Ryan Matthew Gluys v. State of Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-CR-1686 | October 15, 2026 Page 1 of 8
Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in
reliance upon this Memorandum Decision until it is certified.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
I N T H E
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Ryan Matthew Gluys,
Appellant-Defendant
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
October 15, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-CR-1686
Appeal from Hancock Superior Court 2
The Honorable Dan E. Marshall, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
30D02-2409-F6-1710

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-CR-1686 | October 15, 2026 Page 2 of 8
Memorandum Decision by Judge May
Chief Judge Tavitas and Judge Vaidik concur.
May, Judge.
[1] Ryan Matthew Gluys appeals following the revocation of his probation. He
argues the trial court erred by revoking his probation because the State
presented insufficient evidence at the fact-finding hearing to prove that he
violated a condition of his probation. The State agrees with Gluys. We reverse
and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On August 15, 2025, Gluys pled guilty to Class A misdemeanor operating a
vehicle while intoxicated.1 The trial court sentenced Gluys to a term of 365
days in jail but suspended execution of the sentence to probation. On
November 21, 2025, Probation Officer Justin Zirkle (“PO Zirkle”), Gluys’s
probation officer, filed a petition to revoke Gluys’s probation. The petition
alleged three probation violations: (1) Gluys had been charged with Class A
misdemeanor driving while suspended2 in Henry County under cause number
33C03-2511-CM-000744 (“Cause 744”), (2) Gluys had failed to notify his
1 Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2.
2 Ind. Code 9-24-19-3.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-CR-1686 | October 15, 2026 Page 3 of 8
probation officer within 48 hours of a law enforcement interaction, and (3)
Gluys had failed to pay probation user fees.
[3] On June 17, 2026, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the petition to
revoke Gluys’s probation. At the time of the hearing, PO Zirkle was no longer
assigned to Gluys, and Probation Officer Wilann Beeson (“PO Beeson”) was
Gluys’s assigned probation officer. PO Beeson testified that she had
familiarized herself with the allegations in the petition, and the State asked PO
Beeson to “tell us about the violation[.]” (Tr. Vol. II at 6.) PO Beeson
responded:
Well, the violation speaking of the Defendant was charged in
Henry County for a new case for driving while suspended. Um –
and – uh – failed to notify the officer regarding the new
conviction – or, excuse me – the new arrest within forty-eight
(48) hours and then he owes fees for probation.
(Id.) The State did not ask PO Beeson any follow-up questions or present any
additional testimony. The State noted Cause 744 was still pending and asked
the trial court to take judicial notice of that case.
[4] Following the presentation of evidence, the State argued:
Your Honor, while he was on probation in this case, the State of
Indiana has alleged that he committed a new offense, that is
driving while suspended. That case is still pending, but the
allegations have been made. Uh – he also did not – the State
alleges that he also did not inform his probation officer of this
new offense. State would ask that you – that you find him in
violation of the terms of his probation.

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(Id. at 9.) Gluys asserted the State had presented insufficient evidence of a
violation. He argued the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that he had committed the underlying criminal offense in Cause 744
or that his conditions of probation required him to report law enforcement
interactions to his probation officer within 48 hours. After hearing the parties’
arguments, the trial court pronounced: “And, Sir, I do find that you violated the
terms and conditions of your probation.” (Id. at 10-11.) As a sanction, the trial
court ordered Gluys to serve 192 days of his previously suspended sentence in
the Hancock County Jail and to return to probation for the balance of his term.
Discussion and Decision
[5] “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which
a criminal defendant is entitled. The trial court determines the conditions of
probation and may revoke probation if the conditions are violated.” Prewitt v.
State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (internal citation omitted). “Probation
revocation is a two-step process. First, the trial court must make a factual
determination that a violation of a condition of probation actually occurred.
Second, if a violation is found, then the trial court must determine the
appropriate sanctions for the violation.” Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616
(Ind. 2013) (internal citation omitted).
[6] “Probation hearings are civil in nature, and the State must prove an alleged
probation violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” Votra v. State, 121
N.E.3d 1108, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). When evaluating the sufficiency of

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-CR-1686 | October 15, 2026 Page 5 of 8
the evidence supporting a trial court’s finding that a violation of a condition of
probation occurred, we “will consider only the evidence most favorable to the
judgment, without regard to weight or credibility, and will affirm if there is
substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court’s conclusion.”
Id.
[7] Gluys asserts, and the State does not contest, that the State presented
insufficient evidence of a probation violation at the fact-finding hearing.
“When a probationer is accused of committing a criminal offense, an arrest
alone does not warrant the revocation of probation.” Johnson v. State, 692
N.E.2d 485, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). “Likewise, the mere filing of a criminal
charge against a defendant does not warrant the revocation of probation.”
Jackson v. State, 6 N.E.3d 1040, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Rather, “the State is
required to prove – by a preponderance of the evidence – that the defendant
committed the offense.” Id. Here, the State established Gluys was arrested and
charged in Cause 744, but the State did not present any evidence beyond the
charging information to prove Gluys committed the underlying criminal
offense. Therefore, the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that Gluys violated the conditions of his
probation by committing a new criminal offense. See, e.g., Heaton, 984 N.E.2d
at 618 (holding preponderance of the evidence is the correct legal standard to
apply when the State alleges a probationer committed a new criminal offense
while on probation and remanding for a new hearing to ensure the trial court
applied that standard).

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[8] In addition, while the State alleged Gluys violated the terms of his probation by
failing to report his arrest in Cause 744 to his probation officer within forty-
eight hours, the State did not present any evidence that the terms of Gluys’s
probation required him to report law enforcement contacts within forty-eight
hours. Thus, the State presented insufficient evidence to support revocation of
Gluys’s probation on that basis. See Lampley v. State, 31 N.E.3d 1034, 1036 n.2
(Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (“We caution that failing to enter the conditions of
probation into evidence runs the risk of not satisfying the substantial evidence
of probative value standard we use on review.”).
[9] Moreover, while PO Beeson testified that Gluys owed probation fees, the State
presented no evidence that Gluys’s failure to pay the fees was reckless,
knowing, or intentional. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g) (“Probation may not be
revoked for failure to comply with conditions of a sentence that imposes
financial obligations on the person unless the person recklessly, knowingly, or
intentionally fails to pay.”). Therefore, the State failed to present sufficient
evidence to support revocation of Gluys’s probation on that basis.
Consequently, we must reverse the trial court’s revocation of his probation.
[10] Generally, double jeopardy prohibits retrial of a criminal defendant for an
offense after the defendant’s conviction is reversed because the State presented
insufficient evidence. Jaramillo v. State, 823 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (Ind. 2005).
However, “a violation of a condition of probation does not constitute an offense
for purposes of double jeopardy.” Knecht v. State, 85 N.E.3d 829, 835 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2017). A probation revocation hearing is different from a criminal

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proceeding. Childers v. State, 656 N.E.2d 514, 516 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). The
purpose of a probation revocation hearing is to “determine whether a convicted
defendant has complied with the terms previously imposed by the court as
conditions for suspending a portion of the sentence.” Id. “Because the trial
court imposed the specific conditions of probation, the finding of whether a
defendant has complied with these conditions is a question of fact and not an
adjudication of guilt.” Id. Consequently, double jeopardy does not bar a new
fact-finding hearing, and we remand the matter back to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See, e.g., Thompson v. Reivitz,
746 F.2d 397, 400 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding probationer’s right to due process
was not violated when the trial court held a second probation revocation
hearing after the result of the first probation revocation hearing was reversed on
appeal because of insufficient evidence).
Conclusion
[11] The State presented insufficient evidence at the fact-finding hearing to support
the trial court’s finding that Gluys violated a condition of his probation.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
[12] Reversed and remanded.
Tavitas, C.J., and Vaidik, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-CR-1686 | October 15, 2026 Page 8 of 8
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Eugene A. Kress
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Dayton L. Welliver
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana