In re Parentage of V.S.

2026 IL App (1st) 260422-U
SECOND DIVISION
October 13, 2026
No. 1-26-0422
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
In re PARENTAGE OF V.S. ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
(Amber C., ) Cook County.
)
Petitioner-Appellee, )
) No. 22D473
v. )
)
Paul S., ) Honorable
) Bradley Trowbridge,
Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Reyes and Van Tine concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: (1) The trial court’s decisions to grant Amber’s petition to relocate with V.S. and
modify parenting time were not against the manifest weight of the evidence; and
(2) because the record on appeal is insufficient for our review, we presume the
trial court properly calculated its child support order.
¶ 2 Respondent Paul S. appeals pro se from the trial court’s order allowing petitioner Amber
C. to relocate from Norridge, Illinois to McCullom Lake, Illinois with the parties’ minor son. He
argues that: (1) the trial court made a “material factual error” in its best interests analysis; (2) the

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modified parenting schedule failed to show how reducing Paul’s parenting time impacted his
relationship with V.S.; and (3) the trial court’s support order is “facially opaque” and does not
explain the mathematical reasoning for the amounts ordered.
¶ 3 Paul and Amber were in an “intimate relationship” and are the biological parents of V.S.
(born in 2020). Amber has another son from a previous relationship, Julian, who is on the autism
spectrum. In 2022, Amber filed a petition to determine the parent and child relationship between
V.S. and Paul. The trial court later entered an order allocating parental responsibilities and an
agreed parenting plan. The parents were each awarded equal parenting time with V.S. They
shared the decision-making for V.S.’s education, including the selection of schools, and his
medical care, extracurricular activities, and religious practices.
¶ 4 In February 2025, Amber filed a petition for relocation pursuant to section 609.2 of the
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/609.2 (West 2024)). She
had resided in Norridge in a home belonging to her late grandmother that was to be sold. Amber
purchased a home in McCullom Lake and wanted to relocate there with V.S. in June 2025.
¶ 5 Amber also stated that the current equal parenting time schedule was not in V.S.’s best
interests because he was to begin kindergarten that fall. She intended to enroll V.S. at Valley
View Elementary School which was near the new home.
¶ 6 Paul opposed the petition and argued that the majority of V.S.’s contacts had been in the
Chicagoland area, including V.S.’s doctors at Lurie Hospital and his preschool near Paul’s work.
Paul’s family also lived nearby in the Bridgeport neighborhood of Chicago. Paul wanted V.S. to
attend the Mark Sheridan Science and Arts Academy within the Chicago Public Schools system.
¶ 7 The trial court conducted a hearing on the relocation petition over three days in July
2025. A complete report of proceedings of this hearing is not included in the record on appeal.

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The only transcript in the record is the testimony of the guardian ad litem (GAL), which was
attached as an exhibit to Paul’s subsequent motion to reconsider. The rest of the hearing,
including testimony from both Amber and Paul, has not been provided with the appellate record.
¶ 8 The GAL testified that he first met with Paul and V.S. in March 2025 at the father’s
residence in Bridgeport. He found the house to be tidy and did not have any concerns about the
state of the house. He observed Paul and V.S. and found their relationship to be “very traditional,
normal” and he noted “great interaction between a parent and a child.” He did not observe any
behavioral issues with V.S. He had no concerns about Paul’s ability to parent V.S.
¶ 9 The GAL also had his first home visit with Amber and V.S. in March 2025 at her
Norridge residence. Amber’s other son Julian and her mother were also present. V.S. was in a
“hyper” state and enjoying “unseasonably warm” weather outside. He was not taking direction
from either his mother, grandmother, or Julian. The GAL did not find this uncommon for a then
four-year-old. He did not see Julian and V.S. playing together. V.S. was running around while
Julian was observing.
¶ 10 The GAL described the relationship between V.S. and Julian during his examination by
Amber’s attorney.
“Q. How do you think that impacts the relationship as brothers if they only
saw each other on holidays and long weekend[s]?
A. I actually don’t know. I know that Julian is not neuro-typical. I don’t have
the background to independently talk about his ability to have relationships and
what that looks like, and he is not part of this case, so I have not reviewed any
professional opinions about that relationship, so I really can’t opine on that.
Q. When you saw them interacting did they seem like a typical [brother]

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relationship?
A. No.
Q. Why not?
A. Because Julian was more adult-like. I would say Julian presents like a 15
year-old and not an 11 year-old. He appeared very bright and his look did not -- in
fairness, I mean [V.S] was a little unruly so he had that kind of like annoyance of
his brother doing what he was doing. So that was the extent of that observation.
I’m sure they’re close, I just don’t know, I don’t have that independent
knowledge of it.”
¶ 11 The GAL learned that Amber purchased the McCullom Lake residence during a Zoom
meeting in December 2024. He visited Amber and V.S. a second time at the new McCullom
Lake home in May 2025. Only Amber and V.S. were present for this visit. Amber had not moved
into the residence yet, but she intended to move there soon. He later learned that she moved into
the home in June 2025. Amber explained her relocation was because she wanted to own a home
with a yard and a garden. Amber also said the housing cost was much lower in McCullom Lake.
Amber’s sister lived in the next town, and Amber’s mother intended to relocate to that same area.
¶ 12 The GAL reviewed the proposed schools from both parents. He found that there was “not
a huge difference between the two, *** Mark Sheridan is just a bit better than Valley View.”
Both schools were rated as commendable and had the same rating on the Illinois School Report
Card. The GAL noted that “it looked like the class size would be smaller at Valley View.” He
further testified that the Illinois State Report Card stated the average kindergarten class size at
Mark Sheridan was 30 students and Valley View’s average was 14.1 students. He stated that the
overall index score for Mark Sheridan was 82.02 and 74.03 for Valley View.

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¶ 13 The GAL “wouldn’t think” the move to McCullom Lake was in V.S.’s best interest. He
explained that the distance was quite far and changed Paul’s ability to participate in school
activities. He stated that there was “no way” to do a shared schedule of parenting time. The move
would also make co-parenting “very difficult” with Paul being far away from V.S. The GAL
testified that if Amber had stayed in Norridge, he thought a 50/50 schedule “could have worked
out.” According to the GAL, the parties could have chosen a “private school somewhere in the
middle” and then a shared schedule would have been “very feasible.” If the court denied
Amber’s request to relocate, the GAL recommended the parents continue to share parenting
time.
¶ 14 The trial court filed its written order granting Amber’s petition for relocation in August
2025 and summarized the evidence presented at the hearing. In addition to the GAL, the court
heard testimony from Amber, Paul, and Paul’s neighbor Sandy Kneller. We again note that we
do not have the benefit of these transcripts.
¶ 15 The court observed that Amber was not granted leave to relocate with V.S. to McCullom
Lake prior to this hearing and she failed to comply with the terms of the parties’ allocation order.
The court found that Amber “clearly intended” to relocate when she was under contract to
purchase her home in December 2024 but failed to file her petition for relocation until January
2025. The court also noted that Amber had “a dismissive attitude toward Paul’s role as a parent.”
The judge said two facts were uncontested: the parties have a “contentious” relationship and
McCullom Lake is over 45 miles from Paul’s residence.
¶ 16 As part of its decision, the court also reviewed 1400 pages of Our Family Wizard (OFW)
messages between the parties. From these messages, the court found that both parties have a
history of being late to exchange V.S., with Amber being late more often and Paul being hours

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late at least twice. In contrast, the parties were flexible about exchanging V.S. on different dates
and times. According to the court, Paul appeared to be angry “far more” in OFW messages than
Amber, and Amber did not respond to Paul as promptly as she should.
¶ 17 The court discussed each of the witnesses’ testimony as follows.
¶ 18 The court found the GAL’s testimony to be credible with the GAL opining that Amber’s
relocation was not in V.S.’s best interest. The GAL also found Paul’s chosen school, Mark
Sheridan Math and Science Academy, was the preferable school for V.S.
¶ 19 The court also found Paul’s neighbor Sandy Kneller to be credible. She testified that Paul
was “not a nice person” and on one occasion Paul told V.S. not to talk to Kneller because she
was a “f*** b***.” She also “indirectly raised concerns about Paul’s parenting skills,” and
recounted an incident when she found V.S. alone in the alley by her home sitting on a
motorcycle without a helmet. She also saw V.S. setting off fireworks without his shoes on.
Kneller admitted her family members have made threats against Paul.
¶ 20 Amber testified that she believed it was in V.S.’s best interest to reside with her in
McCullom Lake and attend Valley View Elementary School. Amber’s reasons included that V.S.
and Julian were the “best of friends,” her home was larger than Paul’s and was in a family-
friendly neighborhood with a more rural setting. V.S. would be able to play outside and his
school was six minutes away. Amber also has family nearby and her mother intended to move to
the area after the mother’s house was sold. The court noted that Amber’s family did “not appear
to be what this Court would define as ‘close.’ ” However, the court did state that it found
Amber’s reasons for relocation credible but was “less certain” of Amber’s claim that she could
not find a comparable home close to Paul for the same price.

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¶ 21 Amber alleged that Paul has anger issues. The court stated that it heard testimony about a
heated parenting exchange in October 2024, during which both parents cursed inappropriately in
front of V.S. Amber also testified that when she was moving out of Paul’s house in 2020, Paul
threw boxes at her and told her to pack her “s*** and leave.” The court found Amber’s
testimony about Paul’s anger credible. In addition to Amber’s testimony, the court read the OFW
messages and observed Paul in court. The court “often observed Paul unable to control himself.”
He frequently appeared agitated, distracted his attorney with notes and comments, and made
faces during the testimony from Amber and Kneller.
¶ 22 Paul testified that he had flexibility in his work schedule and could take V.S. to school in
the mornings. He has paternal relatives and close friends nearby. The court noted that it was not
established that Paul “actually exposes” V.S. to these individuals.
¶ 23 After going through the witnesses’ testimony, the trial court discussed the best interest
factors a court must consider in deciding a relocation petition. See 750 ILCS 5/609.2(g) (West
2024). Those factors are: (1) the circumstances and reasons for the intended relocation; (2) the
reasons, if any, why a parent is objecting to the intended relocation; (3) the history and quality of
each parent’s relationship with the child and specifically whether a parent has substantially failed
or refused to exercise the parental responsibilities allocated to him or her under the parenting
plan or allocation judgment; (4) the educational opportunities for the child at the existing
location and at the proposed new location; (5) the presence or absence of extended family at the
existing location and at the proposed new location; (6) the anticipated impact of the relocation on
the child; (7) whether the court will be able to fashion a reasonable allocation of parental
responsibilities between all parents if the relocation occurs; (8) the wishes of the child, taking
into account the child’s maturity and ability to express reasoned and independent preferences as

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to relocation; (9) possible arrangements for the exercise of parental responsibilities appropriate to
the parents’ resources and circumstances and the developmental level of the child; (10)
minimization of the impairment to a parent-child relationship caused by a parent’s relocation;
and (11) any other relevant factors bearing on the child’s best interests. Id.
¶ 24 The court began by noting that Amber purchased a home in McCullom Lake because her
former home in Norridge was owned by her aunt and was listed for sale. Amber chose
McCullom Lake because it was close to her current job and she wanted a home in a family
friendly neighborhood with a more rural setting. She also testified that she has family members
near McCullom Lake and her mother intended to move nearby when the Norridge house sold.
The court did “not find multiple family members reside close to McCullom Lake,” but found
Amber’s reasons to relocate with V.S. were “credible and reasonable.” The court also found
Paul’s reasons for objecting to the relocation to be “credible and reasonable” because the
relocation moves V.S. further from Paul’s home.
¶ 25 Each parent has “a positive relationship with V.S.” and neither has “substantially failed
or refused to exercise the parental responsibilities” as previously allocated. In its review of the
OFW messages, the court found both parties have a history of being late for exchanges,
including Paul being late by hours on two occasions. Amber has a pattern of not responding to
Paul within a reasonable amount of time, while Paul would quickly become “aggressive with
Amber.”
¶ 26 The trial court noted that Mark Sheridan appeared to provide a better educational
opportunity, but Valley View appeared to be a “quality school.” The court observed that
Amber’s mother has been a “significant caretaker” for V.S. The court found Amber’s testimony
that V.S. and Julian were the “best of friends” was unimpeached and uncontradicted because the

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GAL was not able to offer an opinion on their relationship. While Paul did not appear to have as
much extended family involved in V.S.’s life, Paul testified that he arranged playdates between
V.S. and his cousins.
¶ 27 Because V.S. was starting school and Amber purchased a home in McCullom Lake, the
court acknowledged that the parenting schedule would change “significantly” regardless of
whether Amber’s petition was granted. The court noted that it was “impossible to keep the
parenting schedule the same,” but said that it could fashion a reasonable allocation of parental
responsibilities. The court did not consider V.S.’s wishes because he was too young to “express a
reasoned and independent preference as to relocation.”
¶ 28 The court reasoned that Amber’s move would not impact parental involvement and
decision-making but would impact parenting time. Regardless of the outcome, one parent’s
relationship with V.S would be impacted by the ruling, but the court found that it was “possible
for each parent to spend significant time” with V.S. The court noted that Paul resided in a
smaller home with what appeared to be a small backyard and an alley behind it while Amber
resided in a larger, three-bedroom home with a large yard and a lake nearby.
¶ 29 The trial court then held:
“Taking into consideration the statutory factors and Paul’s and Amber’s strengths
and deficits as parents, it is in [V.S.’s] best interests to relocate with Amber.
[V.S.] will reside with his half brother, Julian, be in a larger home, have far more
outdoor play space, and possibly have his maternal grandmother, one of his
primary caretakers, nearby.”
¶ 30 The court granted Amber’s petition and modified the 2022 allocation judgment. Amber
was allowed to enroll V.S. at Valley View Elementary School. The court also outlined the

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change in parenting time, allotting Paul alternating weekends and extended time during holiday,
spring, and summer breaks. The court also ordered the parties to “meet at a midway point
designated by the GAL to exchange” V.S. for Paul’s regular parenting time.
¶ 31 Paul filed a motion to reconsider the order granting relocation. He argued that the trial
court disregarded the evidence presented, including the GAL’s opinion against relocation. He
also asserted that the order results in an inequitable allocation of parenting time that diminishes
Paul’s role in V.S.’s life. According to Paul, the statutory factors did not support Amber’s
relocation with V.S.
¶ 32 Paul argued that in its relocation order, the court erroneously relied on Amber’s
testimony that V.S. and Julian were the “best of friends.” Specifically, Paul contended that the
judge erred when he referred to this testimony as “unimpeached and uncontradicted.” According
to Paul, the GAL observed V.S. and Julian at their home on two separate occasions and testified
that the brothers “did not have a close relationship.”
¶ 33 In February 2026, the court denied Paul’s motion to reconsider. The court acknowledged
Paul “rightfully” observed the court made “some incorrect factual findings,” which included
“that the GAL was only able to observe the minor child and AMBER’s other son together ‘once
so he was not able to offer an opinion about their relationship.’ In fact, the GAL observed the
two children together twice and opined the children ‘did not appear close.’ ” The court stated the
GAL’s testimony “contradicted” Amber’s testimony that “the children were the ‘best of
friends.’ ”
¶ 34 Nonetheless, the court found that none of Paul’s allegations related to newly discovered
evidence, change in the law, or errors in the court’s application of the law. After considering its
“limited factual errors,” the court did not change its opinion on the relocation order.

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¶ 35 During the relocation proceedings, Amber also filed a petition for child support.
Thereafter, the trial court entered an order setting child support in which the court stated it
reviewed financial affidavits and year-end paystubs of the parties to determine that child support.
Again, Paul has provided neither the hearing, nor the financial evidence in this appellate record.
¶ 36 Paul’s first contention is that the trial court erred in granting Amber’s relocation petition.
Although Amber has not filed a brief in response, we consider this appeal pursuant to the
principles set forth in First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d
128, 131-33 (1976) (a reviewing court may consider the merits of an appeal on the appellant’s
brief only where the record is simple and the claimed errors can be decided without the aid of the
appellee’s brief).
¶ 37 As noted above, under section 609.2(g) of the Act, the trial court “shall modify” the
allocation judgment and allow relocation in accordance with the child’s best interests. 750 ILCS
5/609.2(g) (West 2024). The burden is on the parent seeking relocation to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the relocation is in the child’s best interest. Kimberly R. v.
George S., 2021 IL App (1st) 201405, ¶ 78.
¶ 38 A best interests finding must be made on a case-by-case basis depending on the
individual circumstances of the case and “ ‘cannot be reduced to a simple bright-line test.’ ” In re
Marriage of Fatkin, 2019 IL 123602, ¶ 32 (quoting In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d 316,
326 (1988)). “Because of the case-by-case nature of our review, the result cannot be reduced to a
simple tally of which party ‘won’ a majority of the enumerated factors; instead, because some
factors in a particular case may weigh more heavily than others, the trial court must consider all
factors and evidence touching on the issue and must arrive at a reasonable result.” In re
Marriage of Levites, 2021 IL App (2d) 200552, ¶ 71. Further, it is well settled that a trial court is

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not bound by a GAL’s recommendations. Taylor v. Starkey, 20 Ill. App. 3d 630, 634 (1974).
¶ 39 We will not reverse the trial court’s best interest determination “unless it is clearly
against the manifest weight of the evidence, and it appears that a manifest injustice has
occurred.” Fatkin, 2019 IL 123602, ¶ 32. We afford this deference to the court’s ruling because it
had the opportunity to observe both parents and was “able to assess and evaluate their
temperaments, personalities, and capabilities.” Id. A decision is against the manifest weight
standard only if the evidence “ ‘calls for a conclusion opposite to that reached by the trial court
or only if the factual findings on which the decision depends are clearly, plainly, and
indisputably erroneous.’ ” Kimberly R., 2021 IL App (1st) 201405, ¶ 75 (quoting In re Parentage
of P.D., 2017 IL App (2d) 170355, ¶ 18).
¶ 40 Paul contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to reconsider because the
court needed to reweigh the best interest factors after it admitted to a “material factual error”
regarding V.S.’s relationship with his brother Julian. According to Paul, the court should have
either conducted a new best interest analysis or explained why the correction of a “material
factor” did not change the result.
¶ 41 As discussed above, the court initially found Amber’s testimony was unimpeached and
uncontradicted that the boys were “the best of friends.” The court had also stated that the GAL
“was only able to observe [V.S.] with Julian together once so he was, not able to offer an opinion
about their relationship.” Paul contended in his motion to reconsider that the GAL “credibly
testified that Julian and [V.S.] did not appear to be close.” Although the court acknowledged the
GAL’s testimony contradicted Amber’s testimony, it denied Paul’s motion. Paul maintains that
the court’s correction “struck” one of its “articulated reasons for granting relocation” and
changed the best interest analysis.

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¶ 42 Contrary to Paul’s claim, the court never referred to V.S.’s relationship with his brother
as a “material factor” in its decision. In fact, the trial court only referenced Julian twice in its
relocation order. The court discussed both parties’ familial involvement, including V.S.’s
relationship with Julian. The fact that V.S. would be living with his brother was one of the many
factors that the trial court enunciated in its analysis. As cited above, a best interests finding is
“not a simple tally of which party ‘won’ a majority.” Levites, 2021 IL App (2d) 200552, ¶ 71.
The trial court may have weighed some factors more heavily than others and the result was based
on its consideration of all the evidence presented. See id.
¶ 43 Defendant relies on two cases in support, In re Marriage of Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d 316
(1988), and In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 204 Ill. 2d 498 (2003). Neither of them uses the
term “material factor,” nor did they consider whether the trial court made a factual error. Both
cases considered a relocation petition filed by a custodial parent to move with the child to
another state. See Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 319 (the mother sought to move from Illinois to Arizona
with the minor child); Collingbourne, 204 Ill. 2d at 500 (the mother asked to relocate from
Illinois to Massachusetts).
¶ 44 In considering the relocation of the minor, the Eckert court set forth several factors to aid
the trial court in determining the best interests of the child. Eckert, 119 Ill. 2d at 326-27. These
factors are similar to those subsequently set forth by the legislature in section 609.2(g) of the
Act. See Pub. Act 99-90, § 5-15 (eff. Jan. 1, 2016) (adding 750 ILCS 5/609.2). Eckert’s holding
and the consideration of these factors was reaffirmed by the supreme court in Collingbourne
under similar facts. Collingbourne, 204 Ill. 2d at 525. Again, neither case considered whether the
trial court made a material factual error in its best interests analysis. These cases do not support
Paul’s argument and his reliance on them is misplaced.

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¶ 45 Here, the court explicitly found that it had made a “limited factual error” in its findings
related to the GAL’s observations. On reconsideration, the court indicated that Paul “rightfully
point[ed] out” the court’s error that the GAL did not offer an opinion on the boys’ relationship.
The court, however, corrected this “limited” error and ultimately concluded that the error did not
change the court’s opinion because Paul’s claims did not include any newly discovered evidence,
changes in the law, or errors in the court’s previous application of existing law See TCF National
Bank v. Richards, 2016 IL App (1st) 152083, ¶ 41 (the purpose of a motion to reconsider is to
bring the court’s attention to these three matters).
¶ 46 More significantly, the trial court’s initial findings related to the GAL were not error. The
GAL never stated that the boys “did not appear close.” This language is from Paul’s motion to
reconsider, not the GAL’s testimony. The GAL never testified that the boys were not close,
rather he stated he was “sure they’re close,” but he did not know and did not “have that
independent knowledge of it.” When asked if the boys had a typical brother relationship, the
GAL responded, “No,” but explained that Julian “presented like a 15 year-old and not an 11
year-old” while V.S. was “a little unruly.” The GAL had observed that V.S. was hyper while
playing outside during an “unseasonably warm” day and V.S.’s behavior was not “uncommon”
for a four-year-old.
¶ 47 Further, while Paul asserted that the GAL observed V.S. and Julian together during both
home visits, the GAL testified that Julian was only present for the first visit. Only Amber and
V.S. were present for the GAL’s second visit. The trial court was correct in its initial order that
the GAL only observed the boys together during one visit. As discussed above, the GAL did not
testify that the boys were not close and his testimony was not far removed from Amber’s
statement. Any factual errors by the trial court were inconsequential. Moreover, living with a

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family member is a relevant consideration for the trial court. See 750 ILCS 5/609.2(g) (West
2024).
¶ 48 In its findings, the court carefully considered the positions of both parties, as well as the
pros and cons of relocation. The court discussed weaknesses from both parents before reaching a
result. On reconsideration, the trial court acknowledged a minor factual error and then reaffirmed
its opinion in light of the error. The trial court was not obligated to reweigh the best interest
factors given this minor factual error. Thus, we decline to hold that the relocation order was
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 49 Paul next asserts that the modified parenting schedule should be vacated because the
written order failed to show how reducing his parenting time minimized the impairment to his
relationship with V.S., under the tenth factor. According to Paul, the court did not provide an
explanation for “why the drastic shift from 50/50 time to alternating weekends was the least
impairing workable arrangement.”
¶ 50 Because this court is unable to review the full report of proceedings from the relocation
hearing, we presume “that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity with law and
had a sufficient factual basis.” Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 392 (1984). It was Paul’s duty
as the appellant to supply the reviewing court with a sufficient record of the trial proceedings to
support his claims of error. Id. at 391-92. Any doubts arising “from the incompleteness of the
record will be resolved against the appellant.” Id. at 392.
¶ 51 Contrary to Paul’s assertion, the court observed multiple times in its order that regardless
of the outcome, it was “impossible to keep the parenting schedule the same.” We point out that
the prior allocation order divided parenting time before V.S. started kindergarten. The court
reasoned that with V.S. in school and the increased travel time, parenting time would be

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impacted in any event. The court then modified parenting time to allow V.S. to attend school in
McCullom Lake and then spend alternate weekends with Paul. The court also divided both
Thanksgiving and winter break between Paul and Amber and awarded every spring break to
Paul. For the summer, the parties would alternate weeks with V.S.
¶ 52 Because the filed record does not contain the testimony from either Paul or Amber from
the relocation hearing, we have no basis to reject the trial court’s findings. We conclude that the
trial court’s best interests finding was not clearly against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Thus, the court did not err in modifying the allocation of parenting time.
¶ 53 Finally, Paul contends that the order setting child support should be vacated because it is
“facially opaque,” references a missing exhibit, and does not explain the calculations used to set
the amounts. Paul acknowledges that the record on appeal does not include the transcripts from
the support hearing but asserts that this court can review the order on its face. We disagree.
¶ 54 As we previously observed, it was Paul’s burden to provide a sufficiently complete
record to support a claim of error, and we resolve any doubt from an incomplete record against
Paul. See Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92.
¶ 55 Here, the record on appeal does not contain the support hearing, nor does it include the
parties’ financial affidavits or paystubs used by the court to set the amount of child support.
Absent a complete record, we are unable to review whether the trial court erred in determining
the award of child support. We have no documentation used by the court to determine the
amount awarded. Since the burden is on Paul as the appellant to provide a complete record on
appeal, we must presume that the trial court properly entered the support order. Accordingly, we
hold that the court did not err in calculating the appropriate amount of child support.
¶ 56 Paul has also requested that this case to be reassigned to a new judge if we were to

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remand. Since we are affirming and will not be remanding, there is no reason for this court to
have the case transferred to a new judge. From our review of the record, this request was
unwarranted in any event.
¶ 57 For all of the reasons listed above, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook
County.
¶ 58 Affirmed.

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