Charboneau v. State

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 50590

JAIME DEAN CHARBONEAU, )
) Filed: July 9, 2024
Petitioner-Appellant, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
STATE OF IDAHO, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Respondent. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Michael J. Reardon, District Judge.

Judgment summarily dismissing petition for post-conviction relief, affirmed.

Greg S. Silvey, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

MELANSON, Judge Pro Tem
Jaime Dean Charboneau appeals from a judgment summarily dismissing his petition for
post-conviction relief. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Charboneau and the victim were in a dating relationship. Approximately two weeks after
the victim ended the relationship, she returned to her home after a night out to find Charboneau in
her bedroom, crouching on the floor, and pointing a loaded and cocked crossbow at her.
Charboneau told her that she had caused the situation, which was “going to be bad.” She managed
to escape with her small dog and ran to the home of a neighbor. Charboneau also fled the residence
and ran to a car he had parked in a nearby field. He discarded the crossbow and its bolts and drove
away. While driving away, he called police dispatch and claimed to have been kidnapped and held
against his will by the victim and an accomplice. After investigating, police arrested Charboneau
and he was charged with burglary and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Counsel was
appointed for Charboneau but, on the eve of trial, he decided to proceed pro se after numerous
Faretta1 warnings. Charboneau was found guilty. On direct appeal, Charboneau’s judgment of
conviction was affirmed in an unpublished opinion. See State v. Charboneau, Docket No. 46552
(Ct. App. May 19, 2020). He then filed a pro se, handwritten verified petition for post-conviction
relief. The petition was nineteen pages long, but the attached affidavit and exhibits added another
1015 pages and alleged numerous claims for relief. Counsel was appointed to represent
Charboneau and filed a notice of intent to proceed on the pro se petition, stating that there were
“no further claims to justify an Amended Petition and [Charboneau] intends to proceed on the
original petition as filed.” The State filed an answer and a motion for summary dismissal and
memorandum of law in support. Charboneau filed a memorandum in opposition to the State’s
motion for summary disposition, and the State filed a reply. After oral argument, the district court
granted the State’s motion for summary dismissal in a written order. Charboneau appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature. I.C.
§ 19-4907; Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 249, 220 P.3d 1066, 1068 (2009); State v. Bearshield,
104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d
1323, 1326 (Ct. App. 1992). Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the petitioner must prove by a
preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is
based. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002). A petition for
post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. Dunlap v. State, 141
Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004). A petition must contain much more than a short and plain
statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). Rather, a petition
for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of
the petitioner, and affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached
or the petition must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the petition. I.C.
§ 19-4903. In other words, the petition must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence

1
See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).

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supporting its allegations or the petition will be subject to dismissal. Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64,
67, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011).
Idaho Code Section 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for
post-conviction relief, either pursuant to a motion by a party or upon the court’s own initiative, if
it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and
agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When considering summary
dismissal, the district court must construe disputed facts in the petitioner’s favor, but the court is
not required to accept either the petitioner’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by
admissible evidence, or the petitioner’s conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647,
873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372
(Ct. App. 1986). Moreover, the district court, as the trier of fact, is not constrained to draw
inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion for summary disposition; rather, the district
court is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidence.
Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008). Such inferences will not
be disturbed on appeal if the uncontroverted evidence is sufficient to justify them. Id.
Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner’s allegations are clearly disproven by
the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima
facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner’s allegations do not justify
relief as a matter of law. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010); DeRushé
v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009). Thus, summary dismissal of a claim
for post-conviction relief is appropriate when the court can conclude, as a matter of law, that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief even with all disputed facts construed in the petitioner’s favor.
For this reason, summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition may be appropriate even when
the State does not controvert the petitioner’s evidence. See Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at
901.
Conversely, if the petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the petition allege
facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction claim may not be
summarily dismissed. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004);
Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920, 923 (Ct. App. 2008). If a genuine issue of

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material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted to resolve the factual issues.
Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 P.3d at 629.
On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards utilized by
the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner’s admissible evidence asserts facts which, if
true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929
(2010); Sheahan, 146 Idaho at 104, 190 P.3d at 923. Over questions of law, we exercise free
review. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250, 220 P.3d at 1069; Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 370, 33
P.3d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2001).
III.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Charboneau argues that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his
petition because he did not receive proper notice of the grounds for dismissal. Alternatively, he
argues that one of his claims--that he was forced to choose between being represented by
ineffective trial counsel or proceeding pro se--should not have been dismissed.
Charboneau argues that the State’s motion for summary dismissal did not provide proper
notice pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(c). The notice requirement of I.C. § 19-4906(c) is met if the
notice is sufficient that the other party cannot assert surprise or prejudice. DeRushé, 146 Idaho at
601, 200 P.3d at 1150. Because a post-conviction proceeding is governed by the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure, a motion for summary dismissal must, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(1), state the
grounds for dismissal with particularity. Id. For example, to prevail on an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, a defendant must show that the attorney’s performance was deficient and that
the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88
(1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 1995). Reasonable
particularity only requires pointing out that there is a lack of evidence showing deficient
performance or prejudice. DeRushé, 146 Idaho at 602, 200 P.3d at 1151. It does not require
explaining what further evidence is necessary to substantiate a petitioner’s claim. Id. If a petitioner
believes the grounds for dismissal alleged by the State in its motion for summary dismissal are
insufficient, he or she must object in the court below. Kelly, 149 Idaho at 522 n.1, 236 P.3d at
1282 n.1. A petitioner for post-conviction relief cannot challenge the sufficiency of the State’s
grounds for dismissal for the first time on appeal. DeRushé, 146 Idaho at 602, 200 P.3d at 1151.

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However, a petitioner may assert for the first time on appeal that his or her post-conviction claims
were dismissed without any notice at all. Kelly, 149 Idaho at 522, 236 P.3d at 1282.
The State’s motion for summary dismissal was filed on August 31, 2022. The motion
identified Charboneau’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel as being subject to dismissal
for failure to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding both deficient performance and
resulting prejudice.2 The State’s memorandum in support of the motion also addressed the lack of
evidence to support Charboneau’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for lack of pretrial
investigation as follows:
The majority of [Charboneau’s] assertions in his petition are just that--mere
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence. His exhibits appear
to be duplicates of the hand-written motions he made prior to trial, the complaints
he made to the State Bar, minutes and other documents related to his prior murder
case, and various pages of the discovery that he made notes on. Dismissal of a
petition is proper where the evidence disproves the essential elements of the
applicant’s assertions or where the evidence does not support relief to the applicant
as a matter of law. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975).
Here the evidence (the underlying court record of which this Court has taken
judicial notice of), belies the unsupported claims of [Charboneau].
At this point, Charboneau would have been on notice that the State challenged his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to deficient
performance and resulting prejudice.
On September 21, 2022, Charboneau’s post-conviction counsel filed a memorandum
opposing the State’s motion. Replying to the State’s argument, the memorandum addressed
Charboneau’s claim in his petition that, because of his trial counsel’s deficient performance,
Charboneau had been “forced into a dilemma requiring him to choose between incompetent
counsel and representing himself” pro se. He alleged that his attorney “failed to make meaningful
visits with Charboneau to engage in serious minded discussions” and that the visits consisted of
“psychological manipulation sessions meant to coerce Charboneau into agreeing to an ill-advised
. . . guilty plea.” He also argued that his counsel had “failed to conduct a reasonable and timely
investigation,” to the point that prejudice should be presumed because counsel was so uninvolved

2
The motion also asserted that Charboneau’s petition was untimely. The district court
resolved that issue in Charboneau’s favor by application of the “mailbox rule.” See, e.g., Munson
v. State, 128 Idaho 639, 643, 917 P.2d 796, 800 (1996).

5
with the case that Charboneau was denied his right to counsel. Charboneau argued that he did not
freely choose to represent himself; rather, he had no desire to do so but was forced into that position
because of his attorney’s ineffective representation.
On October 3, 2022, the State filed a reply which responded in more detail to Charboneau’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, including his attorney’s failure to prepare a witness list,
failure to conduct meaningful visits, and failure to investigate a conspiracy. 3 The reply also made
reference to some of Charboneau’s claims which were properly subjects of direct appeal. The
reply also noted that there existed no factual or legal basis for the presumption of prejudice which
had been argued by Charboneau.
Argument on the State’s motion was held on November 17, 2022. The State noted that
Charboneau’s claims fell into two categories: (1) those that were barred by I.C. § 19-4901 because
they could have been raised on direct appeal; and (2) claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. The State then addressed the claims in Charboneau’s petition in considerably more detail
than it had in the pleadings. Charboneau’s counsel offered argument on the merits of the petition
but did not object to a lack of notice of the State’s claims. The district court entered a written order
ruling, inter alia, that many of Charboneau’s claims should have been raised on direct appeal. The
district court dismissed Charboneau’s petition concluding:
Dismissal of a petition is proper where the evidence disproves the essential
elements of the applicant’s assertions or where the evidence does not support relief
to the applicant as a matter of law. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d
1187, 1190 (1975). Here, the evidence (the underlying court record of which this
Court has taken judicial notice of) contradicts the unsupported claims of
[Charboneau]. As [Charboneau] has failed to provide the Court with any evidence
supporting his allegations, no issue of material fact, genuine or otherwise, exists.
Charboneau’s argument that he was not provided sufficient notice of the State’s claims was
not preserved for appeal. At no point did Charboneau object to sufficiency of notice or that the
State’s argument became more detailed after the initial response to the petition. Generally, issues
not raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal. Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho
321, 322, 815 P.2d 1061, 1062 (1991). More specifically, an appellant may not challenge the

3
Charboneau apparently believes there is a conspiracy among deputy attorney generals,
prosecutors, judges, a police detective and members of a religious denomination to convict him,
apparently as part of a plot to establish that denomination as Idaho’s official religion.

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sufficiency of the notice contained in the State’s motion for summary disposition and
accompanying memoranda, for the first time on appeal. Kelly, 149 Idaho at 521-22, 236 P.3d
1281-82.
Even if we were to address the alleged insufficiency of notice, Charboneau would not
prevail. From the outset, the State argued that Charboneau’s claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel and resulting prejudice were not supported by admissible evidence. Charboneau was,
therefore, provided adequate notice of the State’s claims. Reasonable particularity only requires
pointing out that there is a lack of evidence showing deficient performance or prejudice. DeRushé,
146 Idaho at 602, 200 P.3d at 1151. Even now, Charboneau has failed to point to such evidence
in the record, particularly as to prejudice.
Alternatively, Charboneau argues that he was forced to decide between being represented
by ineffective appointed trial counsel and representing himself. He claims that his appointed
counsel was not preparing for trial and was, instead, trying to get him to plead guilty. As grounds
for relief Charboneau cites Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct (I.R.P.C.) 12 which provides in
part that “in a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after consultation with
the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive a jury trial and whether the client will
testify.” In his petition, Charboneau claimed that his counsel did not adequately prepare for trial
and tried to persuade Charboneau to plead guilty. He did not claim that his counsel did not intend
to abide by Charboneau’s decision to go to trial nor did he present any evidence that his counsel
would not have taken the case to trial. It is not ineffective for counsel to advise a client to plead
guilty nor does it violate I.R.P.C. 12. Rather, the district court found that Charboneau decided to
proceed pro se after a hearing in which, “after multiple Faretta warnings,” the district court
determined that, “up to then, there was no basis on which it could conclude that [counsel] had not
acted competently and that Charboneau “elected nonetheless to fire [counsel] and proceed to trial
representing himself.” Even now, Charboneau has failed to cite to any evidence in the record that
counsel was ineffective for advising Charboneau to plead guilty or that counsel actually failed to
prepare for trial. Instead, Charboneau argues for the first time on appeal, without any supporting
evidence, that the district court “did not seem to recognize” that the decision whether to go to trial
was his and not counsel’s. This claim is based upon a portion of the district court’s order granting
the State’s motion for summary dismissal:

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From [Charboneau’s] own allegations it appears that his pre-trial counsel
understood what the evidence would likely show, the risks that existed by taking
the case to trial and attempted to counsel [Charboneau] in such a way as to have the
best chance of avoiding the most extreme consequences. [Charboneau] was entitled
to competent counsel. He is not constitutionally guaranteed to be appointed counsel
that agrees with his perspective of the case, or one that abandons his professional
responsibility to give advice that the attorney reasonably believes to be in the
client’s best interests. [Charboneau’s] unwillingness to follow that advice does not
make counsel’s performance deficient. As noted with approval in State v. Priest,
128 Idaho 6, [909 P.2d 624] (Ct. App. 1995), “We agree with the district court’s
observation that a criminal defendant may not compel the court to appoint a new
attorney by refusing to cooperate with his existing attorney or otherwise
manufacturing his own conflict.” Id[, at 11, 909 P.2d at 629].
Nothing in the district court’s order, or elsewhere in the record, suggests that it believed that the
decision whether to go to trial was not Charboneau’s alone. The district court observed that
Charboneau’s decision to go to trial, when his attorney had advised him to plead guilty, was
Charboneau’s decision alone (after consulting with counsel) and that Charboneau, having decided
to reject counsel’s advice, could not then complain that the advice was deficient. Charboneau’s
claim that he is entitled to relief because his attorney violated I.R.P.C. 12 or was otherwise
ineffective fails because Charboneau has failed to show both deficient performance and resulting
prejudice.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Charboneau has failed to demonstrate error in the district court’s dismissal of his petition
for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment summarily dismissing Charboneau’s
petition for post-conviction relief is affirmed.
Judge HUSKEY and Judge TRIBE, CONCUR.

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