Y.Z. v. E.F.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-1274

Y.Z.

vs.

E.F.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After obtaining an ex parte harassment prevention order

against her mother-in-law E.F., the plaintiff, Y.Z., sought to

have the order extended for one year. Following a two-party

hearing, however, a District Court judge declined to extend the

order any further.

The daughter-in-law appeals, arguing that the judge

(1) relied too heavily on the mother-in-law's video evidence,

(2) failed to consider the mother-in-law's violation of the

wiretap statute, (3) disregarded the difference between the

daughter-in-law's open evidence collection versus the mother-in-

law's secretive evidence collection, (4) failed to consider the

broader circumstances of the situation, (5) neglected to
properly consider the mother-in-law's behavior and intent,

(6) failed to evaluate each of the daughter-in-law's allegations

of harassment directed at her, (7) neglected to properly

consider inconsistencies and contradictions in the mother-in-

law's account of events, (8) failed to consider the mother-in-

law's violation of the ex parte order, and (9) neglected to

consider the welfare of the children. We affirm.

Discussion. To obtain a civil harassment prevention order

under G. L. c. 258E, § 3 (a), a plaintiff must demonstrate, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed

three or more acts of harassment within the meaning of G. L.

c. 258E, § 1. See Van Liew v. Stansfield, 474 Mass. 31, 36-37

(2016). An act constitutes harassment under G. L. c. 258E, § 1,

when it is "aimed at a specific person"; consists of "willful

and malicious conduct" that is "committed with the intent to

cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property," and

"does in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to

property." See F.K. v. S.C., 481 Mass. 325, 332 (2019). We

review a judge's ruling on a request to extend a harassment

prevention order for abuse of discretion or other error of law.

See Wilhelmina W. v. Uri U., 102 Mass. App. Ct. 634, 637 (2023).

Here, the daughter-in-law and the mother-in-law both

testified at the hearing. From the evidence presented, the

judge could have found that the parties had been living together

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in the same household for several years, with the mother-in-law

helping to take care of the daughter-in-law's children. At the

time that the daughter-in-law sought the harassment prevention

order, she was in the middle of a divorce with her husband (the

mother-in-law's son), and they all continued to live together

under one roof. An issue in the divorce was the schooling of

the children; the mother-in-law taught at a school the younger

child was attending, and the daughter-in-law wanted the child to

attend a Chinese charter school.

According to the daughter-in-law, the mother-in-law put her

in fear for her safety and that of her children in the preceding

few months by (1) entering her bedroom unannounced and taking

her sleeping child out of her arms, (2) blocking her from

accessing a closet in the home, preventing her from getting her

child's school bag, and pushing her away, and (3) blocking her

in the driveway, preventing her from taking her daughters away

on a vacation, and threatening to take the children.1 She also

testified that the mother-in-law violated the ex parte order by

speaking with the daughter-in-law's child through the child's

father's phone.

1 In her affidavit, but not in testimony, the daughter-in-
law referenced another incident where the mother-in-law
destroyed her Chinese New Year themed decoration.

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According to the mother-in-law, she never entered the

daughter-in-law's bedroom or snatched the child away; rather,

the child's father brought the child to the mother-in-law every

morning so that she could get the child ready for school. The

mother-in-law agreed that there was an incident involving the

child's backpack, which was in a closet of the mother-in-law's

bedroom, but denied that she threatened or assaulted the

daughter-in-law in any way. As to the driveway incident, the

mother-in-law testified that her son had positioned his car at

the end of the driveway because he wanted to speak with the

daughter-in-law before she left, unexpectedly taking one of

their children away. She denied being aggressive with the

daughter-in-law in any way. She also denied violating the ex

parte order, saying that she only spoke with her son on the

phone and not with her grandchildren. Moreover, the mother-in-

law testified to a number of additional incidents of alleged

aggression by the daughter-in-law directed at her.

In short, the judge was presented with conflicting

evidence. He took note of the daughter-in-law's four claimed

incidents of harassment and acknowledged the mother-in-law's

denials. Determining that both parties gave "equally credible

recitations of fact," he found that the daughter-in-law failed

to establish that her version of events was more likely to be

true and that therefore she failed in her burden of proving her

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allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. See F.K., 481

Mass. at 332 n.11 (plaintiff must establish entitlement to

relief by preponderance of evidence).

The judge's resolution of conflicting evidence is not open

to challenge, so long as his findings are supported in the

evidence. See Bayer Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 436 Mass.

302, 306-307 (2002) (resolution of conflicts in evidence and

credibility of witnesses within province of board as fact

finder); Crown v. Kobrick Offshore Fund Ltd., 85 Mass. App. Ct.

214, 226 (2014) (where there are two permissible views of the

evidence, the fact finder's choice between them cannot be

clearly erroneous); Commonwealth v. Tanner, 66 Mass. App. Ct.

432, 437 (2006) ("task of assessing the cogency of evidence and

resolving conflicting testimony is the exclusive province of the

fact finder"). See also F.A.P. v. J.E.S., 87 Mass. App. Ct.

595, 601 (2015) (whether or not harassment occurred will be for

judge "who has heard the evidence and can best determine its

credibility" [citation omitted]). Apart from the wiretap

argument,2 the daughter-in-law's claims on appeal all challenge

the weight, rather than the admissibility of the evidence.

2 The daughter-in-law's argument regarding violation of the
wiretap statute challenges the admissibility of the mother-in-
law's evidence. Where the judge found that the daughter-in-
law's evidence was insufficient to meet her burden, the mother-
in-law's evidence is of no matter.

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Since the judge was entitled to resolve the conflicting evidence

in the manner that he did, we discern no abuse of discretion or

other error of law.

Order denying extension of
harassment prevention order
affirmed.

By the Court (Neyman, Singh &
Toone, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: April 17, 2025.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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