WINDROCK TRUST COMPANY, LLC, Trustee v. JONATHAN HEDLUND & Others.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-49

WINDROCK TRUST COMPANY, LLC, trustee,1

vs.

JONATHAN HEDLUND & others.2

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Windrock Trust Company, LLC, as trustee of

the Oak Ridge Realty Trust IX (Oak Ridge), filed this certiorari

action in 2018 seeking to compel the Lincoln Conservation

Commission (LCC) to act with respect to the then-proposed

building of a horse barn and paddock at 21 Sunnyside Lane in

Lincoln. The defendants, Jonathan and Holly Hedlund, are the

owners of 21 Sunnyside Lane. Oak Ridge is an abutter. After a

site visit and a hearing in December of 2017, the LCC determined

that the proposed building was not within a 100-foot buffer zone

1 Of the Oak Ridge Realty Trust IX.

2Holly Hedlund and the town of Lincoln Conservation
Commission.
from any wetland, while only a small portion of the paddock was

within such a buffer zone, and issued a "Negative Determination

of Applicability" (NDA) under the local and State wetlands laws.

Oak Ridge claims that the horse barn and paddock were within a

100-foot buffer zone, and that the LCC accordingly was bound to

take enforcement action under its town bylaws.

A Superior Court judge rejected Oak Ridge's certiorari

action and granted judgment for the defendants. The judge

correctly focused on the record before the LCC at the time it

issued its NDA in 2018, noting that the 2018 administrative

record contained no evidence that the proposed barn and paddock

were situated materially within the 100-foot buffer zone -- and

indeed, that the plaintiff's own expert had agreed with the

wetlands delineation relied upon by the LCC in its

determination. On appeal the plaintiff raises various claims of

error, but its principal point seems to be that years after the

LCC's decision, the plaintiff commissioned another wetlands

delineation of the area, which showed that the paddock was

fifty-six feet from wetlands at its closest point. The

plaintiff further contends that in 2021 the DEP agreed with the

plaintiff's new delineation. Although the plaintiff asserts

that various errors flowed from the judge's refusal to consider

this new evidence, we are not persuaded that the judge erred.

In fact, we are of the view that the appeal is frivolous. We

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accordingly affirm, and award attorney's fees under Mass.

R. A. P. 25, as appearing in 481 Mass. 1654 (2019).

Background and Discussion. As to the LCC's 2018 NDA

decision, the plaintiff does not contest the principle that on

certiorari review, we would ordinarily evaluate the LCC's

decision based upon the record that was before the LCC at that

time. See Bielawski v. Personnel Adm'r of the Div. of Personnel

Admin., 422 Mass. 459, 464 (1996). Indeed, "[t]he relief sought

in an action in the nature of certiorari is 'to correct

substantial errors of law apparent on the record adversely

affecting material rights of the parties,'" and "[o]ur function

in reviewing an appeal of a decision in a certiorari proceeding

is a limited one. In the absence of substantial legal error, we

review the record to determine whether that decision was

supported by substantial evidence" (citations and alterations

omitted). Durbin v. Selectmen of Kingston, 62 Mass. App. Ct. 1,

5 (2004), quoting Cambridge Hous. Auth. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 7

Mass. App. Ct. 586, 587 (1979).

The plaintiff first argues that the LCC erred because the

wetland delineation that was provided to the LCC prior to its

2018 determination did not comply with the Massachusetts

Wetlands Regulations, 310 Code Mass. Regs. § 10.55(2)(c) (2014).

They argue:

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"There are absolutely no facts in the Administrative Record
that the LCC reviewed any BVW [Bordering Vegetated
Wetlands] data from the Hedlund or Wang Properties pursuant
to 310 CMR 10.55(2)(c)2 including submissions on a MassDEP
'Bordering Vegetated Wetland Determination Form 2 ("MassDEP
BVW Data Sheet")' . . . or something similar to provide the
requisite evidentiary support for the delineation depicted
on the 2015 and 2017 Hedlund Plot Plans . . . that were
used by the LCC to render their Negative RDA Decision."

The problem with this argument is that the plaintiff has not

cited any law that suggests that the LCC contravened

§ 10.55(2)(c). That regulation defines the boundary of

"Bordering Vegetated Wetlands" by reference to the type of

vegetation found there, and then states that, under certain

circumstances, "credible evidence shall be submitted by a

competent source demonstrating that the boundary of Bordering

Vegetated Wetlands [meets the definition]." 310 Mass. Code Reg.

§ 10.55(2)(c). As to credible evidence, here the LCC had before

it certified plot plans displaying the wetlands delineation.

The LCC also reviewed the Geographic Information Systems

National Heritage and Endangered Species Program Priority

Habitat map, an online map, for the site. The LCC conducted a

site visit, and reviewed the site against the maps. Experts

retained by both the Hedlunds and Oak Ridge were present at the

site visit. The LCC concluded that only a small portion of the

paddock would be within 100 feet of the nearest wetland. It

reported -- and the judge found -- that both experts present at

the site agreed with the wetlands delineation relied upon by the

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LCC. This record provides more than sufficient "evidentiary

support" for the LCC's decision, inasmuch as we owe deference to

the LCC's implicit determination that this constituted credible

evidence from a competent source as to the boundaries of the

wetland and the location of the proposed building. See Revere

v. Massachusetts Gaming Comm'n, 476 Mass. 591, 605 (2017) ("The

standard of review for a certiorari action should be extremely

deferential to the commission").

The plaintiff appears to suggest that the mapping itself

did not comply with § 10.55(2)(c). But it points to no

authority for this -- it points to no language in § 10.55(2)(c)

that it claims the LCC contravened, even when pressed at oral

argument. Nor does the plaintiff suggest that this argument of

regulatory noncompliance was made to the LCC. Inasmuch as the

LCC's decision was well supported by the record before it in

2018, there is no basis to reverse the LCC on certiorari review.3

The plaintiff also argues, however, that the judge erred in

refusing to reopen the administrative record so that the

Furthermore, we note that contrary to plaintiff's
3

contention, the LCC regulations do not prohibit all building
within the 100-foot buffer zone surrounding a wetland. Rather,
the regulations state that "the Commission may require all
permanent structures to remain outside the Upland Buffer Zone
Resource Area [lands within 100 feet of Wetland Resource
Areas]." Conservation Commission Regulations of the town of
Lincoln, §§ 7.1, 7.8 (2017).

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plaintiff could enter the alleged evidence of its new

delineation, which post-dates the LCC's decision by well over

one year. The plaintiff suggests various procedural vehicles by

which the judge should have done this, but none of them has

merit. The plaintiff argues, for example, that the judge should

have allowed the introduction of new evidence by analogy to

G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (6), which addresses the taking of additional

evidence in connection with chapter 30A review of administrative

decisions. Section 14 (6) states in pertinent part:

"If application is made to the court for leave to present
additional evidence, and it is shown to the satisfaction of
the court that the additional evidence is material to the
issues in the case, and that there was good reason for
failure to present it in the proceeding before the agency,
the court may order that the additional evidence be taken
before the agency upon such conditions as the court deems
proper" (emphasis added).

We need not pause to consider whether § 14 (6) even applies

(by analogy or by Superior Court Standing Order 1-96 [2020]) in

the certiorari context -- the judge ruled it did not -- because

the argument is meritless. By its terms, § 14 (6) requires the

proponent to show "good reason" why the evidence in question was

not presented to the administrative body. The plaintiff has not

done this. The plaintiff had an expert in 2017, yet it has

offered no reason why it could not have prepared and presented

their later-developed maps to the LCC at the time it considered

the issue in 2018. Indeed, the plaintiff has not even addressed

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the "good reason" issue in its briefs. Put differently, the

plaintiff's argument here is that on certiorari review the judge

was required to reopen the administrative record to consider new

evidence, even though that evidence apparently could have been

developed in 2017 and presented to the LCC, but was not, and

even though the plaintiff's own expert participated in the

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evaluation conducted by the LCC in 2017 and agreed with the

delineation. That argument is without legal basis.4, 5

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Englander,
Hershfang & Brennan, JJ.6),

Clerk

Entered: January 24, 2025.

4 We note that the plaintiff appealed the LCC's decision to
the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection
(MassDEP), and that MassDEP issued a Negative Superseding
Determination of Applicability, and upheld the LCC's decision --
even though MassDEP had before it the later-prepared new
delineation.

5 We conclude that the plaintiff's other arguments are also
frivolous, and accordingly award reasonable appellate attorney's
fees to the defendants pursuant to Mass. R. A. P. 25, as
appearing in 481 Mass. 1654 (2019). The defendants shall file
with this court and serve on the plaintiff a submission
detailing and supporting the amount of their attorney's fees and
costs incurred on appeal, in accordance with the procedure
described in Fabre v. Walton, 441 Mass. 9, 10-11 (2004). The
defendants shall file their submission within fourteen days of
the issuance of the decision in this case. The plaintiff will
have fourteen days thereafter to file a response.

In light of our ruling as to attorney's fees, no further
action is required with respect to the defendants' "Motion for
Attorney's Fees" and the plaintiff's opposition thereto and
"Motion to Strike Appellee's Motion for Attorney's Fees and
Sanctions."

6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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