State of Iowa v. Dawn Marie Sheka

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 24-1749
Filed April 29, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Dawn Marie Sheka,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County,
The Honorable Kathryn E. Austin, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Jamie Hunter of Dickey, Campbell & Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines,
attorney for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant
Attorney General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Tabor, C.J., Langholz, J., and Doyle, S.J.
Opinion by Doyle, S.J.

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DOYLE, Senior Judge.

A jury convicted Dawn Sheka of assault on a healthcare provider, a
serious misdemeanor. She appeals that conviction by challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence. Following our review, we affirm.

I. Background Facts & Prior Proceedings

Sheka’s conviction stems from her visit to a Marshalltown emergency
room with her daughter. From the evidence presented at trial about that visit,
a fact finder could find the following facts. Sheka and her daughter traveled
to the emergency room so that both could be seen by a doctor. But when the
doctor met them in the exam room, Sheka was not cooperative. It was
unclear to the doctor what issues brought the mother and daughter to the
hospital. Sheka’s responses to the doctor’s questions were “tangential and
disorganized and not answering the questions.”

The doctor was concerned about the mother’s mental state and
observed Sheka to be agitated, paranoid, and delusional. And she thought
the daughter “was absolutely terrified.” Concerned about the daughter’s
safety, the doctor told Sheka she could leave if desired but would not be
allowed to take her daughter with her. Sheka then became “verbally and
physically aggressive” with the doctor and tried to flee the hospital with her
daughter.

The doctor tried to prevent Sheka from leaving with the child. She
attempted to position herself in front of Sheka as Sheka went toward the exit
with her daughter. There was first physical contact between Sheka and the
doctor in the exam room when Sheka pushed her way out of the room. There
was contact between them again in the hallway and finally in the vestibule at

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the exit of the emergency room. In the vestibule, Sheka elbowed or shoved
the doctor in the ribs back into a glass door panel.

The State charged Sheka with assault on a person in certain
occupations causing bodily injury, in violation of Iowa Code sections 708.1
and 708.3A(3) (2023). The matter proceeded to trial, and the jury convicted
Sheka of the lesser-included offense of assault on persons engaged in certain
occupations.

Sheka appeals.

II. Discussion

We review Sheka’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge “for
correction of errors at law.” State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Iowa
2022) (citation omitted). “[W]e are highly deferential to the jury’s verdict.”
Id. And we are bound by that verdict so long as it is supported by substantial
evidence. Id. “Substantial evidence, in turn, is evidence sufficient to
convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” State v. Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d 247, 256 (Iowa 2022) (cleaned up).
When reviewing the evidence, we view it “in the light most favorable to the
State, including all legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly
and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.” Crawford, 972
N.W.2d at 202 (cleaned up). “It is not our place to resolve conflicts in the
evidence, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to determine the
plausibility of explanations, or to weigh the evidence; such matters are for the
jury.” Brimmer, 983 N.W.2d at 256 (cleaned up).

Because Sheka did not object to the jury instructions, they are the law
of the case for purposes of reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. See State
v. Banes, 910 N.W.2d 634, 639 (Iowa Ct. App. 2018). The marshaling

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instruction addressed both the charged offense and the lesser-included
offense for which Sheka was convicted. It stated:
The State must prove all the following elements of Assault on a
Person Engaged in Certain Occupations Causing Bodily Injury:

1. On or about the 6th of June, 2023, the defendant did an act which
is intended to cause pain or injury to, OR which is intended to result in
physical contact which will be insulting or offensive to another, OR act
which was intended to place another person in fear of immediate physical
contact which would be painful, injurious, insulting or offens[ive].

2. The Defendant had the apparent ability to execute the act.

3. The Defendant’s act caused a bodily [injury]1 to [the doctor] as
defined in Instruction No. 17A.

4. The victim, [the doctor] is a healthcare provider as defined in
Instruction 17B.

If the State has proved all of the elements, the defendant is guilty
of Assault on a Person Engaged in Certain Occupations Causing Bodily
Injury. If the State has proved only elements 1, 2 and 4, the defendant is
guilty of Assault on a Person Engaged in Certain Occupations. If the State
has proved only elements 1 and 2, the defendant is guilty of Assault. If the
State has failed to prove either element 1 or 2, the defendant is not guilty.

Sheka only challenges the first element. She argues that any contact
between her and the doctor was not intentional and was merely incidental as
she tried to leave the hospital. A definitional instruction defined “specific
intent” for the jury as meaning “not only being aware of doing an act and
doing it voluntarily, but in addition, doing it with a specific purpose in mind.”
And that instruction provided this additional guidance,
Because determining the defendant’s specific intent requires you
to decide what he was thinking when an act was done, it is seldom capable

1
The word “injury” was added in and initialed by the district court judge to
correct a scrivener’s error.

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of direct proof. Therefore, you should consider the facts and
circumstances surrounding the act to determine the defendant’s specific
intent. You may, but are not required to, conclude a person intends the
natural results of his acts.

While we agree with Sheka that the evidence establishes she was trying to
leave the hospital with her daughter, it also establishes that, at the same time,
she had physical contact with the doctor that was intended to cause pain or
injury to the doctor or to be insulting or offensive to the doctor. The doctor
testified that Sheka pushed her multiple times while the doctor held her
hands up in the air rather than just walking around her as Sheka exited the
exam room and walked down the hallway. Security footage from the
emergency room showed the same. And footage from the entrance of the
emergency room showed some of the scuffle in the front vestibule. In that
footage, Sheka is seen advancing toward the doctor who had her hands raised
above her head. Then Sheka pushes the doctor up towards the vestibule’s
glass until the doctor is out of frame. That is when Sheka struck the doctor
in the ribs with her forearm and elbow according to the doctor’s testimony.
Meanwhile there is another set of unobstructed doors right by her that Sheka
could have used to exit the building. But she chose to shove, push, and elbow
the doctor. So the physical contact between them was far from incidental and
not the result of Sheka simply trying to exit the building as she contends.

From the doctor’s testimony and the security camera footage of the
confrontation in the vestibule, a jury could reasonably conclude that Sheka
acted with the intent to cause pain or injury to the doctor, intended to have
physical contact with the doctor that was insulting or offensive, or intended
to place the doctor in fear of immediate physical contact that would be
painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive. And we will not substitute our

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judgment for that of the jury’s. See State v. Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514, 519 (Iowa
2022) (“Appellate review of the jury’s verdict is not the trial redux.”).

Sheka’s conviction is supported by substantial evidence.

AFFIRMED.

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