CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON V. DANIEL AKERS, WARDEN AND DEANNA NOBLE, DHO, OF LEE ADJUSTMENT CENTER — NOT TO BE PUBLISHED - OPINION AFFIRMING

RENDERED: OCTOBER 9, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1491-MR CHRISTOPHER JOHNSON APPELLANT v. APPEAL FROM LEE CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE MICHAEL DEAN, JUDGE ACTION NO. 24-CI-00060 DANIEL AKERS, WARDEN AND DEANNA NOBLE, DHO, OF LEE ADJUSTMENT CENTER APPELLEES OPINION AFFIRMING ** ** ** ** ** BEFORE: CETRULO, COMBS, AND L. JONES, JUDGES. JONES, L., JUDGE: Christopher Johnson brings this appeal from an October 15, 2024 order of the Lee Circuit Court dismissing his Petition for Declaration of Rights. We affirm. On May 14, 2024, Christopher Johnson (Johnson) was an inmate at Lee Adjustment Center (LAC) in Beattyville, Kentucky. On that day, an Internal

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-2- Affairs Officer at LAC, Jordon Turner (Turner), was inspecting mail and discovered an envelope addressed to Johnson that looked suspicious. Turner observed the envelope did not have a post mark and did not otherwise appear to have been processed by the United States Postal Service. Inside the envelope, Turner found a folded piece of white paper that seemed to have been sprayed with an unknown substance. When Turner tested the paper, it tested positive for synthetic cannabinoids. Turner then generated a Disciplinary Report Form detailing the incident. The following day, Sergeant Deven Arnold (Arnold) initiated an investigation. Arnold read the Disciplinary Report to Johnson and informed him of the charge against him – “Charge 4-05, [of the Kentucky Department of Corrections Offenses and Penalty Code] Smuggling contraband items into/out of/within [the] institution.” May 22, 2024 Disciplinary Report Form, Part II – Hearing/Appeal; Trial Record (TR) at 18. A disciplinary hearing was conducted by Hearing Officer Deanna Noble on May 22, 2024. Noble concluded Johnson was guilty of the charged offense. Noble imposed a penalty of fifteen days of disciplinary segregation and sixty days of canteen restrictions upon Johnson. Johnson filed an appeal of Noble’s decision to Warden Daniel Akers and asserted the “some evidence” standard was not met as there was no “additional evidence linking him to the envelope outside of his name.” Adjustment Committee

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-3- Appeal Report No. LAC-2024-0001712; TR at 20. Warden Akers upheld Noble’s decision. On July 26, 2024, Johnson filed a Petition for Declaration of Rights (Petition) in the Lee Circuit Court asserting his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution were violated. In the Petition, Johnson primarily asserted the evidence presented at the Disciplinary Hearing was not sufficient to establish he had smuggled contraband into, out of, or within the prison. Johnson asserted the “some evidence” standard was not satisfied resulting in a violation of his due process rights. Warden Akers and Noble then filed a motion to dismiss Johnson’s petition pursuant to CR1 12.02(f). Akers and Noble asserted therein the penalties imposed upon Johnson did not implicate a liberty interest for purposes of a violation of the Due Process Clause. They further argued that “even if there was insufficient evidence to support the sanction of placing him in a restricted housing unit and imposition of canteen restrictions, those sanctions are not violations of [Johnson’s] liberty interest.”2 TR at 42. By order entered October 15, 2024, the circuit court agreed and dismissed Johnson’s Petition. TR at 42. This appeal follows. 1 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 The penalty imposed did not include forfeiture of statutory good-time credits.

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-4- Johnson contends the circuit court erred by granting the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the basis that due process protections did not apply because no liberty interest was lost. Johnson does not contend that being placed in segregation presents a Due Process Clause violation. Rather, Johnson asserts that because he was at risk of losing good-time credit, he was entitled to the protections of the Due Process Clause regardless of whether there was an actual loss of good-time credit. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is governed by CR 12.02(f), and it presents a question of law that is subject to de novo review. Fox v. Grayson, 317 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Ky. 2010) (citations omitted). All pleadings must be liberally construed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and the allegations in the complaint are to be taken as true. Mims v. Western-Southern Agency, Inc., 226 S.W.3d 833, 835 (Ky. App. 2007). A circuit court should deny a motion to dismiss “unless it appears the pleading party would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved in support of his claim.” Edmonson County v. French, 394 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Ky. App. 2013) (citations omitted). It is well established that to prevail upon a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, an inmate must establish “(1) that he enjoyed a protected ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interest within the meaning of the Due

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-5- Process Clause, and (2) that he was denied the process due him under the circumstances.” Marksberry v. Chandler, 126 S.W.3d 747, 749 (Ky. App. 2003) (citation omitted). In Marksberry, this Court relied upon Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). In Sandin, the United States Supreme Court considered whether Conner was entitled to due process protections when facing a punishment of thirty days’ segregation. Id. 475-76. The Sandin Court determined Conner did not have a protected liberty issue as segregation does not impose an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. Particularly relevant to Johnson’s situation, the Sandin Court also determined that where a potential punishment could invoke a liberty interest if imposed, the possibility is too attenuated to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 487. Here, the possible penalties available as punishment for Johnson did include loss of good-time credit. However, the penalty assessed against Johnson was fifteen days of disciplinary segregation and revocation of canteen privileges. There was no loss of good-time credit actually imposed on Johnson. Although Johnson argues the potential for loss of good-time credit is sufficient to trigger a liberty interest, he has not cited any authority for such a claim. The cases relied upon by Johnson, including Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985); Smith v.

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-6- O’Dea, 939 S.W.2d 353 (Ky. App. 1997); and Webb v. Sharp, 223 S.W.3d 113 (Ky. 2007), did not hold that the possibility of losing a protected liberty interest (i.e., loss of good-time credit) was sufficient to implicate the protections afforded by the Due Process Clause. As Johnson has not cited, nor are we aware of, any cases that have recognized the potential loss of good-time credit as giving rise to a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, we decline to do so today; and, thus, we affirm the circuit court’s refusal to do so. Johnson also contends the circuit court erred by determining there was “some evidence” to support the hearing officer’s finding of guilt. More particularly, Johnson asserts the mere fact the envelope containing the contraband was addressed to him is insufficient to support the finding he had smuggled contraband into the institution. It is well-settled that the “some evidence” standard utilized in prison disciplinary proceedings is met if: [T]here was some evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced. . . .” Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record to support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board. Houston v. Fletcher, 193 S.W.3d 276, 278 (Ky. App. 2006) (citations omitted).

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-7- We have thoroughly reviewed the record before us including Part I of the Disciplinary Report Form, the Write-Up and Investigation, as well as Part II, the Hearing/Appeal. Clearly there was some evidence to establish that Johnson was involved. The fact that Johnson was the addressee on the envelope containing the contraband constitutes “some evidence” of his participation. Drugs infiltrating our prison system is undoubtedly one of the most pervasive problems faced by our prisons. Adopting the view espoused by Johnson would allow a mere denial of involvement to avoid accountability which would endanger the safety of the inmates and prison personnel. In sum, we find no merit in Johnson’s claim that there was not “some evidence” to support the finding that he engaged in the charged offense. We view any remaining contentions of error as moot or without merit. We affirm the October 15, 2024 order of the Lee Circuit Court dismissing Johnson’s Petition for Declaration of Rights. ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Christopher Johnson Beattyville, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEES: G. Edward Henry, II Lexington, Kentucky

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