Ludwig v. Howard, ITD

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 52067
ISAAC LUDWIG, an individual,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ROBERT HOWARD a.k.a. BOB HOWARD,
an individual; HOWARD GRAZING
ASSOCIATION, LLC, an Idaho limited
liability company; IDAHO
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, an
executive department in the State of Idaho,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
DOES I -V,
Defendants.
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Boise, June 2026 Term
Opinion Filed: October 13, 2026
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Elmore
County. Theodore Fleming, District Judge.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Evan S. Mortimer, Litster Frost Injury Lawyers, Boise, for Appellant, Isaac Ludwig.
Evan S. Mortimer argued.
Ryan B. Peck, Pocatello, for Respondent, Robert Howard a/k/a Bob Howard. Ryan
B. Peck argued.
Raúl R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Tyler D. Williams and Reid K. Peterson,
Nelson Williams, Special Deputy Attorneys General, Boise, for Respondent, Idaho
Transportation Department. Reid K. Peterson argued.
Robert R. Gates, Eagle, for Respondent, Howard Grazing Association, LLC. Robert
R. Gates argued.
____________________________
MEYER, Justice.
In 2019, Isaac Ludwig was traveling eastbound on I-84 at night when he came upon and
struck a cow that was on the roadway in Elmore County, Idaho. Ludwig was injured from the

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collision and his vehicle was totaled. Seeking redress, Ludwig filed suit, asserting negligence
claims against Robert Howard, the owner of the cow; Howard Grazing Association, LLC (HGA),
the named owner of the grazing permits near the scene of the wreck; and the Idaho Transportation
Department (ITD). The district court granted summary judgment on Ludwig’s claims against
Howard and HGA (collectively, the Howard Defendants), concluding they were entitled to
immunity under Idaho Code section 25-2118 because the collision occurred on open range. The
district court also granted summary judgment on Ludwig’s claims against ITD, concluding that
ITD did not have a duty to prohibit livestock from entering the highway or warn motorists of
livestock and that ITD was entitled to immunity under the Idaho Tort Claims Act.
On appeal, Ludwig challenges the district court’s summary judgment rulings on multiple
bases. He argues, among other things, that (1) federal law preempts Idaho’s open range laws; (2)
the collision did not occur on “open range” land under Idaho Code section 25-2118 because I-84
was enclosed by fencing along the right-of-way; and (3) ITD owed or assumed a duty of care to
maintain I-84 and had a duty to warn Ludwig of the potential presence of cattle on I-84. For the
reasons set forth below, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND
Interstate 84 (I-84) is an interstate highway that runs from Portland, Oregon to its junction
with Interstate 80 near Echo, Utah. While designated as a federal interstate, the portion of the
interstate highway system that runs through Idaho is under the administration of ITD. I.C. § 40-
502; 23 U.S.C. § 116(b). ITD maintains cattleguards across the on-ramps and off-ramps at the two
exits closest to the collision site, as well as fencing on both sides of I-84 along the right-of-way
boundary. According to ITD Administrative Policy 5046, this fencing is “used extensively to
delineate the acquired control of access to a highway” and “may reduce the likelihood of
encroachment onto the highway right-of-way.” Idaho Transp. Dep’t, Admin. Policy 5046, Right-
of-Way Fencing at 2 (Jan. 2014), https://itd.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/A5046.pdf.
In March 2019, ITD crews performed brush clearing on a livestock culvert (known as the
“Hot Creek Tunnel”) after receiving a request from Howard. Hot Creek Tunnel, a large culvert
designed to allow livestock to pass under the interstate from one grazing allotment to another, is
the nearest livestock culvert to the collision site. Howard has gated off Hot Creek Tunnel to restrict
his cattle from crossing under the interstate between the grazing allotments for over 20 years. On
March 30, 2019, one or both of the Howard Defendants herded livestock through Hot Creek

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Tunnel. Thereafter, one of Howard’s cows was struck by Ludwig while traveling through a
construction zone on the interstate. As a result of the collision, Ludwig sustained significant
injuries, and his vehicle was damaged beyond repair. The day after the collision, Howard inspected
the right-of-way fencing along the northern side of I-84 and found a hole in the fence “about a
hundred yards” from the entrance of the Hot Creek Tunnel.
In 2021, Ludwig filed suit against the Howard Defendants and ITD, asserting claims of
negligence and recklessness. In his complaint, Ludwig alleged that (1) the Howard Defendants and
ITD were negligent by failing to warn him that the cow was obstructing eastbound traffic on I-84,
(2) the Howard Defendants breached their “duty to protect the safe transit of motorists” by
allowing their cow to stray onto I-84, and (3) ITD breached its duty to maintain safe, design-
compliant fences along federal interstates.
The Howard Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, arguing that they were
entitled to immunity under Idaho Code section 25-2118 because the collision occurred on open
range. Sections 25-2118 and 25-2119 grants the owner of any domestic animal immunity from a
negligence action arising from highway collisions caused by such animals on “open range” or
when the animals are “lawfully on any highway[.]” I.C. §§ 25-2118, 25-2119. Pertinent here,
“‘[o]pen range’ means all uninclosed lands outside of cities, villages and herd districts, upon which
cattle by custom, license, lease, or permit, are grazed or permitted to roam.” I.C. § 25-2118.
In response, Ludwig argued that the location of the collision did not qualify as “open range”
because I-84 had wire fences and cattleguards; therefore, the land was not unenclosed for purposes
of section 25-2118. Ludwig also argued that Idaho’s open range laws were preempted by the
Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. §§ 101–190, which established a federal funding program
for highway systems. However, Ludwig subsequently took the position in his response to
Howard’s motion for summary judgment that it was “unnecessary to deal with the preemption
question at this stage of the case, as federal interstate laws . . . [do] not conflict with Idaho open
range laws.”
The district court denied the Howard Defendants’ motions for summary judgment,
concluding that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether I-84 was “fenced
out” and, if so, whether the cow breached the fence due to the Howard Defendants’ or ITD’s
negligence. Howard filed a renewed motion for summary judgment, which was joined by HGA.
Howard argued that his cattle were not being fenced out by ITD because the fencing was designed

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to delineate the right-of-way of I-84. The district court denied the Howard Defendants’ renewed
motion for summary judgment, concluding again that there was a genuine issue of material fact
whether I-84 was unenclosed for purposes of section 25-2118.
Howard filed a motion to reconsider the denial of his renewed motion for summary
judgment, which was joined by HGA. Citing Moreland v. Adams, 143 Idaho 687, 690, 152 P.3d
558, 561 (2007), Howard argued in pertinent part that the Idaho Legislature did not intend to limit
the definition of “open range” by including the word “uninclosed” in section 25-2118. Thereafter,
ITD filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that (1) it owed no duty to prohibit livestock
from entering the highway or warn motorists of livestock, and (2) that it was entitled to highway
design and discretionary function immunity under the Idaho Tort Claims Act.
The district court granted the Howard Defendants’ motion to reconsider, as well as ITD’s
motion for summary judgment. The district court agreed with the Howard Defendants that, under
Moreland, the issue of whether I-84 was “uninclosed” was not relevant to determining whether
the collision’s location was open range land; instead, the proper test was whether the land fell
outside any city, village, or herd district. Applying that test, the district court concluded that the
Howard Defendants were entitled to immunity as a matter of law under section 25-2118 for the
damages caused by the collision.
Next, the district court concluded that ITD did not have a statutory duty or assumed duty
to Ludwig regarding the repair and maintenance of the control of access fencing. It further
concluded that ITD did not have a duty to warn Ludwig regarding the presence of livestock on the
interstate. The district court also concluded that ITD was entitled to design immunity under Idaho
Code section 6-904(7) and discretionary function immunity under Idaho Code section 6-904(1).
The district court entered a final judgment dismissing Ludwig’s claims against the Howard
Defendants and ITD on April 3, 2024. Fourteen days later, Ludwig filed motions to reconsider the
“dismissal” of the Howard Defendants and ITD, along with a declaration from Ludwig’s counsel.
However, Ludwig did not state any basis for the relief sought in these motions. Instead, Ludwig
stated in both motions that he would “file a memorandum in support of [his] motion[s] for
reconsideration in accordance with the timelines set forth under” Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
7(b)(3). Ludwig, however, never filed memoranda in support of his motions. After Ludwig’s
deadline to file his memoranda had passed, Howard and ITD objected, arguing that Ludwig’s
motions did not comply with Rule 7(b)(3) because Ludwig did not file supporting memoranda,

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and (2) failed to direct the district court to any evidence or legal argument that would allow the
court to grant his motions.
On May 28, 2024, the district court held a hearing on Ludwig’s motions to reconsider. In
an exercise of its discretion, the district court allowed Ludwig to present argument on his motions.
Relevant here, Ludwig argued that section 25-2118 was preempted by federal law due to “the level
of control the federal government through its regulations has over the [i]nterstate system.”
On June 7, 2024, the district court denied Ludwig’s motions to reconsider on two bases.
First, the district court denied Ludwig’s motions for failing to comply with Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 7(b)(3) and Fourth District Local Rule 8.1, the latter of which “requires that every
motion ‘must be accompanied’ by a separate memorandum or brief that must not exceed 15 pages,
unless the motion concerns a routine or uncontested matter.” The court emphasized that Ludwig
put the opposing parties at a disadvantage because they could not properly or meaningfully respond
to the motions and that Ludwig “essentially document-dumped the court with no explanation of
the exhibits’ relevance.” (Quotation modified.) Second, the district court alternatively denied
Ludwig’s motions to reconsider because he failed to establish that Idaho’s open range law was
preempted by federal law.
Ludwig filed a notice of appeal on July 16, 2024.
II. S TANDARDS OF REVIEW
“This Court exercises de novo review of a grant of summary judgment . . . .” Summerfield
v. St. Luke’s McCall, Ltd., 169 Idaho 221, 228, 494 P.3d 769, 776 (2021) (citing AED, Inc. v. KDC
Inv., LLC, 155 Idaho 159, 163, 307 P.3d 176, 180 (2013)). Summary judgment is proper “if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(a)). “[A] mere scintilla of evidence or merely casting a
slight doubt of the facts will not defeat summary judgment.” Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho
266, 271, 281 P.3d 103, 108 (2012) (citation omitted). When determining “whether the evidence
shows a genuine issue of material fact, the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Id. (citation omitted). “Questions of
law are reviewed de novo.” Safaris Unlimited, LLC v. Sligar, 174 Idaho 239, 248, 552 P.3d 1183,
1192 (2024) (citing Berkshire Invs., LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 80, 278 P.3d 943, 950 (2012)).
“This Court exercises free review over jurisdictional issues.” Riverton Citizens Grp. v.
Bingham Cnty. Comm’rs, 171 Idaho 898, 903, 527 P.3d 501, 506 (2023) (alteration omitted)

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(quoting Nemeth v. Shoshone County, 165 Idaho 851, 854, 453 P.3d 844, 847 (2019)). “The
interpretation of the Idaho Appellate Rules, like the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, is a matter of
law.” Id. (citation omitted). Likewise, “[t]he interpretation of a statute is a question of law.” Idaho
Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. McCormick, 153 Idaho 468, 470, 283 P.3d 785, 787 (2012) (citing
State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 100, 103, 90 P.3d 321, 328 (2004)).
“Further, whether Idaho law is preempted by federal law is also a question of law.” Id. (citing
Christian v. Mason, 148 Idaho 149, 151, 219 P.3d 473, 475 (2009)).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Ludwig timely filed his notice of appeal.
As an initial matter, ITD urges this Court to dismiss Ludwig’s appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. It argues that Ludwig’s appeal is time-barred because he failed to specify any grounds
for his motions to reconsider as required by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b), and, therefore, his
motions to reconsider did not terminate his 42-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal after entry
of the judgment. See I.A.R. 14(a) (“The time for an appeal from any civil judgment or order in an
action is terminated by the filing of a timely motion which, if granted, could affect any findings of
fact, conclusions of law or any judgment in the action[.]”). In response, Ludwig does not dispute
that his motions to reconsider failed to comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b). Instead,
Ludwig cites Department of Environmental Quality v. Gibson, 166 Idaho 424, 435, 461 P.3d 706,
717 (2020), for the proposition that a motion to reconsider terminates the time to appeal unless it
is both “improperly and untimely filed.” He contends that his motions to reconsider were not
improper or untimely as each was filed within 14 days of the judgment and was “supported by
additional evidence and extensive oral argument”; therefore, his time for filing the appeal was
terminated. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Ludwig timely filed his notice of
appeal.
Rule 7 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure “governs motion practice in civil
proceedings.” Ward v. State, 166 Idaho 330, 332, 458 P.3d 199, 201 (2020). In pertinent part, Rule
7(b)(1) requires that a motion “state with particularity the grounds for the relief sought . . . .”
I.R.C.P. 7(b)(1)(B). “The purpose of the state-grounds-with-particularity requirement is to provide
the opposing party with notice.” Gibson, 166 Idaho at 434, 461 P.3d at 716.
Rule 14(a) of the Idaho Appellate Rules provides that appeals from the district court must
be made “within 42 days” of the entry of judgment or appealable order. I.A.R. 14(a). “Failure to

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observe this timing requirement renders [this] Court without jurisdiction to hear the appeal.” Evans
v. Wright, 174 Idaho 330, 336, 554 P.3d 591, 597 (2024) (citing I.A.R. 21). However, this
requirement “is terminated by the filing of a timely motion” that “if granted, could affect any
findings of fact, conclusions of law or any judgment in the action[.]’” I.A.R. 14(a). “A motion for
reconsideration falls under this category.” Evans, 174 Idaho at 336, 554 P.3d at 597 (citation
omitted).
A motion to reconsider any order is timely if it is filed: “(1) at any time before the court
enters a final judgment or (2) within fourteen days after the court enters a final judgment.” Id.
(citing I.R.C.P. 11.2(b)(1)). Where a motion for reconsideration terminates the time to appeal from
an order, the time to appeal from the order “commences to run upon the date of the clerk’s filing
stamp on the order deciding such motion.’” I.A.R. 14(a). Critically, “Idaho Appellate Rule 14 does
not require a successful motion, simply one that, if granted, would alter the findings and
conclusions or final judgment.” Gibson, 166 Idaho at 435, 461 P.3d at 717.
Here, the district court entered a final judgment on April 3, 2024. Fourteen days later, on
April 17, 2024, Ludwig filed two motions to reconsider the district court’s orders granting
summary judgment. The district court entered its order denying Ludwig’s motions to reconsider
on June 7, 2024, and, thirty-nine days later, on July 16, 2024, Ludwig filed his notice of appeal.
Thus, Ludwig filed his motions to reconsider and notice of appeal within the timing requirements
set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11.2(b) and Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a), respectively.
The question before this Court is whether Ludwig’s motions for reconsideration terminated his
time to appeal from the judgment given his failure to provide any “grounds for the relief sought”
in his motions as required by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(1)(B).
We addressed a similar question in Gibson. In that case, a district court entered judgment
in favor of the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) in a civil enforcement action
against Gibson following a bench trial. 166 Idaho at 431–32, 461 P.3d at 713–14. Twelve days
after the district court entered its final judgment, Gibson filed a motion requesting that the district
court “‘reconsider’ its findings, conclusions, and judgment pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2)(B) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (an outdated rule citation).” Id. at 433, 461 P.3d at 715. Noting that
Rule 11.2(b) “does not provide a mechanism for seeking reconsideration of a final judgment[,]”
the district court construed the motion as a motion to amend the court’s findings and conclusions
under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b) and, ultimately, summarily denied Gibson’s motion. Id.

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at 432–34, 461 P.3d 706, 714–16. Gibson appealed and the DEQ requested that this Court dismiss
the appeal as untimely under Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a), arguing that Gibson’s motion to
reconsider was “facially deficient under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7” because Gibson failed
to specify valid grounds for his motion which “left the district court without jurisdiction . . . .” Id.
at 433–34, 461 P.3d at 715–16. Thus, DEQ contended, this Court also lacked jurisdiction to hear
the appeal. Id.
We rejected DEQ’s argument. First, we explained that the district court did not err by
construing Gibson’s motion under Rule 52(b) because (1) “that rule was the procedurally proper
mechanism for Gibson’s request[,]” and (2) the district court had discretion whether to strictly
enforce Rule 7’s requirements and did not abuse such discretion. Id. at 434, 461 P.3d at 716. We
explained that even though the motion “failed to abide by the letter of the rule[,]” “the purpose of
the state-grounds-with-particularity requirement is to provide the opposing party with notice” and
DEQ had adequate notice of Gibson’s claim. Id. Second, this Court determined that “Gibson’s
motion properly invoked the jurisdiction of the court because his motion, once properly construed,
was timely filed under the proper rule.” Id. at 435, 461 P.3d at 717. However, this Court noted
that, “when a motion for reconsideration is improperly and untimely filed, it will not serve to toll
the time to appeal.” Id. (citing Shelton v. Shelton, 148 Idaho 560, 564, 225 P.3d 693, 697 (2009)).1
Ludwig contends that his motions to reconsider terminated the time to file his appeal under
Gibson because his motions were neither “improper” nor “untimely”—as each was filed within 14
days of the judgment and supported by argument during the hearing. However, with respect to our
statement in Gibson indicating that a motion to reconsider will not terminate the time to appeal if
it is “improperly and untimely” filed, that language was not necessary for the disposition of
Gibson’s appeal and is dicta. See Luck v. Rohel, 171 Idaho 51, 59, 518 P.3d 350, 358 (2022) (“If
the statement is not necessary to decide the issue presented to the appellate court, it is considered
to be dictum and not controlling.” (citation omitted)). Thus, the statement in Gibson that “when a
motion for reconsideration is improperly and untimely filed, it will not serve to toll the time to
appeal” is not controlling, and we now disavow that dicta.
1 In Evans, we clarified that “Rule 14(a) of the Idaho Appellate Rules is not a tolling provision; rather, it terminates
the appeal-filing time[.]” 174 Idaho at 336, 554 P.3d at 597.

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Even so, we agree with Ludwig that his motions for reconsideration terminated his time
for filing his appeal from the judgment. During the hearing, the district court exercised its
discretion to allow argument on Ludwig’s motions regardless of his failure to comply with Rule
7(b)(1)(B)’s particularity requirement, stating that it was “interested to hear the parties’ arguments
because [the court] want[ed] to get this right” given the likelihood of an appeal. While the district
court ultimately denied the motions, “Idaho Appellate Rule 14 does not require a successful
motion . . . .” Gibson, 166 Idaho at 435, 461 P.3d at 717. Nor does Rule 14 require a party to
submit a motion or supporting memorandum that complies with the state-grounds-with-
particularity requirement of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3)(A). Instead, it simply requires
a motion that, “if granted, would alter the findings and conclusions or final judgment.” Id.
Ludwig’s motions to reconsider satisfied this requirement. Therefore, we conclude that Ludwig’s
motion was timely under Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a).
B. Ludwig failed to challenge the district court’s alternative ground for denying his motions
for reconsideration, and we affirm the district court on the unchallenged ground.
In challenging the order denying his motion for reconsideration, Ludwig argues that the
district court erred by concluding that Idaho Code section 25-2118 was not preempted by federal
law. In response, the Howard Defendants argue that Ludwig failed to challenge the district court’s
alternative basis for denying Ludwig’s preemption argument—that Ludwig’s motions for
reconsideration failed to comply with Rule 7(b)(3) and Fourth District Local Rule 8.1, which
specifically required the filing of a supporting memorandum.
We agree with the Howard Defendants. “Where a lower court makes a ruling based on two
alternative grounds and only one of those grounds is challenged on appeal, the appellate court must
affirm on the uncontested basis.” Pickering v. Sanchez, 173 Idaho 478, 490, 544 P.3d 135, 147
(2024) (quoting Schweitzer Basin Water Co. v. Schweitzer Fire Dist., 163 Idaho 186, 194 n.4, 408
P.3d 1258, 1266 n.4 (2017)). Here, Ludwig initially raised his federal preemption argument when
responding to the first summary judgment motions filed by HGA and Howard. However, Ludwig
abandoned this argument, taking the position that it was “unnecessary to deal with the preemption
question at this stage of the case, as federal interstate laws . . . [do] not conflict with Idaho open
range laws.” Ludwig later raised his preemption argument during the hearing on his motions for
reconsideration. However, the district court denied Ludwig’s motions to reconsider on two bases:
(1) for failing to comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(3) and Fourth District Local Rule
8.1; and (2) “[a]lternatively,” it “similarly denied” Ludwig’s motions to reconsider on its merits.

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Inasmuch as the district court’s ruling was based on two alternative grounds, Ludwig was required
to challenge both grounds to preserve his preemption argument. Because he assigned no error to
the district court’s ruling concerning his noncompliance with Rule 7(b)(3) and Fourth District
Local Rule 8.1, we “must affirm on the uncontested basis.” Pickering, 173 Idaho at 490, 544 P.3d
at 147 (citation omitted).
C. The district court did not err by concluding that the Howard Defendants were entitled to
immunity for damages caused by the collision.
The district court concluded that the Howard Defendants were entitled to immunity for
damages caused by the collision under Idaho Code section 25-2118 because it occurred on open
range. In its order, the district court explained that the issue of whether I-84 was “uninclosed” was
not a relevant factor in determining whether the land was open range under Moreland v. Adams,
143 Idaho 687, 690, 152 P.3d 558, 561 (2007). Instead, the district court concluded that, to hold
the Howard Defendants liable, Ludwig had the burden to demonstrate the land where the collisions
took place fell within a city, village, or herd district, which he failed to do. The district court further
determined that the “fence out rule would only be relevant in this case if the subject cow had
damaged property that was fenced out and belonging to the State.”
On appeal, Ludwig argues that the district court’s interpretation of section 25-2118 renders
the term “uninclosed” superfluous, and the district court erred in applying Moreland because it is
distinguishable. He further contends that Idaho’s “fence out” rule applies to personal injury
damages including those from motor vehicle collisions. In response, the Howard Defendants
contend that the district court properly applied Moreland when it determined that the collision
occurred on open range and, therefore, they are entitled to immunity under section 25-2118. For
the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
“When construing a statute, the focus of the Court is to determine and give effect to the
intent of the legislature.” Adamson v. Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602, 605, 990 P.2d 1213, 1216 (1999)
(quoting George W. Watkins Fam. v. Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 540, 797 P.2d 1385, 1388 (1990),
abrogated on other grounds by, Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 265
P.3d 502 (2011)).
Statutory interpretation begins with the literal language of the statute. Provisions
should not be read in isolation, but must be interpreted in the context of the entire
document. The statute should be considered as a whole, and words should be given
their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings. It should be noted that the Court must
give effect to all the words and provisions of the statute so that none will be void,

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superfluous, or redundant. When the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly
expressed intent of the legislative body must be given effect, and the Court need
not consider rules of statutory construction.
Arreola v. Scentsy, Inc., 172 Idaho 251, 257–58, 531 P.3d 1148, 1154–55 (2023) (citation
modified). Furthermore, “[w]hen there is controlling precedent on questions of Idaho law ‘the rule
of stare decisis dictates that we follow it, unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over
time to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious
principles of law and remedy continued injustice.’” Id. at 257, 531 P.3d at 1154 (quoting
Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 592, 130 P.3d 1127, 1130
(2006)).
“Livestock areas in Idaho fall into two categories outside cities and villages: open range
areas and herd districts.” Adamson, 133 Idaho at 606, 990 P.2d at 1217. “Open range” includes
“all uninclosed lands outside of cities, villages and herd districts, upon which cattle by custom,
license, lease, or permit, are grazed or permitted to roam.” I.C. § 25-2118. Section 25-2118
provides that “[n]o person owning, or controlling the possession of, any domestic animal running
on open range, shall have the duty to keep such animal off any highway on such range, and shall
not be liable for damage to any vehicle or for injury to any person riding therein, caused by a
collision between the vehicle and the animal.” Id. In other words, section 25-2118 “relieves owners
of livestock roaming on open range of the duty to keep such stock off the highway and grants
absolute immunity from liability for any damages stemming from ‘a collision between the vehicle
and the animal.’” Adamson, 133 Idaho at 607, 990 P.2d at 1218 (quoting I.C. § 25-2118). “In herd
districts, however, animals may not roam freely and owners incur a duty to keep livestock fenced.”
Id. (citing Whitt v. Jarnagin, 91 Idaho 181, 187, 418 P.2d 278, 284 (1966)); see also I.C. §§ 25-
2407, -2408.
In Moreland, this Court clarified the standard for determining whether land is open range.
In that case, a motorcyclist, Rodney Moreland, died after colliding with a calf on a roadway. 143
Idaho at 688, 152 P.3d at 559. “While corrals and fencing appeared in some areas on the land
alongside the road, signs posted around the area designated the land as open range.” Id. “The calf
was owned by Randy Adams and the land adjacent to the road was owned in part by Royce
Adams.” Id. Following the collision, Moreland’s family filed a wrongful death action against the
Adamses “based on the negligence of Royce in failing to repair and maintain the fence on his land,
and Randy in failing to keep the calf within the enclosed area.” Id. The district court granted the

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Adamses’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that the land was classified as open range
and, therefore, the Adamses were entitled to absolute immunity under section 25-2118. Id.
On appeal, the Morelands argued the district court erred because it “failed to apply a three-
prong statutory test for open range land as required by [section] 25-2118.” Id. at 689, 152 P.3d at
560. According to the Morelands, section 25-2118 only granted immunity if “the land is (1)
‘uninclosed,’ (2) falls ‘outside of cities, villages and herd districts,’ and (3) is land ‘upon which
cattle by custom, license, lease, or permit, are grazed or permitted to roam.’” Id. at 690, 152 P.3d
at 561.
We rejected the Morelands’ three prong test and affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment. Id. at 691, 152 P.3d at 562. We explained that the proper standard for
determining whether land was open range is whether the land “fell outside any city, village, or
herd district.” Id. at 690–91, 152 P.3d at 561–62. While recognizing that all parts of a statute should
be given meaning, we concluded that the use of “[u]ninclosed” in section 25-2118 “indicates that
open range immunity does not protect a livestock owner against liability for damage done by
livestock when a landowner does ‘fence out’ livestock off his property.” Id. at 691, 152 P.3d at
562. This Court further concluded that reading “uninclosed” as a “requirement that open range
land contain no fences” would conflict with the statutory language, the companion herd district
statutes, and the historical meaning of open range under Idaho law:
To read “uninclosed” as a requirement that open range land contain no fences is to
create a test that is unworkable and could not have been intended by the legislature
in adopting this statutory scheme. In contrast to a rule that all land outside cities,
villages and herd districts is open range, courts would be analyzing cases on a very
fact specific basis. Courts would be forced to ask: what type of fence makes land
enclosed; is immunity lost only when the livestock owner, as opposed to anyone
else, erects a fence; must the fence enclose cattle and be gated; does a fence erected
for any purpose render the land no longer “uninclosed”? As a policy matter,
requiring that land contain no fences whatsoever in order to qualify as open range
would discourage ranchers from erecting fences, for any purpose, on open range
land, lest they waive their open range immunity. Further, the herd district provisions
would be meaningless, with de facto herd districts created anytime a fence was
constructed, thereby shifting liability to livestock owners for damage caused by
unfenced animals. The statutory reading the Morelands propose violates Idaho’s
historical policy that open range land is “fence out.” Indeed, the Morelands would
construe the statute to violate the inherent presumption of Idaho’s “fence
out”/“fence in” system that both open range and herd districts will contain fences,
with the difference lying in the purpose the fencing serves.

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Id. at 690–91, 152 P.3d at 561–62. Therefore, this Court held that the district court “correctly
placed the burden of proof on the Adamses to demonstrate the land fell outside a city, village, or
herd district” and, consequently, the district court’s summary judgment order was affirmed. Id. at
691, 152 P.3d at 562.
In this case, Ludwig is essentially making the same arguments that we rejected in
Moreland. Ludwig, however, has not asked us to overrule Moreland. Instead, he argues that
Moreland is distinguishable because, in this case, (1) “the collision occurred on a federal interstate,
with a speed limit of 80 mph, not a two-lane county road” and (2) unlike the sporadic corrals and
fencing in Moreland, I-84 “was fully enclosed by lawful fences” that were “built by ITD to protect
the traveling public.” Ludwig contends that “[t]hese differences are crucial in analyzing whether
I-84 is considered ‘open range’ . . . because, in Moreland, there was no need for the Court to
determine if the roadway was enclosed . . . under [s]ection 25-2118 because the fences and corrals
were built by the landowner/rancher to ‘fence in’ cattle.”
Ludwig’s argument is unpersuasive. First, it is unclear why the location of the collision on
a federal interstate highway, or the highway’s speed limit, is a material distinction. Section 25-
2118 provides that owners of livestock roaming on open range have no duty “to keep such animal
off any highway on such range . . . .” I.C. § 25-2118 (emphasis added). The statute does not,
therefore, exclude federal interstate highways or highways with higher speed limits from its ambit.
Second, we did not need to address the issue of whether the roadway was fully enclosed in
Moreland because we concluded that it was not part of the test for determining whether land was
open range. Id. at 690–91, 152 P.3d at 561–62. Instead, we determined that the relevant test for
determining whether land was open range is whether the land “fell outside any city, village, or
herd district.” Id. Thus, Ludwig’s assertion that the fences and corrals in Moreland were built by
the landowner to fence in cattle is immaterial.
In conclusion, Ludwig failed to demonstrate why this Court’s decision in Moreland should
not apply to the facts of this case. Therefore, we conclude that the district court properly applied
Moreland when it determined that Ludwig had the burden to demonstrate that the land where the
collision took place fell within a city, village, or herd district to hold the Howard Defendants liable.
Because he did not meet this burden below, we affirm the district court’s order granting summary
judgment to the Howard Defendants because they were entitled to immunity under Idaho’s open
range law.

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D. The district court did not err by concluding that ITD owed no duty in tort to Ludwig.
Ludwig’s negligence claim against ITD is subject to the Idaho Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”),
set forth in Idaho Code sections 6-901 to -929. ITCA “abrogates the doctrine of sovereign
immunity and renders a governmental entity liable for damages arising out of its negligent acts or
omissions” while still “preserv[ing] the traditional rule of immunity in certain specific situations.”
S. Hill Meat Lockers Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep’t, 176 Idaho 10, ___, 573 P.3d 151, 160 (2025)
(quoting Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 458, 886 P.2d 330, 334 (1994)). “The purpose
of the ITCA is to provide much needed relief to those suffering injury from the negligence of
government employees.” Stoddart v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. #£25, 149 Idaho 679, 683, 239 P.3d 784,
788 (2010) (citation modified).
The district court granted summary judgment on Ludwig’s negligence claims against ITD,
concluding that ITD did not owe any duty to Ludwig individually, and that ITD was entitled to
design and discretionary function immunity under Idaho Code section 6-904. Ludwig challenges
both conclusions on appeal. However, because we hold that the district court correctly concluded
that ITD did not owe any duty to Ludwig, we need not address Ludwig’s arguments concerning
design and discretionary function immunity. See S. Hill Meat Lockers Inc., 176 Idaho at ___, 573
P.3d at 167 (“A reviewing court is free to consider issues related to duty and immunity under the
ITCA in the order of its choosing.” (citation modified)).
In this case, Ludwig contends that ITD owed him both a statutory and common law duty
to prevent livestock from entering I-84 or to warn motorists of livestock on highways. Next, he
contends that a “special relationship” exists between ITD and Ludwig, such that the imposition of
a duty of care is reasonable. Third, he contends that ITD assumed a duty to prevent livestock from
entering I-84 because it performed brush clearing in the Hot Creek Tunnel. Fourth, he argues that
ITD had a duty to warn the public of dangerous conditions on public highways. Each argument is
addressed in turn.
1. Ludwig has not established that ITD owed him a common law or statutory duty
actionable in tort to prevent livestock from entering I-84.
Ludwig argues that ITD owed him both a common law and statutory duty to reasonably
maintain and repair I-84, including the right-of-way fencing, for the protection of the traveling
public under Idaho Code section 40-201 and 23 U.S.C. § 116(b). ITD acknowledges that it has a
statutory duty to maintain highways within the state. However, ITD argues that the district court
properly determined that these statutes do not impose a duty of care to ensure that right-of-way

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fencing prohibits livestock from entering the right-of-way. It further argues that these statutes do
not give rise to an affirmative duty under Idaho’s public duty rule because they confer a benefit to
the general public rather than a particular class of people. We agree with ITD.
“No liability arises from the law of torts unless the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff.”
Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 389, 34 P.3d 1069, 1072 (2001). “The question of whether
a duty existed is generally a question of law.” Yellowstone Log Homes, LLC v. City of Rigby, 173
Idaho 288, 297, 540 P.3d 990, 999 (2023) (citation modified). “Under Idaho law, one owes the
duty to every person in our society to use reasonable care to avoid injury to the other person in any
situation in which it could be reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a failure to use such care
might result in such injury.” GSN Cap., LLC v. Shoshone City & Rural Fire Dist., 173 Idaho 345,
352, 541 P.3d 703, 710 (2024) (citation modified). “However, one also owes no affirmative duty
to act to assist or protect another absent unusual circumstances, which justify imposing such an
affirmative responsibility.” Udy, 136 Idaho at 389, 34 P.3d at 1072 (citation omitted).
“One such ‘unusual circumstance’ is when a statute establishes an affirmative duty.” GSN
Cap., LLC, 173 Idaho at 352, 541 P.3d at 710 (citation omitted). “This Court has recognized that
to give rise to an affirmative duty, a statute must require a particular action by an agency to benefit
a particular class of people rather than a duty running to the general public.” Id. at 16, 137 P.3d at
403 (citation modified). The latter is known as the “public duty rule,” which provides that “the
duty imposed on state agencies and public officials is one owed to the public generally, and breach
of this duty does not provide an individual with a cause of action.” Caroline Forell, The Statutory
Duty Action in Tort: A Statutory/Common Law Hybrid, 23 Ind. L. Rev. 781, 807–08 (1990).
“Whether a statutory duty exists is a question of law subject to free review.” GSN Cap., LLC, 173
Idaho at 352, 541 P.3d at 710 (citing Udy, 136 Idaho at 388, 34 P.3d at 1071).
Here, ITD’s duty to maintain the highway is not based on the common law. Rather, “ITD
retains exclusive custody and control over the maintenance of the highway by virtue of statutory
authority[.]” Udy, 136 Idaho at 390, 34 P.3d at 1073; see also Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Columbia
Basin Steel & Iron, Inc., 93 Idaho 719, 721–25, 721 n.1, 471 P.2d 574, 576–80, 576 n.1 (1970)
(common law principles abrogated by statutory enactments). Idaho Code section 40-201 imposes
upon the State the duty to “improve and maintain the highways” within its jurisdiction:
The improvement of highways and highway systems is hereby declared to be the
established and permanent policy of the state of Idaho, and the duty is hereby
imposed upon the state, and all counties, cities, and highway districts in the state,

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to improve and maintain the highways within their respective jurisdiction as
hereinafter defined, within the limits of the funds available.
I.C. § 40-201. The legislature, in turn, “placed the responsibility of maintaining State highways
. . . on the ITD.” Udy, 136 Idaho at 388, 34 P.3d at 1071 (citation modified); see also I.C. § 40-
120(5) (defining “State highway system”). Idaho Code section 40-502 provides that, “[a]ll state
highways shall be maintained by the [ITD] at state expense . . . .” I.C. § 40-502. Congress has
likewise provided that “[i]t shall be the duty of the State transportation department or other direct
recipient to maintain, or cause to be maintained, any project constructed under the provisions of
this chapter or constructed under the provisions of prior Acts.” 23 U.S.C. § 116(b).
Notably, these statutes do not explicitly require ITD to build fencing or deter livestock
from entering a state highway. However, in Udy, we stated that Idaho Code section 40-201
“indicates that the State of Idaho, through its [Transportation Department], has a statutory duty to
remove rocks and other obstructions as part of its maintenance of the State’s highways.” 136 Idaho
at 389, 34 P.3d at 1072 (emphasis added). Even so, neither Idaho Code section 40-201 nor 23
U.S.C. § 116(b) identifies a “particular class of people” that benefits from ITD’s maintenance duty.
See GSN Cap., LLC, 173 Idaho at 352–53, 541 P.3d at 710–11 (citation omitted). Rather, the duty
appears to run to the general public. Therefore, a breach of this duty does not provide Ludwig with
a cause of action under the public duty rule. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s conclusion
that ITD did not owe an affirmative duty specific to Ludwig under Idaho Code section 40-201 or
23 U.S.C. § 116(b).
2. Ludwig did not establish that a special relationship exists between ITD and Ludwig
that would give rise to an affirmative duty to protect.
The district court determined that “a special relationship does not exist between Ludwig
and ITD” because “ITD did not possess custody or control over Howard’s livestock” or “over
Ludwig to any degree that would impose a higher level of care be extended such that would create
a duty.” On appeal, Ludwig argues that a special relationship exists between ITD and Ludwig
because “ITD is rightfully considered the ‘possessor’ of the [i]nterstate,” which imposed a duty of
ordinary care on ITD to reasonably maintain I-84 because it is open to the public. In response, ITD
argues that the district court properly determined that no special relationship exists between ITD
and Ludwig because ITD did not have custody and control over Ludwig himself. We agree with
ITD.
“An affirmative duty of care can arise based on a special relationship between the parties.”

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GSN Cap., LLC, 173 Idaho at 353, 541 P.3d at 711 (citation omitted). “When determining whether
an affirmative duty should be recognized on the basis of a special relationship, the first question
must be whether a special relationship exists.” Id. at 355, 541 P.3d at 713. “The determination of
whether there is the requisite special relationship is a question of law over which we exercise free
review.” Id. at 356, 541 P.3d at 714.
“For tort-law purposes, Idaho recognizes two categories of special relationships.” Spears
v. Antelope Mountain Resort, LLC, 177 Idaho 70, ___, 585 P.3d 314, 322 (2026). “The first exists
between the actor and a third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third
person’s conduct.” Id. (citation modified). Examples of these relationships include “a parent’s duty
to control his child, an employer’s duty to control an employee while at work, or a law enforcement
officer’s duty to control a dangerous prisoner.” Id. (quoting Henrie v. Corp. of President of Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 162 Idaho 204, 209, 395 P.3d 824, 829 (2017)). “The second
category of a special relationship ‘exists between the actor and the other which gives the other a
right to protection.’” Id. at ___, 585 P.3d at 322–23 (quoting Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244,
248, 985 P.2d 669, 673 (1999). One such relationship exists between a land possessor and invitee:
“‘[a] possessor of land who holds his land open to members of the public who enter upon the land
in response to his invitation’ creates a ‘special relationship’ that imposes on the possessor of land
an affirmative duty to act.” Oswald v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 167 Idaho 540, 552, 473 P.3d 809,
821 (2020) (quoting Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 401, 987 P.2d 300, 313
(1999)).
In this case, Ludwig has not argued that ITD has the ability or obligation to control the
conduct of the Howard Defendants. Nor has he asserted that ITD exercises custody or control over
him personally. Instead, Ludwig contends a special relationship arose under a commercial
premises liability theory: because ITD “maintained complete and exclusive control over I-84,”
which is open to members of the public, ITD is therefore “under a duty to protect those that respond
to that invitation against unreasonable risk of physical harm.” We disagree.
First, commercial premises liability principles are inapposite to this case. The affirmative
duty that arises between a land possessor and an invitee “reflects the age-old principle that, because
the land possessor effectively throws open his property to the public for business, an invitee is
entitled to visit and assume that the premises have been made safe for his visit.” Oswald, 167 Idaho
at 552–53, 473 P.3d at 821–22 (citations omitted). “An invitee is one who enters upon the premises

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of another for a purpose connected with the business conducted on the land, or where it can
reasonably be said that the visit may confer a business, commercial, monetary or other tangible
benefit to the landowner.” Id. at 552, 473 P.3d at 821 (quoting Ball v. City of Blackfoot, 152 Idaho
673, 677, 273 P.3d 1266, 1270 (2012)).
Here, ITD’s operation and maintenance of public highways is devoid of any commercial
purpose; instead, these are governmental functions that serve the public’s interests. See I.C. § 40-
310(4) (The Idaho Transportation Board “shall . . . [l]ocate, design, construct, reconstruct, alter,
extend, repair and maintain state highways, and plan, design and develop statewide transportation
systems when determined by the board to be in the public interest.”). Furthermore, Ludwig was
not responding to a commercial solicitation when traveling on I-84 nor did his use of the highway
confer any benefit on ITD.
Second, ITD does not owe a duty to protect individual motorists like Ludwig driving on
state highways. As we discussed above regarding whether Idaho Code section 40-201 and 23
U.S.C. § 116(b) gave rise to statutory duties actionable in tort, these statutes contain no mandate
for the benefit of a specific class. Thus, as a general matter, ITD had no obligation specific to
Ludwig that was not owed to every member of the public. Under these circumstances, ITD did not
have a duty to protect Ludwig indicative of a special relationship. See GSN Cap., LLC, 173 Idaho
at 356, 541 P.3d at 714 (holding that a city fire district did not have a special relationship with a
company where the district’s statutory duty to preserve life and protect property benefitted every
taxpayer within its territory).
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that no
affirmative duty of care arose based on a special relationship between ITD and Ludwig.
3. ITD did not have a duty to warn Ludwig regarding the potential presence of livestock
on I-84.
The district court determined that ITD had no duty to warn Ludwig of the potential for
livestock on the interstate. On appeal, Ludwig argues the district court erroneously required proof
that ITD had actual knowledge of a dangerous condition rather than constructive knowledge.
Ludwig contends that ITD had a duty to warn because “ITD knew or, through the exercise of
reasonable care, should have known that splitting cows and calves on opposite sides of the
[i]nterstate created a dangerous situation for the traveling public” and that “the unauthorized
‘tunnel gates’” would “significantly increase the chances of a cow pushing through the right-of-
way fencing[.]” In response, ITD argues that there is no evidence that ITD was aware that the cow

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Ludwig struck had strayed onto the interstate and, even if it had a duty to warn motorists regarding
livestock, it complied with that duty by “includ[ing] a warning about the presence of livestock on
the roads” in the Idaho Driver’s Manual.
“The State is not immunized from liability when with respect to a public highway, the State
maintains a known dangerous condition on the highway and fails to properly warn motorists of
such a condition.” Haight v. Idaho Dep’t of Transp., 163 Idaho 383, 390, 414 P.3d 205, 212 (2018)
(citation modified). Here, Ludwig did not present a scintilla of evidence that establishes ITD had
actual or constructive notice that (1) Howard had split cows and calves on opposite sides of the
interstate, (2) that the tunnel gates increase the chances of a cow pushing through the right-of-way
fencing, or (3) that a cow had broken through a fence. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
conclusion that ITD did not have a duty to warn Ludwig regarding the potential presence of
livestock on I-84.
4. ITD did not assume any duty by performing brush clearing in the cattle culvert.
The district court determined that “ITD did not undertake any actions that were outside of
its statutory duties to erect, maintain, or repair the control-of-access fencing along I-84, and
therefore, it did not assume a duty above what is typically done or required to do.” On appeal,
Ludwig first argues that ITD assumed a duty to use ordinary care in maintaining and repairing the
right-of-way fences to deter livestock because ITD had the responsibility to maintain and repair
the right-of-way fencing along I-84 under federal law, and “[a] lawful fence in good repair clearly
serves to protect the interstate from unwanted livestock intrusions; a safety-related service.”
Ludwig then argues that ITD assumed a duty “to keep the right-of-way fencing in good repair”
because “ITD was actively helping the Howard Defendants to separate their cattle from one side
of the interstate to the other” by clearing the Hot Creek Tunnel of tumbleweeds at Howard’s
request. In response, ITD contends that “performing brush clearing in the cattle pass is not
‘assisting’ Howard in separating his cattle,” and there was no evidence that members of the
motoring public relied on ITD’s brush clearing in the cattle pass to ensure their safety on I-84.
“Even when an affirmative duty generally is not present, a legal duty may arise if one
voluntarily undertakes to perform an act, having no prior duty to do so.” Beers v. Corp. of Pres. of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 155 Idaho 680, 688, 316 P.3d 92, 100 (2013) (citation
omitted). “A duty arises in the negligence context when one previously has undertaken to perform
a primarily safety-related service; others are relying on the continued performance of the service;

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and it is reasonably foreseeable that legally-recognized harm could result from failure to perform
the undertaking.” Id. (citation omitted).
Ludwig’s first argument is unpersuasive because, as the district court concluded, he did not
establish that ITD undertook any actions that were outside of its statutory duties to erect, maintain,
or repair the control-of-access fencing along I-84. And while the control-of-access fencing may
help to limit unwanted livestock intrusions, Ludwig has not established that the primary purpose
of constructing the control-of-access fencing along I-84 was related to this purpose. Ludwig’s
second argument is unpersuasive because there is no evidence that ITD failed to perform any
safety-related service; ITD conducted the brush clearing on the cattle culvert at the Howard
Defendants’ request to facilitate cattle movement through the tunnel, not to enhance travel safety
on the interstate. Furthermore, as set forth above, Ludwig has not established that ITD was aware
of Howard’s cattle management plan on the day of the collision, and the mere fact that ITD cleared
brush in the cattle tunnel does not indicate that ITD was actively helping the Howard Defendants
to separate their cattle. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that ITD did not, by its
actions, assume any duty to Ludwig under the facts of this case.
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that ITD did not
owe Ludwig a duty in tort. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s order granting summary
judgment to ITD.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the district court. Costs are awarded to
the Howard Defendants and ITD as a matter of course. I.A.R. 40(a).
Chief Justice BRODY, and Justices BEVAN, MOELLER, and ZAHN CONCUR.

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