Andrew Rudolf Wulf v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-0556
Filed August 30, 2023

ANDREW RUDOLPH WULF,
Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Davis County, Crystal S. Cronk,

Judge.

Andrew Wulf appeals the denial of his postconviction-relief application.

AFFIRMED.

Jessica Donels of Parrish Kruidenier Dunn Gentry Brown Bergmann &

Messamer L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
2

AHLERS, Judge.

A jury convicted Andrew Wulf of ongoing criminal conduct and two counts

of theft for his actions related to his hunting outfitter business. This court affirmed

his convictions on direct appeal. See generally State v. Wulf, No. 18-0398, 2019

WL 720469 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2019). Wulf sought postconviction relief

(PCR), raising a number of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, which the

PCR court rejected. Wulf appeals.

I. Background Facts

On direct appeal, we summarized the facts relating to Wulf’s criminal

convictions as follows:

Wulf owned and operated Whitetail Ridge Outfitters, LLC
(WRO), which provided guided hunts for hunters. . . .
In May 2016, Paul Rademaker entered into an agreement with
WRO for a ten-day fully guided hunt in Iowa and Missouri beginning
December 27, 2016, for $5000. Wulf paid for Rademaker’s lodging
at a motel in Bloomfield but only provided three or four meals, rather
than the thirty meals Rademaker expected to receive. Also, Wulf
never took Rademaker to any hunting locations. Wulf provided
Rademaker with an electronic map with a pin on it and told
Rademaker to go to the location himself. Rademaker’s Iowa hunting
license was only valid in Zone 6, but one of the locations Wulf sent
to Rademaker was in Zone 5, where it was illegal for Rademaker to
hunt. No locations were in Missouri. Wulf did not provide
Rademaker with any other guide services. After a few days,
Rademaker contacted another outfitter who took him to hunting
locations, provided blinds and tree stands, and information from trail
cameras. Rademaker did not receive a refund from Wulf.
John Granberg entered into an agreement with WRO for a
five-day fully guided hunt in Iowa, beginning December 27, 2016, for
which he paid $2750. Wulf told Granberg to check in at the
Bloomfield motel, where Wulf had paid for Granberg’s lodging.
Granberg wanted to go hunting that day. He exchanged calls and
texts with Wulf, but Wulf never appeared to take him hunting.
Granberg decided to leave Bloomfield. He went to another town and
lined up another outfitter. Granberg asked Wulf for a refund but
never got any money back.
3

In May 2016, Randall McMillan entered into a contract with
WRO for a five-day fully guided hunt in Iowa in December 2016 and
paid a deposit of $1250. Under the terms of the contract, McMillan
would be refunded his deposit if he did not receive a nonresident
antlered deer-hunting license. McMillan did not receive a
nonresident antlered deer-hunting license in the drawing. Wulf did
not give McMillan a refund for his deposit.

Id. at *1 (footnote omitted).

The criminal trial included testimony from several people relevant to Wulf’s

PCR claims. Davis County Sheriff’s Deputy Joshua O’Dell, the primary

investigator in the case, testified about his investigation. That testimony included

repeating statements Rademaker, Granberg, and McMillan made to him during the

investigation. During trial, the prosecutor questioned O’Dell about the details of

his investigation, including whether he ever questioned Wulf. O’Dell explained

that, although he attempted to question Wulf, Wulf never spoke with him.

Game Warden Matt Rush testified at trial that he received reports from

hunters complaining about Wulf’s services, though he did not identify the

complaining hunters. Conservation Officer Bob Stuchel testified that he was still

investigating allegations of hunting violations by Wulf.

Wulf’s landlord testified that Wulf’s rent check bounced. Wulf’s former

employee explained he had a difficult time getting paid by Wulf and decided it was

too much effort to continue to work for Wulf. A motel manager who would

sometimes rent rooms to hunters for Wulf’s business noted the payment provided

by Wulf was sometimes denied and Wulf would need to provide a different credit

card number to pay for the room rentals.

Rademaker, Granberg, and McMillan also testified about their experiences

contracting with Wulf for hunting expeditions. Rademaker explained that he found
4

negative reviews of Wulf’s business online. Likewise, Granberg testified he

conducted a Google search of Wulf’s name and discovered negative reviews about

Wulf and his business.

Any additional facts will be provided as necessary.

II. Discussion

PCR proceedings are ordinarily reviewed for legal error. Sothman v. State,

967 N.W.2d 512, 522 (Iowa 2021). But when the PCR applicant claims trial

counsel provided ineffective assistance, which raises a constitutional issue, our

review is de novo. Id. With de novo review, “‘we give weight to the lower court’s

findings concerning witness credibility[,]’ [b]ut we are not bound by the lower

court’s determination.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

To establish an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the applicant must

establish both (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty; and (2) that failure

resulted in prejudice. Dempsey v. State, 860 N.W.2d 860, 868 (Iowa 2015). “Both

elements must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” Ledezma v. State,

626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001). If an applicant fails to establish either element

the claim fails, and we need not address the other element. Dempsey, 860 N.W.2d

at 868; see also Sothman, 967 N.W.2d at 522 (“If the claim lacks prejudice, it can

be decided on that ground alone without deciding whether the attorney performed

deficiently.” (citation omitted)).

The first element is satisfied when the applicant demonstrates counsel

breached an essential duty by making “errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed [to] the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment.” State v. Warren, 955 N.W.2d 848, 859 (Iowa 2021) (citation
5

omitted). “We presume counsel acted competently[,] but that presumption is

overcome ‘if we find [an applicant] has proved [trial] counsel’s performance fell

below the normal range of competency.’” Sothman, 967 N.W.2d at 522 (citation

omitted). “[C]laims of ineffective assistance involving tactical or strategic decisions

of counsel must be examined in light of all the circumstances to ascertain whether

the actions were a product of tactics or inattention . . . .” Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at

143. “While strategic decisions made after ‘thorough investigation of law and facts

relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable,’ strategic decisions

made after a ‘less than complete investigation’ must be based on reasonable

professional judgments which support the particular level of investigation

conducted.” Id. (citation omitted). And of course, “[t]rial counsel is not incompetent

in failing to pursue a meritless issue.” State v. Hoskins, 586 N.W.2d 707, 709

(Iowa 1998).

As to the second element, “constitutional prejudice, the defendant is

required to show ‘that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant

of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.’” State v. Walker, 935 N.W.2d 874,

881 (Iowa 2019) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). “It

is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had [only] some . . . effect

on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted).

“The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.
6

A. Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Objections

Wulf brings a series of claims asserting trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to raise Confrontation Clause and hearsay objections to testimony from

various witnesses. As these are distinct claims, we will address them separately.

1. Confrontation Clause

“The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that

‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted

with the witnesses against him.’” State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734, 753 (Iowa

2006) (alterations in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI). “An out-of-court

statement by a witness that is testimonial in nature is barred under the

Confrontation Clause unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a

prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.” Id. However, “when the declarant

appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no

constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.” Crawford v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004). And “[n]ontestimonial statements are not

subject to scrutiny under the Confrontation Clause.” Musser, 721 N.W.2d at 753.

With these principals in mind, we turn to Wulf’s claims that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to object to testimony as violating his right to confrontation.

Wulf claims Deputy O’Dell’s testimony about what Rademaker, Granberg, and

McMillan told him during his investigation amounted to a Confrontation Clause

violation. We disagree. All three men testified and were subject to cross-

examination at trial. So, the Confrontation Clause was not violated by Deputy

O’Dell’s testimony, and counsel was not ineffective for not objecting on this ground.

See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9 (holding introduction of a testimonial statement
7

does not violate the Confrontation Clause when the declarant appears for cross-

examination at trial).

Next, Wulf claims Game Warden Rush’s testimony that he “received several

calls from hunters that were from out of state, from various different states, lodging

complaints against Mr. Wulf for not providing the services that they had hired him

for” amounted to a Confrontation Clause violation. The State points out that, to the

extent these complaints came from Rademaker, Granberg, and McMillan, no

Confrontation Clause violation occurred because all three testified and were thus

subject to cross-examination. But even assuming Rush’s testimony included

repeating testimonial statements made by non-witnesses in violation of the

Confrontation Clause and warranted an objection, Wulf has not established

prejudice. The testimony was a passing reference in a three-day trial. Its exclusion

was unlikely to change the outcome of the trial, and its inclusion does not

undermine our confidence in Wulf’s convictions. Wulf is not entitled to relief on this

basis.

Finally, Wulf complains that Granberg’s references to reading different

internet posts about Wulf and his business violated the Confrontation Clause.

Wulf’s claim fails for two reasons. First, we note Wulf develops no Confrontation

Clause argument beyond his passing reference in an issue heading, waiving the

claim. See Midwest Auto. III, LLC v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 417, 431

n.2 (Iowa 2002) (finding perfunctory mention of an issue without elaboration or

supporting authority waives the claim); State v. Mann, 602 N.W.2d 785, 788 n.1

(Iowa 1999) (holding random mention of an issue, without elaboration or

supporting authority, is insufficient to raise the issue for appellate court’s
8

consideration). Second, none of the original posters’ internet statements qualify

as testimonial. See Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011) (noting that

whether an out-of-court statement is testimonial is measured by its “primary

purpose,” and specifically whether it was intended as “an out-of-court substitute

for trial testimony”); Lee-Purvis v. Pennsylvania, 314 F. Supp. 3d 665, 678 (E.D.

Pa. 2018) (finding no Confrontation Clause violation for admitting Facebook posts

because there was no indication that the primary purpose of the posts “was to

memorialize an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony”); Turkot v. State,

No. 2814, 2017 WL 2687764, at *18–19 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. June 22, 2017)

(finding statements posted on Facebook Messenger are not testimonial because

they were not intended as “an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony” (quoting

Bryant, 562 U.S. at 358)). As such, Granberg’s reference to the posts did not

violate the Confrontation Clause, so counsel had no duty to object on Confrontation

Clause grounds.

2. Hearsay

Next, we address Wulf’s claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to

object to certain testimony as violating the rule against hearsay. Hearsay is an

out-of-court statement offered “into evidence to prove the truth of the matter

asserted in the statement.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.801(c)(2). Hearsay is not admissible

at trial unless an exception applies. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.802. However, “[a]n out-

of-court statement offered only to explain responsive conduct that is relevant to an

aspect of the [S]tate’s case is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted

and is therefore not hearsay.” State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d. 801, 812 (Iowa 2017).
9

As he did in his direct appeal, Wulf complains about Deputy O’Dell’s

testimony. Here he contends that O’Dell’s testimony about what Rademaker,

Granberg, and McMillan told him constituted hearsay.1 But O’Dell didn’t testify

about anything Rademaker, Granberg, and McMillan said that the three didn’t also

say themselves when they testified. So even if O’Dell’s testimony included

hearsay, it was cumulative of other properly admitted testimony, and its exclusion

would not have impacted the outcome of the trial. See State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d

6, 19 (Iowa 2006) (“[W]e have held that notwithstanding the presumption of

prejudice from the admission of [hearsay] evidence, the erroneously admitted

hearsay will not be considered prejudicial if substantially the same evidence is

properly in the record.”). Accordingly, Wulf cannot establish prejudice, and he is

not entitled to relief on this basis.

Wulf also claims Game Warden Rush’s statements about what he learned

from complaining hunters amounted to hearsay and trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to object. Our review of this part of Rush’s testimony reveals it was given

to explain his responsive conduct—why he contacted O’Dell in the first place—

rather than for the truth of the matter asserted. As such, it was not hearsay. To

the extent his testimony went beyond explaining his responsive conduct, it was

duplicative of other evidence that was properly admitted through testimony from

Rademaker, Granberg, and McMillan as well as text message exhibits. So, again,

even if counsel had objected and the testimony was excluded as hearsay, the jury

1 To the extent Wulf attempts to challenge certain portions of O’Dell’s testimony

about Rademaker’s statements as hearsay and claims counsel was ineffective for
failing to object, we already found the statements were not hearsay and counsel
had no duty to object on direct appeal. See Wulf, 2019 WL 720469, at *5.
10

still would have learned the same information from other sources. So Wulf cannot

establish prejudice and is not entitled to relief. See id.

Next, Wulf argues counsel was ineffective for not objecting to testimony

from Rademaker as hearsay. We already addressed a portion of the challenged

testimony on direct appeal and determined it was not hearsay because it explained

his responsive conduct. Wulf, 2019 WL 720469, at *5. So as to the previously

addressed portion of Rademaker’s testimony, Wulf’s claim is barred by issue

preclusion. See Barker v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 922 N.W.2d 581, 587 (Iowa

2019) (defining issue preclusion). As to the remaining challenged portion of

Rademaker’s testimony—in which Rademaker explained he went through

negative online reviews of Wulf, grew concerned, and decided to confront Wulf via

text message—we again conclude the testimony was not given to prove the truth

of the matter asserted. First, Rademaker didn’t even provide specific details about

the online reviews other than noting they were “[q]uite negative,” and second, that

minor detail was necessary for Rademaker to explain why he confronted Wulf. It

provided necessary context for Rademaker’s responsive conduct. It is not

hearsay, and counsel had no duty to object to it.

Likewise, Wulf claims that Granberg’s testimony about conducting a Google

search about Wulf and coming across stories similar to his experiences with Wulf

and Wulf’s business amounted to hearsay to which counsel should have objected.

Again, our review of the testimony shows it was not offered to prove the truth of

the Google search results, which were never presented to the jury, but to explain
11

Granberg’s responsive conduct. The testimony was not hearsay, and counsel had

no duty to object.2

B. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Wulf’s next set of claims allege trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

object to various instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Prosecutorial misconduct

occurs when the prosecutor acts with reckless disregard of the duty to ensure the

defendant has a fair trial in compliance with the requirements of due process or

intentionally makes statements in violation of an obvious obligation, legal standard,

or applicable rule that goes beyond an exercise of poor judgment. State v.

Coleman, 907 N.W.2d 124, 139 (Iowa 2018).

1. Right to Remain Silent

First, Wulf claims the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting

testimony from Deputy O’Dell regarding Wulf’s decision to remain silent in violation

of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights through the following exchange:

Q. . . . [D]id you talk to Mr. Wulf? A. I attempted to. I went to
the residence . . . in an attempt to make contact with him. I was never
able to find him there. Also, after we filed the warrants and he was
arrested, I did meet with Mr. Wulf at the Davis County Jail,
Mirandized him, and asked to speak with him, and he chose not to.
Q. When he chose not to speak with you, did you ever—
besides being—working at the jail, did you ever talk to Wulf again
about this case? A. No, sir, not outside, never about the case, just
jail issues.
Q. Did Mr. Wulf at any time ever tell you that he had this
contract? A. No, sir, he never told me anything.

2 Our conclusion that the challenged testimony of Rush, Rademaker, and
Granberg was not hearsay is consistent with the decision reached in Wulf’s direct
appeal, where we held that a similar class of testimony was not hearsay because
it was offered to prove responsive conduct rather than for the truth of the matter
asserted. See Wulf, 2019 WL 720469, at *5
12

Testimony commenting on a defendant’s decision to invoke the right to

remain silent is not admissible. State v. Porter, 283 N.W.2d 351, 352–53 (Iowa

1979). But Wulf is not contending counsel was ineffective for failing to object to

the testimony itself. Instead, he frames his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim

based on counsel’s failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct, meaning he must

show the prosecutor acted with reckless disregard of a duty or intentionally elicited

the prohibited testimony, see Coleman, 907 N.W.2d at 139, counsel breached a

duty for failing to object, and that breach resulted in constitutional prejudice, see

Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 142. However, as the State points out, Wulf has not

established that the prosecutor acted with reckless disregard of a duty or

intentionally sought out testimony about Wulf’s constitutionally protected post-

arrest silence. So he cannot establish a would-be claim of prosecutorial

misconduct to which defense counsel should have objected. As a result, Wulf is

not entitled to relief on this ground.

2. Closing Arguments

Next, Wulf claims the prosecutor committed misconduct by “asking the jury

to send a message” during closing arguments and counsel was ineffective for not

objecting. Wulf asserts that this statement during the prosecutor’s closing

argument constituted “asking the jury to send a message”:

Those three guys are the people that got hurt in this case.
They’re all out-of-towners. They’re all out-of-staters. The defendant
is out of town here. Those three men came to your county, and they
were deceived, and they were took. People that live here or people
that come here should not be took by other people.

While prosecutors cannot “urge the jurors to convict the defendant in order

to protect community values and prevent further criminal activity” in a manner that
13

amounts to “an improper emotional appeal designed to persuade the jury to decide

the case on issues other than the facts before it,” that is not what occurred here.

See State v. Johnson, 534 N.W.2d 118, 127–28 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). Rather, it

appears the prosecutor was driving home the point that no person, regardless of

where the person is from, should be subject to theft by deception.3 See Iowa Code

§ 714.1(3) (2015). Even if this portion of closing argument amounted to

prosecutorial misconduct and counsel should have objected, Wulf cannot establish

that had counsel objected the outcome of the trial likely would have been different.

See Johnson, 534 N.W.2d at 128. The comment amounted to six lines of transcript

of the State’s closing argument, which spanned almost nineteen pages.4 It was a

fleeting reference in a thorough and comprehensive closing argument. We cannot

conclude that, had counsel objected to this passing comment, the outcome of the

trial would have likely been different. So Wulf has not established the prejudice

necessary to obtain relief on this ground.

3. References to Pre-trial Detention

Finally, Wulf contends the prosecutor committed misconduct during jury

selection, while questioning Deputy O’Dell and Wulf’s landlord, and during closing

arguments, by referencing the fact that Wulf had been arrested for the charged

offenses and taken to the county jail. He contends the “comments were akin to

Wulf appearing for trial in prison garb or shackled: they were inherently prejudicial[]

because they undermined the presumption of innocence.” See id. at 126 (“The

3 The trial information and jury instructions made clear the State was alleging Wulf

committed theft by deception.
4 Each page of transcript includes twenty-five lines.
14

[S]tate cannot compel a defendant to stand trial in identifiable prison clothing.”).

We do not consider the references to Wulf’s arrest and stay at the county jail as

being functionally the same as a defendant appearing before the jury in prison

clothing. And Wulf points us to no authority barring references to the defendant’s

arrest and subsequent detention. As such, he cannot show the prosecutor acted

with reckless disregard or intentionally sought to inform the jury of some prohibited

information. Counsel had no duty to object, and Wulf is not entitled to relief on this

ground.

C. Prior Bad Acts Testimony

Next, Wulf claims counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prior-bad-

acts evidence, which was introduced through testimony of four witnesses.

“[E]vidence of prior bad acts is not admissible for purposes of proving character.”

State v. Putman, 848 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2014); see also Iowa R. Evid. 5.404(b)(1)

(“Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s

character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in

accordance with the character.”). However, the “evidence may be admissible for

another purpose such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Iowa R.

Evid. 5.404(b)(2).

First, Wulf argues counsel should have objected to testimony from his

former landlord about his history of bouncing checks. But defense counsel

explained during the PCR proceedings that he had a strategic reason for not

objecting to the testimony. See Ledezma, 626 N.W.2d at 143. Specifically, he

didn’t object so that the jury would also hear that Wulf “ended up making the check
15

good or paid cash” and actually provided housing for hunters. While reasonable

minds could disagree on whether this was the most prudent strategy, it did further

his defense theory that Wulf ultimately provided the services he claimed he would.

Because counsel had a reasonable trial-strategy-based reason for not objecting,

counsel was not ineffective. See Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 866 (Iowa

2012) (“When counsel makes a reasonable tactical decision, this court will not

engage in second-guessing.” (quoting Fryer v. State, 325 N.W.2d 400, 413 (Iowa

1982))).

Second, Wulf complains Conservation Officer Stuchel’s testimony that he

was investigating hunting violations and had received a trespassing complaint

about Wulf amounted to impermissible evidence of prior bad acts. As to the

trespassing complaint, on cross-examination, Wulf’s counsel had Stuchel clarify

that he never pursued a trespassing charge against Wulf, thus suggesting that the

purported prior bad act never occurred. With respect to Stuchel’s references to

investigating hunting violations, counsel made a strategic decision not to object to

the testimony in effort to not draw attention to it. Counsel’s decision to address the

trespass comment by clarifying Wulf had never been charged and to not draw

attention to the hunting violation investigation were reasonable trial strategies that

we will not second-guess. See id. Counsel did not breach an essential duty by

not objecting.

Third, Wulf points to testimony from his former employee explaining that the

former employee quit because he “had trouble getting paid” as impermissible prior-

bad-acts evidence. We disagree with his characterization of the testimony as

impermissible prior-bad-acts evidence. Instead, it was admissible to show motive
16

for Wulf’s criminal scheme—he was cash poor and needed money to pay his

debts, including his payroll. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.404(b)(2). Accordingly, counsel

had no duty to object, and Wulf’s claim fails.

Finally, Wulf complains the motel manager testifying about Wulf’s credit

card being declined at times amounted to prior-bad-acts evidence. But once again,

we think this evidence was properly admitted to establish motive because it

highlighted Wulf’s cash-flow problems. See id. So, again, counsel had no duty to

object, and Wulf’s claim fails.

D. Cumulative Prejudice

Wulf’s final argument is that the cumulative prejudice of counsel’s missteps

deprived him of a fair trial. “Iowa recognizes the cumulative effect of ineffective

assistance of counsel claims when analyzing prejudice under Strickland.” State v.

Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488, 501 (Iowa 2012). “[I]f a claimant raises multiple claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel, the cumulative prejudice from those individual

claims should be properly assessed under the prejudice prong of Strickland.” Id.

When a claimant raises multiple grounds of ineffective-assistance and the court

resolves the claims on the prejudice prong without considering whether counsel

failed to perform an essential duty, then the overall claim can only be dismissed

after considering the potential prejudice cumulatively. Id.

Here, we arguably resolved some of Wulf’s claims on the prejudice prong

without reaching a definitive decision as to whether counsel breached an essential

duty. Those claims include Wulf’s (1) Confrontation Clause and hearsay claims

regarding Game Warden Rush’s testimony about receiving complaints about Wulf,

(2) hearsay claim regarding Deputy O’Dell’s testimony about what the hunters told
17

him, (3) and prosecutorial misconduct claim relating to the State’s closing

argument. Even considering the potential cumulative prejudice of these claims,

which would be minimal with respect to each claim, our confidence in Wulf’s

convictions is not shaken, and we conclude Wulf received a fair trial. Wulf did not

suffer cumulative prejudice and is not entitled to relief on this basis either.

III. Conclusion

Following our de novo review of the record, we conclude Wulf failed to

establish he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel with respect to

any of his claims. The PCR court properly denied his application for PCR.

AFFIRMED.