State of Iowa v. Rick Jason Reifenrath

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1045
Filed June 7, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

RICK JASON REIFENRATH,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Plymouth County, Daniel P.

Vakulskas, District Associate Judge.

Rick Reifenrath appeals the district court’s denial of his request for a

deferred judgment. AFFIRMED.

Debra S. De Jong, Orange City, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Israel Kodiaga, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.

The State charged Jason Reifenrath with three counts of the aggravated

misdemeanor crime of child endangerment for his claimed failure to provide each

of his three children “adequate food, and fail[ure] to maintain a safe living

environment.” See Iowa Code §§ 726.6(1)(a), (8) (Supp. 2021).1 Reifenrath pled

guilty to a single count. The plea document did not identify the count or child. To

establish a factual basis, Reifenrath attested that he was a parent or guardian “of

a minor child and [he] failed to provide necessary shelter[,] which created a

substantial risk of harm [to his] minor child’s mental, emotional or physical health.”

The district court accepted the plea. The court denied Reifenrath’s request

for a deferred judgment and instead imposed and suspended a 365-day jail term.

Reifenrath was placed on probation for one year.

On appeal, Reifenrath contends the district court (1) improperly considered

unproven or uncharged facts, and (2) failed to consider all the sentencing factors

in denying his request for a deferred judgment.

I. Unproven Offenses

“A sentencing court may not consider an unproven or unprosecuted offense

when sentencing a defendant unless (1) the facts before the court show the

accused committed the offense, or (2) the defendant admits it.” State v.

Gonzalez, 582 N.W.2d 515, 516 (Iowa 1998). Minutes of testimony may “establish

1 The trial information alleged the conduct for each count to have occurred between
July 2018 and November 2021. While section 726.6 was amended in that
timeframe—effective July 1, 2021—the relevant subsections were not affected.
See 2021 Iowa Acts ch. 78, § 2. In any event, the factual basis provided in
Reifenrath’s written guilty plea disclosed the crime was committed in November
2021.
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a factual basis for the charge to which the defendant pleads guilty.” State v.

Black, 324 N.W.2d 313, 316 (Iowa 1982). “However, where portions of the minutes

are not necessary to establish a factual basis for the guilty plea, they are denied

by the defendant, and they are otherwise unproved,” so there is “no basis to allow

the sentencing court to consider and rely on these portions.” Id.

Reifenrath argues, “[T]he portions of the minutes that were not necessary

to establish the factual basis for the plea should not have been relied upon by the

sentencing court.” The State responds that Reifenrath agreed the court could

consider the minutes and, accordingly, he cannot complain about their use. But

Reifenrath’s agreement was limited to the court’s consideration of “whether there

[was] a factual basis for this [p]lea of [g]uilty.” (Emphasis added.) Reifenrath has

not waived his contention that the court was foreclosed from considering anything

in the minutes beyond references to the condition of the home. That said,

Reifenrath fails to point to any unproven conduct referenced in the minutes on

which the district court relied. See State v. McCombs, No. 21-1964, 2023

WL 2673260, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2023) (stating the defendant did “not

point to any statements made by the court that he believe[d] establishe[d] that the

court relied on unproven facts or allegations from the minutes in imposing

sentence”).

Reifenrath’s primary focus is on eight exhibits—not attached to the

minutes—that were offered by the State and were admitted at the sentencing

hearing over his objections. He asserts, “[I]t is clear in reviewing the [e]xhibits that

there are facts included that are not necessary to establish the factual basis for the

plea and therefore were denied . . . and were unproved and should not have been
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relied upon to any degree.” We agree the exhibits cover much more than the

children’s shelter—the only fact underlying the guilty plea. But again, the district

court did not reference any unproven conduct encompassed in the documents

beyond stating, “I’ve reviewed the exhibits.” That reference was insufficient to

establish “an affirmative reliance by the trial court on an unproven offense.” See

State v. Clark, No. 05-1801, 2006 WL 1279280, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 10, 2006);

see also State v. Guise, 921 N.W.2d 26, 30 (Iowa 2018) (“The fact that the

sentencing judge was merely aware of the uncharged offense is not sufficient to

overcome the presumption that his discretion was properly exercised.” (quoting

State v. Ashley, 462 N.W.2d 279, 282 (Iowa 1990))).

Reifenrath also contends the district court considered the two dismissed

child endangerment charges. We disagree. See Clark, 2006 WL 1279280, at *1–

2 (distinguishing opinions in which the court “gave some weight” to the unproven

offenses in imposing sentence). The court simply asked Reifenrath’s attorney to

clarify that he was “originally charged with three counts, and he’s pleading to one

count.” Counsel stated that was “[c]orrect.” The court’s question did not establish

reliance on the dismissed charges in imposing sentence.

Finally, Reifenrath asserts the court “brought up the fact that [he] had an

ongoing [child-in-need-of-assistance] case.” The record supports his assertion.

But that case did not implicate a criminal “offense.” And, even if it did, the judge

mentioned the case to clarify that he “was not presiding over it, although he may

have signed a removal order.”

We conclude the district court did not consider unproven charges in

sentencing Reifenrath.
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II. Consideration of Sentencing Factors

Reifenrath argues the district court failed to consider all of the statutory

sentencing factors in deciding whether to grant his request for a deferred judgment.

See Iowa Code §§ 901.5, 907.5(1). He acknowledges the court made a “general

reference to rehabilitation and deterrence,” but argues the court emphasized “the

seriousness of the offense.”

“Even a ‘terse and succinct statement is sufficient . . . when the reasons for

the exercise of discretion are obvious in light of the statement and the record before

the court.’” Goodwin v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 936 N.W.2d 634, 648 (Iowa 2019) (quoting

State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015)). The reasons are obvious

here. The court expressed sympathy for Reifenrath but found the seriousness of

the offense outweighed the mitigating circumstances cited by him. We discern no

abuse of discretion in the court’s stated reasons for declining Reifenrath’s request

for a deferred judgment.

AFFIRMED.