ZUBAIR HASAN SIDDIQUI V. FATIMA ALI AHMED — NOT TO BE PUBLISHED - OPINION OTHER

RENDERED: OCTOBER 9, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2024-CA-1156-MR
ZUBAIR HASAN SIDDIQUI APPELLANT
v.
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE TRACI H. BRISLIN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 23-CI-02281
FATIMA ALI AHMED APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING IN PART,
AND AFFIRMING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: ACREE, KAREM, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
ACREE, JUDGE: Zubair Siddiqui appeals the family court’s order awarding
Fatima Ahmed sole custody of their minor child, restricting Siddiqui to supervised
visitation, and requiring Siddiqui to make a $7,000.00 payment to Ahmed pursuant
to their marriage contract. We vacate and remand the family court’s custody and
visitation rulings and affirm the $7,000.00 payment award.

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The parties’ marriage was arranged pursuant to a marriage contract,
and they married in August 2021. Their only child was born in 2022. Ahmed filed
for divorce in 2023.
There is an active domestic violence order against Siddiqui. Based on
the family court’s previous finding that Siddiqui committed domestic violence
against Ahmed, it awarded Ahmed sole custody of their child and granted Siddiqui
supervised visitation only.
The marriage contract called for Siddiqui to pay Ahmed $7,000.00.
The family court concluded that Ahmed was entitled to that payment. We develop
additional facts and procedural history as necessary.
We review a family court’s rulings on questions of law and its
application of the law to the facts of a given case de novo. F.E. v. E.B., 641
S.W.3d 700, 704 (Ky. App. 2022).
The family court’s ruling on custody is based on the following
findings of fact:
The Court makes the following findings under KRS
403.270(2) and 403.315:
a. [Ahmed] testified that she believed sole custody was in
the child’s best interest in order to protect the child.
[Siddiqui] wants joint custody and equal timesharing,
or at least unsupervised timeshare.
b. The Court previously found that [Siddiqui] committed
an act of domestic violence against [Ahmed] and

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entered a domestic violence order. It is unreasonable
to order [Ahmed] to attempt to co-parent with someone
that the Court has determined committed an act of
domestic violence against her.
c. Therefore, [Ahmed] is granted sole custody of the
minor child.
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Dissolution, May, 30, 2024
(Record (R.) 173)).
Siddiqui contends the family court erred when it awarded sole custody
to Ahmed and argues that:
The trial court’s findings appear to improperly rely on
allegations of misconduct rather than a proper best-interest
analysis under KRS[1] 403.270. While the trial court found
domestic violence occurred, the statute explicitly requires
a showing that such misconduct negatively impacts the
child’s well-being before it can serve as a basis for
restricting custody or time sharing. The record in this case
is devoid of any factual findings or testimony
demonstrating that the alleged misconduct has had any
adverse effect on the minor child.
(Appellant’s Br. at [4]).
At this point, we believe it helpful to note that the legislature amended
the statutes applicable here, effective July 15, 2026. When the family court
entered its order, and when the parties drafted their briefs, the prior versions of
these statutes—KRS 403.270 and KRS 403.315—were in effect. The amendment
1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

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reinforces and clarifies, as we hope this Opinion does, that the child’s best interests
remain a part of the analysis even when a domestic violence order is among the
factors the family court must consider. This Opinion is consistent both with the
prior versions of the statutes and their current 2026 versions. On remand, the
family court will find it helpful to apply the statutes’ current versions. Our review,
however, proceeds by analyzing the order under KRS 403.270 and KRS 403.315
prior to their amendment, as applied by the family court.
Ahmed agrees that analysis always begins with a presumption “that
joint custody and equally shared parenting time is in the best interests of the child.”
KRS 403.270(2). However, she argues that a finding of domestic violence negates
all need for a “best interests” analysis. We disagree.
Although KRS 403.315 plainly disallows the presumption of joint
custody when “a domestic violence order is being or has been entered against a
party[,]” it does not eliminate the requirement that the family court perform a “best
interests” analysis. The statute says so: “The court shall weigh all factors set out
in KRS 403.270 in determining the best interests of the child.” KRS 403.315(1)
(emphasis added). Therefore, it is not impossible that after balancing all factors,
joint custody and equal timesharing, though no longer presumed, remain in a
child’s or the children’s best interests.

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The family court made three findings of fact—a., b., and c.,
respectively—that Ahmed wanted sole custody, that a DVO was in place against
Siddiqui, and that Ahmed is granted sole custody. Although the family court may
have considered every best-interests factor in the nonexclusive list set out in KRS
403.270(2)(a) through (k), it did not memorialize that consideration for the record.
That makes Siddiqui’s argument persuasive that the court based its entire reason
for granting sole custody and supervised visitation on the DVO.
To paraphrase Anderson v. Johnson, the family court decided only
that sole custody would be in the child’s best interests “which is the conclusion of
law required by KRS 403.[270]. The order includes no findings of fact to support
this conclusion, which violates the command of CR 52.01.” 350 S.W.3d 453, 458–
59 (Ky. 2011).
The current 2026 versions of KRS 403.270 and KRS 403.315 make
the process of analyzing all these factors more straightforward while also
incorporating the jurisprudence of Anderson v. Johnson explicitly requiring fact
finding. Under these versions, “prior to consideration of any other factors
enumerated in subsection (4) of this section[,]”2 the family court must “[c]onsider
any allegations of . . . [d]omestic violence and abuse as defined in KRS 403.720 . .
. committed by one (1) party against another party or a child of the parties . . . .”
2 Formerly KRS 403.270(2)(a) through (k).

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KRS 403.270(3)(a)1. (2026). The family court shall then “[m]ake written findings
on the record as to the impact, if any, of the allegations” of domestic violence “on
the child.” KRS 403.270(3)(b) (2026).
Because the family court failed to memorialize its consideration, if
any, of the best-interest factors which Ahmed effectively concedes, we vacate and
remand with instructions to engage in fact finding as described in Anderson v.
Johnson and now in the relevant statute. The family court will determine whether
it needs to hear further proof.
Whereas the remand might well affect Siddiqui’s remaining
arguments regarding custody, visitation, and child support, we also vacate those
rulings, to be addressed again by the family court as part of the remand.
The family court also ruled that Siddiqui was required to pay Ahmed
$7,000.00 as part of their marriage contract. Siddiqui argues that, inherently, the
$7,000.00 cannot be considered marital property, and thus that the family court
lacked jurisdiction to rule on a contract claim. However, there is no legal basis
upon which to argue a family court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to interpret and
enforce a matrimonial contract. To the contrary, KRS 23A.100(1) addresses the
jurisdiction of our family courts, defining them as “a division of Circuit Court with
general jurisdiction pursuant to Section 112(6) of the Constitution of Kentucky[.]”
(emphasis added). KRS 23A.100(2) likewise states, “In addition to general

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jurisdiction of Circuit Court, a family court division of Circuit Court shall have the
following additional jurisdiction . . . .” (emphasis added). We know of no
countervailing authority and Siddiqui cites none.
Based on the foregoing, we vacate the Fayette Circuit Court, Family
Division’s rulings regarding custody, visitation, and child support, and remand
with instruction to determine custody pursuant to KRS 403.270. We affirm the
trial court’s ruling with respect to the $7,000.00 payment.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Brandon M. Music
Grayson, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Brandi N. Lewis
Lexington, Kentucky

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