Hampton v. Department of Employment Security

2026 IL App (1st) 251726-U
No. 1-25-1726
Order filed October 15, 2026
Fourth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
DONIEL HAMPTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY;
DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY; BOARD OF REVIEW;
and RED ROBIN GOURMET BURGERS,
Defendants
(The Department of Employment Security; Board of
Review; and Red Robin Gourmet Burgers, Defendants-
Appellants).
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County.
No. 25 L 50258
Honorable
John A. Simon,
Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE OCASIO delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Mitchell and Navarro concurred in the judgment.
ORDER

-- 1 of 11 --

No. 1-25-1726
- 2 -
¶ 1 Held: We affirm the Board’s decision that plaintiff was ineligible for unemployment
insurance benefits, where the evidence supported a finding that plaintiff was
discharged from his employment for misconduct.
¶ 2 Plaintiff Doniel Hampton appeals pro se the circuit court’s order affirming the decision of
defendant, the Board of Review (Board) of the Department of Employment Security (Department),
that plaintiff was discharged for misconduct and thus ineligible for unemployment benefits under
the Unemployment Insurance Act (Act) (820 ILCS 405/100 et seq. (West 2024)). He contends that
the circuit court’s order was based on false information that his former employer, Red Robin
International, Inc. (Red Robin), provided to the Board.1 We affirm.
¶ 3 On October 19, 2016, Hampton began employment as a line cook at a Red Robin restaurant
located in Orland Park. He was discharged on August 24, 2024. Hampton filed with the
Department a petition seeking unemployment benefits under the Act.
¶ 4 On September 25, 2024, the Department entered a determination finding Hampton was
“not ineligible” for unemployment benefits from September 8, 2024, as Hampton had not been
discharged for misconduct connected with his work. The Department reasoned that Hampton was
not discharged due to “deliberate or willful” action, but rather because “his work performance did
not meet [Red Robin’s] expectations.” Red Robin appealed the determination, and a hearing before
a Department referee (Referee) was set for November 18, 2024.
¶ 5 At the hearing, Red Robin kitchen manager Aaron Struble testified that, on August 20,
2024, he observed Hampton rinsing off food prep equipment, namely, cutting boards, knives, a
1 In his complaint for administrative review, plaintiff named the director of the Department as a
defendant. His notice of appeal, however, does not name the director as an appellee. Further, while plaintiff
named defendant as “Red Robin Gourmet Burgers” in the administrative review proceedings, the record
shows that Red Robin’s company name is Red Robin International, Inc.

-- 2 of 11 --

No. 1-25-1726
- 3 -
slicer, and a dicer. According to Struble, Hampton was supposed to wash and sanitize said
equipment. Hampton also failed to wipe down the prep counters and sink, leaving food particles
on them. Hampton received a written warning, which is part of the record on appeal. The warning
states the incident was “documented as unacceptable behavior,” violated Red Robin’s “health and
safety policy,” and was the “[s]econd offense.” The warning also reflects that the resulting action
was termination, effective immediately.
¶ 6 Struble further testified that, on August 24, 2024, he spoke to Hampton about the August
20 incident. Struble told Hampton that he “rinsed off slicers, dicers, cutting board[s] and knives
and then left the *** prep area a mess.” Hampton was “adamant” that he “didn’t do it” and was
“not responsible.” He was discharged on that date.
¶ 7 Struble testified that Hampton had violated two items in Red Robin’s professional conduct
policy. Those items, as seen in the policy included in the record on appeal, provide that
employment may be terminated based on (1) “[i]nsubordination or refusing to obey lawful
instructions properly issued by your Manager pertaining to your work” and (2) “[n]egligence or
any careless action which endangers the life or safety of another person.”
¶ 8 Struble further testified that Hampton had been observed engaging in similar behavior
previously. On May 7, 2024, Hampton had received another written warning, which Struble read
from at the hearing and is part of the record on appeal. The May 2024 warning states that it is the
“Final Written Warning” and concerns “Food Safety/Health & Safety.” More specifically, it
indicates that, on May 7, 2024, Hampton was observed rinsing off an immersion blender head
instead of taking it to the dish station. “Immediately” after, Hampton grabbed two pans from the
FOG tank, failed to clean them properly, and made ranch and onion sauce in the pans. The sauce

-- 3 of 11 --

No. 1-25-1726
- 4 -
was subsequently thrown out due to “food safety/health and safety concerns.” The May 2024
warning states, “On multiple occasions, you have been coached on following proper procedure
when handling dirty dishes,” and “[t]wice you have been caught rinsing dirty dishes off to put
them back down on the shelf.” It further states that it was “annotated twice” that Hampton had
“rinsed off” the immersion blender and was “coached each time this has occurred.” The May 2024
warning concludes: “These incidents are a violation of health and safety policies and will not be
tolerated.”
¶ 9 Hampton testified that on August 20, 2024, he used the cutting board, knife, slicer, and
dicer and left them in the dishwashing machine. Hampton stated, “That’s all I have to do, just leave
it there.” The next time he saw the equipment was when another line cook brought it from the
dishwasher back under the counter. Hampton did not use the equipment again. When asked what
else he did after prepping food on the counter, Hampton testified that he “rinse[d] and sanitize[d]”
the prep counter and sink, “clean[ed] off” the drain, and “t[ook] away” the sanitation bucket.
¶ 10 When asked if he was trained on cleaning the food prep counter and equipment, Hampton
testified, “I’ve been doing this for years, so I definitely know what I’m doing.” He stated that, in
the eight years he had worked at Red Robin, he had never been written up for a sanitation violation
until the two he received in 2024, and he never “had a problem with sanitation as long as [he had]
been in their employment.” On examination by Struble, Hampton stated Struble was “not
necessarily” more focused on health and safety than his previous managers, as “some” managers
were “very strict on their sanitation.”
¶ 11 The Referee asked Hampton if he had any further remarks. Hampton stated that, a “couple
days” before “those infractions,” his “schedule was already made,” but “he” “took two hours off”

-- 4 of 11 --

No. 1-25-1726
- 5 -
each of the days Hampton worked. Hampton stated that “he” knew the “infractions” would occur
“before that even happened” and asked, “Why would you *** cut my hours before the infraction
even happened?”
¶ 12 On November 19, 2024, the Referee entered a decision finding Hampton was disqualified
from receiving unemployment benefits, as he was discharged for misconduct as provided in section
602(A) of the Act (820 ILCS 405/602(A) (West 2024)). The Referee found that Hampton’s
conduct on August 20, 2024, was a “deliberate and willful violation” of Red Robin’s policy
prohibiting “insubordination and careless action that endangers the safety of another person.” The
Referee also found that Hampton lacked credibility.
¶ 13 On December 14, 2024, Hampton filed an appeal with the Board challenging the Referee’s
decision.
¶ 14 On April 1, 2025, the Board entered a decision affirming the Referee’s decision. The Board
found that the preponderance of the evidence established that Hampton deliberately and willfully
violated Red Robin’s “reasonable and known sanitation and safety policies.” The Board found that
Struble testified credibly that he saw Hampton not properly cleaning items and the prep counter.
The Board further stated that, while Hampton denied that he violated Red Robin’s policies, the
“credible evidence indicates that [his] conduct reflected a conscious choice to not do the things
required of him by the employer’s rules and policies, particularly in light of a prior written warning
on the same issue.” The Board also found that Hampton’s conduct “posed potential harm to the
employer by [threatening] the health and safety of its customers.”
¶ 15 On May 5, 2025, Hampton filed a pro se complaint for administrative review with the
circuit court of Cook County, naming as defendants the Department, the Department director, the

-- 5 of 11 --

No. 1-25-1726
- 6 -
Board, and Red Robin. Following a hearing on September 3, 2025, in which Hampton and the
State defendants’ counsel were present, the circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision.
¶ 16 Hampton timely appealed. Subsequently, we took the appeal on the record and his brief
only. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976)
(reviewing court may take case on appellant’s brief only).
¶ 17 On appeal, Hampton argues that the trial court erred in denying his complaint for
administrative review because the Board’s decision was based on “false statements” by Red Robin.
Namely, he claims that Red Robin “made false and made-up excuses” for terminating him and “set
[him] up” with “false write-ups.”
¶ 18 As an initial matter, Hampton’s brief fails to comply with most of the requirements of
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). For instance, Hampton fails to include a
table of contents and summary statement clearly setting forth the points argued and authorities
cited. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(1) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). In violation of Rule 341(h)(6), Hampton fails to
set forth a statement of facts containing the facts “necessary to an understanding of the case.” See
Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Hampton also fails to provide argument with “citation
of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1,
2020).
¶ 19 Supreme court rules are not mere suggestions. SMS Financial CH, LLC v. Feurer, 2025 IL
App (1st) 250033, ¶ 40. Pro se litigants must comply with the same procedural rules required of
attorneys. Gillard v. Northwestern Memorial Hospital, 2019 IL App (1st) 182348, ¶ 45. When a
party fails to comply with Rule 341, this court may strike the brief or parts thereof or may disregard
the noncompliant material. Pasic v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation, 2022 IL

-- 6 of 11 --

No. 1-25-1726
- 7 -
App (1st) 220076, ¶ 15. Nonetheless, the deficiencies of Hampton’s brief do not hinder our review.
To the extent that Hampton makes assertions not supported by the record, they will be disregarded.
Id.
¶ 20 In reviewing an appeal from a decision in which unemployment insurance benefits have
been denied, we review the decision of the Board and not that of the circuit court. Petrovic v.
Department of Employment Security, 2016 IL 118562, ¶ 22. Our review is limited to the record
before the administrative agency. Maskevich v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 2022
IL App (1st) 210779, ¶ 17.
¶ 21 The Act was enacted to “relieve the economic insecurity and hardship caused by
involuntary loss of employment” and to “benefit persons who become unemployed through no
fault of their own.” Craig v. Department of Employment Security, 2022 IL App (1st) 210475, ¶ 19.
The Act is to be “liberally construed to protect individuals from severe economic insecurity
resulting from involuntary unemployment.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Matlock v. Illinois
Department of Employment Security, 2019 IL App (1st) 180645, ¶ 22.
¶ 22 Because the Act is aimed at alleviating the burdens of “involuntary” employment, certain
unemployed individuals are specifically disqualified from obtaining benefits. Petrovic, 2016 IL
118562, ¶ 24. Relevant here, unemployed individuals are disqualified from obtaining benefits
where they were discharged for “misconduct” connected with their work. 820 ILCS 405/602(A)
(West 2024). Disqualification for misconduct is intended for individuals who “intentionally
commit conduct which they know is likely to result in their termination.” Petrovic, 2016 IL
118562, ¶ 27. “Misconduct” includes the “[r]efusal to obey an employer’s reasonable and lawful
instruction, unless the refusal is due to the lack of ability, skills, or training for the individual

-- 7 of 11 --

No. 1-25-1726
- 8 -
required to obey the instruction or the instruction would result in an unsafe act.” 820 ILCS
405/602(A)(5) (West 2024). Under the Act, an employee was discharged for misconduct if, as
relevant here: (1) the employer had a reasonable work rule; (2) the employee deliberately and
willfully violated the rule; and (3) the violation either was repeated by the employee despite a prior
warning or harmed the employer. Cannici v. Department of Employment Security Board of Review,
2021 IL App (1st) 181562, ¶ 41. The employer has the burden of proving that the employee was
discharged for misconduct. Soni v. Department of Employment Security, 2024 IL App (1st)
220137, ¶ 69.
¶ 23 The standard of review here depends on whether the issue involved is a question of fact,
law, or a mixed question of fact and law. Leach v. Department of Employment Security, 2020 IL
App (1st) 190299, ¶ 22. Generally, the ultimate issue of whether an employee was discharged for
misconduct presents a mixed question of fact and law, which we review under the clearly erroneous
standard. Cannici, 2021 IL App (1st) 181562, ¶ 43. An agency’s decision is clearly erroneous
“only if the court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 24 Here, we find the Board’s determination that Hampton deliberately and willfully violated
a reasonable work rule made by Red Robin was not clearly erroneous. Red Robin’s professional
conduct policy provides that employees may be disciplined, up to and including termination, for
(1) refusal to obey lawful instructions issued by their manager pertaining to work, and (2)
negligence or any careless action which endangers the life or safety of another person. There is no
dispute that a policy requiring an employee to follow a manager’s lawful work instructions, and to
not risk the life or safety of others, is a reasonable one. See Pesoli v. Department of Employment

-- 8 of 11 --

No. 1-25-1726
- 9 -
Security, 2012 IL App (1st) 111835, ¶ 31 (“A reasonable rule concerns standards of behavior
which an employer has a right to expect from an employee.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
¶ 25 Further, Red Robin presented evidence and testimony that Hampton had a pattern of not
properly cleaning food prep equipment at work and had previously received warnings for the
behavior. On May 7, 2024, Hampton received a “Final Written Warning” concerning “Food
Safety/Health & Safety,” after he failed to properly wash an immersion blender head and used
pans that were not properly cleaned to make a sauce. The warning reflects that Hampton had been
coached on following proper cleaning procedure on multiple occasions, but the behavior persisted.
The warning stated that the incidents were “a violation of health and safety policies and will not
be tolerated.” Then, on August 20, 2024, Hampton failed to properly wash and sanitize food prep
equipment and also failed to wipe down the prep counters and sink. He was discharged for the
August 20 incident. Given that Hampton had been repeatedly warned that he was not following
Red Robin’s cleaning procedures, the evidence supported a finding that Hampton deliberately and
willfully violated Red Robin’s policy on August 20, 2024, as he was made aware of the policy but
nonetheless chose not to follow it. See Cannici, 2021 IL App (1st) 181562, ¶ 47 (“A violation of
a work rule is considered deliberate and willful when the employee was aware of the rule but
disregarded it.”). The evidence also supported a finding that respondent repeated the policy
violation by the employee despite a prior warning. See id. (elements for showing an employee was
discharged for misconduct). After reviewing the record, we cannot say, definitively and firmly,
that the Board made a mistake in determining that Hampton was discharged for misconduct and
thus was ineligible for unemployment benefits. We therefore conclude that the Board’s decision
was not clearly erroneous. Id. ¶ 43.

-- 9 of 11 --

No. 1-25-1726
- 10 -
¶ 26 Nonetheless, Hampton argues that Red Robin “set [him] up,” “made up” the reasons for
which he was discharged, and falsified the written warnings documenting his policy violations.
Hampton here raises pure questions of fact, as he essentially challenges the credibility of Red
Robin’s witness and submitted evidence, and argues that he did not commit the acts for which he
was discharged. Cf. Soni, 2024 IL App (1st) 220137, ¶ 66 (a mixed question of fact and law is
raised where the historical facts are admitted or established, and the only question is whether the
facts satisfy the statutory standard).
¶ 27 When reviewing a question of fact, we will reverse the Board’s factual findings only if they
are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. A finding is against the manifest weight of the
evidence only when the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Cannici, 2021 IL App (1st)
181562, ¶ 42. The Board is the trier of fact, and its “purely factual findings are prima facie true
and correct.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Craig v. Department of Employment Security,
2022 IL App (1st) 210475, ¶ 15. A court conducting administrative review will not reweigh the
evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the Board. Id. “If there is any evidence in the record
to support the Board’s decision, that decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence
and must be sustained on review.” Woods v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 2012 IL
App (1st) 101639, ¶ 16.
¶ 28 Here, as we have found, Red Robin submitted evidence that Hampton willfully and
deliberated violated a reasonable policy made by Red Robin, and that he had repeatedly violated
the policy despite prior warnings. Thus, because there is evidence in the record supporting the
Board’s decision, we cannot find the decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.
Moreover, the Board expressly found that Hampton did not testify credibly and that Red Robin’s

-- 10 of 11 --

No. 1-25-1726
- 11 -
submitted testimony and evidence was credible. It was the Board’s role as trier of fact to weigh
the evidence before it and assess the witnesses’ credibility, and we must deem the Board’s factual
findings as prima facie true and correct. Craig, 2022 IL App (1st) 210475, ¶ 15. We therefore defer
to the Board’s factual finding that Hampton did commit the acts that led to his discharge by Red
Robin. Because the Board’s decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we find
no reason to disturb the circuit court’s order affirming the Board’s decision.
¶ 29 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court that affirmed the
Board’s decision to deny Hampton unemployment benefits.
¶ 30 Affirmed.

-- 11 of 11 --