52098/52099 State v. Taylor

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket Nos. 52097/52098/52099

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: December 22, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
ERIN THERESE TAYLOR, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Kootenai County. Hon. Barbara Buchanan, District Judge. Hon. Ross D. Pittman,
District Judge. Hon. Cynthia K.C. Meyer, District Judge.

Order revoking probation, affirmed; judgments of conviction and sentences,
affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

Before GRATTON, Chief Judge; LORELLO, Judge;
and TRIBE, Judge
________________________________________________

PER CURIAM
In these consolidated appeals, Erin Therese Taylor pled guilty to possession of
methamphetamine and misdemeanor driving under the influence, Idaho Code §§ 37-2732(c)(1),
18-8004. In exchange for her guilty plea, additional charges were dismissed. The district court
imposed a unified term of four years with two years determinate and retained jurisdiction.
Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended the sentence and placed
Taylor on probation for two years (Docket No. 52097). In Docket No. 52098, Taylor pled guilty
to introduction of major contraband into a correctional facility, I.C. § 18-2510. In Docket No.

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52099, Taylor pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, I.C. § 37-
2732(b)(4)(A); possession of fentanyl, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1). Pursuant to a global resolution plea
agreement, Taylor admitted to violating her probation and additional charges were dismissed. The
district court revoked Taylor’s probation and executed her underlying sentence of four years with
two years determinate in Docket No. 52097. The district court further imposed concurrent
sentences of twelve years with five years determinate for possession of methamphetamine with
intent to deliver, seven years with five years determinate for possession of a fentanyl, five years
determinate for possession of a firearm, and five years determinate for introduction of a major
contraband into a correctional facility. Taylor appeals, contending that the district court abused
its discretion by revoking her probation and imposing an aggregate sentence of twelve years with
five years determinate.
It is within the trial court’s discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and conditions
of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 324,
325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261
(Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In
determining whether to revoke probation a court must examine whether the probation is achieving
the goal of rehabilitation and consistent with the protection of society. State v. Upton, 127 Idaho
274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass,
114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. The court may, after a probation violation has been established,
order that the suspended sentence be executed or, in the alternative, the court is authorized under
I.C.R. 35 to reduce the sentence. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; State v. Marks, 116
Idaho 976, 977, 783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989). The court may also order a period of retained
jurisdiction. I.C. § 19-2601(4). A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only
upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion. Beckett, 122 Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at
327. In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, the focus of the inquiry is the conduct
underlying the trial court’s decision to revoke probation. State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, 621,
288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the record
before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues which are properly made part
of the record on appeal. Id.
Sentencing is also a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and
the factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of a sentence are well established and

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need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-
15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984);
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the
length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722,
726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Our role is limited to determining whether reasonable minds could
reach the same conclusion as the district court. State v. Biggs, 168 Idaho 112, 116, 480 P.3d 150,
154 (Ct. App. 2020).
When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation,
we will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment.
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 29, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009). We base our review upon
the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original
sentencing and the revocation of probation. Id. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court that are properly made part of the record on appeal. Morgan, 153
Idaho at 621, 288 P.3d at 838.
Applying the foregoing standards, and having reviewed the record in these cases, we cannot
say that the district court abused its discretion either in revoking probation or by imposing Taylor’s
sentences. Therefore, the order revoking probation and directing execution of Taylor’s previously
suspended sentence is affirmed; Taylor’s judgments of conviction and sentences are also affirmed.

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