State of Iowa vs. Iowa District Court for Polk County

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 144 / 97-1162
Filed July 29, 1998
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
IOWA DISTRICT COURT
FOR POLK COUNTY,
Defendant.
Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Polk County, George W. Bergeson, Judge.
State challenges habeas corpus relief granted by district court, terminating probation. WRIT SUSTAINED;
CASE REMANDED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County
Attorney, and Mark Sandon, Assistant County Attorney, for plaintiff.
Thomas D. Hanson, Des Moines, for defendant.
Considered by Harris, P.J., and Larson, Carter, Neuman, and Andreasen, JJ.
NEUMAN, Justice.
The State petitioned for certiorari to challenge the lawfulness of a writ of habeas corpus issued by one
district court judge to countermand another judge’s order extending the probation of James Polson. We
granted the State’s petition and, for the reasons that follow, now sustain the writ.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
James Polson’s interaction with the District Court for Polk County has been recently documented in our
opinion suspending his license to practice law, Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics &
Conduct v. Polson, 569 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1997). In short, Polson spent most of 1996 in jail. His
incarceration originated with two distinct proceedings: (1) On January 25, 1996, Polson pleaded guilty to
domestic assault in violation of Iowa Code section 708.2A(2)(b) (1995), for which he was sentenced to
one year in jail, all but sixty days suspended, and placed on probation for one year with the requirement
of attending programs to treat alcohol abuse and domestic violence; (2) at the same time, he stipulated to
thirty-one violations of a no-contact order issued in October 1995, resulting in a finding of contempt
warranting sixty days in jail with credit for time served. Polson’s subsequent and repeated violations of the
court’s initial no-contact order led to a confusing array of hearings beginning in May 1996.

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On May 2, during a hearing at which Polson appeared personally and with counsel, Roger Owens, the
court heard proof that Polson violated the no-contact order in April 1996. Finding Polson in contempt,
Judge Cynthia Moisan sentenced him to six months incarceration with credit for time served. During the
proceedings, the following colloquy occurred:
THE COURT: Well, I agree with Mr. Owens. I’m not sure we’re here today on a probation
violation hearing. Am I in error, Mr. Sandon?
MR. SANDON [Prosecutor]: Judge, in setting the violation of the no-contact order hearing, the order that I
have shows that it addresses the probation violations.
MR. OWENS: I have no report of violations.
THE COURT: Apparently there’s a probation hearing scheduled for June 6 on ICIS, so I think we’ll deal
with his probation violation at that time.
Polson’s counsel filed a motion to reconsider the six-month sentence. At a hearing held June 25, 1996,
wherein Polson was represented by Jerry Foxhoven as well as Roger Owens, the following exchange
with Judge Moisan took place:
THE COURT: We’re here in the matter of State of Iowa versus James D. Polson, criminal number 95907.
This is a hearing on a motion to reconsider filed by Roger Owens, defendant’s attorney. And I believe it is
also a probation revocation hearing. Would that be essentially correct?
MR. SANDON: I thought we already addressed his probation revocation.
MR. OWENS: I think we did it at the same time, Your Honor.
MR. SANDON: I think when we ended up the last time we had taken care of the probation revocation, so
this is a reconsideration, I think, on the violation of the no-contact order.
MR. OWENS: Judge, you gave him six months run concurrent with contempt, is how I recall it.
After discussing the pros and cons of continued incarceration versus treatment for alcohol abuse, the
following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Polson, as Mr. Sandon said, I don’t know what your threshold is for jail time. I’m
hoping this is it.
THE DEFENDANT: It is, Judge.
THE COURT: Because I don’t know what else to do, so I’m going to reconsider your sentence, and I’m
going to let you out of jail today. No contact order’s still in effect, but I’m going to–
This is why I asked Mr. Sandon if we could deal with the probation matter because I want to make the
Antabuse and his reporting to the probation officer regarding the Antabuse a condition of his probation.
Do you have any objection to that?
MR. SANDON: No, I don’t, Judge.
THE COURT: Do you have the probation number?

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MR. SANDON: It will be the same number as the one you have.
THE DEFENDANT: Judge, my son has indicated he would like to live with me, and that would be very
good. That would give me some additional support.
THE COURT: I’m going to extend your probation period for another year.
MR. SANDON: Judge, had we already done that the last time, maybe?
THE COURT: I don’t see that in here. That’s what I was wondering.
MR. FOXHOVEN: Judge, he indicates to me that he believes you did the last time, that you extended it a
year.
THE COURT: Did he ever finish the domestic abuse classes?
MR. SANDON: No.
THE COURT: You need to do that. Be on probation until January 5th–excuse me–January 25th, 1998. . .
.
In keeping with this colloquy, the court file reveals a document dated May 31, 1996, finding Polson in
contempt for violating his probation and ordering that he serve a six-month sentence concurrent with his
sentence for violating the no-contact order. The written order, signed by Judge Moisan, also stated:
“Probation is extended to 1-25-98.”
Polson’s reprieve was disappointedly short lived. At a hearing held August 1, 1996, the court found
Polson violated the no-contact order thirteen more times. He was sentenced to serve six months in jail,
with credit for time served. By separate written entry, the court found no proof of further probation
violation but directed that Polson “shall remain on probation until 1-25-98 as previously ordered.”
Upon his release on December 17, 1996, Polson was ordered to immediately make arrangements for
probation supervision. He did so, but the meeting with his probation officer did not go well. Advised that
he would be on intensive supervision with curfews and electronic monitoring, Polson refused to sign the
probation agreement. A warrant issued for his arrest.
On December 18, 1996, free on bond, Polson filed the petition for writ of habeas corpus which forms the
basis for the controversy now before us. His petition sought “relief from the confinement of probation and
no-contact.” As grounds for issuance of the writ, Polson claimed he had suffered a significant and
unlawful restraint on his liberty because (1) Judge Moisan had no authority to extend his probation
beyond the original one-year term, and (2) even if the law permitted such an extension, it was imposed
upon him without due process. His due process claim rested on the fact that the court records revealed
no transcript of a hearing in connection with the order entered May 31, 1996, extending his probation to
January 25, 1998.
The State resisted Polson’s petition on the ground it stated no claim upon which a writ of habeas corpus
could be granted. Before the matter could be heard, however, Polson appeared before district associate
judge Patricia Houlihan on the State’s report of probation violation and Polson’s motion to dismiss the
State’s action and terminate probation. At this hearing Polson, now represented by attorney Thomas D.
Hanson, reiterated his due process argument and challenge to Judge Moisan’s order extending his
probation. Judge Houlihan rejected these arguments, reasoning that due process was satisfied by the
later, transcribed hearing at which Polson was notified, in open court, that his probation was extended.
The judge also overruled Polson’s motion to terminate probation, finding no merit in his claim that

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probation could not be extended from one to two years. The court nevertheless found Polson had a
“legitimate misunderstanding of his obligations” concerning probation, thus his refusal to “sign-up” on
December 17 did not constitute a “violation” warranting revocation. Polson filed an appeal of this ruling
which, thirty days later, he withdrew and dismissed.
Meanwhile, on May 8, 1997, Polson’s petition for writ of habeas corpus came on for hearing before Judge
George Bergeson. Like Judge Houlihan, Judge Bergeson believed the district court had authority to
extend probation for two years in the case of an indictable misdemeanor. See Iowa Code § 907.7 (length
of probation shall not exceed two years for misdemeanor). But–unlike Judge Houlihan–Judge Bergeson
was convinced the State had denied Polson due process because the record revealed no hearing in
connection with the May 31, 1996, order that directed the extension. Judge Bergeson therefore sustained
the writ of habeas corpus, terminating Polson’s probation “immediately.” This certiorari action by the State
followed.
II. Issue on Appeal and Scope of Review.
The issue posed by the State’s certiorari petition is “whether defendant [Polson] could properly challenge
the extension of his probation through a habeas action.” By granting the writ of habeas corpus, the State
asserts, Judge Bergeson “erred, and thereby exceeded [his] authority,” making the controversy
appropriate for disposition by certiorari. See French v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 546 N.W.2d 911, 913 (Iowa 1996)
(“Certiorari is a procedure to test whether a . . . court exceeded its proper jurisdiction or otherwise acted
illegally.”); Iowa R. Civ. P. 306 (same). Our review on certiorari is for the correction of errors at law.
French, 546 N.W.2d at 913.
III. Analysis.
The State contends Polson chose the wrong avenue for relief when he challenged Judge Moisan’s order
by writ of habeas corpus. The argument rests on solid authority. Iowa Code chapter 663 governs the
issuance of writs of habeas corpus. Section 663.36, captioned “Nonpermissible issues,” states: “It is not
permissible to question the correctness of the action of a court or a judge when lawfully acting within the
scope of their authority.” This statutory limitation on the scope of habeas relief echoes the long-
established rule at common law:
“It is a settled rule that wherever a court has acquired jurisdiction of a case, no other
court may, upon habeas corpus, interfere with its action as to matters concerning which it
has acquired jurisdiction. Any other rule would produce a conflict of jurisdiction over the
right to the custody of the person of the prisoner and lead to inextricable confusion,
resulting in a defeat of the due administration of the law.”
Peff v. Doolittle, 235 Iowa 443, 447, 15 N.W.2d 913, 915 (1944) (quoting 25 Am. Jur. Habeas Corpus §
108, at 223); accord Bell v. Lainson, 247 Iowa 505, 506, 74 N.W.2d 592, 592-93 (1956) (“Habeas corpus
cannot perform the function of an appeal from a judgment of conviction and may not be used as a means
of reviewing errors of law and irregularities, in connection with the charge and trial, not involving the
question of jurisdiction.”).
In Peff, this court acknowledged the value and importance of the writ in guarding and preserving human
liberty. The court nevertheless made clear that exercise of the power to grant the writ could not be used
“to unsettle valid legal proceedings or to interfere with the exercise of the jurisdiction of other courts.” Peff,
235 Iowa at 448, 15 N.W.2d at 915. Thus, the court held, “unless void, proceedings of a court of
concurrent jurisdiction cannot be inquired into by habeas corpus in another court. The remedy can only
be by appeal.” Id. at 451, 15 N.W.2d at 917.
In defending Judge Bergeson’s ruling, Polson makes no attempt to refute this authority. Rather, he relies
on State v. Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d 481 (Iowa 1993), to suggest that Judge Moisan was without authority

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to extend Polson’s probation without his consent. Alternatively he claims the lack of a hearing preceding
entry of her order violated his right to due process. In either event, he argues, Judge Moisan’s order is
void, rendering Judge Bergeson’s act–releasing Polson from probation–lawful.
Polson’s reliance on Mandicino is misplaced. In Mandicino, the defendant sought a two-year extension of
his probation to pay fines, then challenged the lawfulness of the extension when, sometime later, the
State filed a complaint of probation violation. Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d at 482. Describing Mandicino’s
plight as a “self-inflicted wound,” we held he remedied any “defect” in the court’s authority by requesting
the extension. Id. at 483. Our decision turned on the distinction between the court’s subject matter
jurisdiction and its authority to determine the particular case before it. Id. at 482. A court’s subject matter
jurisdiction can be raised at anytime, see id., but “an impediment to a court’s authority can be obviated by
consent, waiver or estoppel.” Id. at 483. Because the court clearly possessed the statutory power to
“grant and superintend” Mandicino’s probation, any error in its decision to grant his request for extension–
a matter of mere authority–was “remedied” by Mandicino’s consent. Id. at 483; accord State v. Canas,
571 N.W.2d 20, 23 (Iowa 1997). We did not, in Mandicino, decide whether the extension sought and
received by Mandicino was, in fact, permitted by statute. Nor did we decide whether the court’s authority,
generally, hinges on the probationer’s “consent.”
We need not decide those questions here. Judge Moisan was plainly acting within her statutorily granted
jurisdiction when sentencing Polson and dictating the terms of his probation. See Iowa Code §
602.6306(2) (granting district associate judges jurisdiction over indictable misdemeanors); Canas, 571
N.W.2d at 23 (court has authority to fix length of probation). As early as May 31, 1996, Polson was made
aware by written order that Judge Moisan had extended his probation an additional year to satisfy
unfulfilled conditions of the original sentencing order; at a reported hearing held June 25, 1996, his
counsel acknowledged the order and Polson’s understanding of it. Any impediment to the court’s authority
to impose this additional condition, whether for alleged lack of due process or other legal error, was
obviated by Polson’s failure to challenge it by certiorari or postconviction petition. Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d
at 483; see Thompson v. City of Osage, 421 N.W.2d 529, 531 (Iowa 1988) (petition for writ of certiorari
must be filed within thirty days from date tribunal exceeded jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally); Iowa
Code § 822.2(5) (authorizing postconviction relief for unlawful revocation of probation or when petitioner
“otherwise unlawfully held in . . . restraint”).
Habeas corpus is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging final judgments or seeking relief from alleged
errors of law not involving the question of jurisdiction. Bell, 247 Iowa at 506, 74 N.W.2d at 592-93.
“[U]nless void, proceedings of a court of concurrent jurisdiction cannot be inquired into by habeas corpus
in another court.” Peff, 235 Iowa at 451, 15 N.W.2d at 917. Judge Bergeson made such inquiry here and,
in doing so, exceeded his authority.
We, therefore, sustain the writ of certiorari, thereby annulling the writ of habeas corpus issued by Judge
Bergeson. Because Judge Bergeson’s writ relieved Polson from further probationary obligations, we
remand to the chief judge of the district, or his designee, for hearing on whether the purposes of probation
have been fulfilled. See Iowa Code § 907.9.
WRIT SUSTAINED; CASE REMANDED.

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