State of Iowa v. Terry Dean Erickson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0925
Filed May 22, 2024

STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

TERRY DEAN ERICKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D. Huppert,

Judge.

A defendant appeals the district court sentencing order. AFFIRMED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Olivia D. Brooks, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ.
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SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Terry Erickson appeals his indeterminate thirty-year sentence imposed by

the district court following a plea of guilty. He argues the court abused its discretion

by only considering the nature of the offense to the exclusion of other relevant

factors.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings

In 2022, Erickson was charged with five felonies related to controlled

substances. As part of a plea agreement, Erikson pled guilty to possession of

methamphetamine with intent to deliver, second or subsequent offense, a class

“C” felony. There was no agreement reached as to the sentence, and both parties

were free to make sentencing recommendations at the hearing.

Because this was a second or subsequent offense, Iowa Code section

124.411 (2022) recites that “[a]ny person convicted . . . may be punished by

imprisonment for a period not to exceed three times the term otherwise

authorized.” Erickson requested a term of ten years, while the State asked the

court to impose a sentence not to exceed thirty years. The court imposed an

indeterminate term of incarceration not to exceed thirty years. Erickson appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review the sentence in a criminal case for errors at law, but “the decision

of the district court to impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is

cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only be overturned for an

abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate matters.” State v.

Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). “An abuse of discretion will not be
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found unless we are able to discern that the decision was exercised on grounds or

for reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable.” Id.

III. Sentence

Erickson argues the district court improperly considered only a single factor,

the nature of the offense, in sentencing him to the maximum allowable

indeterminate term of incarceration. He does not dispute that the sentence could

not be suspended and does not argue the sentence was outside that permitted by

statute.

In sentencing a defendant, the court should “consider the societal goals of

sentencing criminal offenders, which focus on rehabilitation of the offender and the

protection of the community from further offenses.” Id.

The trial court . . . should weigh and consider all pertinent matters in
determining proper sentence, including the nature of the offense, the
attending circumstances, defendant’s age, character and
propensities and chances of his reform. The courts owe a duty to
the public as much as to defendant in determining a proper sentence.
The punishment should fit both the crime and the individual.

State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Iowa 1979) (quoting State v. Cupples,

152 N.W.2d 277, 280 (Iowa 1967)). Further, “each decision must be made on an

individual basis, and no single factor, including the nature of the offense, will be

solely determinative.” State v. McKeever, 276 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Iowa 1979). And

the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure require the court to state its reason for a

particular sentence on the record. State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 919 (Iowa

2014). However, “[w]hile the rule requires a statement of reasons on the record,

a ‘terse and succinct’ statement may be sufficient, ‘so long as the brevity of the

court’s statement does not prevent review of the exercise of the trial court’s
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sentencing discretion.’” State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015)

(quoting State v. Johnson, 445 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Iowa 1989)).

In this case, the court stated:

The Court has also reviewed the presentence investigation report
[(PSI)]. Based upon the information contained within that report,
most notably, as noted by the State, the defendant’s criminal history
and his prior conviction for—I believe, if I’m—I think it was a class
“B” level possession or at least it was a 25-year sentence according
to the PSI. Mr. Erickson, I don’t accept your position that your eyes
have been opened and that things will be much better now that
you’ve had a chance to think about things. I think you have not
addressed these matters when given the chance both in the
community and previously in the Department of Corrections. And I
believe that the best way for you to pursue whatever path toward
rehabilitation your life may take you will be in not only the Department
of Corrections as the mandatory option for today but for the
maximum amount of time available under the statute, which is a triple
enhancement for a 30-year sentence. And it will be up to you to
make whatever progress there is to make and convince the Board of
Parole whenever that time will be when you’ll be back in the
community. But to the degree I have any say in the matter, I am
going to impose the maximum sentence today for the reasons that
I’ve noted.

Erickson argues this statement shows the court considered only the nature of the

offense in sentencing him, and therefore reversal is required. See State v.

Dvorsky, 322 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Iowa 1982) (“The nature of the offense alone cannot

be determinative of a discretionary sentence.”)

We disagree. First, the court specifically stated at the sentencing hearing

its consideration of the PSI. The consideration of the PSI includes consideration

of its contents. See State v. Wright, No. 21-1821, 2023 WL 152773, at *3 (Iowa

Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2023) (“The court specifically noted its consideration of the

contents of the presentence investigation report, which would include its

recommendation.”). The court also stated its consideration of Erickson’s criminal
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history, which it noted was included in the PSI, and the court stated why it believed

the sentence imposed was necessary for Erickson’s rehabilitation. The court’s

written sentencing order reflected that the court considered the defendant’s age,

prior record of convictions and deferments of judgment, if any; the defendant’s

mental health and substance-use history and the treatment options available in the

community and the correctional system; the nature of the offense committed; the

plea agreement; and statutory sentencing requirements.

Despite these additional stated considerations, Erickson argues the “[t]he

record does not indicate serious consideration of any other ‘minimal essential

factors’ by the court.” Even though a court must state more than “boilerplate”

reasoning, a “terse and succinct” statement is sufficient. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d at

408 (“‘The court has determined that this sentence will provide reasonable

protection of the public. Probation is denied because it is unwarranted.’ We

concluded such language, standing alone, did not satisfy the requirement.”

(quoting State v. Lumadue, 622 N.W.2d 302, 304 (Iowa 2001) (en banc))). And

placing “greater importance on one sentencing consideration over others” is not

an abuse of discretion. See State v. Latcham, No. 10-1262, 2011 WL 1138569, at

*3 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2011).

The court stated a consideration of factors other than just the “nature of the

offense” in sentencing Erickson. This included the PSI, his criminal history, and

rehabilitation of the defendant. The court sufficiently considered factors beyond

the nature of the offense and properly exercised its discretion. See McKeever,

276 N.W.2d at 387–88. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.