In the Interest of A.V., A.V.-N., A.V., and S.C., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1916
Filed April 24, 2024

IN THE INTEREST OF A.V., A.V.-N., A.V., and S.C.,
Minor Children,

M.V.-C., Mother,
Appellant,

J.C., Father of S.C.,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Shelby County, Charles D. Fagan,

Judge.

A mother and a father separately appeal the termination of their parental

rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Sara E. Benson of Meldrum & Benson Law, P.C., Council Bluffs, for

appellant mother.

J. Joseph Narmi, Council Bluffs, for appellant father of S.C.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

William Early, Harlan, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.
2

GREER, Judge.

This appeal concerns four minor children—Ad.V., born May 2015; S.C.,

born June 2017; A.V.-N., born July 2019; and Ar.V., born February 2021. The

mother (M.V.-C.) of all four children and S.C.’s father (J.C.) separately appeal the

termination of their parental rights. At the time of the termination proceedings,

Ad.V. resided with her biological father, A.S., and the fathers of A.V-N. and Ar.V.

were unknown.1 Upon our review, we affirm the termination as to both parents—

M.V.-C. and J.C.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

This family first came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health and

Human Services (the department) in June 2021 after the department received

allegations that J.C. was sexually abusing Ad.V. As part of the investigation of the

allegations, Ad.V. and S.C. participated in forensic interviews. During her

interview, Ad.V. described J.C. touching and licking her “vagina” as well as putting

his penis in her “pee hole” and mouth. She said that “excited stuff comes out of

his penis” and that the “excited stuff” would get on her belly. She reported that she

could not push him off her because “he’s too big and too strong.” S.C. shared that

J.C. touched his “wee-wee” and spanked him with a belt and a stick. The

allegations led to a founded sexual abuse investigation by the department. The

State filed child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA) petitions for all four children.

1 Although efforts were made to DNA test other potential fathers, at the time of the

termination trial, the parental rights of the two unknown fathers of A.V.-N. and Ar.V.
were also terminated.
3

All four children were removed from the mother’s home in July via ex parte

removal order and placed in the custody of the department; they have been out of

parental custody continuously since that time. The juvenile court confirmed the

removal later that month and ordered visitation at the discretion of the department

but ordered that J.C. was to “have no contact with the children at this time due to

[the] pending sexual abuse investigation.” The children were all adjudicated CINA

pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2) and (d) (2021) in August. The

mother reported that she was seeking a divorce from J.C.; yet, law enforcement

and the mother’s therapist observed them together in the community and the

mother’s vehicle parked at J.C.’s home.

Ad.V. exhibited behavioral issues including sleepwalking, nightmares,

hoarding food, and eating out of the trashcan. S.C. also struggled with behavioral

issues2 including sleepwalking, nightmares, hoarding food, eating out of the

trashcan, bedwetting, and soiling himself. On one occasion his foster father found

him with no pants on, and S.C. stated that that was how he played at the mother’s

home. At visits with the mother, department social work case managers reported

concerns with finding bedbugs in Ar.V.’s diaper and a family centered services

worker reported that the mother used a dirty highchair and bottle with the children.

Because of the bedbug infestation, one of the foster families demanded video

rather than in-person visits so that the children would not potentially bring bedbugs

into the foster family’s home. Visits were moved to a public location where the

2 S.C. was diagnosed with depression, autism, disruptive mood dysregulation
disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, and
panic disorder.
4

mother had one fully supervised two-hour visit with all four children a week,

although the mother frequently cancelled visits. Ad.V. told her foster mother and

a social work case manager that she did not want to see the mother and was not

comfortable being around her. S.C. would claim that he had a stomachache and

could not go to visits; he made these statements to his foster parents and teachers.

In January 2022, paternity testing confirmed J.C. as S.C.’s biological father.

In May, the mother had a full bedbug extermination performed on the home and

visits moved back to the mother’s home. However, at a visit in July, the social

work case manager noticed the home smelled of cat urine and learned that the

mother had at least four adult cats, four kittens, and a puppy; one of the adult cats

was pregnant. There was also animal waste on the floor and, because the litter

box did not have enough cat litter, pee on the floor as well.

In August, the no-contact order between J.C. and S.C. was lifted. Visits

between J.C. and S.C. began in October, and S.C. would hit, kick, and bite himself

afterwards. J.C. had two fully supervised two-hour visits with S.C. per month, and

the mother’s visits with S.C. were decreased to the same frequency. Department

caseworkers reported that J.C. did not seem to know what to do with a child of

S.C.’s age, and S.C. did not want to go to visits. The mother had a fifth child, T.C.,

in November. This child was not removed from the mother’s custody.3 At a visit

between the children and the mother in January 2023, the family centered services

worker noted that the mother was unable to supervise all five children

3 T.C. is also not part of our case.
5

simultaneously and relied on the worker for help. The mother was employed on

and off during this time.

A petition to terminate both parents’ rights was filed in May. It cited issues

with safety and lack of adequate supervision in the mother’s home along with the

mother’s difficulty in maintaining stable employment in its petition to terminate the

mother’s parental rights. In its petition to terminate J.C.’s parental rights, it pointed

to the lack of significant improvements in his parenting skills and S.C.’s behavior

the days following visits with his father. At that time, Ad.V. had been placed in the

care of her biological father since June 2022; A.V.-N. and Ar.V. were placed

together in foster care, and S.C. was placed with a separate foster care family.

The department continued to offer family safety, risk, and permanency services;

foster care placement; supervised visitations; mental-health services/treatment;

transitional services; family team meetings; and both individual and family

counseling/therapy services.

The court held a termination hearing over two days in July and September.

At the hearing, the social work case manager testified that there was very little

evidence of bonding between J.C. and S.C. The case manager also clarified that

the department had concerns about the safety of all of the children while they were

all in the mother’s care together; the department had not opened a case for T.C.

because T.C. was the only child currently in the mother’s care, and the mother did

not have issues with one child at a time. In addition, the case manager

acknowledged that J.C. has two older children, one who was believed to be

seventeen years old and one that was an adult. The family centered services

worker testified that she did not believe that any extra visits between J.C. and S.C.
6

would allow for J.C. to progress in parenting skills because the department had

“been doing this since February and there hasn’t been any progression.” She

added that the mother cancelled about one visit per month. The mother testified

that she was pregnant again and due in April 2024. She also stated that she

caught S.C. “in the room with Ad.V., and I had to separate them and scold them

both and tell them why what [S.C.] was doing to [Ad.V.] was not appropriate.”

The mother and J.C. both moved to dismiss the petition to terminate their

parental rights or to continue it for six additional months. They argued that because

they both have other children in their care—the mother has T.C. and J.C. has his

seventeen-year-old—that there must not be concerns with their parenting. The

court denied the motions and terminated the mother’s rights to all four children

under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) (2023); to Ad.V., S.C., and A.V.-N. under

paragraph (f); and to Ar.V. under paragraph (h). It terminated J.C.’s rights to S.C.

under section 232.116(1)(e) and (f). The court stated that it “does not feel that

causing continued trauma is warranted given the parents’ inability to form bonds

with their children and the ongoing harm shown.” Furthermore, the court found

that “[r]easonable, but unsuccessful, efforts were made to reunify the children with

their parents.” The mother and J.C. separately appeal.

II. Standard of Review.

We review the termination of parental rights de novo. In re Z.K., 973 N.W.2d

27, 32 (Iowa 2022). We give careful consideration to the court’s factual findings

and determinations based on in-person observations, but we are not bound by

them. In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021). “[O]ur fundamental concern”
7

in review of termination proceedings “is the child[ren]’s best interests.” In re J.C.,

857 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Iowa 2014).

III. Analysis.

In general, we follow a three-step analysis in reviewing the termination of a

parent’s rights. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010). We first consider

whether there is a statutory ground for termination of the parent’s rights under

section 232.116(1). Id. Second, we look to whether termination of the parent’s

rights is in the child’s best interests. Id. (citing Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). Third,

we consider whether any of the exceptions to termination in section 232.116(3)

should be applied. Id. We review only those steps that are actually raised and

briefed on appeal by the parent challenging termination. See Hyler v. Garner, 548

N.W.2d 864, 870 (Iowa 1996). We address each parent’s appeal separately.

A. Mother’s Appeal.

The mother challenges the juvenile court’s ruling as to the statutory grounds

for removal, reasonable efforts on the part of the department, and the best interests

of the children.

1. Statutory Grounds. First, the mother argues that the State did not meet

its burden to prove the statutory grounds for termination. “There must be clear and

convincing evidence of the grounds for termination of parental rights.” In re M.W.,

876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016). But “we may affirm the . . . order on any ground

that we find supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d
8

703, 707 (Iowa 2010). Here, we choose to focus on paragraphs (f)4 and (h),5 which

both require clear and convincing evidence that the children could not be returned

to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing. See Iowa Code

§§ 232.116(1)(f)(4), (h)(4); M.W., 876 N.W.2d at 223 (interpreting “at the present

time” to mean “at the time of the termination hearing”).

The mother’s arguments regarding the statutory grounds all relate to her

own testimony about her home and ability to provide and care for her children. But

the State presented testimony to the contrary, including testimony by multiple

department staff members describing the state of the mother’s home as unclean

and unsafe for the children. Bedbugs in the home are a health concern. See In

re Z.I., No. 20-1473, 2021 WL 811130, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2021); In re

4 The court may order the termination of parental rights under paragraph (f) if it

finds that all of the following have occurred:
(1) The child is four years of age or older.
(2) The child has been adjudicated [CINA].
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
the child’s parents for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or
for the last twelve consecutive months and any trial period at home
has been less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that at the present
time the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s
parents . . . at the present time.
Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f). The mother only challenges the fourth element.
5 The court may order the termination of parental rights under paragraph (h) if it

finds that all of the following have occurred:
(1) The child is three years of age or younger.
(2) The child has been adjudicated [CINA].
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
the child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months,
or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home
has been less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child
cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents . . . at the
present time.
Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h). The mother again only challenges the fourth element.
9

T.P., No. 18-1159, 2018 WL 4381550, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2018)

(describing the bedbug infestation as an issue with the cleanliness of the home).

On top of cleanliness issues, the children shared concerns about “bad

people” the mother associated with who scared them or caused them to feel

unsafe. It appeared the mother lacked insight about decisions she was making

that directly impacted the children’s safety. To this end, the department noted the

mother’s history of associating with people who had criminal records that included

being on the sexual abuse registry and who were involved with substance use and

abuse allegations. The mother also did not fully acknowledge the sexual abuse by

J.C. against Ad.V. and continued to have interactions with J.C. “[R]efusal or

inability to address the danger of sexual abuse” amounts to a safety risk to the

children. In re A.S., No. 22-0260, 2022 WL 1100304, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 13,

2022); accord In re D.D., 955 N.W.2d 186, 192–93 (Iowa 2021). During the

pendency of the case, it became clear that the mother talked to the children about

topics that were not age-appropriate, told the children to lie, and struggled with

basic parenting skills during her two-hour visits. The department had concerns

over the mother’s mental health, but the mother was not always forthcoming about

her treatment and was often hostile and volatile in her interactions with the

department. The mother’s therapist noted serious concerns about the mother’s

decision-making ability and lack of insight over how to keep her children safe from

future harm.

Furthermore, the mother never progressed beyond supervised visits with

the children. See In re C.N., No. 19-1861, 2020 WL 567283, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.

Feb. 5, 2020) (“[The mother] never progressed to unsupervised visits or trial home
10

visits. Without this necessary progression, we cannot say the children could have

returned to the mother’s care.”). “We look to the past for indicators of what is likely

to occur in the future.” In re M.P., No. 19-0995, 2019 WL 5063337, at *5 (Iowa Ct.

App. Oct. 9, 2019); see also In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006) (“When

making this decision, we look to the parents’ past performance because it may

indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of providing in the future.” (citation

omitted)). Thus, without any demonstrated progress through improvement in

cleanliness or semi-supervised visits in the mother’s home, we find that the State

presented clear and convincing evidence that the children could not be returned to

her custody at the time of the termination hearing.

2. Reasonable Efforts. The mother asserts that the one, two-hour visit per

week did not constitute reasonable efforts to reunify her with the children. But to

preserve a challenge to reasonable efforts, our case law generally requires that a

parent complain to the juvenile court directly “to demand other, different or

additional services.” In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 65 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999).

Furthermore, a parent cannot challenge reasonable efforts for the first time on

appeal or even first raise a challenge at the termination hearing. See In re E.H.,

No. 21-0467, 2021 WL 2709486, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 30, 2021). A parent

must alert the juvenile court of any perceived deficiency in services “at the removal,

when the case permanency plan is entered, or at later review hearings.” In re C.H.,

652 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2002). When a parent fails to timely request additional

or different services, the parent waives any reasonable-efforts challenge. Id.

Here, the mother never timely informed the court of any deficiency in services, so

her reasonable-efforts challenge is waived.
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3. Best Interests. First, we note that the strength of the parent-child bond

is not one of the considerations in the best interests analysis. See In re A.B.,

No. 23-0235, 2023 WL 3335422, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 10, 2023) (“In

considering the best interests of the children, we are required to use the best-

interests framework set out by our legislature. And that framework does not

include the word ‘bond.’” (internal citations omitted)); In re E.S., No. 23-0590, 2023

WL 4104126, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 21, 2023) (“Consideration of the parent-

child bond is not a part of our best-interests analysis.”).

Removing the reference to the strength of the bond between the mother

and the children, the mother makes only the following argument on best interests:

“There was insufficient evidence presented that it is in the children’s best interest

to permanently sever the child-parent relationship. It would be detrimental to the

well-being of the children should parental rights be terminated.” Without

developing how the facts in this record support her position or citing legal authority,

we find that this argument is waived. See Iowa Rs. App. P. 6.201(1)(d) (“The

petition on appeal must substantially comply with rule 6.1401—Form 5.”), 6.1401—

Form 5 (“[S]tate what findings of fact or conclusions of law the district court made

with which you disagree and why, generally referencing a particular part of the

record, witnesses’ testimony, or exhibits that support your position on appeal

.... General conclusions . . . are not acceptable. Include supporting legal

authority for each issue raised, including authority contrary to appellant’s case, if

known.”); see also In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (“A broad, all

encompassing argument is insufficient to identify error in cases of de novo

review.”).
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B. J.C.’s Appeal.

J.C. argues that the statutory grounds for termination were not met,

termination of his rights is not in S.C.’s best interests, the department failed to

make reasonable efforts to reunify him and S.C., and the strength of their bond

precludes termination.

1. Statutory Grounds. Here, again, we choose to focus on termination under

paragraph (f). See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707 (allowing court to affirm termination

on any ground supported by the record). J.C. only challenges the fourth element

of this paragraph: that there was clear and convincing evidence that S.C. could not

be returned to his custody. J.C. contends that he has been a good and appropriate

father to S.C. in spite of S.C.’s severe behavioral issues and the allegations of

sexual abuse against him. Yet, at the same time that J.C. argues that S.C. is only

with him for a few hours a month and thus S.C.’s behaviors cannot be blamed on

him, he also contends that more time with him would remedy S.C.’s behavioral

issues and resolve the claims against him. We disagree. J.C. never progressed

beyond fully supervised visits and failed to demonstrate that returning S.C. to his

care would not cause S.C. further harm. See C.N., 2020 WL 567283, at *1; J.E.,

723 N.W.2d at 798. And J.C. does not address the sexual abuse allegations made

by Ad.V. or S.C. See In re L.H., 904 N.W.2d 145, 150 (Iowa 2017) (noting “the

common sense notion that, ordinarily, all siblings are at risk when one child has

been sexually abused” (citation omitted)). Here, again, we recognize that “refusal

or inability to address the danger of sexual abuse” amounts to a safety risk to the

child. A.S., 2022 WL 1100304, at *3; accord In re M.L., No. 11-1326, 2011 WL

5389620, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 9, 2011) (“The fact remains that the parents
13

have ‘no insight in what happened so that it’s not going to happen again.’ Without

that insight, the services provided to, and received by, the parents cannot ensure

that an abused child . . . would be safe.”). Thus, because of the safety risk to S.C.,

we find that the State has met its burden and the statutory ground for termination

was met.

2. Best Interests. Here, J.C. asserts that S.C. should be with his two half

siblings and, thus, termination is not in S.C.’s best interests. Yet, we note that one

of the half-siblings is already an adult and living out of state and the other is

seventeen years old. The existence of the one half-sibling in the home does not

change our analysis. While there is “a preference to keep siblings together,” the

“preference is not absolute” and must give way to the children’s best interests.

J.E., 723 N.W.2d at 800. In considering the best interests of the child we “give

primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the

long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and

emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). As our case

law provides, the defining elements in the child’s best interests are the child’s

safety and need for a permanent home. J.E., 723 N.W.2d at 801 (Cady, J.,

concurring specially). Both S.C.’s safety and need for a permanent home point

towards termination, for the same reasons discussed above. Because multiple

department workers noted that J.C. was unsure what to do with a child of S.C.’s

age and J.C. failed to address the sexual-abuse allegations against him by S.C. or

Ad.V, S.C.’s best interests require termination.

3. Reasonable Efforts. Next, J.C. repeatedly argues that four hours of

visitation a month did not constitute a reasonable effort to reunify him with S.C. He
14

claims that he made requests for reasonable efforts at the May 2022 and January

and April 2023 hearings. But in the May 2022 order, the court found reasonable

efforts had been made and noted that J.C. was under a no-contact order as to S.C.

and would not have therapeutic visitation until it was deemed appropriate by S.C.’s

therapist. Likewise, the January6 and April 2023 orders confirm reasonable efforts

being made without any notations of a request for more time or other services by

J.C. Even so, he did not request transcripts of those hearings or cite to any places

in our available record for support of his claimed reasonable-efforts requests.

Thus, we are unable to verify if J.C. did, in fact, make timely challenges.

However, assuming without deciding that he did, “the nature and extent of

visitation is always controlled by the best interests of the child.” In re M.B., 553

N.W.2d 343, 345 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996); see also Iowa Code § 232.102A(1)(a) (“A

child’s health and safety shall be the paramount concern in making reasonable

efforts.”). Applying the best-interest-of-the-child standard to visitation frequency

and duration “may warrant limited parental visitation.” M.B., 553 N.W.2d at 345;

accord id. (finding no failure to make reasonable efforts when the department did

not increase visitation because the mother had “demonstrated an inability to make

those changes in her life essential to proper parenting, including her continued

codependency on abusive males”). Here, given the ongoing sexual abuse

allegations against J.C. by Ad.V. and S.C., which included a no-contact order that

was not lifted until August 2022, we find that the visitation afforded J.C. was

reasonable and the department did not fail to make reasonable efforts.

6 As of January, J.C. still had not completed the mental-health evaluation with a

parenting assessment requested by the department.
15

4. Permissive Exception. As a final argument, regarding the permissive

exception J.C. writes that “[c]learly there is a very-very-very strong bond” between

him and S.C. and “[d]ue to the closeness of the parent-child relationship,

terminating [his] parental rights would be absolutely devastating” to S.C. “The

court need not terminate the relationship between the parent and child if the court

finds . . . [t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be

detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child

relationship.” Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c). However, “the existence of a bond is

not enough. The law requires clear and convincing evidence that ‘termination

would be detrimental to the child . . . .’” In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 169 (Iowa

2021) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c)). And the burden is on J.C. to prove

such a detriment to S.C. See In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018)

(providing the parent has the burden to establish a permissive exception to

termination should be applied).

Here, not only has J.C. not met that burden, but evidence in the record

establishes the contrary. S.C. often did not want to attend visits with J.C., telling

his foster family and his teachers that he did not want to go and that his stomach

hurt. When S.C. did attend, he exhibited increased behavioral issues afterwards

including hitting, kicking, and biting himself. Such a reaction does not evidence

the type of strong bond that J.C. claims and does not overcome the advantage to

S.C. of termination. Thus, we decline to rely on the permissive exception in this

instance.
16

IV. Conclusion.

Because we conclude after our de novo review of the record that a statutory

ground for termination was met as to each child and the mother has waived her

challenges to reasonable efforts and the best interests of the children, we affirm

the termination of her parental rights. We also affirm the termination of J.C.’s

parental rights to S.C., holding that a statutory ground for termination was proved

by clear and convincing evidence, termination is in S.C.'s best interests, the

department made reasonable efforts at reunification, and the strength of J.C.’s

bond with S.C. does not overcome the advantage of termination.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.