Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board Vs. Patricia K. Wengert

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 10–0195
Filed October 29, 2010
IOWA SUPREME COURT
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,
Complainant,
vs.
PATRICIA K. WENGERT,
Respondent.
On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Grievance commission recommends a three-year suspension of
attorney’s license to practice law. LICENSE REVOKED.
Charles L. Harrington and David J. Grace, for complainant.
John P. Roehrick, Des Moines, for respondent.

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STREIT, Justice.
Patricia Wengert practiced law in Iowa between 1990 and 2007.
During that time, she committed numerous ethical violations, including
representing clients notwithstanding a conflict of interest, disobeying a
court order, mishandling client funds, and neglecting a client matter.
Because Wengert misappropriated client funds, in addition to numerous
other ethical violations, we revoke her license to practice law.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
Patricia Wengert was admitted to practice law in Iowa in 1990.
She engaged in private practice in Sioux City and Des Moines until 2007,
when she left the practice of law. Her license is on inactive status.
The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board filed a
complaint alleging nine counts of ethical violations committed by
Wengert while practicing. Wengert and the board filed a stipulation
setting forth agreed-upon facts and admitted violations of ethical rules
under counts I, II, III, V, VI, VIII, and IX. The stipulation set forth
mitigating and aggravating circumstances and recommended that
Wengert be suspended from the practice of law for three years.
The Grievance Commission of the Iowa Supreme Court found that
the admitted violations were supported by the agreed-upon facts. The
commission also found additional ethical violations based on the
stipulated facts for counts I, III, V, and VI. The commission
recommended that Wengert’s license to practice law be suspended with
no possibility of reinstatement for a period of three years pursuant to
Iowa Court Rule 35.10(2) and ordered that prior to reinstatement,
Wengert must (1) provide proof that the $9,790.29 paid from the Marva

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Edwards settlement to the Veda Kilbert1 subrogation claim has been
repaid to Ms. Edwards, (2) retake and successfully pass the Multistate
Professional Responsibility Examination, and (3) complete and produce a
comprehensive psychiatric and psychological evaluation. We hold the
proper sanction is revocation because Wengert misappropriated client
funds, in addition to other ethical violations.
II. Scope of Review.
We review attorney disciplinary proceedings de novo. Iowa Ct. R.
35.10(1). Although we give weight to the commission’s factual findings,
we are not bound by them. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Marzen, 779 N.W.2d 757, 759 (Iowa 2010). The board has the burden to
prove the allegations of misconduct contained in the complaint by a
convincing preponderance of the evidence. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l
Ethics & Conduct v. Evans, 537 N.W.2d 783, 784 (Iowa 1995). While this
burden is higher than the burden in civil cases, it is lower than in a
criminal prosecution. Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v.
Ronwin, 557 N.W.2d 515, 517 (Iowa 1996).
III. Ethical Violations.
A. Conflict of Interest (Count I). In 2006, Wengert represented
Mary Stenlund in an involuntary guardianship and conservatorship
proceeding. During the course of the proceedings, the State of Iowa filed
a criminal charge against Stenlund’s daughter, Linda Wilson, for neglect
of Stenlund. Wengert filed an appearance on Wilson’s behalf. The
district associate judge found a concurrent conflict of interest,
disqualified Wengert from representing Wilson, and ordered Wengert not
1The commission mistakenly switched the names Kilbert and Edwards, stating
that the Kilbert settlement was used to pay the Edwards subrogation claim. According
to the stipulation, the Edwards settlement was used to pay the Kilbert subrogation
claim.

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to discuss the case with Wilson. Wengert admits she had contact with
Wilson after Wilson was represented by another attorney. Wengert was
found in contempt of the court’s order on April 12, 2007, and received a
seven-day suspended jail sentence.
Wengert stipulated to the violation of three rules of the Iowa Rules
of Professional Conduct: rule 32:1.7(a) prohibiting concurrent conflicts
of interest, rule 32:4.2 prohibiting an attorney from contacting an
individual who is represented, and rule 32:8.4(d) prohibiting an attorney
from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.
We agree the stipulated facts demonstrate Wengert violated these
rules. Wengert’s attempt to represent Stenlund in a guardianship and
conservatorship proceeding and to simultaneously represent Wilson for
alleged neglect of Stenlund was a clear conflict of interest that violates
ethical rule 32:1.7(a). See also Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics &
Conduct v. Wagner, 599 N.W.2d 721, 726 (Iowa 1999) (noting under the
Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers that “the mere
possibility of an adverse effect upon the exercise of free judgment
prevents a lawyer from representing clients with opposing interests”).
Wengert violated rule 32:4.2(a), which prohibits an attorney from
“communicat[ing] about the subject of the representation with a person
the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter.”
Wengert admits she contacted Wilson and was held in contempt for
violating an order not to discuss the case with Wilson.
Engaging in the clear conflict of interest and then disobeying a
court order constitute conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice, a violation of rule 32:8.4(d). See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l
Ethics & Conduct v. Mulford, 625 N.W.2d 672, 682 (Iowa 2001) (“[W]hen

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an attorney willfully disobeys an order or command of a court or the
processes of a court, the administration of justice is prejudiced.”). The
commission also found a violation of rule 32:3.4(c), which prohibits an
attorney from knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a
tribunal. We agree that the district court’s order holding Wengert in
contempt supports a violation of rule 32:3.4(c) as well.
B. Inappropriate Statements (Counts II and III). Wengert
stipulated to making a number of critical statements during court
proceedings in two instances. First, Wengert stipulated that in 2006,
following a hearing on a fee application after Wengert was removed as the
attorney for an estate, Wengert made “unduly critical allegations
concerning the probate process and the court.” Wengert also stipulated
that during the process of her representation of a client involved in a
juvenile court proceeding in 2006, Wengert “suggested the process was
racist; requested the judge’s recusal because of lack of objectivity and
violation of the mother’s (client’s) constitutional rights; and, accused the
Department of Human Services of fraudulently misleading the court.”
Wengert stipulated that she violated rule 32:8.4(d) prohibiting
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in both instances.
The commission also found Wengert violated rule 32:1.1 which requires
an attorney to provide competent representation. The commission noted
that Wengert’s statements in the juvenile court proceeding would only be
prejudicial to the administration of justice if false and making false
statements during the course of a representation constitutes a failure to
provide competent representation.
We are unable to find that Wengert violated any ethical rules
relating to her allegedly inappropriate statements because the stipulation
does not articulate the necessary underlying facts. Wengert admits only

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to making “unduly critical” statements. We cannot simply assume, as
the commission did, that because Wengert stipulated to an ethical
violation, those statements must have been false. Instead, the
underlying stipulation must provide the facts to support the ethical
violation. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Carpenter, 781
N.W.2d 263, 272 (Iowa 2010) (holding the commission’s recommendation
that the attorney be ordered to refund his clients’ funds could not be
enforced because the stipulation failed to detail the amount of such
funds and no witness testimony or evidence was taken on the matter).
C. Mishandling Client Funds (Counts V and VI). Wengert
mishandled client funds in two separate circumstances. First, Wengert
represented Pamela Meals in a personal injury case. In August 2006,
Meals wrote Wengert a check of $1,825 to pay for a medical examination.
Wengert used the funds to pay herself for other expenses that she claims
were advanced on behalf of Meals. Over a year later, Wengert used her
personal funds to pay the cost of the medical examination.
In the second instance of mishandling client funds, Wengert
represented three individuals (Veda Kilbert, Marva Edwards, and
Daphine Hayes) in a case seeking recovery for injuries sustained in a
work-related accident. All three cases settled. Wengert violated a variety
of the rules governing appropriate conduct relating to client funds. First,
Wengert advanced $175 to Kilbert. Second, Wengert improperly handled
settlements obtained on behalf of her clients. Wengert received
settlement funds in Kilbert’s case in February 2006. Wengert did not use
those funds to pay Kilbert’s $9,790.29 subrogation obligation to St. Paul
Travelers and used “those settlement funds for other purposes.” Wengert
then received the funds to settle Edwards’s claim for $81,000 in June
2006. Wengert did not deposit the settlement proceeds in her trust

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account and did not pay Edwards’s subrogation obligation of $17,811.23
owed to St. Paul Travelers. Instead, Wengert used some of the Edwards
settlement funds to pay Kilbert’s $9,790.29 subrogation obligation.
Wengert did not keep an accurate accounting for the Edwards
settlement.2 Wengert eventually paid off Edwards’s subrogation
obligation over a year later with her personal funds. As noted by the
commission, it is unclear whether the money used to pay Kilbert’s
$9,790.29 subrogation obligation was repaid to Edwards.
During this time period—in April 2006—Wengert signed a Client
Security questionnaire in which she asserted that her trust account was
properly reconciled. An audit of Wengert’s trust account demonstrated
serious problems including: comingling of personal and trust funds, lack
of records regarding which client funds were affected, and lack of
reconciliations. The auditor found it was impossible to reconcile the
account.
Wengert stipulated to violations of rules 32:1.15, 32:1.8(e), and
32:8.4(c). The commission also found violations of rule 32:8.4(d) and
Iowa Court Rules 45.1 and 45.2(2). Wengert’s failure to keep her client’s
funds separate from her own funds, failure to place client settlement
funds into a trust account, and use of client settlement funds for “other
purposes” and to pay the subrogation obligation of another client violated
rule 32:1.15, which governs the safekeeping of a client’s property. See
also Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Harris, 524 N.W.2d 179, 181
(Iowa 1994) (noting under the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility
for Lawyers that “paying the client from trust funds belonging to other
2Wengert claimed in her response to the complaint that the money used from
the Edwards settlement was part of the attorney fee portion of the settlement, although
this was not a stipulated fact. The stipulation states only that Wengert “used some of
the Edwards recovery to pay the Kilbert subrogation obligation.”

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clients is a gravely serious ethical violation”). Wengert’s failure to place
settlement funds into her trust account and keep appropriate records
violated client trust account rules 45.1 and 45.2(2). Wengert’s false
certification that her trust account was properly reconciled and her
misappropriation of and failure to account for client settlement funds
violated rule 32:8.4(c), which prohibits an attorney from engaging in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. See
Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Isaacson, 750 N.W.2d 104, 109
(Iowa 2008) (holding attorney’s false representations on client security
questionnaire violated DR 1–102(A)(4) of the Iowa Code of Professional
Responsibility, which prohibited conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Moorman, 729 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Iowa 2007) (holding attorney’s failure to
account for retainer fees violated DR 1–102(A)(4)).
The commission also found Wengert’s mishandling of client funds
violated rule 32:8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice). We have explained that acts are prejudicial to
the administration of justice when they “ ‘have hampered the “efficient
and proper operation of the courts or of ancillary systems upon which
the courts rely.” ’ ” Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Templeton,
784 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Howe, 706 N.W.2d 360, 373 (Iowa 2005)). The
stipulation does not provide sufficient facts to support a violation of
32:8.4(d) for Wengert’s actions with regard to Meals. Wengert improperly
used funds meant for a medical examination for other expenses. It is
unclear based on the stipulated facts, however, whether the independent
medical examination was ordered by a court and whether Wengert’s
actions delayed or hampered the court system.

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We are also unable to find that Wengert’s handling of the Kilbert
and Edwards settlement funds violated rule 32:8.4(d). We have
previously held that delay in the administration of settlement funds after
a lawsuit had been filed, and therefore delay in the resolution of a client’s
pending lawsuit, violated rule 32:8.4(d). See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Casey, 761 N.W.2d 53, 59 (Iowa 2009) (finding
attorney’s untimely disbursement of settlement proceeds, mishandling of
subrogation lien, and failure to respond to client’s complaints that the
court costs and subrogation lien had not been paid constituted conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice under Iowa Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 1–102(A)(5)). Although Wengert failed to
timely pay subrogation claims and used settlement funds for other
purposes, it is unclear from the stipulation whether Wengert had filed
lawsuits on behalf of Kilbert and Edwards. Therefore, it is unclear
whether Wengert’s actions hampered the efficient operation of our court
system.
Additionally, Wengert’s loan of funds to a client violated rule
32:1.8(e), which prohibits an attorney from providing financial assistance
to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation except
in the case of a contingency fee or an indigent client.3
D. Neglect of Client Matter (Count VIII). In 2007, Wengert
represented a client in a domestic relations appeal but failed to timely file
the appellant’s proof brief. Wengert was notified of the default, fined
$50, and given fifteen days to cure the default. She ignored the default
3The stipulation is unclear regarding whether the advancement of $175 to
Kilbert took place after July 1, 2005, the date on which the Iowa Rules of Professional
Conduct replaced the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers. Regardless,
the previous rules also prohibited such conduct in DR 5–103(B), which stated that “a
lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to a client.”

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notice and the appeal was dismissed. Wengert’s neglect of her client’s
matter violated rules 32:1.3 (attorney must act with reasonable diligence
and promptness in representing client) and 32:8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice). See Carpenter, 781 N.W.2d at 268–69
(stating that “[u]nder our rules prohibiting neglect, an attorney must
advance and protect his clients’ interests” and holding attorney neglect
violated ethical rules, including rules 32:1.3 and 32:8.4(d)); Iowa
Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Tompkins, 733 N.W.2d 661, 668–69
(Iowa 2007) (holding an attorney’s failure to comply with the appellate
deadlines and disregard of the default notice in a client’s appeal
constituted a violation of rules 32:1.3 and 32:8.4(d)); see also Templeton,
784 N.W.2d at 768 (noting acts prejudicial to the administration of
justice are those which “ ‘have hampered “the efficient and proper
operation of the courts or of ancillary systems upon which the courts
rely” ’ ” or violate “the well-understood norms and conventions of the
practice of law” (quoting Howe, 706 N.W.2d at 373)).
E. Failure to Provide Competent Representation (Count IX).
Wengert and the board stipulated that in 2007, Wengert represented
Christine Kilmer in a federal civil rights case, and the “drafting of the
Complaint was poor.” Wengert stipulated that by virtue of her poor work
in this case she failed to provide competent representation in violation of
rule 32:1.1 and also engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration
of justice under rule 32:8.4(d). Although there may be circumstances in
which a single poorly drafted complaint could constitute an ethical
violation, the stipulation does not provide enough factual detail for this
court to find a violation of rules 32:1.1 and 32:8.4(d). The stipulation
does not detail what, if any, harm to the client resulted or why the
complaint was considered “poorly drafted.”

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IV. Sanction.
There is no standard sanction for a particular type of attorney
misconduct, and we determine an appropriate sanction based on the
particular circumstances of each case. Carpenter, 781 N.W.2d at 270.
“In determining the appropriate sanction, we consider ‘ “the nature of the
violations, protection of the public, deterrence of similar misconduct by
others, the lawyer’s fitness to practice, and the court’s duty to uphold the
integrity of the profession in the eyes of the public.” ’ ” Marzen, 779
N.W.2d at 767 (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Iversen, 723 N.W.2d 806, 810 (Iowa 2006)). We consider relevant
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Id.
Wengert violated ethical rules relating to conflicts of interest,
disobeying a court order, mishandling client funds, and neglecting client
matters.
Misappropriation of a client’s funds by an attorney will typically
result in license revocation. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v.
Plumb, 766 N.W.2d 626, 634 (Iowa 2009). “Restitution or restoration of
client funds prior to the discovery of their misappropriation does not
preclude the imposition of revocation as a sanction.” Id. This court will
on occasion impose a lesser penalty when commingling of funds appears
negligent, instead of intentional; the funds were not converted to the
attorney’s own use; no client suffered financial loss; or the attorney had
a colorable future claim to the funds. Id.; Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l
Ethics & Conduct v. D’Angelo, 619 N.W.2d 333, 339 (Iowa 2000). We
have imposed license suspension of up to eighteen months when the
violation involves poor office management and neglect. See Carpenter,
781 N.W.2d at 271.

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Wengert used a client check meant for a medical examination for
other expenses and a year later used her own funds to cover the cost of
the medical examination. Wengert claims that although she commingled
funds, she had a colorable claim to the check for other work in her
representation of Meals and there is no stipulation to the contrary.
Alone, this behavior, though serious, would not necessarily warrant a
revocation.
Wengert also mishandled settlements received on behalf of clients.
She failed to timely pay subrogation obligations for two clients—Kilbert
and Edwards. She used the Kilbert settlement funds meant for the
subrogation obligation for “other purposes.” Wengert then used the
Edwards settlement to pay the $9,790.29 Kilbert subrogation obligation.
It is unclear from the stipulation whether Edwards eventually received
the complete amounts due her from the settlement. The commission was
concerned that Edwards did not receive her entire settlement and
ordered Wengert to provide proof that the amount paid from the Edwards
settlement to cover the Kilbert subrogation obligation had been repaid to
Edwards.
Although the stipulation states “[i]t is not clear that any client
suffered damage, however, and Respondent’s conduct may have been
negligent and sloppy rather than deliberate conversion of client funds,”
the commission’s order suggests that a client may have been harmed by
Wengert’s poor management of funds. At the very least, it is clear that
Wengert converted client funds for her own use. Wengert used the
portion of the Kilbert settlement funds meant for the subrogation
obligation for “other purposes.” She later used the Edwards settlement
funds to pay back the money taken from the Kilbert settlement. Such
behavior has previously resulted in revocation. See Iowa Supreme Ct.

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Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Leon, 602 N.W.2d 336, 338–39 (Iowa
1999) (imposing sanction of revocation where attorney repeatedly
neglected client legal matters and misappropriated other clients’ funds in
an effort to cover up the neglect). This is not a situation where Wengert
had a colorable claim to funds but failed to follow the proper procedures
for withdrawals. See Plumb, 766 N.W.2d at 634; Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of
Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Gottschalk, 553 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Iowa 1996).
Wengert’s misappropriation of client funds, therefore, supports a
sanction of revocation.
The stipulation identified aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. As mitigating circumstances, the stipulation noted
Wengert no longer wishes to practice law, Wengert planned to obtain a
psychological evaluation because of depression but did not because of a
lack of funds, and Wengert cooperated with the board. We agree with the
commission that only Wengert’s cooperation is a mitigating factor.
Iversen, 723 N.W.2d at 811. Wengert’s decision that she no longer
wishes to practice has no bearing on her fitness. Additionally, Wengert
received a continuance from the board and an order for a mental health
examination, but she failed to follow through on the order. This does not
demonstrate that Wengert suffers from any medical disorder such as
depression, but instead demonstrates she was unable to follow through,
a common problem in her prior legal practice.
As aggravating factors, the stipulation noted that Wengert
committed multiple violations of the ethical rules. In addition to the
misappropriation of client funds, Wengert disobeyed a court order,
engaged in a representation that was a conflict of interest, and neglected
a client matter. The large number and variety of Wengert’s ethical
violations is an aggravating factor. “Multiple violations of our

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disciplinary rules such as occurred here call for enhanced disciplinary
sanctions.” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Lesyshen,
585 N.W.2d 281, 288 (Iowa 1998).
Wengert was also previously admonished for making a recklessly
false allegation in connection with the Stenlund matter. The prior
admonishment occurred during the timeframe and related to a matter we
are considering in this action, therefore, it does not require us to
increase the severity of the sanction. See Moorman, 729 N.W.2d at 805–
06 (noting the allegations pertained to the same time period for which
Moorman had already been suspended for two years and therefore
imposing a concurrent sanction of a public reprimand).
The parties recommended a license suspension of three years, and
the commission agreed. We disagree and hold revocation is the
appropriate sanction. The large number of serious ethical violations
suggests a severe sanction is necessary. Additionally, Wengert
misappropriated client settlement funds twice, once for “other purposes”
and a second time to fulfill the obligation arising from her previous
misappropriation.
Three cases present similar facts: Iowa Supreme Court Attorney
Disciplinary Board v. Earley, 774 N.W.2d 301, 308–09 (Iowa 2009), Leon,
602 N.W.2d at 339, and Harris, 524 N.W.2d at 180. In Earley, this court
concluded Earley’s misappropriation of client settlement funds warranted
license revocation. Earley, 774 N.W.2d at 308–09. Earley received
settlement funds on behalf of a client but failed to pay the subrogation
obligations and instead used that money for personal reasons. Id. at
306, 308. We revoked Earley’s license, explaining that Earley did not
assert a colorable claim to the settlement funds and “the
misappropriation of client monies [is] intolerable.” Id. at 309.

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In Harris, the attorney withdrew a client’s money from the trust
account to apply toward attorney fees, even though the client had only
agreed the money was to be used for the client’s personal expenses, court
costs, and expenses of litigation. Harris, 524 N.W.2d at 180. When the
client objected, Harris paid the client $3,000 from the client trust
account, even though the client only had $670 in the trust account. Id.
We suspended Harris for three years. Id. at 181. We declined to revoke
Harris’s license because of a “good past professional record” and because
Harris was “not charged with obtaining funds for himself beyond those
fairly earned as fees.” Id. In Leon, the attorney repeatedly covered up
his neglect by paying clients from the client trust account even though
those clients did not have funds in the trust account—therefore, paying
with other clients’ money. Leon, 602 N.W.2d at 337. We revoked Leon’s
license and noted the distinction from Harris was a likelihood of future
misconduct because Leon had misappropriated funds on more than one
occasion involving multiple clients, had lied to coverup his actions, and
had failed to fully reimburse the trust account. Id. at 339.
Revocation is more appropriate here because, just as in Earley,
Wengert failed to pay subrogation obligations and misappropriated
settlement funds from Kilbert and Edwards. In addition, similar to Leon,
Wengert attempted to cover up her actions by paying a client with
another client’s money and this behavior was part of a series of ethical
violations. Wengert failed to keep an accounting of client funds,
intermingled client and personal funds, disobeyed a court order, engaged
in a representation that was a conflict of interest, and neglected a client
matter leading to dismissal. Wengert’s pattern of misconduct leads us to
conclude that future misconduct is likely. Consistent with our prior
decisions, we conclude revocation is the appropriate sanction.

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V. Conclusion.
Wengert’s license to practice law in Iowa is revoked. Costs are
taxed to Wengert pursuant to Iowa Court Rule 35.26(1).
LICENSE REVOKED.

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