People v. Oyler

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2026 IL App (5th) 250621-U
NO. 5-25-0621
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Effingham County.
)
v. ) No. 24-CM-134
)
MELISSA E. OYLER, ) Honorable
) Allan F. Lolie,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE CLARKE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Barberis and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: We affirm the defendant’s conviction for misdemeanor battery over her contention
that the State failed to disprove her affirmative defenses beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 2 A jury found the defendant, Melissa E. Oyler, guilty of battery, a Class A Misdemeanor
(720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(2) (West 2022)). The trial court sentenced the defendant to 30 days of
incarceration in the Effingham County jail. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of
the evidence used to convict her. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On July 2, 2024, the defendant was charged with battery for knowingly making physical
contact of an insulting or provoking nature, in that the defendant used her hand to strike Keri
Heiden in the face on January 4, 2024. The case proceeded to a jury trial on June 25, 2025.
NOTICE
This order was filed under
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed
under Rule 23(e)(1).
NOTICE
Decision filed 10/14/26. The
text of this decision may be
changed or corrected prior to
the filing of a Petition for
Rehearing or the disposition of
the same.

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¶ 5 At trial, the State called Deputy Nathan Hill, of the Effingham County Sheriff’s Office,
who investigated the incident on January 4, 2024, to testify. Deputy Hill stated that when he arrived
at the Heidens’ residence, he spoke to Keri and her husband, Johnathan, who told him that their
dog escaped their home, their children went looking for it, and when the children stopped outside
of the defendant’s home, a woman began yelling vulgar statements at them and threatened to take
their dog.
¶ 6 Once the children arrived home and told Keri and Johnathan about the woman yelling at
them, Keri and Johnathan went to the defendant’s residence to sort out what happened with their
children. When Keri went up to the front porch, two women at the residence “immediately started
yelling and arguing with her.” The defendant then struck Keri’s face, causing her to fall backward.
Deputy Hill explained that Keri believed she was hit with a closed fist because of how the punch
felt, but she was not entirely sure.
¶ 7 Deputy Hill also spoke with Anna Tipsword and the defendant. Tipsword told Deputy Hill
that the defendant exited the house first. The defendant admitted to striking Keri with the palm of
her hand and explained that Keri fell down the stairs and off the porch. Deputy Hill testified that
the porch was “10 to 12 feet deep from the edge of the stairs to the front door and approximately
15 feet wide.” Deputy Hill stated that when he asked the defendant whether she was provoked in
any way or whether Keri made any physical motion toward her that could be deemed a threat, the
defendant said she did not.
¶ 8 Keri testified that on January 4, 2024, her family dog, Josephine, had gotten out, and the
children chased after the dog to bring her back home. Her children returned home in tears because
a neighbor had been “cussing them out,” using threatening language and telling them that they
would not get their dog back. Keri explained that she and her husband got into their car and drove

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to the defendant’s house with the children to ask the neighbor about what the children had told
them. Keri went onto the porch alone and knocked on the door. Tipsword answered the door, and
then the defendant came out of the house and started screaming at her. Tipsword, who answered
the door, then went back inside. The defendant told Keri to “get the F off [her] property,” and then
punched Keri with what she believed to be a closed fist in the face, in the lip area, knocking her
off the porch and onto the ground below at the bottom of the steps.
¶ 9 Keri explained that she was standing at the back edge of the porch, by the steps, when she
was struck. Keri confirmed she was not given time to leave the property before being struck. Keri
explained that the whole incident lasted about 30 seconds and that she did not know the defendant’s
name at the time. After falling off the porch, Keri told the defendant she was going to call the
police, and the defendant replied, “go ahead, I got my bail money, B***.” Keri further explained
that Johnathan did not go onto the porch during the incident, but after Keri fell to the ground,
Johnathan stepped in between her and the defendant and “said something to the effect of you’re
not going to hit my wife.” Keri also denied being confrontational and denied threatening the
defendant or striking her.
¶ 10 Johnathan testified similarly to Keri but further explained that their intention of going to
the defendant’s house was to ask about the dog and why their kids were threatened. Johnathan
explained that Keri began to speak with Tipsword, who opened the door, before the defendant
aggressively exited the residence, immediately approached, and yelled at Keri to get off her
property, then promptly struck her. Johnathan estimated the distance from the front door to the
steps as “maybe 8 to 10 feet.” Johnathan further explained that another neighbor came from across
the road to ask what happened, and the defendant responded, “I just punched that b*** in the face.”
Johnathan also confirmed that he and his wife did not threaten or act aggressively towards anyone.

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¶ 11 At the close of the State’s case, the defendant moved for directed verdict asserting that the
State failed to prove that the defendant acted without legal justification. The court denied the
motion and the defense called Tipsword to testify.
¶ 12 Tipsword explained that the front porch was “18 by 6 or maybe 16 by 18” feet and that it
took her three steps to reach the door. Tipsword also testified that a few days before the January
4, 2024, incident, she called animal control to pick up Heiden’s dog because it had gotten loose
and she was concerned for its safety. On January 4, Tipsword saw the Heiden’s dog loose again
and went outside to help catch it. Tipsword heard the children make a comment about “the lady
that called animal control.” Frustrated, Tipsword told the children she did and would do it again
because she was concerned for the dog’s safety. Tipsword explained that she went back inside the
home to get food to attract the dog’s attention.
¶ 13 While Tipsword was in the house, she heard someone “beating on the door,” and the
defendant answered the door. When Tipsword later stepped outside, she saw Keri “up in [the
defendant’s] face screaming.” Tipsword testified that she and the defendant “continually” told Keri
and her husband to get off their property. During the argument, Tipsword said that the defendant
was “stepping back between the gap between [their] front porch and front door.” Tipsword stated
that once the defendant had been backed up to the front door, the defendant said to Keri, “I’m
going to tell you one more time to leave our property.” Tipsword said that Keri responded, “what
are you going to do if I don’t?” The defendant then struck Keri, who stumbled off the porch.
Tipsword explained that after Keri fell off the porch, Johnathan helped her up, took a few steps up
the porch stairs, and made “comments” to her and the defendant. Tipsword testified that Keri and
Johnathan still did not leave the property after Keri was struck.

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¶ 14 During cross-examination, Tipsword testified that the defendant had her back to the door
during the confrontation, but, as she was giving Keri a final warning to leave the property, she may
have taken a step or two towards Keri to get her to back up off the porch. Tipsword testified that
at the time Keri was struck, she was six feet from the stairs and had stumbled backward before
falling. Tipsword explained that she did not remember Keri being physical with the defendant, and
she did not remember whether Keri threatened to do anything physical. However, Tipsword
believed that Keri and her husband came to their home in a threatening manner. Tipsword also
recalled the defendant telling the other neighbor that “[she] just punched that b***. Call the cops.
I got bail money.”
¶ 15 The defendant testified that on January 4, she was at home caring for her son who was
home from school sick, when she heard Keri and Johnathan “pound[ing] on [her] door.” After the
defendant opened the door, Keri began yelling and “kind of backed [her] up towards the door.”
The defendant explained that she felt threatened because she “wasn’t really sure what was going
to happen.” The defendant testified that she told Keri to leave 20 to 30 times over four to five
minutes. She explained that she then “punched [Keri] in the face” and Keri fell off her porch. The
defendant further explained that she admitted to everyone involved that she hit Keri because she
“didn’t think that [she] did anything wrong.” The defendant further explained that she felt like
“[she] was defending [herself] and [her] home.” When asked why she did not retreat back into her
home if she felt threatened, the defendant explained that she wanted to protect Keri from her “bully
dog,” who could have gotten out and possibly bit Keri or Johnathan if she opened the door. At the
close of the defense’s evidence, the defendant renewed her motion for directed verdict, which the
court again denied. After closing arguments and deliberations, the jury found the defendant guilty.

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¶ 16 On June 27, 2025, the defendant filed a motion for acquittal, or, in the alternative, a motion
for new trial, in which she alleged, inter alia, that the court erred in denying her motions for
directed verdict, that the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and that
the State failed to prove the defendant guilty of “[d]omestic [b]attery”1 beyond a reasonable doubt.
On July 31, 2025, the court denied the defendant’s motion and sentenced her to 30 days in county
jail, to be served over 15 weekends. Thereafter, the defendant filed her notice of appeal.
¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 18 On appeal, the defendant argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that she was guilty of battery. The defendant asserts that no evidence was presented at trial to
establish that she acted without legal justification. The defendant argues that the State was required
to “prove that [she] did not reasonably believe” that her conduct was “necessary to defend herself,”
or was not necessary to “terminate Keri’s trespass on her real property.” The State, in response,
argues that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the State proved all elements
of battery, and disproved the defendant’s claim that she acted with legal justification. In her reply
brief, the defendant maintains that “no rational jury could have found [her] guilty of battery”
because the State failed to establish that she acted without legal justification.
¶ 19 When reviewing a claim that the State’s evidence was insufficient to support a conviction,
“the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “Under
this standard, the reviewing court does not retry the defendant, and the trier of fact remains
1We note that the defendant’s motion to the trial court asserts that the State failed to prove her guilty
of domestic battery; however, she was not charged or convicted of domestic battery in this case; rather, the
defendant was charged and convicted of battery, pursuant to 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(2) (West 2022).

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responsible for making determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be
given their testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.” People v.
Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 272 (2008). However, “merely because the trier of fact accepted certain
testimony or made certain inferences based on the evidence does not guarantee the reasonableness
of its decision.” Ross, 229 Ill. 2d at 272. A conviction will be reversed where the evidence is “so
unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory” that there remains a reasonable doubt about the
defendant’s guilt. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d at 272.
¶ 20 To prove the defendant guilty of battery, the State had to establish that the defendant,
knowingly and without legal justification, made physical contact of an insulting and provoking
nature with Keri. See 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(2) (West 2022). Here, the defendant does not contest
whether the State established the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, she
contends that the trial court erred in finding her guilty of battery when, according to defendant, the
State failed to disprove her affirmative defenses, i.e., that she acted in self-defense and in defense
of her property. According to defendant, she reasonably believed that she needed to use force to
protect herself and her property from Keri, when she told Keri and Johnathan to leave, and Keri
instead “kept yelling” at her and advanced towards her, causing her to be “backed up against her
front door.”
¶ 21 Self-defense and defense of property are both affirmative defenses. Self-defense requires
the defendant to establish some evidence that (1) unlawful force was threatened against the
defendant; (2) the defendant was not the aggressor; (3) the danger of harm was imminent; (4) the
use of force was necessary; (5) the defendant subjectively believed a danger existed requiring the
use of force; and (6) the defendant’s belief was objectively reasonable. People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill.
2d 104, 127-28 (1995); 720 ILCS 5/7-1(a) (West 2022). If the State negates any one of these

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elements, the defendant’s self-defense claim cannot prevail. People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 50.
For defense of property, the State must disprove that the defendant reasonably believed (1) that his
or her real property was in immediate danger of unlawful trespass, and (2) that the use of force
was necessary to avoid this danger. People v. Grabow, 2022 IL App (2d) 210151, ¶¶ 22-23; 720
ILCS 5/7-3(a) (West 2022). Applying these standards to the trial record, a rational jury could find
the State negated multiple elements.
¶ 22 “[T]he phrase ‘reasonably believes’ means ‘that the person concerned, acting as a
reasonable man, believes that the described facts exist.’ ” People v. Harmon, 2015 IL App (1st)
122345, ¶ 55 (quoting 720 ILCS 5/2-19 (West 2008)). A trier of fact need not accept a defendant’s
contention that she acted in self-defense; it is a question of fact, and the court may consider the
probability or improbability of the defendant’s account, the circumstances surrounding the offense,
and other witnesses’ testimony. People v. Young, 347 Ill. App. 3d 909, 920 (2004). We believe
this same principle applies with equal validity to the issues of defense of property.
¶ 23 In the case at bar, the battery charge was based on the defendant striking Keri. Accordingly,
we must determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that, in doing so, the defendant
was not acting in self-defense or in defense of her property. Here, applying the facts to the
defendant’s claim of self-defense, the evidence at trial established that Keri did not strike, threaten,
or make any physical motion toward the defendant. Deputy Hill testified that the defendant herself
said Keri did not provoke her and did not make a threatening physical motion. Those admissions
undercut any claim of an imminent threat requiring force. Both Keri and Johnathan described the
defendant exiting the residence, yelling at them to get off the property, and immediately striking
Keri, knocking her off the porch. That sequence allowed the jury to reasonably determine that the
defendant was the initial aggressor. Even crediting the defendant’s claim that she felt threatened,

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the jury could reasonably find that non‑force alternatives were available. The defendant could have
retreated inside, closed the door, and called law enforcement. The defendant claimed that she could
not call law enforcement because her phone was inside, and that she could not go inside because
she was concerned that her dog would get out and bite Keri or Johnathan.
¶ 24 While, as the defendant points out in her reply brief, Illinois imposes no duty to retreat
when a person is lawfully present (People v. Bailey, 15 Ill. App. 3d 558, 561 (1973)), the jury
could reasonably find the use of force here was not necessary or objectively reasonable under
section 7‑1(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/7‑1(a) (West 2022)). Here the record
supports that the defendant subjectively felt threatened; however, the jury, as the trier of fact, was
entitled to reject the objective reasonableness of that belief given the full circumstances and
credibility assessments. See Young, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 920; Ross, 229 Ill. 2d at 272.
¶ 25 Similarly applying the facts to the defendant’s claim of defense of property, the evidence
at trial established that the witnesses estimated the porch to be 8-12 feet deep from the door to the
steps. Keri testified she was standing near the steps at the far edge of the porch when she was
struck. Although the defendant claimed that Keri was near the front door and that her back was
pressed against the door, the jury, as the finder of fact, was permitted to accept Keri’s version. The
defendant also stated that she may have stepped forward toward Keri to get her back off the door.
The defendant further testified that she told Keri to leave 20 to 30 times over a span of four to five
minutes before hitting her, and further admitted that Keri made no threatening movements toward
her. Based on this evidence, a rational jury could find that, even if Keri was trespassing, punching
her was neither necessary nor reasonable to make her leave the property. See Grabow, 2022 IL
App (2d) 210151, ¶¶ 22-23.

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¶ 26 The jury also heard that the defendant admitted that she “punched” Keri and later told a
neighbor she had “punched that b*** in the face” and had “bail money.” The jury could reasonably
have treated those statements as corroborating her intent to strike and undermining her claim that
force was necessary to protect herself or her property. In sum, a rational trier of fact could find
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the battery and that the State negated at
least one essential element of both self‑defense and defense of property.
¶ 27 Therefore, in this case, the jury had the opportunity to hear all the testimony and judge the
witnesses’ credibility. The jury ultimately found that the defendant was guilty of battery. Taking
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find there was sufficient evidence to
support the defendant’s conviction of battery.
¶ 28 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 29 For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Effingham County circuit court.
¶ 30 Affirmed.

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