People v. Lauster

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2026 IL App (5th) 260612-U
NO. 5-26-0612
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Pope County.
)
v. ) No. 26-CF-12
)
TODD A. LAUSTER, ) Honorable
) Kelly R. Phelps,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Bollinger and Clarke concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The circuit court’s orders granting the State’s verified petition to deny pretrial
release and denying defendant’s motion for relief due to a real and present threat
are affirmed.
¶ 2 Defendant, Todd A. Lauster, appeals the April 21, 2026, order from the Pope County circuit
court that granted the State’s petition to deny pretrial release and the July 15, 2026, denial of his
motion for relief and immediate release. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On April 16, 2026, defendant was charged with three counts of predatory criminal sexual
assault of a child in that he made sexual contact with a minor under the age of 13. 720 ILCS 5/11-
1.40(a)(1) (West 2024). The State filed a verified petition to deny defendant pretrial release on
NOTICE
Decision filed 10/15/26. The
text of this decision may be
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for
Rehearing or the disposition of
the same.
NOTICE
This order was filed under
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed
under Rule 23(e)(1).

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April 17, 2026. The State alleged that defendant was charged with a detainable offense and posed
a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community.
¶ 5 On April 21, 2026, the matter proceeded to a hearing on the petition. The State called Pope
County Sheriff Jerry Suits to testify. On April 3, 2026, Sheriff Suits received a phone call from an
Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) investigator, Christy Vick, about a
minor, K.F., who was born in 2015. Vick requested that Sheriff Suits be present for a Child
Advocacy Center (CAC) interview about a report of sexual conduct by the defendant with K.F.
Sherrif Suits attended the CAC interview with K.F. and observed while the CAC employee
conducted the interview. During the interview, K.F. disclosed that the defendant, whom she calls
“grandpa,” “touched her private parts” over and inside her clothing. K.F. stated that she was
between 8 and 9 years old when the contact occurred in the bedroom of defendant. Sheriff Suits
spoke with K.F.’s mother, Ashley, who confirmed that K.F. spent time with defendant routinely
on the weekends and throughout the summer. Defendant was Ashley’s stepfather, and Ashley’s
mother, Melinda, resided with defendant in the residence where the alleged conduct occurred.
Melinda and defendant lived together but did not share a bedroom. During the interview, Sheriff
Suits was informed that defendant did not sleep clothed. When K.F. stayed at the house of
defendant and Melinda, she would sleep on the couch with Melinda or in a bedroom close to
defendant’s room.
¶ 6 K.F. initially disclosed the sexual abuse to Ashley through two notes she put under the
door, in which she stated that defendant “kind of raped” her and touched her “not in a good way.”
The notes were consistent with her statements during the CAC interview. K.F. stated that defendant
touched her over and under her clothing, touched her vagina with his hands, touched her breasts,
and penetrated her vaginally and anally. K.F. informed the CAC employee that the first time it

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happened, it was during a storm, and she became scared and went to defendant before he raped
her. He then instructed her not to tell Melinda. Sheriff Suits also testified that defendant owned
firearms and had a Firearm Owner Identification (FOID) card and a concealed carry license (CCL).
¶ 7 On April 8, 2026, Sheriff Suits contacted defendant and asked him to come in for an
interview, and requested that Melinda come as well. When they arrived the following day, Sheriff
Suits did not interview defendant or Melinda after they invoked their right to an attorney. Also on
April 8, 2026, Ashley called Sheriff Suits to inform him that defendant sent her text messages to
inquire about repairs on her vehicle, which was odd to Ashley as defendant had “never” texted her
before. Melinda also sent a text message to Ashley that day, asking if K.F. would be staying at
their house that weekend, to which Ashley responded she would not.
¶ 8 The State argued that defendant’s charged offense of predatory criminal sexual assault was
nonprobationable. The State asserted that it presented clear and convincing evidence that defendant
committed a detainable offense. While defendant had no previous criminal history, the State
argued that he was still a danger to K.F. and her mother, stating that the
“nature of these charges in and of itself provide a dangerousness element, not to mention
the psychological and emotional damage this has done to [K.F.] and the significant future
damage both psychologically and emotionally that it can provide if he is let out and
continues to have contact with the family or has [a] member of his family make contact.”
The State said that after Sheriff Suits called defendant to speak with him about allegations, he
made contact with Ashley, which “never” happened, and Melinda asked if K.F. would come to
their house the following weekend. Another family member contacted Ashley regarding “the
allegations in this case.” The State further argued that conditions, such as home arrest or electronic
monitoring, would not be sufficient to “prohibit further contact” with K.F. or Ashley. Defendant

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could have access to phones, and those conditions would only “possibly tell us of his whereabouts
after such contact occurred.” The State asked for defendant’s pretrial release to be denied.
¶ 9 Defense counsel proffered that defendant was 55 years old, a lifelong resident of the area,
with no criminal history, and was retired after working for over 20 years. He had been married to
Melinda for over 26 years. Defense counsel asserted that conditions would be sufficient to
eliminate “any possible risk of contact.” Specifically, a no contact order with K.F. and Ashley,
electronic monitoring on home confinement, and no access to phones. Defendant would also be
willing to surrender his firearms, FOID card, and CCL while the case was pending. Defendant
would also undergo a mental health evaluation and any recommended treatment if required.
Defense counsel asked for defendant’s release with conditions pending trial.
¶ 10 The State responded to defense counsel’s suggested conditions, arguing that they would
not be sufficient. Defendant could still contact K.F. and posed a risk of dangerousness to her. Upon
inquiry from the court, the State clarified that defendant and Melinda sent Ashley text messages
after Sheriff Suits asked them to come in for an interview, and stated that Ryan Richards,
defendant’s relative, sent Ashley a text message that said, “WTF [(what the f*** is wrong with
you)], you’re about to lose this whole side of the family. You’re going to ruin a lot of lives with
this nonsense, Ash.”
¶ 11 The circuit court found that the State proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
proof was evident or presumption great that defendant committed a qualifying offense, that he
posed a real and present threat to K.F. and Ashley, and that no condition or combination of the
conditions could mitigate that threat. The circuit court said the offered conditions would not
mitigate defendant’s risk due to K.F.’s age, “the potential mental and emotional impact on” K.F.,
and the attempted contact with Ashley.

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¶ 12 On May 20, 2026, the circuit court held a preliminary hearing, during which Sheriff Suits
and defendant testified. Sheriff Suits provided the same testimony he gave during the initial
detention hearing. The additional information included that when Sheriff Suits called defendant to
schedule an interview, he did not discuss the specific allegations. Further, K.F. previously reported
abuse from defendant but recanted. Sheriff Suits, however, was not part of that interview or
investigation and was unfamiliar with the allegations and recanting.
¶ 13 Defendant testified on his own behalf, first providing an exhibit of text messages between
defendant and Ashley from October 2022 until April 2026. The messages included information
about a few car repairs, and the message he sent on April 8, 2026, was in relation to further car
repairs for Ashley. Defendant was unaware of the allegations against him when Sheriff Suits made
contact on April 8, 2026. Defendant testified that he and Melinda slept in different rooms due to
medical issues and sleep habits. Defendant would routinely take his pain medication before dinner
and drink a few beers before getting in bed. Defendant testified that K.F. was the one who initiated
any inappropriate contact after he was already in bed, and denied the sexual assault allegations.
Defense counsel asked that the circuit court revisit the issue of pretrial detention and release
defendant on conditions.
¶ 14 At the end of the hearing, the circuit court found probable cause. The circuit court also
revisited whether continued detention was necessary, finding that there was no change in
circumstances and ordered continued detention. The court said that GPS monitoring or home
confinement “would not adequately protect the victim in this case.”
¶ 15 On June 16, 2026, defendant filed a motion for relief, which he later amended on July 14,
2026. The amended motion argued that the circuit court’s reliance upon the text messages sent
from defendant and Melinda was given improper weight during the initial detention hearing

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because the parties were unaware of the accusations when Sheriff Suits contacted them. The
motion specifically presented the following issue: “whether the State has proven by clear and
convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions can protect the alleged victim
or the community.” The motion offered 15 potential conditions of release, such as home
confinement and monitoring, no contact with K.F. or Ashley, no access to social media or a smart
phone, and no contact with any minors.
¶ 16 The matter proceeded to a hearing on the motion on July 15, 2026. During the hearing,
defense counsel first asserted that he was “not asking the [c]ourt to minimize the seriousness of
the charges,” but rather was challenging the finding that no conditions would be sufficient to
mitigate defendant’s risk. Due to the evidence presented during the preliminary hearing, the
proposed conditions would “directly eliminate any possible harm.” Defense counsel argued that
during the initial detention hearing, the circuit court relied upon the fact that defendant made
contact with Ashley after being contacted by Sheriff Suits to schedule a time to come in, even
though, at that time, the defendant would not have been aware of the reason for the interview.
Defendant did not make any further contact with K.F. or Ashley once he was made aware of the
allegations. Defense counsel argued that there were no specific facts that showed defendant would
not comply with pretrial conditions, especially considering that the circuit court relied upon
“incorrect false information” about the text messages in this case.
¶ 17 The State argued that defendant should remain detained pending trial, even if he did not
have a criminal history. Citing to People v. Romine, 2024 IL App (4th) 240321, the State said that,
“[T]he evidence of a defendant’s charged conduct, even if it took place on a single
occasion, may reflect such a departure from the basic expectations of civil society that it

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becomes difficult to predict the defendant’s compliance with court orders or even societal
norms regarding the safety of others if the defendant is placed on pretrial release.”
In this case, defendant was charged with three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a
child. The State presented evidence that supports defendant’s detention, including the nature and
circumstances of the offenses charged, the history and characteristics of defendant, the identity of
any person or persons whose safety defendant was believed to pose a threat, statements made by
defendant, age and physical condition of defendant and the victim, and whether defendant owns
any weapons. The State argued that defendant’s release posed a “significant threat” to K.F.,
including mental and emotional harm. The State asked that defendant remain detained, as the
suggested conditions would “only indicate” defendant’s location, not whether he was in the
presence of any minor child, and there was not an adequate way to monitor his contact or internet
usage.
¶ 18 The circuit court considered the arguments from the parties and the applicable case law on
this issue. The court addressed the nature and circumstances of the offense, the age of K.F. being
8 to 9 years old when the offenses occurred, and the potential psychological or emotional harm to
her. The court found relevant that defendant and his family members attempted to communicate
with Ashley after Sheriff Suits contacted the defendant. In particular, the court found concerning
a text from defendant’s relative about Ashley “losing” part of the family. The court also noted that
defendant testified during the preliminary hearing that “any questionable physical contact between
him and the 8- to 9-year-old victim was initiated by the victim.” The court said that defendant’s
conduct reflected “a departure from the basic expectations of civil society,” which made it
“difficult to predict” defendant’s compliance with court orders if he was released. The circuit court
denied defendant’s motion. Defendant appealed.

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¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 20 Pretrial release, including the conditions related thereto, is governed by article 110 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2024)), as amended by
Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act. A
defendant’s pretrial release may be denied only in certain statutorily limited situations. 725 ILCS
5/110-6.1 (West 2024). Upon filing a timely, verified petition requesting denial of pretrial release,
the State has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the
presumption great that the defendant has committed a qualifying offense, that the defendant’s
pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community or
poses a flight risk, and that less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to
the safety of any person or the community and/or prevent the defendant’s willful flight from
prosecution. Id. § 110-6.1(e), (f). The State or the defendant may present evidence to the circuit
court by way of proffer based upon reliable information. Id. § 110-6.1(f)(2). The circuit court may
order a defendant detained pending trial if the defendant is charged with a qualifying offense and
the circuit court concludes the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person
or the community (id. § 110-6.1(a)(1)-(7)) or there is a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid
prosecution (id. § 110-6.1(a)(8)).
¶ 21 Our standard of review of pretrial release determinations is dependent on whether the trial
court heard live witness testimony or whether the parties proceeded solely by proffer or submission
of documentary evidence. People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54. Where the parties to a pretrial
detention hearing proceed solely by proffer or submission of documentary evidence, this court
stands in the same position as the circuit court and may conduct its own independent review of the
proffered evidence, thus reviewing the record de novo. Id. However, when the circuit court

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considers live-witness testimony and makes factual findings, we review under the manifest weight
of the evidence standard. Id. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the
opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based
on the evidence presented.” People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008). Given the live testimony
at the detention hearing in this matter, we will apply the manifest weight of the evidence standard.
¶ 22 Defendant was permitted, but not required, to file a memorandum on appeal. Defendant
did not file a memorandum. “Issues raised in the motion for relief are before the appellate court
regardless of whether the optional memorandum is filed.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15,
2024). Therefore, our review is limited to the issues raised in the motion for relief.
¶ 23 The State argues on appeal that defendant waived the issues of whether the State proved
by clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident or presumption great that he
committed a detainable offense, and whether defendant posed a real and present threat. We agree.
The motion for relief makes clear that the only issue the defendant asked the circuit court to review
at the hearing was whether conditions could mitigate his threat. As such, we will review whether
the circuit court erred in finding that no condition or combination of conditions would mitigate
defendant’s threat under the manifest weight of the evidence standard.
¶ 24 Once a court determines that the defendant poses a threat to the safety of any individual or
the community, the trial court must determine whether the State has met its burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence what pretrial release conditions, “if any, will reasonably ensure the
appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person or the community and the
likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release.” 725 ILCS
5/110-5(a) (West 2024). In reaching its determination, the trial court must consider (1) the nature
and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant;

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(3) the history and characteristics of the person;1 (4) the nature and seriousness of the specific,
real, and present threat to any person that would be posed by the person’s release; and (5) the
nature and seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice
process. Id. § 110-5(a)(1)-(5). The Code lists no singular factor as dispositive. See id. § 110-5(a).
The nature and circumstances of the underlying offense is “just one factor to consider in
determining whether the threat posed can be mitigated by conditions of release.” People v. Lopez,
2025 IL App (2d) 240709, ¶ 19.
¶ 25 We have thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal in this matter, including the initial
detention hearing and the motion for relief hearing. The circuit court spent time during the
detention and motion for relief hearings detailing the reasons why conditions would not be
sufficient to mitigate defendant’s risk. The court stated that defendant was charged with three
counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. The charge is a sex offense, which may be
considered under the nature and circumstances of the offense charged. See 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(1)
(West 2024). The court also considered the age of K.F. and the future psychological or emotional
harm to the victim if defendant was released. Id. § 110-5(a)(4). Defense counsel offered multiple
conditions related to defendant’s phone and internet usage. The court focused on this issue because
defendant and defendant’s family members contacted Ashley, stating that their contact showed
they “were aware of the purpose and the request of Sheriff Suits’ request for an interview,” and
that the contact was “concerning.” The circuit court considered all the offered conditions and the
1The defendant’s history and characteristics include: “the defendant’s character, physical and
mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community,
community ties, past relating to drug or alcohol abuse, conduct, *** criminal history, and record concerning
appearance at court proceedings,” as well as “whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the
defendant was on probation, parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of
sentence for an offense under federal law, or the law of this or any other state.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(3)(A),
(B) (West 2024).

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specific facts of this case, but found that defendant’s conduct reflected “a departure from the basic
expectations of civil society” and made it “difficult to predict the defendant’s compliance with
court orders or even societal norms regarding the safety of others if the defendant were placed on
pretrial [release].”
¶ 26 Based on these facts, the circuit court found that no condition or combination of conditions
could reasonably mitigate the danger the defendant posed to the victim and her mother. An
opposite conclusion is not clearly evident, and the finding is not unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unsupported by the evidence presented. Therefore, we find that the circuit court’s decision to detain
the defendant was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶¶ 38,
43.
¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 28 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s orders of April 21, 2026, and
July 15, 2026.
¶ 29 Affirmed.

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