretion, and the legality of the suspended
fines.

DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We review Luna’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for the
correction of errors at law. State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 202
(Iowa 2022). We defer to the jury’s verdict and will uphold the verdict if
supported by substantial evidence. Id. “Substantial evidence is evidence
sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Id. When conducting this review we construe evidence
“in the light most favorable to the State” which includes any “legitimate
inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from
the record evidence.” Id. (citation omitted).

To prove that Luna enticed T.A. with a sexual purpose in violation of
Iowa Code Section 710.10(2), the State must prove that he intended “to
commit an illegal sex act upon or sexual exploitation of [T.A.]” at the time
of the alleged enticement. Iowa Code § 710.10(2). That code section
provides, in full, that:
A person commits a class “D” felony when, without authority and with
the intent to commit an illegal sex act upon or sexual exploitation of a minor
under the age of sixteen, the person entices or attempts to entice a person
reasonably believed to be under the age of sixteen including a law
enforcement officer or agent posing as a minor under the age of sixteen.

Id. The Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Osmundson recognized that the
statute creates an explicit standard as the focus is on actions of the defendant

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and a scienter element is included, underscoring that specific intent is built
into the offense. 546 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Iowa 1996).

As the district court framed the elements, the State was required to
prove:
1. On occasions between May 2, 2024 and on or about May 31,
2024, [Luna] enticed or attempted to entice T.A.

2. [Luna] did so with the specific intent to commit sexual abuse or
sexual exploitation upon T.A.

3. [Luna] committed an overt act evidencing his purpose to entice
T.A.

4. At the time T.A. was enticed or [Luna] attempted to entice T.A.,
either:

a. T.A. was a minor under the age of sixteen; or

b. [Luna] reasonably believed T.A. was under sixteen years
of age.

See Iowa Crim. Jury Instruction 1000.12. In addition to these elements, it
clarified that
The state needs to show Luna had the specific intent to commit a sexual
abuse or sexual exploitation of T.A. Specific intent means not only being
aware of doing an act and doing it voluntarily, but in addition, doing it with
a specific purpose in mind. Because determining the defendant’s specific
intent requires a fact finder to decide what he was thinking when an act was
done, it is seldom capable of direct proof. Therefore, a finder of fact should
consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the act to determine the
defendant’s specific intent. The fact finder, may, but is not required to
conclude a person intends the natural results of his acts.

It also supplementally defined “entice” as meaning “to wrongfully invite,
tempt, solicit, lure, coax, seduce or persuade a person to do a thing.” See Iowa

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Crim. Jury Instruction 1000.13. Finally, it defined the “overt act”
requirement as requiring proof of an
act indicating the person’s intent to accomplish the enticement. The overt
act itself does not have to be a criminal act. [Luna] cannot be guilty of
enticing, or attempting to entice unless [the court] find[s] that he
committed an overt act that showed it was [Luna]’s purpose to entice T.A.

See Iowa Crim. Jury Instruction 1000.14. Luna contends that the State failed
to satisfy the second element: “The evidence is insufficient to prove that
Mr. Luna had the requisite specific intent at the time of the overt act.” We
disagree.

Substantial evidence supports the district court’s finding of specific
intent. Luna initiated and maintained private communications with T.A., a
fourteen-year-old minor, through Snapchat. Those communications became
increasingly focused on T.A.’s physical appearance—her body, lips, and
clothing—and included encouragement to wear a two-piece swimsuit. He
instructed her to delete messages and described their relationship as a
“secret,” conduct the fact finder could reasonably view as concealment.

Luna also asked T.A. to go for a drive and told her she could not tell
anyone. That invitation—paired with secrecy—supports an inference he
sought to isolate her. His subsequent conduct confirms the trajectory of those
communications. While alone with T.A., Luna pulled her closer, placed his
hand on her chin, and asked her for a kiss. Taken together, this is not a series
of disconnected acts. It is a progression: private messaging, sexualized
comments, secrecy, attempted isolation, and physical advance. From that
course of conduct, a rational fact finder could infer Luna specifically intended
to engage in a prohibited sexual act or exploitation. After all, “[s]pecific intent
is seldom capable of direct proof.” State v. Ernst, 954 N.W.2d 50, 55
(Iowa 2021) (citation omitted). “It is the rare case in which a criminal

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defendant openly proclaims his further intent while committing his crime.”
State v. Hawkins, 27 N.W.3d 562, 569 (Iowa 2025).

II. The district court was not required to accept innocent
explanations for each individual act or to view them in isolation.
See State v. Jones, 967 N.W.2d 336, 343 (Iowa 2021) (explaining a
jury is “not required to accept the defendant’s version of the
events” (citation omitted)); State v. Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d 247,
256 (Iowa 2022) (stating it is “for the jury to decide which
evidence to accept or reject”). As we recently said in rejecting a
similar sufficiency argument, “[a] criminal defendant is not
entitled to acquittal merely because he wishes the jury had
believed him instead of the victim.” State v. Hernandez, 20
N.W.3d 502, 507–08 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025). Substantial evidence
supports the district court’s finding of specific intent.Abuse of
Sentencing Discretion

We review a district court’s specific sentencing decision for abuse of
discretion. State v. Laffey, 600 N.W.2d 57, 62 (Iowa 1999). We will not disturb
a sentence unless the defendant shows an abuse of discretion or a defect in
the sentencing procedure. State v. Witham, 583 N.W.2d 677, 678 (Iowa 1998).
“An abuse of discretion will only be found when a court acts on grounds
clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” State v. Hopkins, 860
N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa 2015) (citation omitted).

A sentencing “court shall state on the record the basis for the sentence
imposed.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(g). The sentencing court weighs “the
nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the age, character and
propensity of the offender, and the chances of reform” along with the
defendant’s criminal history, family circumstances, and the societal goals of
sentencing. State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 106 (Iowa 2020) (citation
omitted). The district court’s statement may be “terse and succinct” if “the

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reasons for the exercise of discretion are obvious in light of the statement and
the record before the court.” State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408
(Iowa 2015). The district court “has broad discretion to impose the sentence
it determines is best suited to rehabilitate a defendant and protect society.”
State v. West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d 344, 355 (Iowa 2022). This discretion “to
impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a
strong presumption in its favor,” and we will only reverse for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002).

At sentencing, the district court gave a lengthy explanation of its
decision:
As to sentencing options, I have considered everything that the Code will
allow me to consider, which does include the psychosexual evaluation from
Dr. Newring, the presentence investigation report, victim impact
statements and obviously everything that’s been contained in those
documents. I certainly take note of what was in each of these reports. I
certainly understand the criminal history and recognize that most, with the
exception of the most recent incident in Boone County, Iowa, that most of
this has been a number of years ago. And I also understand and appreciate
the fact that none of these prior offenses have any sort of a sexual element,
if you will, which would be at all similar to what count I is in this situation.
So I recognize that.

I recognize the fact that you’re employed and have a job and have a
job that you can go back to. So I appreciate that as well. It seems as though
that’s difficult sometimes to get individuals to do.

And I appreciate the fact that the psychosexual evaluation seems to
conclude that there is a low risk for you to reoffend. But I’ll be remiss if I—
I’d be remiss if, ultimately speaking, sir, I didn’t tell you what I was most
concerned about and what I’m concerned about in regards to the idea of
probation.

I have considered a suspended sentence for you. I’ve actually
thought long and hard about this ever since my ruling was issued, prior to
seeing anything as to what should happen. Understanding the impact that

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this has on this minor child, and that seems to be very apparent in regards
to her victim impact statement. And I appreciate your remorse that you
shared with the Court this morning. That isn’t for naught. The
circumstances of this case really are what trouble me more than anything
with what’s going on. As you know, this was a trial to the Court. And I had,
as in any case, first-hand experience of hearing everything that was
presented and what was going through this child’s mind, seeing the
evidence and text messages and the actions that occurred.

There’s certainly some things that stand out. And I guess, to that
extent, I would agree with what the State argues as to what needs to
happen. I was concerned to begin with, but I do also take note of some of
the information that was in Dr. Newring’s report. Perhaps the intentions
were innocent enough in regards to trying to bolster the self-awareness or
self-esteem of this minor child, but the manner in which this went forward
was I think completely inappropriate. You know, the report references that
she has had a history of psychiatric care, that you knew this, that you knew
this in advance, that you knew she had a history of calling herself names
out loud and putting herself down. She has indicated you treated her like
your own daughter, like a family member. I honestly think that you probably
had good intentions in regards to that. She’s a friend of your daughter, and
that was important.

But it seems to violate and take advantage of a fourteen-year-old’s
trust and everyone, yourself included. The messages that were sent and
obviously the actions that I saw amounting and leading up to this
conviction I just think in the end are significant, and I just can’t brush that
under the rug. You clearly seem to be involved in a pattern of behavior to
gain her trust or to gain her confidence, to bolster her self-esteem, to make
her feel appreciated, and at some point it obviously went way too far. The
comments that were made in regards to having beautiful lips and she has a
gorgeous body and you wish she wore a two-piece swimsuit, that’s part
of—you know, the attempt to kiss, that her idea of being scared, your
deliberateness in making sure that she deletes her messages and doesn’t
share that information with others, “don’t tell anybody; don’t let my
daughter see your phone,” all of those things are incredibly concerning to
me. In the end that’s really what is driving me more than anything else in
this situation.

....

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. . . This Court will run these sentences concurrent with one
another. In running these sentences concurrent with one another, I’ve
considered your need for rehabilitation, the need to protect society, to
prevent further offenses like this from occurring, also based upon the
information contained within the presentence investigation report and the
recommendations therein. As to these sentences, other than the fines, this
Court declines to suspend those sentences. This Court will order your
incarceration accordingly.

Upon our review, we find the district court did not abuse its discretion
in imposing carceral sentences. Each of the factors the district court
discussed is a proper sentencing factor. See Iowa Code § 901.5. Given the
sentences are based on proper factors and sufficiently explained, we discern
no abuse of discretion, and we will not disturb them. See Formaro, 638 N.W.2d
at 724. To the extent that Luna asks us to reweigh the factors and grant him
probation, we will not do so. See State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 863
(Iowa 2023) (“The test for whether a sentencing court abused its discretion
is not whether we might have weighed the various factors differently.”).

III. Illegality of Sentences

Luna’s final argument claims that the sentences imposed are illegal
because of the district court’s imposition of prison but suspension of fines.
His argument is based entirely on the dissenting opinion in State v. Laue,
No. 23-0208, 2023 WL 8448475, at *2–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2023)
(Ahlers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But our court has
rejected that position while sitting en banc. State v. Cullum, No. 23-0911,
2025 WL 2057904, at *4–5 (Iowa Ct. App. July 23, 2025) (en banc).
Accordingly, we are not convinced that suspension of fines in this case
amounts to an error at law. See State v. Duffield, 16 N.W.3d 298, 304

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(Iowa 2025) (declining to endorse the Laue dissent’s reasoning). So, we
affirm the district court in all respects.

AFFIRMED.

Buller, J., concurs; Ahlers, P.J., dissents in part and concurs in part.

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AHLERS, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I concur with the majority opinion as it relates to finding sufficient
evidence to support Inez Luna’s conviction for enticing a minor and finding
no abuse of the district court’s discretion to impose a term of incarceration
for that crime. But I respectfully dissent from the decision to reject Luna’s
challenge to the suspension of his fines on his convictions.

For the reasons stated in my partial dissents in State v. Laue,
No. 23-0208, 2023 WL 8448475, at *2–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2023)
(Ahlers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), and State v. Cullum,
No. 23-0911, 2025 WL 2057904, at *10–12 (Iowa Ct. App. July 23, 2025) (en
banc) (Ahlers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), our sentencing
statutes require a defendant to be placed on probation if any part of a sentence
is suspended. Since the district court suspended the fines on Luna’s three
charges, it was required to place him on probation. See Iowa Code
§§ 901.5(3) (giving the court authority to suspend execution of any part of a
sentence “as provided in chapter 907”), 907.3(3) (2024) (requiring the court
to place the defendant on probation upon suspension of a sentence). Because
the court did not couple the suspension of Luna’s fines with probation, the
suspension of the fines runs afoul of our sentencing statutes and constitutes
illegal sentences. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from that part of the
majority opinion that does not vacate the sentences and remand for
resentencing.

I also respectfully disagree with the majority’s contention that Cullum
answered the question here. The Cullum majority identified the issue as
“whether a district court has the flexibility to impose a term of incarceration
and suspend the fines.” 2025 WL 2057904, at *4. As I pointed out in my
partial dissent in Cullum, that’s not the issue. Id. at *10 (Ahlers, J.,

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concurring in part and dissenting in part). No one disputes that the court has
the authority to impose a term of incarceration while also suspending the fine,
so the lengthy discussion in the Cullum majority opinion addressing that
undisputed issue doesn’t answer the question presented here. The pertinent
question is this: If the fine is suspended, do the governing statutes require the
court to also place the defendant on probation? For the reasons highlighted
above and discussed in more detail in my partial dissents in Laue and Cullum,
I conclude they do.

In the event this case goes to the supreme court on further review—
and I hope it does—it is worth mentioning that the State appears to make a
similar mistake as the Cullum majority in identifying the issue. The State
argues that Luna “urges that Iowa’s district courts lack the statutory ability
to impose a period of incarceration and suspend the attendant fine.” Again,
that is not the issue. No one is claiming there is some link between the
carceral part of the sentence and the fine part of the sentence that prevents
the district court from suspending the fine if incarceration is ordered. To the
contrary, Luna and I both acknowledge that the court can suspend the fine
even though Luna was sentenced to prison. The governing statute expressly
grants that authority. See Iowa Code § 901.5(3) (granting the court the
authority to “suspend the execution of the sentence or any part of it as
provided in chapter 907” (emphasis added)). So, the incarceration decision
here has nothing to do with the issue at hand. The sole issue is whether, once
the decision was made to suspend the fine, the court was required to place
Luna on probation. I conclude that section 907.3(3) unambiguously states
that probation as it relates to suspension of the fine and not the imposition of
incarceration is required. And, contrary to another part of the State’s
argument, the “may” language in section 907.3(3) refers to the fact that the
district court has discretion whether to suspend any part of the sentence; it

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doesn’t make it discretionary whether to place the defendant on probation
once it chooses to suspend any part of the sentence. Once the decision to
suspend any part of the sentence is made—here, the fine—section 907.3(3)
requires imposition of probation as it relates to that suspended fine.

Because the State misidentifies the issue—as did the Cullum
majority—it barks up the wrong tree by citing cases that address issues that
are not in dispute here and proclaiming there to be a thirty-year history of
precedent. But none of the cases the State cites support its position as to the
real issue in this case. See State v. Duffield, 16 N.W.3d 298, 304 (2025)
(holding that the court had the authority to suspend the fine, but saying
nothing about whether there is a corresponding obligation to couple the
suspension with probation); State v. Ayers, 590 N.W.2d 25, 29–32 (Iowa 1999)
(recognizing that the court has authority to suspend a fine even though it
imposed a prison sentence, but saying nothing about whether the suspension
of the fine would also require imposition of probation); State v. Klein, 574
N.W.2d 347, 348–49 (Iowa 1998) (same); State v. Grey, 514 N.W.2d 78, 79
(Iowa 1994) (same) 1 ; State v. Chana, 476 N.W.2d 38, 39–40 (Iowa 1991)
(same). The only case the State cites that even arguably addresses the issue
in this case is State v. Lee, 561 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa 1997), which is the case relied
upon by Judge Langholz in his special concurrence in Cullum. In a footnote
to my partial dissent in Cullum, I explained why I am not persuaded that Lee

1
Grey actually supports my position when it notes, “Suspending a fine and
imposing no fine are not equivalent: a suspended sentence is subject to later being
executed if the defendant fails to comply with conditions set by the court.” 514 N.W.2d at
79. This is a recognition that probation is required when the fine is suspended because
there is no way other than probation-revocation proceedings that could trigger the
execution of the suspended fine. The suspension of Luna’s fine with no corresponding
probation means there is no possible way the fine “is subject to later being executed,”
running afoul of the principle enunciated in Grey.

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controls the outcome here, so I will not repeat my reasoning here. See 2025
WL 2057904, at *11 n.7.

As I have noted before, this issue has been lingering for several years.
And I note that there is adversarial briefing on the issue, and Luna asked the
supreme court to retain the case to address it. Alas, the supreme court did
not retain it. But it is my hope that Luna will seek further review, and our
supreme court will grant it. While I believe the relevant statutes
unambiguously require the outcome I’ve described, there continues to be
disagreement on this court. I believe it is in everyone’s best interest for the
supreme court to take the case on further review to resolve the disagreement,
whatever that resolution may be.

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