Bharani Padmanabhan v. Board of Registration in Medicine.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-10

BHARANI PADMANABHAN

vs.

BOARD OF REGISTRATION IN MEDICINE.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Bharani Padmanabhan, appeals from the

dismissal of his Superior Court mandamus action that sought an

order compelling the defendant, the Board of Registration in

Medicine (board), to act on his petition for reinstatement of

his medical license. We affirm.

Background. In May 2017, the board indefinitely suspended

the plaintiff's medical license.1 The plaintiff did not appeal

1Before the board's decision was final, the plaintiff filed
a petition for certiorari, arguing that a preliminary decision
of a magistrate issued in 2015 violated his due process rights.
The Supreme Judicial Court denied relief, ruling that the
magistrate's decision was not the final decision of the board.
Padmanabhan v. Board of Registration in Med., 477 Mass. 1026,
1027 (2017).
the board's decision, despite the fact that in June 2017 the

Supreme Judicial Court alerted him that he "now has the

opportunity to pursue judicial review of the final decision of

the board, which he may do pursuant to G. L. c. 112, § 64."

Padmanabhan v. Board of Registration in Med., 477 Mass. 1026,

1028 (2017).

In 2019, the plaintiff filed a petition with the board to

reinstate his medical license. The board took no action on the

plaintiff's petition.

In 2020, the plaintiff filed a mandamus action (2020

mandamus action) in Superior Court seeking an order compelling

the board to act on his petition for reinstatement. After a

judge dismissed the complaint, a panel of this court affirmed

the dismissal in an unpublished memorandum and order, holding

that "the plaintiff has not shown that the board had any legal

duty to act on the petition." Padmanabhan v. Board of

Registration in Med., 101 Mass. App. Ct. 1109, slip op. at 6

(2022) (Padmanabhan II), cert. denied sub nom. Padmanabhan v.

Massachusetts Bd. of Registration in Med., 143 S. Ct. 1765

(2023).2

2 The plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint in Superior
Court against the executive director of the board, but did not
serve the complaint on the office of the Attorney General.
After the plaintiff moved for entry of default, a judge denied
the motion. The plaintiff sought mandamus relief from a single
justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, which was denied. The

2
In 2023, the plaintiff filed in Superior Court the present

mandamus action (2023 mandamus action), again seeking to compel

the board to act on his petition for reinstatement. On the

board's motion pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365

Mass. 754 (1974), a judge dismissed the complaint. The judge

ruled that claim preclusion barred the 2023 mandamus action,

because it arose out of the same transaction and sought the same

redress as the 2020 mandamus action. The judge further ruled

that mandamus relief was inappropriate because the court could

not compel the board to consider the reinstatement petition,

which was a discretionary act, and the plaintiff was essentially

seeking judicial review of his indefinite suspension from which

he had not appealed. Judgment entered for the board, and the

plaintiff appeals.

Discussion. We review de novo a dismissal under Mass. R.

Civ. P. 12 (b) (6). See Ryan v. Holie Donut, Inc., 82 Mass.

App. Ct. 633, 635 (2012).

Claim preclusion. "Claim preclusion makes a valid, final

judgment conclusive on the parties and their privies, and

prevents relitigation of all matters that were or could have

been adjudicated in the action" (emphasis added, quotation

Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial. Padmanabhan v.
Executive Director of the Bd. of Registration in Med., 491 Mass.
1031, 1032-1033 (2023).

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omitted). Kobrin v. Board of Registration in Med., 444 Mass.

837, 843 (2005). The basis for the doctrine is "that the party

to be precluded has had the incentive and opportunity to

litigate the matter fully in the first lawsuit" (quotation

omitted). Id. The doctrine of claim preclusion applies where

three requirements are met: "(1) the identity or privity of the

parties to the present and prior actions, (2) identity of the

cause of action, and (3) prior final judgment on the merits"

(quotation omitted). Id.

The plaintiff argues that the doctrine of claim preclusion

should not apply because his petition in the 2023 mandamus

action sought equitable relief, but his 2020 mandamus action

sought legal relief. In support of this argument, he quotes

from the decision of a panel of this court affirming the

dismissal of the 2020 mandamus action, which held that "the

plaintiff has not shown that the board had any legal duty to

act" (emphasis added). Padmanabhan II, 101 Mass. App. Ct. 1109,

slip op. at 6. He argues that the panel's use of the word

"legal" shows that the relief at issue in the 2020 mandamus

action was different from the equitable relief that he sought in

the 2023 mandamus action. We are not persuaded, because his

claim for equitable relief was "or could have been adjudicated,"

Korbin, 444 Mass. at 843, in his 2020 mandamus action.

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We conclude that the gravamen of the 2023 mandamus action

is the same as that of the 2020 mandamus action. Both actions

"grow[] out of the same transaction" and "seek[] redress for the

same wrong." LaRace v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 99 Mass. App.

Ct. 316, 325 (2021), quoting Fassas v. First Bank & Trust Co. of

Chelmsford, 353 Mass. 628, 629 (1968). After unsuccessfully

arguing in the 2020 mandamus action that the board had a "legal"

duty to act on his petition, the plaintiff now argues that the

board has "a recognized enforceable mandatory non-discretionary

'non-legal' duty" to act "even in the absence of a regulatory or

statutory duty." Whether the plaintiff labels his claim as

arising at law or in equity, it is the same. See LaRace, 99

Mass. App. Ct. at 325 ("[S]eeking an alternative remedy . . .

does not allow a party to avoid the doctrine of claim preclusion

and get a proverbial second bite at the apple" [quotation

omitted]). See also Bagley v. Moxley, 407 Mass. 633, 637-638

(1990).

As to the remaining two requirements for claim preclusion,

we agree with the judge that they were met here. The parties in

the 2020 and 2023 mandamus actions are the same. The 2020

mandamus action ended with a dismissal under Mass. R. Civ. P.

12 (b) (6), which is a final judgment on the merits with

preclusive effect. See Buffalo-Water 1, LLC v. Fidelity Real

Estate Co., 481 Mass. 13, 19 n.9 (2018) ("At least for res

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judicata purposes . . . a dismissal under Mass. R. Civ. P.

12 [b] [6] is considered an adjudication on the merits"). That

dismissal was affirmed on appeal. Padmanabhan II, 101 Mass.

App. Ct. at 1109.

Mandamus. The judge ruled that mandamus relief would not

be appropriate for two other reasons: a court may not compel

the board to perform the discretionary act of considering the

plaintiff's reinstatement petition, and the "crux" of the

plaintiff's claim was about the merits of the indefinite

suspension of his medical license, from which he failed to

appeal. The plaintiff argues that the board is obligated by a

"mandatory equitable duty" to act on his petition for

reinstatement and seeks mandamus relief to compel the board to

act.

Although we need not reach the issue, we agree with the

judge that mandamus would not have been appropriate to compel

the board to consider the plaintiff's reinstatement petition.

"A complaint in the nature of mandamus is a call to a government

official to perform a clear cut duty" (quotation omitted).

Ardon v. Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs., 464 Mass. 1001, 1001

(2012), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 872 (2013). See L.G.G. v.

Department of Social Servs., 429 Mass. 1008, 1008-1009 (1999)

("extraordinary" mandamus remedy inappropriate to compel agency

to file care and protection petition; plaintiff could seek

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judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14). According to board

regulations, the reinstatement of the plaintiff's medical

license "is addressed to the Board's discretion." 243 Code

Mass. Regs. § 1.05(4) (2012). Thus the board's consideration of

the plaintiff's reinstatement petition would plainly be a

"discretionary act" outside the scope of a mandamus remedy. See

Ardon, supra. The plaintiff misplaces his reliance on Doe, Sex

Offender Registry Bd. No. 6969 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 99

Mass. App. Ct. 533, 538 (2021), which held that the Sex Offender

Registry Board had "inherent authority to reopen a

classification proceeding and reconsider its decision"

(quotation omitted); it did not hold that there was any

affirmative equitable duty to do so.

We further agree that the plaintiff's 2023 mandamus action

was an attempt to seek review of the merits of his indefinite

suspension, from which he did not appeal. The plaintiff relies

on Hoffer v. Board of Registration in Med., 461 Mass. 451, 456

(2022), which held that a doctor could obtain judicial review of

the board's denial of -- but not failure to act on -- her

petition to reinstate her medical license. The Hoffer court

concluded that certiorari review under G. L. c. 249, § 4, was

appropriate because "the board's order was not the result of an

'adjudicatory proceeding,'" and so the ordinary avenues of

review under G. L. c. 112, § 64, and G. L. c. 30A, § 14, were

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not available to Hoffer. Hoffer, supra. Here, by contrast, the

board's indefinite suspension of the plaintiff's license was the

result of an adjudicatory proceeding. The plaintiff had

available to him the ordinary avenues of review of his

indefinite suspension under G. L. c. 112, § 64, and G. L.

c. 30A, § 14, but did not avail himself of them. See L.G.G.,

429 Mass. at 1009 (affirming denial of mandamus relief where

petitioner had alternative remedies).

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Massing,
Henry & Grant, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: November 22, 2024.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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