George Elbert Grady v. State of Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-CR-1050 | October 20, 2026 	Page 1 of 7
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any
action in reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is certified.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
I N 	T H E
Court of Appeals of Indiana
George Elbert Grady,
Appellant-Defendant
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
October 20, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-CR-1050
Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court
The Honorable Scott A. Norrick, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
48C05-2405-F6-1451
Memorandum Decision by Judge Scheele
Judges Brown and Kenworthy concur.

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Scheele, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] 	George Elbert Grady appeals his convictions for Level 6 felony counterfeiting,
arguing the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] 	In February 2024, the Alexandria Police Department received a public records
request form, which was purportedly filled out and signed by Jordan Allen.
Allen is a deputy with the Madison County Sheriff’s Department and denied
submitting the form. Soon after, the Alexandria Clerk’s Office received a public
records request form purportedly filled out and signed by Erica Bell. Bell is a
deputy clerk and denied submitting the form. Police investigated and
determined both requests came from an email address linked to Grady.
[3] 	The State charged Grady with two counts of Level 6 felony identity deception
and two counts of Level 6 felony counterfeiting. A bench trial was held in
March 2026. The trial court found Grady guilty of both counts of Level 6 felony
counterfeiting but acquitted him of both counts of identity deception. The court
sentenced Grady to 365 days suspended to probation for each offense, to be
served concurrently. Grady now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[4] 	Grady argues the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for Level 6
felony counterfeiting. Our standard for reviewing a claim of insufficient
evidence is well settled:

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For sufficiency of the evidence challenges, we consider only
probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the
judgment of the trier of fact. On sufficiency challenges, we will
neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. We will
affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find
the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021) (citations omitted).
[5] 	Resolution of Grady’s sufficiency challenge turns on our interpretation of
Indiana’s counterfeiting statute. Even if framed as a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence, we apply a de novo standard of review to questions of statutory
interpretation. Dobeski v. State, 64 N.E.3d 1257, 1259 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
When faced with a question of statutory interpretation, we first
examine whether the language of the statute is clear and
unambiguous. If it is, we need not apply any rules of construction
other than to require that words and phrases be given their plain,
ordinary, and usual meanings. Where a statute is open to more
than one interpretation, it is deemed ambiguous and subject to
judicial construction. Our primary goal in interpreting a statute is
to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent, and the best
evidence of that intent is the statute itself.
Id. at 1259-60 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
[6] 	To establish that Grady committed Level 6 felony counterfeiting, the State was
required to prove he knowingly or intentionally “ma[de] or utter[ed] a written
instrument in such a manner that it purports to have been made: (A) by another
person; (B) at another time; (C) with different provisions; or (D) by authority of
one who did not give authority[.]” Ind. Code § 35-43-5-2(a)(1) (2021). A

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“written instrument” means “a paper, a document, or other instrument
containing written matter and includes money, coins, tokens, stamps, seals,
credit cards, badges, trademarks, medals, retail sales receipts, labels or markings
. . . or other objects or symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification.” Ind.
Code § 35-43-5-1(s) (2021).
[7] 	Grady argues the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions because the
public records request forms were not “written instruments” within the meaning
of the counterfeiting statute. Specifically, he argues a “written instrument”
under the counterfeiting statute must “independently carr[y] a legal, pecuniary,
or proprietary effect.” Appellant’s Br. p. 20. In support, he cites several
nineteenth- and twentieth-century cases addressing forgery, contending these
cases “limit[] the reach of the ‘written instrument’ statute to only those
instruments that carry an apparent legal, pecuniary, or proprietary
consequence[.]” Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 7 (citing Garmire v. State, 4 N.E. 54
(Ind. 1886); State v. Floyd, 81 N.E. 1153 (Ind. 1907); State v. Hazzard, 80 N.E.
149 (Ind. 1907)).
[8] 	But these cases do not analyze the current counterfeiting statute. And we see no
such requirement in that statute. Rather, the plain language of the statute
provides that a “written instrument” means “a paper, a document, or other
instrument containing written matter[,]” and that language plainly covers the
public records request forms. See I.C. § 35-43-5-1(s). Grady argues the statute
cannot be read “so broadly as to include every paper, document, or instrument
containing written matter[.]” Appellant’s Reply Br. p. 6. But that is the clear

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and unambiguous language of the statute. Our Supreme Court has
acknowledged the definition is “broad[]” in that “a written instrument could be
an instrument containing written matter or it could be an object or symbol of
value, right, privilege, or identification—whether or not such object or symbol
contains any writings or markings.” A.-H.Y. v. State, 975 N.E.2d 1273, 1279
(Ind. 2012).
[9] 	Further, more recent case law supports this reading. In Trainor v. State, 950
N.E.2d 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied, the defendant, purporting to be a
law enforcement officer, filled out and signed order forms for various
collectibles to be delivered to the home of the officer he was impersonating.
When that officer received the collectibles and accompanying bills, he traced
the forms to the defendant, who was later convicted of counterfeiting. On
appeal, the defendant argued the order forms were not “written instruments”
within the statute “because they ha[d] no value, they create[d] no privilege, and
they [were] not objects of identification”—relying on the latter half of the
“written instrument” definition. Id. at 355. In rejecting this argument, we
explained:
But the statutory definition of written instrument is not limited to
“objects or symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification.”
See I.C. § 35-43-5-1(t). [1] Rather, a written instrument is defined as
“a paper, a document, or other instrument containing written
matter and includes” a list of specific items and “other objects or
1 The statutory definition of “written instrument” now codified in Indiana Code section 35-43-5-1(s) was
previously found in subsection (t), which is the subsection cited in Trainor.

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symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification.” Id. (emphasis
added). The order forms undoubtedly constitute papers,
documents, or other instruments containing written matter, and
thus fall within the statutory definition of written instrument.
Id.2
[10] 	Similarly, here, the public records request forms submitted by Grady
undoubtedly constitute papers, documents, or other instruments containing
written matter. Thus, these forms fall within the statutory definition of written
instrument. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Grady’s
convictions for Level 6 felony counterfeiting.
[11] 	Affirmed.
Brown, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Cara Schaefer Wieneke
Wieneke Law Office, LLC
Brooklyn, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
2 Grady acknowledges Trainor but emphasizes that in Trainor the court went on to conclude that the order
forms in question were also objects or symbols of value because they caused the officer to receive items of
value and created a debt obligation. While the Trainor court did reach that conclusion, it did so only after
holding that the order forms constituted papers, documents, or other instruments and thus were “written
instruments” under the statute. See Trainor, 950 N.E.2d at 355 (court finding the order forms fall within the
statutory definition of “written instrument” as they are “papers, documents, or other instruments containing
written matter” and then concluding “[m]oreover, . . . the order forms were objects or symbols of value”).

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J.T. Whitehead
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana