Martin Booth v. Efroymsom House Owner's Association, Inc.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-MF-1861 | October 19, 2026 	Page 1 of 6
Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take
any action in reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is certified.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
I N 	T H E
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Martin L. Booth,
Appellant-Defendant
v.
Efroymson House Owner’s Association, Inc.,
Appellee-Plaintiff
October 19, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-MF-1861
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
The Honorable Ian Stewart, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
49D05-2306-MF-22241
Memorandum Decision by Judge Bailey
Judges Bradford and Altice concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-MF-1861 | October 19, 2026 	Page 2 of 6
Bailey, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] 	Martin Booth, pro se, appeals the trial court’s denial of his Trial Rule 60(B)
motion for relief from judgment. Booth raises one issue for our review, namely,
whether the trial court erred when it denied his motion. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] 	Booth owned a property on Delaware Street in Indianapolis. In December
2020, Efroymson House LLC obtained a foreclosure judgment against Booth in
the amount of $5,484.89, and that judgment was subsequently assigned to
Efroymson House Owner’s Association, Inc. (the “Association”). Then, on
May 18, 2021, the Association recorded a notice of homeowner’s association
lien on Booth’s property in the amount of $11,031.59.
[3] 	On June 2, 2023, the Association filed a complaint to foreclose the judgment
lien and the homeowner’s lien. Booth failed to respond, and, on December 7,
the Association filed a motion for default judgment. The court granted that
motion the next day.
[4] 	On November 27, 2025, Booth filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant
to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(2), (3), (6), and (8). In relevant part, Booth alleged
that the default judgment was “void” because the Association “did not legally
exist” when it filed the lawsuit, Efroymson House LLC “had no corporate
existence” to assign the foreclosure judgment, “[u]nauthorized construction and

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-MF-1861 | October 19, 2026 	Page 3 of 6
fraudulent assessments formed the basis of the lien,” “[f]alse affidavits and false
ownership certifications infected the entire process,” “FHA underwriting rules
were violated,” and the Association’s “counsel failed to disclose these
jurisdictional defects.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 39-40. He further claimed
that the judgment was void because the Association “lack[ed] standing” since it
did “not legally exist,” the “assignor entity is dissolved,” and “[j]urisdictional
facts are missing or concealed.” Id. at 43. And he alleged a “[t]otal lack of due
process for” himself. Id. at 48.
[5] 	The trial court held a hearing on Booth’s motion on June 30, 2026. During that
hearing, Booth testified that he was “not able to respond” to the complaint
because he was “in and out of the hospital” and “couldn’t take care” of himself.
Tr. at 10. He acknowledged that he had received “a few e-mails” from the
Association while he was in the hospital but “didn’t know about it on time.” Id.
at 11 (emphasis in original). And he testified that he was “late” getting the
notice and then “late responding” because he “didn’t know how to actually
respond or take care of the issue.” Id. at 12. The Association asked Booth if he
had been hand-delivered a copy of the complaint, and Booth responded: “I do
not recall.” Id. at 18.
[6] 	The court then entered its order denying Booth’s motion to set aside the default.
In its order, the court found that Booth’s motion was “untimely” and that he
“did not establish any of the grounds for setting aside a judgment pursuant to
Indiana Trial Rule 60(B).” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 15. This appeal ensued.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-MF-1861 | October 19, 2026 	Page 4 of 6
Discussion and Decision
[7] 	Booth contends that the court erred when it denied his motion for relief from
judgment. Initially, we note that Booth proceeds pro se. “It is well settled that
pro se litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This
means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of
procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to
do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal
citation omitted).
[8] 	Further, the Association has not filed an appellee’s brief. When an appellee
does not file a brief, our Court will not undertake the burden of developing
arguments on that party’s behalf. Thurman v. Thurman, 777 N.E.2d 41, 42 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2002). Rather, we apply “a less stringent standard of review” and may
reverse the trial court if the appellant establishes prima facie error. Id. Prima
facie “means at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id.
[9] 	On appeal, Booth contends that the trial court should have granted his motion
for relief from judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6), which
provides that a court may relieve a party from a default judgment when the
judgment is void. In particular, Booth alleges that the judgment is void because
the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him due to insufficient service of
process of the Association’s complaint. He maintains that the Association did
not comply with Indiana Trial Rule 4.12(a) when it served a copy of the
summons.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-MF-1861 | October 19, 2026 	Page 5 of 6
[10] 	However, at no point did Booth make this particular argument to the trial court.
In his motion for relief from judgment, Booth cited Trial Rule 60(B)(6) but on
the grounds that the Association did not legally exist when it filed the
complaint, that the foreclosure was assigned to the Association by a dissolved
LLC, that unauthorized construction and fraudulent assessments served as the
basis of the lien, that FHA underwriting rules were violated, and that the
Association’s counsel failed to disclose those jurisdictional defects. See
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 39-40. Booth further argued that the Association
lacked standing because it did not legally exist. And, while he baldly asserted
that there was a “[t]otal lack of due process” for him, he did not argue that he
was denied due process for lack of valid service. Id. at 48.
[11] 	Then, at the hearing on his motion, Booth cited various reasons for his failure
to timely respond; but, again, he did not argue that there had been a lack of
proper service of the complaint. Rather, he asserted that he did not respond
timely because he had been in and out of the hospital and that he did not know
how to respond to the emails he had received. The only time service of process
was mentioned was when the Association asked Booth if he had been
personally served with the complaint, to which Booth responded that he did not
recall. At no point did Booth claim that there had been insufficient service, that
there was a lack of personal jurisdiction, or that the default judgment was void
on those grounds.
[12] 	It is well settled that issues not raised at the trial court are waived on appeal. See
Heartland Res., Inc. v. Bedel, 903 N.E.2d 1004, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-MF-1861 | October 19, 2026 	Page 6 of 6
(holding that party failed to allege lack of personal jurisdiction in its Trial Rule
60(B) motion and therefore waived that issue for review on appeal). Because
Booth did not raise the issue of lack of personal jurisdiction to the trial court, he
cannot now raise it on appeal. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order.
[13] 	Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.
APPELLANT PRO S E
Martin L. Booth
Indianapolis, Indiana