Kraft Heinz Company and Indemnity Insurance Company of North America v. Ernest Bynum

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0045
Filed February 7, 2024

KRAFT HEINZ COMPANY and INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF
NORTH AMERICA,
Petitioners-Appellants,

vs.

ERNEST BYNUM,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert B. Hanson,

Judge.

An employer appeals the district court’s denial of its petition for judicial

review of the workers’ compensation commissioner’s ruling. AFFIRMED.

Peter J. Thill and Brandon W. Lobberecht of Betty, Neuman & McMahon,

P.L.C., Davenport, for appellants.

Adnan Mahmutagic of Adnan Mahmutagic P.L.L.C., Clive, for appellee.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Ahlers and Chicchelly, JJ.
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AHLERS, Judge.

Ernest Bynum began working for Kraft Heinz Company (Kraft) in November

2018 through a temporary employment agency. He was hired as a Kraft employee

on January 7, 2019. Bynum’s job duties while employed by the temp agency and

by Kraft were the same. Those duties in Kraft’s sanitation department included

shoveling waste and stacking pallets. It was physically demanding work. Over

time, this work caused Bynum to experience pain and a pulling sensation in his

groin. Bynum saw doctors about the problem. In early February, a doctor

diagnosed a hernia and scheduled Bynum for surgery later in the month to repair

it. Prior to the surgery, Bynum informed Kraft of his medical problems and

upcoming surgery. After the surgery, he took time off work to recover. While off

work, he received short-term disability benefits. While the benefits were managed

by a third party, Bynum worked with Kraft personnel to sign up for those benefits.

Bynum returned to work, but still felt pain, so he visited the doctor again.

After the pain resulted in an emergency room visit in May, Bynum did not return to

work. In June, Bynum requested a referral for a second opinion from University of

Iowa Hospitals and Clinics (UIHC), but because the injury was work-related, UIHC

declined to schedule an appointment. On June 13, Bynum wrote a letter to his

supervisors and others in the company explaining that he had informed multiple

people about his injury but had received no help and that he believed he should

be receiving workers’ compensation benefits. A Kraft employee subsequently filed

a first report of injury. In November, Bynum again returned to his doctor

complaining of the same pain and discomfort. The doctor recommended a trial of
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pain medication and referred him to a pain clinic. At some point after delivering

the June 13 letter, Bynum tried to return to work and learned he had been fired.

Bynum filed a workers’ compensation claim against Kraft and its workers’

compensation insurer, Indemnity Insurance Company of North America.1 The

deputy commissioner determined that Bynum had suffered a cumulative injury

caused by his work at Kraft, finding February 5, 2019, to be the date of injury. Kraft

asserted the affirmative defense that it had not received notice of the injury within

ninety days of that date as required by Iowa Code section 85.23 (2019). The

deputy commissioner disagreed, finding Kraft had failed to prove it did not receive

timely notice because it had not rebutted credible testimony that Bynum had

informed multiple supervisors of the injury within the ninety-day period. Kraft

appealed to the commissioner, who affirmed and adopted the deputy

commissioner’s decision. Kraft petitioned for judicial review, making the same

argument.2 The district court concluded that substantial evidence supported the

commissioner’s3 conclusion that Kraft failed to prove lack of notice and denied the

petition.

1 As Kraft and its insurer share a common interest, we will refer only to Kraft

throughout this opinion for ease of reference.
2 In both its intra-agency appeal and its petition for judicial review, Kraft raised

multiple issues. On appeal to this court, Kraft only raises the issue of whether it
received timely notice of Bynum’s injury.
3 Because the commissioner adopted the deputy commissioner’s proposed ruling,

we treat the two decisions as one and refer to them collectively as the
commissioner’s ruling, except when distinguishing the two decisions is warranted.
See Schutjer v. Algona Manor Care Ctr., 780 N.W.2d 549, 556 n.2 (Iowa 2010)
(following the same method for referencing the two decisions of the agency).
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Kraft appeals. It argues the commissioner’s notice finding was not

supported by substantial evidence. Kraft asks us to reverse the district court’s

ruling and remand with instructions to dismiss Bynum’s claim for benefits.

We review district court rulings on judicial review of agency decisions under

Iowa Code chapter 17A (2022). Chavez v. M.S. Tech. LLC, 972 N.W.2d 662, 666

(Iowa 2022). We apply section 17A.19(10) to determine whether we come to the

same conclusions as the district court. Ghost Player, LLC v. Iowa Dep’t of Econ.

Dev., 906 N.W.2d 454, 462 (Iowa 2018). “[W]e accept the commissioner’s factual

findings when supported by substantial evidence.” Bluml v. Dee Jay’s Inc., 920

N.W.2d 82, 84 (Iowa 2018). “‘Substantial evidence’ means the quantity and quality

of evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and

reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue when the consequences resulting

from the establishment of the fact are understood to be serious and of great

importance.” Iowa Code §17A.19(10)(f)(1).

Iowa Code section 85.23 (2019) provides, in relevant part:

Unless the employer or the employer’s representative shall
have actual knowledge of the occurrence of an injury received within
ninety days from the date of the occurrence of the injury, or unless
the employee or someone on the employee’s behalf or a dependent
or someone on the dependent’s behalf shall give notice thereof to
the employer within ninety days from the date of the occurrence of
the injury, no compensation shall be allowed.[4]

Kraft argues it did not receive timely notice of the injury because, before sending

the June 13 letter, Bynum only mentioned that he was hurt, not that the injury was

4 Both Kraft’s argument and the commissioner’s findings focus only on notice.

Neither address whether Kraft had actual knowledge of Bynum’s work-related
injury.
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work-related. But it is Kraft’s burden to prove it lacked notice before the notice

period expired. See IBP, Inc. v. Burress, 779 N.W.2d 210, 219 (Iowa 2010).

Bynum, whom the deputy commissioner found generally credible, testified that he

informed multiple supervisors of his injury and that he was experiencing the

symptoms of the injury due to his work activities. Kraft introduced testimony and

affidavits from some of its employees to try to rebut Bynum’s claim. However, Kraft

did not introduce testimony or other evidence to rebut Bynum’s claim that two of

his supervisors, Ron Meier and Rufina Neild, knew he had suffered a work-related

injury. The commissioner found that without any evidence to rebut Bynum’s claim

that Meier and Neild knew of his work-related injury within ninety days of

February 5, Kraft had not met its burden to prove it lacked notice.

This finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Iowa

Code §17A.19(10)(f) (2022). At the hearing, Bynum testified,

it start—just started hurting, and then I back off and—back off and
wait a while, and then I go back to doing the same thing, and it just—
it started getting worse, so I went to my team leader which was Ron,
and Ron told me—he said he would get me some help, so it said
Anthony. Anthony come back and talk to me and told me to take it
easy, okay, telling me to take it easy, they would send me some help
which I never did get. . . . [E]verybody told me to go to talk to Rufina
which is my supervisor, older supervisor, and I went in and talked to
Rufina, and Rufina told me to go to HR and talk to HR about some
time off and—I went to my doctor. My doctors gave me a packet. I
took the packet to Rufina. Rufina referred—I told her about the
operation, and they gave me the time off for the operation. I reported
it to Rufina and to Ron and to Anthony.

This testimony establishes that Rufina Neild and Ron Meier knew Bynum was

injured and experiencing pain from his work activities. And when asked

approximately what he told Rufina Neild, Bynum said “I say [sic], Rufina, I’m hurting

here from lifting all these pallets, so she told me she would go to HR and talk to
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HR about some light duty; they didn’t—they didn’t have light duty.” This testimony

provides substantial evidence supporting the commissioner’s finding that Bynum

communicated his injury and the work-related nature of it to Kraft.

Faced with this evidence, Kraft tries to discount it by arguing there is no

evidence that the conversations during which Bynum notified Neild or Meier of his

injury occurred within the ninety-day period. But Bynum’s testimony quoted above

references the conversations taking place before his surgery, which occurred on

February 28, 2019—well within the ninety-day period after the injury occurred.

Kraft also contends that Bynum’s testimony that “[t]he document that I put

on the desk [referring to Bynum’s June 13 letter], all of ‘em knew at the same time”

conclusively establishes that Bynum did not notify Kraft before delivering that letter.

But Kraft’s hyperfocus on select passages of Bynum’s testimony ignores other

evidence in the record that could reasonably be interpreted a different way. For

example, Bynum also testified that “I told ‘em all at the same time. They all knew

‘cause they all talk about it.” This testimony reasonably could support the inference

that his supervisors and the employees in human resources all knew at the same

time because they were discussing his injury with each other, not because they all

got the same letter. Even in the testimony Kraft relies on that “all of ‘em knew at

the same time,” Bynum went on to say “[t]he whole plant knew I was hurting . . .

‘cause they told me to slow down. They wanted to help me out . . . even the

supervisor on the dock told me to slow down, it’s too much work on you. Everybody

knew I was hurting.” That suggests Bynum’s co-workers, including a supervisor,

were aware of his injury through word-of-mouth or observation, not via the letter.

Further, the letter itself mentions Bynum telling his supervisors about the injury and
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that they told him to take it easy, supporting the conclusion that Bynum notified

Kraft before the letter.

Also, in an affidavit submitted on Kraft’s behalf, Bynum’s supervisor

(Anthony Meeks) acknowledges Bynum informed him of his hernia before the

surgery, and thus before the June 13 letter. While the same affidavit denies Bynum

telling Meeks that the hernia was work related, when the affidavit is considered

with other evidence, a reasonable fact finder could conclude Bynum notified

multiple supervisors at Kraft of his injury and its work-related nature before his

surgery. Finally, Bynum testified that he told Rufina Neild about his injury orally

rather than through the letter—he recalled saying, “Rufina, I’m hurting here from

lifting all these pallets,” and that she told him to go to human resources. When

looking beyond just the select statements relied upon by Kraft to the entire record,

there is substantial evidence supporting the commissioner’s finding that Bynum

gave notice of his injury and the work-related nature of it within the ninety-day

period following the injury. See Ripperger v. Iowa Pub. Info. Bd., 967 N.W.2d 540,

548 (Iowa 2021) (noting that an appellate court will only disturb the commissioner’s

factual findings “if they are ‘not supported by substantial evidence in the record . . .

when that record is reviewed as a whole’” (ellipsis in original) (citation omitted)).

Although the record could support the conclusion that Bynum failed to

provide timely notice, that does not mean the commissioner’s finding to the

contrary is not supported by substantial evidence. See Arndt v. City of Le Claire,

728 N.W.2d 389, 393 (Iowa 2007) (“Just because the interpretation of the evidence

is open to a fair difference of opinion does not mean the commissioner’s decision

is not supported by substantial evidence.”). The question for us is not whether the
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evidence could support a different finding; the question is whether it supports the

finding actually made. Sherman v. Pella Corp., 576 N.W.2d 312, 320 (Iowa 1998).

Substantial evidence supports the commissioner’s finding that Bynum provided

notice of his injury and its work-related nature to Kraft within ninety days of the

injury, so we affirm.

AFFIRMED.