JAMES E. DORAN ET. AL. V. FARM CREDIT MID-AMERICA, PCA — NOT TO BE PUBLISHED - OPINION AFFIRMING

RENDERED: OCTOBER 9, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2026-CA-0044-MR JAMES E. DORAN AND JANE L. DORAN APPELLANTS v. APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE DIANE MINNIFIELD, JUDGE ACTION NO. 25-CI-02712 FARM CREDIT MID-AMERICA, PCA APPELLEE OPINION AFFIRMING ** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: ACREE, CALDWELL, AND EASTON, JUDGES. EASTON, JUDGE: James and Jane Doran (the Dorans), pro se, appeal the Fayette Circuit Court’s order granting summary judgment to Appellee (Farm Credit) on a commercial line of credit loan. Finding no error, we affirm.

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-2- FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On December 14, 2022, the Dorans and Farm Credit executed a Commercial Line of Credit Agreement and Note (Loan). The Loan included a line of credit limit of $102,000 with a term of twelve (12) months. The Loan also included a term that Farm Credit may make advances as a revolving line of credit up to the maximum credit limit. It also included a term: that each year on the original Maturity Date and each anniversary date thereof, this Agreement will automatically be extended for a period of one year on the same terms and conditions, unless Lender delivers to Borrower a written notice stating that the Maturity Date will not be extended. The written notice will be delivered to Borrower by Lender at least 15 days prior to the original Maturity Date or any such anniversary date of this Agreement in accordance with the terms hereof.1 Also on December 14, 2022, the Dorans executed an Agricultural Security Agreement, which pledged collateral for the Loan. The term “Description of Collateral” reads: The collateral covered by this Agreement (the “Collateral”) is all of the Debtor’s property described below which the Debtor now owns or may hereafter acquire or create and all proceeds and products thereof, whether tangible or intangible, including proceeds of insurance and which may include, but shall not be limited to, any items listed on any schedule or list attached hereto. 1 Commercial Line of Credit Agreement and Note, Plaintiff’s Exhibit A, Trial Record (TR) at 10.

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-3- Farm Products. “Farm Products” shall consist of All livestock now owned or hereafter acquired, born or unborn, including but not limited to poultry and aquatic goods produced in aquacultural operations; supplies used or produced in Debtor’s farming operation; or products of livestock in their unmanufactured states.[2] Farm Credit sent the notice of termination of loan on December 13, 2024, and the Loan matured on January 1, 2025. The balance of the loan was not paid, and the Dorans were in default. Farm Credit filed its Complaint to collect the amount due on June 30, 2025. In July 2025, the Dorans filed an Answer and a Counterclaim against Farm Credit. In their Counterclaim, they made allegations of harassment, predatory lending practices, violation of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act, emotional distress, and financial elder abuse. They requested $25,000 in damages. Notably, in their Answer, the Dorans admit they signed the Loan and Agricultural Security Agreement with Farm Credit. The Dorans later sought and were granted leave to amend their Counterclaim, to which they added claims for fraud, elder abuse, reputational harm, breach of contract, and breach of good faith. They increased their request for damages to $2 million. They also demanded a jury trial. 2 Agricultural Security Agreement, Plaintiff’s Exhibit B, TR at page 16.

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-4- In August 2025, Farm Credit filed a motion to dismiss the Counterclaim for failure to state a claim, as well as a motion to strike the jury demand. Farm Credit argued the allegations in the Dorans’ Counterclaim do not contain any specific facts to support their claims. Farm Credit also argued to the circuit court that the Dorans waived a jury trial in the Loan.3 The circuit court ruled that the Dorans had not pled adequate facts or assertions to support any of their counterclaims, with the exception of the breach of contract claim. The circuit court dismissed all counterclaims, except it allowed the counterclaim for breach of contract to proceed. The circuit court acknowledged that the Loan contained a term to waive a jury trial, but, because the Dorans were alleging a breach of that contract, the same subject as the Complaint, it would allow their request for a jury trial to stand for the time being. In October 2025, the Dorans filed a motion for a protective order, to prevent Farm Credit from coming onto their property to inspect the collateral. They argued that Farm Credit had never specified what collateral was attached, that no location for the collateral was provided, and that Farm Credit had not done any inspection of the collateral prior to the Loan. The Dorans insist these actions are required before Farm Credit is entitled to secure attachment of the collateral. 3 On page 4 of the Loan Agreement, there is a paragraph in bold typeface which explicitly states the parties agree to waive “any right to trial by jury of any dispute . . . .” TR at 13.

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-5- Around this same time, Farm Credit filed a motion for the circuit court to compel the Dorans to allow an inspection of the collateral, as they were entitled to do so under the terms of the Loan. Farm Credit agreed that they did not specify particular livestock or where they were located, as they relied on the Dorans’ sworn statements as to what collateral they owned in their application for the Loan. The circuit court granted Farm Credit’s motion to compel and denied the Dorans’ motion for a protective order. The circuit court told the Dorans that ultimately, this case is about a loan for money. It explained to the Dorans that Farm Credit is entitled to inspect the collateral that was a part of the application to borrow money. The circuit court urged the Dorans to obtain legal counsel.4 Throughout this process, the Dorans served copious amounts of discovery requests on Farm Credit. At the hearing on October 10, 2025, counsel for Farm Credit informed the circuit court that the Dorans had served 11 discovery requests and had filed 11 pleadings in the previous 30 days. On several occasions, the Dorans served new discovery requests to Farm Credit before the prior requests were due. Because of this flood of discovery requests, Farm Credit filed a motion for a protective order and motions for sanctions, along with its Motion for Summary Judgment in late October 2025. 4 The Dorans acted pro se throughout the underlying circuit court proceedings. At every hearing in which they appeared, the circuit court “strongly urged” the Dorans to hire an attorney to assist them.

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-6- At the hearing on October 31, 2025, Farm Credit argued that no genuine issue of material fact existed. The Dorans did not dispute they signed the Loan, that the Loan had matured, and that they had not paid the Loan balance in full. Farm Credit asserted the Dorans’ arguments are about ancillary issues that are not relevant to these material facts. Farm Credit provided a full payment history to the circuit court, which was sufficient to show the amount due. The Dorans continued to argue about the identification of specific collateral. They further argued that because Farm Credit accepted interest payments post-maturity, Farm Credit waived default.5 As for Farm Credit’s motion for protective order, it informed the circuit court that the Dorans had filed 180 pages of demands in the past seven weeks, that they had served 15 sets of discovery in three months, and had sent 28 5 Pursuant to the terms of the Loan, under the term “Remedies,” the Loan states: “Upon the occurrence of an Event of Default, [Farm Credit] . . . may exercise one or more of the following rights and remedies . . . (a) declare all Indebtedness immediately due and payable and the whole will bear interest at the Default Rate of Interest.” TR at 12. The Loan further states: Borrower severally waives any . . . other indulgence by Lender . . . . No failure or delay on the part of Lender, and no course of dealing between Borrower and Lender, will operate as a waiver of such power or right.” TR at 12-13. “[A] secured lender’s acceptance of late payments generally does not constitute a waiver of the right to enforce the terms of a security agreement.” Catron v. Citizens Union Bank, 229 S.W.3d 54, 57 (Ky. App. 2006) (emphasis added). “A partial payment of a debt then due is not a bar to a recovery of the balance due[.]” Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Berryman Realty Co., 193 Ky. 7, 234 S.W. 748, 751 (1921). Because the entire debt had been accelerated, any payments made after filing of the suit would not result in a waiver by Farm Credit. See Tackett v. Home Owners’ Loan Corp., 150 S.W.2d 229, 230 (Ky. 1941). We are not dealing here with acceptance of a payment that became due only after the suit was filed, and we express no opinion about that.

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-7- letters to Farm Credit within the past five weeks. Farm Credit stated that the Dorans would regularly make unreasonable requests, such as sending an email at 1:00 a.m. with a demand for a response by noon the same day. Farm Credit further informed the circuit court that the Dorans had not complied with the court’s order to allow Farm Credit to inspect the collateral. Farm Credit requested the circuit court limit discovery to what is allowed under the civil rules, including the discovery already served on them. The circuit court granted Farm Credit’s motion for a protective order, as it agreed discovery was being used to harass and unduly burden Farm Credit. As for the summary judgment motion, the circuit court denied it at that time. It stated that the Dorans did allege some deceptive and predatory lending practices at the origination of the Loan. But the circuit court explained to the Dorans that more than just an allegation was required to survive summary judgment. It allowed the Dorans an opportunity to present specific allegations or evidence to support their claims. The court further explained to the Dorans that the other issues they kept arguing about, such as the collateral identification, will not remove the fact that the debt is owed. The court reset the summary judgment hearing to November 21, 2025, to give the Dorans an opportunity to present some evidence of deceptive or predatory lending at the origination of the Loan.

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-8- Between the October 31 and the November 21 hearings, the Dorans filed a “Motion to Strike or Disregard Improper Portions of Plaintiff’s Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment,”6 as well as a “Sur-Reply in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment.”7 In neither of these documents did the Dorans further explore their claim of deceptive or predatory lending practices in the origination of the Loan. They instead rehashed arguments previously stated to the circuit court, such as collateral identification, approval of interest payments post-maturity, and interest calculation. Farm Credit filed its Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to the circuit court’s briefing schedule. The Dorans then filed “Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Supplemental Opposition Under CR[8] 56.03 and CR 56.07.”9 In this document, the Dorans continued to argue that genuine issues of material facts exist, but they did not make any additional factual assertions regarding any deceptive lending 6 TR at 422. 7 TR at 425. 8 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. 9 TR at 476.

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-9- practices of Farm Credit. Instead, they asked the circuit court to allow them additional discovery. On November 21, 2025, the Dorans argued to the circuit court that the protective order it granted to Farm Credit was in contradiction to its statements on October 31, in which the court said it would give the Dorans additional time to prove issues with origination of the Loan. They argued it “cuts off the discovery” that they need. The circuit court explained that the only reason it did not grant Farm Credit summary judgment at the last hearing was to allow the Dorans to produce some evidence of predatory lending practices. The court stated the purpose was not to generally reopen discovery, but for them to tell the court what was in the origination of the Loan that should be considered a predatory lending practice. The circuit court ruled that because the Dorans did not bring forth any specific factual allegations or evidence showing predatory lending practices, Farm Credit had met its burden to be granted summary judgment. It stated there was a valid contract, a breach of that contract, and damages were due. The order granting summary judgment was entered on December 1, 2025. The Dorans then filed a Motion to Alter, Amend, or Vacate, which was denied after a hearing in late December 2025. The Dorans then timely filed this appeal.

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-10- STANDARD OF REVIEW “The standard of review of a trial court’s granting of summary judgment is whether the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is proper when it appears that it would be impossible for the adverse party to produce evidence at trial warranting a judgment in its favor.” Andrew v. Begley, 203 S.W.3d 165, 169 (Ky. App. 2006) (citations omitted). “Because summary judgment involves only legal questions and the existence of any disputed material issues of fact, an appellate court need not defer to the trial court’s decision and will review the issue de novo.” Jenkins v. Best, 250 S.W.3d 680, 688 (Ky. App. 2007). ANALYSIS The Dorans appeal the circuit court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of Farm Credit. They argue there are genuine issues of material fact that render summary judgment inappropriate; that the circuit court erred by accepting an affidavit and business records from Farm Credit as proof; and that the circuit court erred by awarding Farm Credit both a personal money judgment and an in rem collateral-based judgment. First, the Dorans insist that genuine issues of material fact exist. They continue to argue several factors that the circuit court deemed immaterial to the

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-11- issue at hand, which was whether Farm Credit was entitled to judgment on a defaulted loan. At its core, this case is about a simple breach of contract. The elements for a breach of contract are “a contract, . . . a breach of that contract, and that the breach caused damages.” EQT Prod. Co. v. Big Sandy Co., L.P., 590 S.W.3d 275, 293 (Ky. App. 2019). None of these elements are disputed by the Dorans. They acknowledged, both in their Answer and orally to the circuit court on several occasions, that they signed the Loan. They also acknowledged that they had not paid the balance of the Loan. Instead, they argue that issues about collateral, the timeline of the default, and acceptance of post- default interest payments render summary judgment inappropriate absent further discovery. While these issues may be disputed, in order to defeat summary judgment, there must be a genuine issue of material fact. None of these disputes are material to the three elements Farm Credit needed to prove to be granted summary judgment. “[N]ot every factual dispute reflects a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Key v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 686 S.W.3d 630, 637 (Ky. App. 2023). While it is at times difficult to discern the arguments the Dorans are asserting, it appears one of their alleged factual disputes is over the amount due. It seems the Dorans do not contend they do not owe Farm Credit on the debt, but they dispute the amount put forward by Farm Credit. But the Dorans have failed to

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-12- assert or supply any evidence contradicting the amount claimed by Farm Credit. “The party opposing summary judgment cannot rely on their own claims or arguments without significant evidence in order to prevent a summary judgment.” Wymer v. JH Props., Inc., 50 S.W.3d 195, 199 (Ky. 2001). Farm Credit attached the payment history as an exhibit to their Motion for Summary Judgment. It also provided an Affidavit from Farm Credit’s Litigation Manager (which the Dorans argue was improper for the circuit court to rely upon, which will be discussed below). The Dorans have never alleged the amount due was other than what Farm Credit claimed it to be. They provided no evidence whatsoever to oppose Farm Credit’s evidence. Somewhat relatedly, the Dorans argue the circuit court erred by granting Farm Credit’s protective order against additional discovery. They claim the circuit court contradicted itself by denying summary judgment at the October 31 hearing, which allowed the Dorans an opportunity to present evidence supporting their claim that Farm Credit engaged in predatory lending practices, but then denied them the opportunity to obtain discovery to prove that claim. “CR 26.03 states that a trial court may, upon motion and good cause shown, enter an order not allowing or placing limits on a requested deposition or other discovery request ‘which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense . . . .’” Key v.

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-13- CitiMortgage, Inc., 686 S.W.3d at 635. “A protective order is within the full discretion and authority of the trial court and is appropriate only to prevent a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue expense or burden.” Richmond Health Facilities-Madison, LP v. Clouse, 473 S.W.3d 79, 83 (Ky. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). This issue is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. at 84. We determine the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting Farm Credit’s protective order. As the circuit court explained to the Dorans, its denial of Farm Credit’s motion for summary judgment at the October 31 hearing was for the purpose of allowing the Dorans to assert some specific facts to support their claim of predatory or deceptive lending practices. These would be facts within their own knowledge. Had the Dorans filed a supplemental pleading which included any relevant factual allegations, the circuit court may very well have allowed them additional discovery to support their claims. But they did not do so. “Conclusory allegations based on suspicion and conjecture are not sufficient to create an issue of fact to defeat summary judgment.” Henninger v. Brewster, 357 S.W.3d 920, 929 (Ky. App. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We should also not forget that the Dorans had served numerous discovery demands upon Farm Credit. Under CR 33.01(3), a party is limited to thirty interrogatories and thirty requests for admission, unless granted an exception

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-14- by the circuit court. The Dorans do not explain what they are looking for in order to provide evidence of deceptive lending practices. “The curtain must fall at some time upon the right of a litigant to make a showing that a genuine issue as to a material fact does exist. If this were not so, there could never be a summary judgment since ‘hope springs eternal in the human breast.’ The hope or bare belief . . . that something will ‘turn up,’ cannot be made basis for showing that a genuine issue as to a material fact exists.” Neal v. Welker, 426 S.W.2d 476, 479–80 (Ky. 1968). “A trial court can grant a summary judgment only after the litigants have been provided an ample opportunity to complete pretrial discovery. It is not necessary that litigants be allowed to complete discovery but only that they be granted sufficient time to complete discovery and then fail to produce any evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Martin v. Pack’s Inc., 358 S.W.3d 481, 485 (Ky. App. 2011) (citation omitted). Because we have referenced Farm Credit’s affidavit, we will discuss that contention of error next. The Dorans claim it was error for the circuit court to accept the affidavit of Farm Credit’s Litigation Manager and its business records as proof. The Dorans do not express in their briefs what exactly in the affidavit should have been deemed “inadmissible” or what in those records were contradictory with other records. “Without any argument or citation of authorities, an appellate court has little or no indication of why the assignment represents an

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-15- error.” Hadley v. Citizen Deposit Bank, 186 S.W.3d 754, 759 (Ky. App. 2005) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). “It is not our function as an appellate court to research and construct a party’s legal arguments[.]” Id. Nevertheless, we find no error in the circuit court’s reliance on Farm Credit’s affidavit or its business records. CR 56.03 specifically allows affidavits to be considered. “The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. KRE10 803(6) treats regularly kept business records as a hearsay exception. The Dorans challenge the circuit court’s reliance on these documents, but they present no evidence to the contrary. Nor do the Dorans actually contest the contents of the affidavit or the business records. “The affidavits themselves are ‘proof’ sufficient to warrant summary judgment in the absence of countervailing affidavits or the existence of some reason why the opposing party ‘is presently unable to present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition.” Hill v. Fiscal Ct. of Warren Cnty., 429 S.W.2d 419, 422 (Ky. 1968). After the moving party has made a prima facie showing that would entitle him to summary judgment, the question arises concerning the obligation of the adverse party to counter such showing. As noted above, if 10 Kentucky Rules of Evidence.

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-16- uncontroverted affidavits fairly disclosing the facts show that a genuine issue does not exist, the adverse party has an obligation to do something more than rely upon the allegations of his pleading. Id. at 423 (citing Author’s Comment (5), Clay, Kentucky Practice, Vol. 7, p. 166). Finally, the Dorans allege the circuit court erred by awarding Farm Credit both a personal monetary judgment as well as a collateral-based in rem judgment. They cite no legal precedent explaining why this is error. In fact, Kentucky law explicitly allows this under KRS11 426.005, which states, “(1) In an action to enforce a mortgage or lien, judgment may be rendered for the sale of the property and for the recovery of the debt against the defendant personally.” The terms of the Loan specifically attached the collateral as security for the Loan. The Dorans’ dispute of what exactly was to be considered “collateral” under the Loan does not prohibit Farm Credit from obtaining judgment.12 No error occurred in the circuit court’s judgment in favor of Farm Credit. 11 Kentucky Revised Statutes. 12 There is no genuine issue of material fact about the Agricultural Security Agreement. While questions may arise about collateral to be liquidated to apply to this debt, these are matters pertaining to enforcement of the judgment for the debt clearly owed. Such collection issues do not prevent the entry of the final judgment by the circuit court to enforce the Loan and the Agricultural Security Agreement in the circumstances of this case.

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-17- CONCLUSION The Dorans failed to put forward any sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, and therefore Farm Credit was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We AFFIRM the order of the Fayette Circuit Court. ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS: James E. Doran, pro se Jane L. Doran, pro se Lexington, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Seth T. Church Sara A. Johnston Lexington, Kentucky

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