State of Iowa v. Jabri Malik Guy

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0493
Filed January 10, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JABRI MALIK GUY,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Brendan Greiner,

District Associate Judge.

The defendant appeals his sentence for operating while intoxicated, second

offense. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Maria Ruhtenberg,

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Olivia D. Brooks, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Buller, JJ.
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GREER, Presiding Judge.

Jabri Guy challenges the sentence imposed following his January 2023

written guilty plea to operating while intoxicated (OWI), second offense, an

aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code § 321J.2 (2022). At the top of

his list of concerns, Guy found the sentence to be too harsh given the factors he

believes the court should have considered and discounting the factors he claims

the court should not have given weight. To that point, Guy maintains the court

failed to properly consider that his substance-abuse evaluation recommended no

treatment, gave his criminal history of other OWI convictions too much weight, and

gave too little weight to the other risk assessments. Based on the parameters of

our review, we affirm the sentence.

After Guy pled guilty by a written plea agreement, the sentencing court held

a sentencing hearing in March 2023. The State recommended a two-year term of

imprisonment; Guy requested suspension of all but the minimum jail sentence of

seven days with supervised probation, which aligned with the recommendation in

the presentence investigation (PSI) report. Guy admitted that “he has a limited

criminal history, the two OWI’s prior to this one being the main two.” The State

pointed out that the conviction Guy was being sentenced on was “a lifetime third

pled down to a second. His last two OWI’s were both very recent in 2021.” The

PSI report listed both previous OWI convictions.1 The sentencing court imposed

a term of imprisonment not to exceed two years and stated that it did so because

1 Guy was twice previously convicted of OWI, first offense: in case OWCR235961

in June 2020 and again in case OWCR236783 in January 2021. The conviction
underlying the sentence at issue in this appeal, case OMOM092410, is Guy’s
lifetime third conviction for OWI.
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it had doubts about the substance-abuse evaluation and it considered that “this is

a third [OWI] case, and [it had] serious concerns for the protection of the

community.” In its view, the sentencing court added that it did not “believe that

[Guy] is ready to change [his] behavior, in part because this is the third OWI in two

years, and [it doesn’t] see a recommendation for treatment.” As for other factors,

on the sentencing order, the court also marked these sentencing consideration

factors: the nature and circumstances of the crime, protection of the public from

further offenses, Guy’s criminal and substance abuse history, and the maximum

opportunity for rehabilitation. Guy appeals.

Although Guy pled guilty, because he is challenging the sentence imposed

and not the guilty plea, he has good cause for appeal. See Iowa Code

§ 814.6(1)(a)(3) (granting the right of appeal “where the defendant establishes

good cause”); State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020) (“We hold that

good cause exists to appeal from a conviction following a guilty plea when the

defendant challenges his or her sentence rather than the guilty plea.”). We reverse

a sentence within the statutory limits—like here—only if the sentencing court

abused its discretion or there was some defect in the sentencing procedure.

Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 103. An abuse of discretion occurs when “the district court

exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or

unreasonable.” State v. Gordon, 921 N.W.2d 19, 24 (Iowa 2018). A ground or

reason is untenable if it is based on an erroneous application of law. See Willard

v. State, 893 N.W.2d 52, 58 (Iowa 2017). “[M]ere disagreement with the sentence

imposed, without more, is insufficient to establish an abuse of discretion.” State v.

Pena, No. 15-0988, 2016 WL 1133807, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2016).
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Guy contends that the sentencing court erred in imposing a term of two

years of imprisonment rather than suspending all of it but for the minimum seven-

day sentence and authorizing supervised probation as the PSI evaluator

recommended. However, “[a] sentencing court’s decision to impose a specific

sentence that falls within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption

in its favor . . . .” State v. Wilbourn, 974 N.W.2d 58, 65 (Iowa 2022) (citation

omitted). And section 321J.2(4) authorizes a sentencing court to punish a

conviction for OWI, second offense through the imposition of “a minimum period

of imprisonment in the county jail or community-based correctional facility of seven

days but not to exceed two years.” While this sentence may seem unduly harsh,

“our task on appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the district court,

but to determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” State v.

Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2002). Likewise, “The test for whether a

sentencing court abused its discretion is not whether we might have weighed the

various factors differently.” State v. Gordon, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2023 WL

8655919, at *3 (Iowa 2023).

Guy raises several claimed unreasonable grounds he believes the court

utilized in forming his sentence. First, Guy takes issue with the court’s opinion that

he was not ready to change his behavior and emphasizes that the October 2022

substance-abuse evaluation did not recommend treatment and the PSI report

recommended the minimum sentence for OWI, second offense. Yet, the

sentencing court must merely “consider the substance abuse evaluation in

sentencing a second or subsequent OWI offender with an eye toward treatment

recommended as a result of the required evaluation.” State v. Ludley, 465
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N.W.2d 912, 913 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). Second, a PSI sentencing

recommendation does not bind the sentencing court but is simply “a factor that can

influence the sentencing decision.” State v. Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d 550, 557 (Iowa

2015); accord State v. Fesko, No. 13-1736, 2014 WL 2885336, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.

June 25, 2014) (finding no abuse of discretion when the sentencing court declined

to follow the PSI’s sentencing recommendation).

True, prior to pleading guilty, Guy completed the court-ordered substance-

abuse evaluation and it did not recommend any treatment. But we find that

evaluation report does not offer much assurance that Guy has turned the corner

on accepting his problem with excessive alcohol consumption and driving, so we

understand the sentencing court’s hesitation. In part the evaluation noted that Guy

reported “the only legal issue he’s ever had was his OWI” in August 2022 (i.e. this

case). And the evaluator concluded that “[b]ased on what the client reports, no

[treatment] is recommended.” The PSI report also referenced an earlier

substance-abuse evaluation from March 2021 involving an earlier OWI charge that

recommended extended outpatient treatment but said “defendant was directed to

get another one,” which resulted in a no treatment recommendation. Thus, the

court’s hesitation over Guy’s rehabilitation as an important factor going forward

was not improper, as Guy suggests. The court was reasonable in its approach.

Next, Guy argues the sentencing court placed too much weight on this being

his third OWI when it instead should have only focused on a sentence to the crime

he pled to—OWI, second offense. But, Guy admitted on the record that he had

two previous convictions for OWI, and the PSI contained the same information.

See State v. Grandberry, 619 N.W.2d 399, 402 (Iowa 2000) (holding that the
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sentencing court did not err in considering the defendant's traffic charges listed in

the PSI report when the defendant did not contest that data). And in any event,

the sentencing court considered that the crimes were all close in time and all

involved excessive use of alcohol on Iowa roads—a factor related to protection of

the community.

As a last argument, Guy asserts the sentencing court did not consider other

mitigating factors that he believes would have guided the court to a less harsh

sentence. “The societal goals of sentencing are to provide maximum opportunity

to rehabilitate the defendant and to protect the community.” Damme, 944 N.W.2d

at 106. “A sentencing court weighs multiple factors, ‘including the nature of the

offense, the attending circumstances, the age, character and propensity of the

offender, and the chances of reform,’” which encompass mitigating factors as well

as aggravating. Id. (quoting Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725). To his credit, Guy had

an excellent job, was seeking advancement there through training, had a strong

family support system, and professed to have changed for the benefit of his young

child. He also had a limited criminal history at his young age. As for its

consideration of those factors, the sentencing court began its pronouncement of

the sentence by highlighting just those strengths and then explained it “had serious

concerns for the safety of the community.” Finally, the sentencing court

emphasized from its review of the October 2022 substance-abuse evaluation there

remained concerns that Guy “minimized [his] behavior.” And in the sentencing

order, the court identified five specific factors that were most significant in

determining the sentence—all related to the discussion at the sentencing hearing.

Therefore, we find that Guy has failed to demonstrate any evidence of
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unreasonable or untenable grounds relied on by the sentencing court. Absent any

showing of an abuse of discretion, we affirm the sentence imposed.

AFFIRMED.