Kim Joseph Bassett v. State of Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-CR-356 | October 20, 2026 	Page 1 of 12
Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take
any action in reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is certified.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
I N 	T H E
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Kim Joseph Bassett,
Appellant-Defendant
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Plaintiff
October 20, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-CR-356
Appeal from the Johnson Circuit Court
The Honorable Andrew S. Roesener, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
41C01-2306-F6-442
Memorandum Decision by Judge Brown
Judges Kenworthy and Scheele concur.

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Brown, Judge.
[1] 	Kim Joseph Bassett appeals his conviction for strangulation as a level 6 felony
and the trial court’s restitution order. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] 	At about 10:30 p.m. on June 10, 2023, Bassett knocked on the door at O.C.’s
residence, O.C. opened the door, and he entered the residence. O.C. and
Bassett had been dating, and O.C. believed that Bassett had been drinking.
O.C. repeatedly told Bassett that he could not stay and to leave, and they
argued. Bassett was on the couch, and O.C.’s laptop “was sitting right next to
the couch on [a] cushion.” Transcript Volume I at 44. Bassett stood up,
“started . . . pacing back and forth, angry,” and stated “where the f---’s my
phone.” Id. Bassett “picked up [O.C.’s] laptop” and was “pacing with [the]
laptop.” Id. Then Bassett, “all of a sudden, throws it, swings it across the
room, hits the wall” and, “before [O.C.] could even turn around to look at him,
he [] had a hold of [her] and just drove [her] towards the couch,” id. at 44-45,
and her head struck the wall “right above . . . the couch,” leaving an
indentation “where her head hit the drywall.” Id. at 32. “It happened so
quick,” and O.C. “didn’t even have time to look at the wall [or] laptop and then
look at him.” Id. at 45. Bassett “then [] grabbed [O.C.] again and threw [her]
on the couch.” Id. The couch “split” or “snapped in half.” Id. at 32, 50.
Bassett “started strangling” O.C. with both of his hands, she thought he was
going to kill her, and she “couldn’t take a breath.” Id. at 45. After Bassett

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released her, O.C. ran outside and to a neighbor’s house, and the neighbor let
O.C. inside and called 911. The following day, O.C. went to the hospital.
[3] 	The State charged Bassett, as amended, with: Count I, strangulation as a level 6
felony; Count II, domestic battery as a class A misdemeanor; and Count III,
criminal mischief as a class A misdemeanor. The case proceeded to a bench
trial beginning on August 26, 2024. The State presented the testimony of O.C.,
who testified as to the damage to her laptop, to her couch, and to two areas of
the wall, one where the laptop struck the wall and the other where her head
struck the wall. Following a recess, the court stated that the prosecutor and
Bassett’s counsel indicated that a resolution had been reached. The court stated
that Bassett would plead guilty to Count I and restitution would be argued at
the time of sentencing. Bassett admitted that he did, “in a rude, insolent and/or
angry manner knowingly and/or intentionally apply pressure to the throat or
neck of [O.C.] in a manner that impeded normal breathing or blood circulation
of [O.C.].” Id. at 96. The court accepted Bassett’s guilty plea to Count I.
[4] 	On November 4, 2024, Bassett appeared with new counsel. The court stated:
We’re here today for sentencing. [O]ne of the things I need to do
before we move into this, Mr. Bassett, is to disclose to you [] that
one of the partners in the firm that represents you is related to me
by marriage. That’s Mr. Baldwin. He’s obviously not here today.
[B]ecause of that relationship – that familial relationship – I’m not
allowed to hear any cases where Mr. Baldwin is counsel. As it
relates to the other members of that firm, I am allowed to hear
those cases, but I have to disclose, as I am now, on the record the
nature of that relationship and give you an opportunity to tap out
if you don’t think that I’m the person to hear this case. [Defense

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counsel] may have explained that to you already. If he hasn’t, I’m
telling you now. [I]f you decide you don’t think I’m the guy to
hear the case, I think I’m compelled to honor that and I won’t
hold it against you or be upset, but I need to disclose the nature of
that to you. If you want a moment before we proceed to talk with
[defense counsel] about that to the extent that you haven’t, I’m
happy to give you an opportunity to do that.
Id. at 102. Bassett replied: “It’s not necessary, Your Honor. It’s okay with
me.” Id. The prosecutor indicated the State did not object. The court stated,
“[w]e’ll show that the conflict, or at least potential conflict has been disclosed
and it’s been waived.” Id. at 102-103. The court asked, “do the parties agree
that we need to enter a domestic violence determination on this case,” and
defense counsel replied, “[w]e would request not. He’s plead guilty to
Strangulation, not an actual Domestic Battery.” Id. at 103. After a recess,
Bassett asked for a continuance, which the court granted.
[5] 	On December 10, 2024, Bassett filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea
alleging that he “agreed to the plea, at least in part, because he was trying to
avoid having a domestic violence determination, which would prohibit him
from possessing firearms,” he “was not advised by his counsel at the time that a
strangulation conviction would also result in a domestic violence
determination,” and “[h]ad he been made aware, he would have rejected the
plea offer and proceeded to trial.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 117.
The court granted Bassett’s motion.

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[6] 	In July 2025, Bassett filed a request for leave to take a deposition of O.C.,
stating that prior counsel had conducted a deposition of O.C., the State failed to
preserve any recording of the deposition, and no transcript was made.
Following a hearing, the court issued an order stating that Bassett had “two (2)
hours of [O.C.’s] detailed trial testimony annotating the timing, mechanics,
motives, and circumstances surrounding the crimes allegedly committed,”
granting Bassett’s motion in part, and ordering that Bassett was “permitted to
conduct a deposition of [O.C.] for a duration of no longer than twenty (20)
minutes.” Id. at 167, 169.
[7] 	The court resumed the bench trial on November 24, 2025. The State dismissed
Count III. The State presented further testimony, without objection, regarding
the damage to the drywall and laptop. O.C. was present, but Bassett decided
not to call her as a witness. The court found Bassett guilty on Counts I and II.
The court did not enter judgment on Count II due to double jeopardy concerns.
At sentencing, the State introduced and the court admitted, without objection,
exhibits showing that O.C. incurred costs for medical treatment of $7,304.88,
drywall repair of $475, a replacement laptop of $961.92, and a replacement
couch of $695.48. The court sentenced Bassett to 365 days with 180 days
suspended and ordered him to pay restitution in the amount of $9,437.28.
Discussion
[8] 	Bassett asserts the trial judge should have recused himself, his confrontation
rights were violated, and the court erred in its restitution order.

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A. Trial Judge
[9] 	Bassett claims the trial judge should have recused himself because one of the
partners in the firm that represented him was related to the trial judge by
marriage. When Bassett appeared with his new counsel, the judge disclosed,
“one of the partners in the firm that represents you is related to me by marriage.
That’s Mr. Baldwin” and gave Bassett an opportunity to object or request that
the judge not hear the case. Transcript Volume I at 102. Bassett replied, “[i]t’s
not necessary, Your Honor. It’s okay with me.” Id. The judge stated, “[w]e’ll
show that the conflict, or at least potential conflict has been disclosed and it’s
been waived.” Id. at 102-103. Bassett did not object and thus has waived his
claim. See Curtis v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1143, 1148 (Ind. 2011) (issue not raised
before trial court is waived on appeal). Further, Bassett does not allege
fundamental error. Waiver notwithstanding, the attorney related by marriage
to the judge did not participate in the proceedings, and we find no reversible
error. See Henderson v. State, No. 22A-CR-2298, 2023 WL 6120623 at *10-11
(Ind. Ct. App. Sep. 19, 2023) (“During a pre-trial hearing . . . the trial judge
disclosed the conflict of interest between him and Henderson’s co-counsel,
Andrew Baldwin. . . . Henderson waived the conflict of interest. Waiver
notwithstanding, we fail to see how Henderson was prejudiced based on this
alleged error. Although Attorney Baldwin entered an appearance on
Henderson’s behalf, he did not participate in the bench trial or sentencing
hearing. Henderson has not shown a clear and blatant violation of a basic

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principle of due process. Therefore, there was no fundamental error.”)
(footnote omitted), trans. denied.1
[10] 	Bassett also claims it was improper for the same trial judge who heard his guilty
plea to conduct the bench trial. However, Bassett failed to raise this issue below
and does not assert fundamental error. Waiver notwithstanding, we cannot say
reversal is warranted. We presume that the trial judge is unbiased, Bloomington
Mag., Inc. v. Kiang, 961 N.E.2d 61, 64 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), and knows the law.
Crider v. State, 984 N.E.2d 618, 624 (Ind. 2013). We cannot say the mere fact
that the trial judge presided over Bassett’s guilty plea proceedings and later
presided over his bench trial, without more, establishes bias or prejudice. See
Brim v. State, 471 N.E.2d 672, 674 (Ind. 1984) (“Here, appellant chose to
withdraw his plea after the commencement of the guilty plea hearing. The fact
that the judge presiding at that hearing also conducted appellant’s bench trial
was not sufficient to require a change of judge.”).
B. Right to Confrontation
[11] 	Bassett next asserts that “the twenty-minute time limitation the trial court
imposed on [his] deposition of O.C. was a violation of the Sixth Amendment
1 Bassett also cites Rule 2.11 of the Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct. “A judge’s obligations under that
Code, however, ‘do not create freestanding rights of enforcement in private parties.’ Rather, a judge’s
obligations are first enforced by the individual judge against himself and later by disciplinary actions of our
Supreme Court if necessary.” Henderson, 2023 WL 6120623 at *11 n.13 (quoting Mathews v. State, 64 N.E.3d
1250, 1255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied).

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right to Confrontation.” Appellant’s Brief at 19. The Indiana Supreme Court
has held
The Confrontation Clause provides criminal defendants with the
right “to confront the witnesses against him,” [Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S. Ct. 1065 (1965)], but it “only protects a
defendant’s trial rights, and does not compel the pretrial
production of information that might be useful in preparing for
trial,” Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53 n.9, 107 S. Ct. 989
(1987) (plurality opinion). “[I]t is this literal right to ‘confront’
the witness at the time of trial that forms the core of the values
furthered by the Confrontation Clause.” California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1930 (1970). The right to confrontation
is a trial right—not a pretrial right. See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 52,
107 S. Ct. 989 (rejecting a similar argument which would
effectively “transform the Confrontation Clause into a
constitutionally compelled rule of pretrial discovery”). Indeed,
the original “primary object” of the Confrontation Clause was to
“prevent depositions . . . [from] being used against the prisoner
in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the
witness” at trial. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242, 15 S.
Ct. 337 (1895) (emphasis added).
Church v. State, 189 N.E.3d 580, 593 (Ind. 2022).
[12] 	The record reveals that Bassett’s counsel thoroughly cross-examined O.C.
during the bench trial that began on August 26, 2024. When the trial resumed,
the parties agreed that the court could consider O.C.’s prior testimony, and
O.C. was present and available to testify but Bassett did not call her as a
witness. Reversal on this basis is not warranted.
C. Restitution Order

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[13] 	Finally, Bassett challenges the court’s restitution order. The court ordered
Bassett to pay restitution in the total amount of $9,437.28, which consisted of
$7,304.88 for O.C.’s medical treatment, $475 for drywall repair, $961.92 for a
replacement laptop, and $695.48 for a replacement couch. Bassett does not
assert that restitution based on O.C.’s medical treatment was improper. Rather,
he argues restitution based on the damage he caused to O.C.’s wall, couch, and
laptop related to the charge of criminal mischief under Count III which the
State dismissed.
[14] 	The principal purpose of restitution is to vindicate the rights of society and to
impress upon the defendant the magnitude of the loss the crime has caused.
Pearson v. State, 883 N.E.2d 770, 772 (Ind. 2008). Restitution also serves to
compensate the offender’s victim. Id. Ind. Code § 35-50-5-3(a) provides in part
that the court shall base its restitution order upon a consideration of “(1)
property damages of the victim incurred as a result of the crime, based on the
actual cost of repair (or replacement if repair is inappropriate)” and “(2)
medical and hospital costs incurred by the victim (before the date of sentencing)
as a result of the crime.”
[15] 	The Indiana Supreme Court has held that, “[b]y statute, restitution shall be
based on damage ‘incurred as a result of the crime’” and, “[w]hile this statute is
to be strictly construed against the state, Morgan v. State, 49 N.E.3d 1091, 1094
(Ind. Ct. App. 2016),” the trial court “abuses its discretion in ordering
restitution ‘only if no evidence or reasonable inferences therefrom support the trial
court’s decision,’ Little v. State, 839 N.E.2d 807, 809 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)

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(emphasis added).” Archer v. State, 81 N.E.3d 212, 216 (Ind. 2017). This Court
has held that “a restitution order must reflect a loss sustained by the victim ‘as a
direct and immediate result’ of the defendant’s criminal acts.” Morgan, 49
N.E.3d at 1094 (citing Rich v. State, 890 N.E.2d 44, 51 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008),
trans. denied). The amount of actual loss is a factual matter to be determined
upon the presentation of evidence. Id.
[16] 	The record reveals that, after O.C. repeatedly told Bassett to leave, he started
“pacing back and forth, angry,” he picked up the laptop, “all of a sudden,
[threw] it,” and before O.C. “could even turn around . . . he [] had a hold of
[her] and just drove [her] towards the couch,” and her head struck the wall
above the couch, leaving an indentation in the drywall. Transcript Volume I at
44-45. Bassett grabbed O.C. and threw her on the couch, the couch “snapped
in half,” and Bassett strangled O.C. with both of his hands. Id. at 32. At the
sentencing hearing, when the prosecutor introduced the exhibits showing the
costs incurred by O.C. pertaining to the damage to the wall, laptop, and couch,
Bassett’s counsel stated, “There’s no objection, Your Honor.” Id. at 208.
Bassett’s counsel made no argument regarding restitution or that any restitution
should exclude any costs incurred by O.C. related to the wall, laptop, and
couch. We also note that, in his statement of facts in his brief, Bassett
acknowledges that he threw O.C.’s computer, held her, and drove her toward
the couch. We cannot say there is “no evidence or reasonable inferences
therefrom,” see Archer, 81 N.E.3d at 216, supporting the determination that the
damage to O.C.’s property occurred as a “direct and immediate result” of

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Bassett’s criminal acts. See Morgan, 49 N.E.3d at 1094. We decline to find the
fact that the State dismissed Count III necessarily precluded the court from
ordering restitution related to O.C.’s property damage. As long as the evidence
and reasonable inferences support the conclusion that O.C. sustained the losses
as a direct and immediate result of Bassett’s criminal acts—which we find is the
case—we will not disturb the trial court’s order.2
[17] 	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Bassett’s conviction and the trial court’s
restitution order.
[18] 	Affirmed.
Kenworthy, J., and Scheele, J., concur.
2 Bassett cites Turpen v. State, 280 N.E.3d 881 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026). In that case, Chasity Turpen was found
in a state of intoxication caused by her use of alcohol or a controlled substance, and the State charged her
with criminal mischief and public intoxication. 280 N.E.3d 881, 882 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026). Turpen pled
guilty to public intoxication, and the State dismissed the criminal mischief count. Id. At a restitution
hearing, Whitney Baker testified that Turpen pulled into a parking spot, “started cussing” at her, and “got so
close” to her car, and Baker stated “[t]here is still the dent in my car” and “multiple scratch marks.” Id. at
883. Baker stated “that she received an estimate of $964.96 to repair the damage to her vehicle,” and the trial
court indicated it would order restitution of that amount. Id. On appeal, Turpen argued that she did not
plead guilty to the criminal mischief charge “nor did she lay a factual basis that would support a restitution
order for that alleged conduct.” Id. This Court held that, in light of the dismissal of the criminal mischief
charge and the record, the court abused its discretion in ordering that Turpen pay restitution. Id. at 886.
Unlike in Turpen, where the defendant pled guilty to public intoxication and the factual basis did not include
evidence supporting a restitution order, in this case evidence was presented at Bassett’s bench trial regarding
his attack upon O.C., the timing and nature of Bassett’s actions, and when and how during the assault the
property damage occurred. We find Turpen distinguishable.

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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Cynthia M. Carter
Law Office of Cynthia M. Carter, LLC
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Robert M. Yoke
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana