Martin Booth v. Efroymson House Owner's Association, Inc.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-PL-1198 | October 20, 2026 Page 1 of 14
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not
take any action in reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is
certified.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
I N T H E
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Martin L. Booth,
Appellant/Defendant
v.
Efroymson House Owner’s Association, Inc.,
Appellee/Plaintiff
October 20, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-PL-1198
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
The Honorable A. Richard M. Blaiklock, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49D11-2604-PL-21363

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Memorandum Decision by Judge Bradford
Judges Bailey and Altice concur.
Bradford, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] In April of 2026, the Efroymson House Owner’s Association, Inc. (“the
HOA”), sued HOA member Martin Booth for vandalism and sought a
temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary injunction against him
after he had damaged landscaping it had installed on common land. After a
hearing, the trial court granted the HOA’s request for a preliminary
injunction, which Booth contends was an abuse of discretion. Because we
disagree, we affirm and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The Efroymson House was built in the early twentieth century in
Indianapolis, along with a carriage house on the same lot (“the Efroymson
Lot”). Between 2016 and 2018, the owner of the Efroymson Lot, Efroymson
House, LLC (“the LLC”), added another structure, consisting of a garage with
a dwelling above (“the Property”). In October of 2018, Booth entered into a
purchase agreement with the LLC for the purchase of the Property and took
pre-closing possession in December of the same year. On May 28, 2019, the
Efroymson Lot was divided into three separate lots, of which the Property was
one. On May 29, 2019, the LLC caused to be recorded a declaration of

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covenants, conditions, easements, and restrictions (“CCRs”) applicable to the
three parcels comprising the Efroymson Lot. The CCRs provided for the
creation of the HOA, which apparently occurred around this time. The CCRs
also designated certain portions of the Efroymson Lot (including a portion of
the Property) as common areas, which the HOA shall maintain and repair (or
cause to be maintained or repaired) and over which it had the power to
acquire title, install improvements and manage, maintain, repair, and replace.
[3] On September 11, 2019, a memorandum of land contract between Booth and
the LLP for the Property was recorded. On January 3, 2020, Booth and the
LLP mutually released the land contract and all related purchase agreements
because Booth had been able to arrange financing to purchase the Property
outright. Later that month, the parties entered into a new purchase
agreement, and Booth received a warranty deed for the Property on February
12, 2020. In or around 2023, the HOA installed landscaping in the common
areas, including arborvitae shrubs, tulips, other plants, lighting, and a bench.
[4] On April 14, 2026, Booth, without the consent of the HOA, entered the
common areas and cut arborvitae shrubs and other plants, stomped and
deadheaded tulips and other flowers, and damaged other vegetation. The next
day, Booth returned and chopped down an eight-foot-tall arborvitae shrub
with an axe, pulled a shrub from the ground by hand, tipped over the bench,
and tore landscape lighting from the ground. Kevin Krulewitch, the president
of the HOA, personally witnessed Booth’s actions on April 14 and 15, 2026,
and asked him to stop, to no avail. Booth replied that he could not be legally

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stopped and intended to do “whatever he wanted with ‘his’ property.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 81.
[5] On April 16, 2026, the HOA filed suit against Booth, alleging vandalism and
that Booth was civilly liable for damages pursuant to the Indiana Crime
Victims Relief Act (“CVRA”) and seeking an emergency TRO and
preliminary injunction. The next day, the trial court issued an emergency
TRO. On April 21, 2026, the trial court held a hearing on the HOA’s motions
for a TRO and preliminary injunction. Booth acknowledged his actions in the
common areas, characterized them as “routine maintenance” that he was
performing on his property, and claimed that his “equitable interest” in the
Property predated the CCRs because of his previous land contract. Tr. Vol. II
pp. 15, 16. The HOA argued that Booth had taken the warranty deed subject
to the CCRs, which provide that the common areas are to be controlled by the
HOA. The trial court refused to admit Booth’s proffered Exhibit 3,
purportedly an application by Krulewitch to the Indianapolis Historic
Preservation Commission (“IHPC”) to approve the landscaping in the
common areas, for lack of foundation and relevance.
[6] Following the hearing, the trial court extended the TRO by ten days and took
the matter of the preliminary injunction under advisement. On May 6, 2026,
the trial court granted the HOA’s motion for a preliminary injunction and
ordered that the HOA post a surety bond of $100.00, finding that the HOA
had established a reasonable likelihood of success on its vandalism claim
against Booth, the HOA would continue to suffer irreparable harm without an

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adequate remedy at law, the balance of harms weighed in the HOA’s favor,
and the issuance of a preliminary injunction was in the public interest.
Discussion and Decision
[7] As an initial matter, we note that, although Booth is proceeding pro se, he is
held to the same standards as trained attorneys and is afforded no inherent
leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented. Zavodnik v. Harper, 17
N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). Moreover, we note that the HOA has not filed
an Appellee’s brief.
When the appellee has failed to submit an answer brief we need
not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the
appellee’s behalf. Rather, we will reverse the trial court’s
judgment if the appellant’s brief presents a case of prima facie
error. Gibson v. City of Indianapolis, 242 Ind. 447, 448, 179 N.E.2d
291, 292 (1962). Prima facie error in this context is defined as,
“at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Santana
v. Santana, 708 N.E.2d 886, 887 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Where an
appellant is unable to meet this burden, we will affirm. Id.
Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006).
[8] That said, Booth contends that the trial court abused its discretion in setting
the HOA’s surety bond at $100.00, abused its discretion in excluding one of
his proffered exhibits, improperly resolved disputed issues prematurely, erred
in finding that the HOA had established an inadequate remedy at law and
irreparable harm, and erred in finding that the HOA had established a
likelihood of success on its CVRA/vandalism claim.
The issuance of a preliminary injunction is within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and the scope of appellate review is

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limited to deciding whether there has been a clear abuse of
discretion. Reilly v. Daly, 666 N.E.2d 439, 443 (Ind. Ct. App.
1996), trans. denied. When determining whether or not to grant a
preliminary injunction, the trial court is required to make special
findings of fact and state its conclusions thereon. Ind. Trial Rule
52(A). When findings and conclusions are made, the reviewing
court must determine if the trial court’s findings support the
judgment. Norlund v. Faust, 675 N.E.2d 1142, 1149 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1997), trans. denied. The trial court’s judgment will be
reversed only when clearly erroneous. Id. Findings of fact are
clearly erroneous when the record lacks evidence or reasonable
inferences from the evidence to support them. Id. We consider
the evidence only in the light most favorable to the judgment and
construe findings together liberally in favor of the judgment. Id.
The trial court’s discretion to grant or deny preliminary
injunctive relief is measured by several factors: 1) whether the
plaintiff’s remedies at law are inadequate, thus causing
irreparable harm pending the resolution of the substantive action
if the injunction does not issue; 2) whether the plaintiff has
demonstrated at least a reasonable likelihood of success at trial
by establishing a prima facie case; 3) whether the threatened
injury to the plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm the grant of
the injunction may inflict on the defendant; and 4) whether, by
the grant of the preliminary injunction, the public interest would
be disserved. Reilly, 666 N.E.2d at 443. In order to grant a
preliminary injunction, the moving party has the burden of
showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the facts and
circumstances entitle him to injunctive relief. Id. The power to
issue a preliminary injunction should be used sparingly, and such
relief should not be granted except in rare instances in which the
law and facts are clearly within the moving party’s favor. Id.
Barlow v. Sipes, 744 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.

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I. The Trial Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in Setting
the HOA’s Bond
[9] As mentioned, the trial court ordered the HOA to post a bond of $100.00,
which Booth contends is insufficient security. Indiana Rule of Trial
Procedure 65(c) provides, in part, that
[n]o restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except
upon the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the
court deems proper, for the payment of such costs and damages
as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have
been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.
Moreover,
[t]he fixing of the amount of the security bond is a discretionary
function of the trial court and is reversible only for an abuse of
that discretion. [Peters v. Davidson, Inc., 172 Ind. App. 39, 47, 359
N.E.2d 556, 561 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977).] When assessing the
amount of security, the trial court should consider “not only the
estimated damages offered by the parties but its own experience
and knowledge.” Id.
Kennedy v. Kennedy, 616 N.E.2d 39, 43 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. denied.
[10] Booth contends that the bond of $100.00 does not address possible “contempt
exposure[,]” “duration, compliance costs, loss of use, or damages” should it
turn out that he was wrongfully enjoined. Appellant’s Br. p. 18. The
potential costs identified by Booth, however, are mostly not the potential costs
of the injunction itself, but, rather, the potential costs to him if he chooses to
violate it. The costs of the injunction itself are the costs Booth would incur by
not further damaging plants and other items in the common area, which

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would seem to be very minimal, even if he had been wrongly enjoined. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the potential
damages to Booth from ceasing his activities in the common area would be
covered by a $100.00 surety bond.
II. The Trial Court did not Abuse Its Discretion in
Excluding Booth’s Proffered Evidence
[11] Booth contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit or
consider his proffered Exhibit 3, which was Krulewitch’s purported
application for a certificate of appropriateness to the IHPC. The admission
and exclusion of evidence falls within the sound discretion of the trial court,
and we review the admission of evidence only for an abuse of discretion.
Turner v. KLS Servs., LLC, 254 N.E.3d 1082, 1087 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). An
abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is clearly against the
logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Dow v. Hurst, 146
N.E.3d 990, 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.
[12] Booth contends that proffered Exhibit 3, which apparently indicates that he is
the owner of the Property, was relevant to show
whether the HOA possessed an undisputed right to install and
exclusively control improvements on Lot 3; whether Booth
knowingly damaged “property of another person” without
consent; whether the HOA came to equity after undertaking
work over the recorded owner’s objection; and whether the
parties’ property-rights dispute could be treated as settled at the
preliminary stage.

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Appellant’s Br. p. 19. Booth cites to Evidence Rules 401 and 402 (addressing
relevance and certain limits on admissibility) to support his argument on this
point. Even if we were to ascribe all of the alleged relevance to Exhibit 3 that
Booth does, it does no more than tend to show that Booth owns the Property,
which is not disputed and does not require further proof.
[13] Moreover, Booth entirely fails to address one of the bases on which the trial
court declined to admit the proffered exhibit, which was a lack of proper
foundation. Evidence Rule 901 provides, in part, that “[t]o satisfy the
requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the
proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item
is what the proponent claims it is.” Our review of the relevant portions of the
record indicates that Booth made no attempt to lay an adequate foundation
for the admissibility of proffered Exhibit 3. Booth has failed to establish an
abuse of discretion in this regard.
III. The Trial Court did not Err by Resolving Contested
Issues
[14] Booth contends that the trial court prematurely resolved several issues in
resolving the preliminary-injunction question, namely, that it finally resolved
all disputed property and servitude rights and the question of the effect of the
parties’ release of the land contract for the Property. The trial court’s order
does not do this, explicitly stating that it is merely deciding whether the HOA
has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, as it was required to do.
Simply put, the state of the record at this stage of the proceedings is that the

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HOA has introduced evidence that Booth destroyed landscaping on land that
the HOA has an exclusive right to maintain, repair, manage, and control,
while Booth has (so far) not produced any admissible evidence or legal
authority to dispute any of this. While this is sufficient to establish a
reasonable likelihood of success, it does not finally resolve anything. Booth
has failed to establish that the trial court impermissibly decided any issues
prematurely.
IV. The Trial Court did not Err in Finding an Inadequate
Remedy at Law and Irreparable Harm
[15] Booth contends that the trial court erred in finding that a preliminary
injunction was warranted because the HOA’s legal remedy (should it prevail)
was inadequate to make it whole in the absence of a preliminary injunction.
While Booth argues that the items in the common areas (including those he
has not yet damaged) all have ascertainable values, “[i]t is not enough to
defeat injunction that there is a remedy at law.” McKain v. Rigsby, 250 Ind.
438, 237 N.E.2d 99, 103 (1968) (citation omitted). Rather, a legal remedy is
adequate only where it is as “plain, complete and adequate—or, in other
words, as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt
administration—as the remedy in equity.” Id. (citation omitted). Injunctive
relief should be granted if it is more practicable or efficient than that afforded
by law. Hatcher v. Graddick, 509 N.E.2d 258, 260 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). An
injunction is appropriate where a refusal to grant an injunction “throws upon
the plaintiff an unusual and unconscionable expense and annoyance […]

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notwithstanding a remedy exists at law.” Haines v. Trueblood, 67 Ind. App.
456, 465, 119 N.E. 383, 386 (1918) (citation omitted).
[16] Here, the trial court determined that the HOA’s remedy at law was inadequate
because Booth had demonstrated a pattern of non-compliance with HOA
obligations and had explicitly stated his intention to continue his activity in
the common areas. It is undoubtedly more efficient to enjoin Booth (at
negligible to no monetary cost to him personally) than to allow him to
continue destroying or damaging seemingly perfectly good plants that he may
have no right to control. Put another way, if it should turn out that the HOA
wins its vandalism suit against Booth, it would end up costing Booth far more
in money damages (and causing the HOA considerably more trouble) if he is
allowed to continue than if he is enjoined. Moreover, the less Booth destroys,
the more any others who have access to the common areas will be able to
enjoy them in the meantime. Booth has failed to establish error in this regard.
V. The Trial Court did not Err in Concluding that the
HOA has a Reasonable Likelihood of Success on the
Merits
[17] Finally, Booth contends that the HOA failed to produce sufficient evidence to
sustain a finding that it has a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of
its CVRA claim, i.e., that Booth had vandalized its property and that it had
suffered damages. A prima facie case for a reasonable likelihood of success
must be established through substantial, probative evidence. See Ind. High Sch.
Athletic Ass’n, Inc. v. Martin, 731 N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“In order to
prove that she had a reasonable likelihood of succeeding on the merits of her

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claim to the extent necessary for the preliminary injunction to be proper,
Martin must establish a prima facie case through substantial, probative
evidence that she was entitled to full eligibility.”), trans. denied. Substantial
evidence is “more than a scintilla and less than a preponderance.” Partlow v.
Ind. Family and Soc. Servs. Admin., 717 N.E.2d 1212, 1217 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999). Although the HOA had to establish a prima facie case, it was “not
required to show that [it wa]s entitled to relief as a matter of law, nor [wa]s [it]
required to prove and plead a case which would entitle [it] to relief upon the
merits.” Norlund, 675 N.E.2d at 1149.
[18] Pursuant to the CVRA,
[i]f a person […] suffers a pecuniary loss as a result of a violation
of IC 25-37.5, IC 35-43, IC 35-42-3-3, IC 35-42-3-4, IC 35-45-9,
or IC 35-46-10, the person may bring a civil action against the
person who caused the loss for the following:
(1) An amount not to exceed three (3) times:
(A) the actual damages of the person suffering the loss, in
the case of a liability that is not covered by IC 24-4.6-5; or
(B) the total pump price of the motor fuel received, in the
case of a liability that is covered by IC 24-4.6-5.
(2) The costs of the action.
(3) A reasonable attorney’s fee.
(4) Actual travel expenses that are not otherwise reimbursed
under subdivisions (1) through (3) and are incurred by the
person suffering loss to:
(A) have the person suffering loss or an employee or agent
of that person file papers and attend court proceedings
related to the recovery of a judgment under this chapter; or

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(B) provide witnesses to testify in court proceedings related
to the recovery of a judgment under this chapter.
(5) A reasonable amount to compensate the person suffering
loss for time used to:
(A) file papers and attend court proceedings related to the
recovery of a judgment under this chapter; or
(B) travel to and from activities described in clause (A).
(6) Actual direct and indirect expenses incurred by the person
suffering loss to compensate employees and agents for time
used to:
(A) file papers and attend court proceedings related to the
recovery of a judgment under this chapter; or
(B) travel to and from activities described in clause (A).
(7) All other reasonable costs of collection.
Ind. Code § 34-24-3-1. One of the offenses covered by the CVRA is criminal
vandalism, which provides that “[a] person who […] recklessly, knowingly, or
intentionally damages or defaces property of another person without the other
person’s consent […] commits criminal vandalism[.]” Ind. Code § 35-43-1-2.
We conclude that the HOA has easily shown a reasonable likelihood of
success on the merits, as there is clearly more than a scintilla of evidence that
Booth intentionally damaged the property in the common areas and that,
pursuant to the CCRs, that property was the HOA’s, which did not give its
consent. The trial court did not err in this regard. Booth has failed to
establish that any of the relevant factors weigh against the trial court’s
issuance of a preliminary injunction.
[19] We affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

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Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.
APPELLANT PRO SE
Martin L. Booth
Indianapolis, Indiana