William C. Connell v. Robert J. Morrissey.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-759

WILLIAM C. CONNELL

vs.

ROBERT J. MORRISSEY.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, William C. Connell,1 filed a complaint

against his father-in-law, Robert J. Morrissey, claiming

Morrissey improperly advised him not to obtain a prenuptial

agreement before marrying Morrissey's daughter. Connell appeals

from a judgment dismissing his artfully drafted complaint on

statute of limitations grounds. We reverse the order allowing

the motion to dismiss and vacate the judgment.

Background. We set forth the facts alleged in the

complaint, accepting them as we must at this procedural stage as

true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Connell's favor.

1Unless specified otherwise, all references to "Connell"
are references to the plaintiff.
See Bassichis v. Flores, 490 Mass. 143, 148 (2022). A resident

of Greenwich, Connecticut, Connell is the founder of a private

equity firm, one of six beneficiaries of the Connell family

trusts, and the sole beneficiary of the William C. Connell 1989

trust (1989 trust).2 Morrissey was a trustee of the Connell

family trusts and the 1989 trust until his resignation in August

2020.

Morrissey, a named partner at his own trusts and estates

law firm, was a close personal friend of Connell's father,3 who

personally selected Morrissey to serve as trustee of the Connell

family trusts and to protect the Connell family assets. A major

donor of his time and money, Morrissey has held "positions of

responsibility at significant institutions in Massachusetts and

beyond." For decades, Morrissey served as a member of the

Connell Limited Partnership advisory board with Connell, and, in

that capacity, Morrissey gained direct knowledge of the Connell

family assets. Morrissey held himself out to Connell as a

Connell also holds a minority interest in Connell Family
2

Partnership III with his siblings. Connell's father founded
Connell Limited Partnership, which Connell alleges was, at its
peak, one of the largest privately held companies in the United
States. In the 1980s and 1990s, Connell's father placed
ownership of that entity and other family assets into a series
of trusts.

3 The elder Connell, William F. Connell, passed away in
2001.

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trusted counselor and advisor to wealthy families and

institutions, and as a man of "substantial personal wealth."4

The Connell family trusts have paid Morrissey millions of

dollars for his services.

In 2006, Connell became engaged to Morrissey's daughter,

Pamela.5 Connell had not been married before; Pamela was

divorced and had three children from her prior marriage. When

Connell broached the subject of a prenuptial agreement, Pamela

informed Connell that "she would follow her father's direction."

Both Connell and his personal attorney then spoke separately

with Morrissey about the topic. During his conversation with

Morrissey, Connell explained that he wanted a prenuptial

agreement, and that "he was primarily worried about protecting

the trusts and [his] premarital assets." Morrissey informed

Connell that "he had nothing to worry about, [and] that a

prenuptial agreement was unnecessary." Morrissey held himself

out as having "superior knowledge" of the couple's respective

financial positions, and he represented to Connell that "only he

4 Morrissey owned multiple homes, high-end cars, and a boat,
and flew on private jets.

5 Because Connell's complaint refers to the plaintiff as
"Connell" and to Connell's wife as "Pamela M. Connell," we refer
to the wife by her first name to avoid confusion.

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had sufficient knowledge of both Pamela's and Connell's finances

to weigh in on the need for a prenuptial agreement."6

Connell's attorney subsequently met with Morrissey in

September 2006 and informed him that Connell wanted a prenuptial

agreement, and that he had recommended that Connell obtain one.

In response, Morrissey "purported to explain Pamela's financial

situation," stating, "Pamela was giving up a lot by marrying

Connell." Morrissey also repeated his representation that he

was the only one with knowledge of both sides' financial

situations, which qualified him "to weigh in on the need for a

prenuptial agreement." Connell's attorney later repeated this

conversation to Connell.

Connell understood from these two conversations that the

Connell family trust assets and premarital assets were protected

in the event of a future divorce -- even without a prenuptial

agreement in place -- and that, given Morrissey's substantial

personal wealth, Pamela "would have no reason to ever seek

Connell family assets and would never do so." Connell alleged

that he believed Morrissey was acting in his and the Connell

family's best interests when he advised against the prenuptial

6 Connell understood Morrisey's claim to "knowing the
finances on both sides" to refer to Morrissey's substantial
personal wealth, Pamela's financial situation, and the financial
support Morrissey had provided to and would continue to provide
to Pamela.

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agreement, and that he believed Morrissey's representations.

Connell never "imagined that Morrissey would betray [his

deceased, close personal friend] by doing anything other than

what was best for Connell and his family, even in a matter

involving Morrissey's own daughter."7

On December 30, 2006, Connell married Pamela without a

prenuptial agreement. After thirteen years of marriage and the

birth of two children with Pamela, Connell commenced divorce

proceedings against her in the Connecticut Superior Court. One

of Pamela's first actions was to file a document request seeking

production of all documents relating to the Connell family

trusts, of which Connell is a beneficiary. In August 2020,

Pamela also sought to add the trustees of the 1989 trust,

including her father, as parties to the divorce action, and

sought an order directing the trustees to make distributions

from the 1989 trust for her benefit. The lack of a prenuptial

agreement has thus "substantially" increased Connell's

litigation costs in the Connecticut divorce action.

Discussion.8 The issue presented is whether Connell's

breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and gross negligence claims,

7 As we have noted, we are constrained to accept this
allegation as true. See Bassichis, 490 Mass. at 148.

8 In the trial court, Connell objected to Morrissey's
improper attempt to file a motion to dismiss pursuant to Mass.
R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), after he had filed

5
and his request for declaratory relief, accrued at the time of

his marriage in 2006, as Morrissey contends, or, as Connell

argues, when Pamela sought to access information about his

trusts in 2020. At this procedural stage, where we are

constrained to accept the truth of the facts as alleged in the

complaint, Bassichis, 490 Mass. at 148, Connell has the better

argument.

The parties agree that all claims are subject to a three-

year limitations period, see G. L. c. 260, § 2A, and that the

actual knowledge standard applies. See Tocci v. Tocci, 490

Mass. 1, 12 (2022) ("Where claims arise out of a fiduciary

relationship, the statute of limitations is tolled until a

plaintiff has actual knowledge that [he or] she has been injured

by the fiduciary's conduct" [quotations and citation omitted]).

See Doe v. Harbor Schs., Inc., 446 Mass. 245, 254-255 (2006).

As explained by the Supreme Judicial Court, in the context of a

trustee relationship, "a cause of action for breach of fiduciary

duty does not arise until the beneficiary is aware that

an answer. See Holmquist v. Starr, 402 Mass. 92, 93 n.4 (1988).
The judge analyzed the motion under rule 12 (b) (6). Nothing in
our decision turns on this procedural irregularity, as a motion
for judgment on the pleadings under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (c) is
"akin" to a rule 12 (b) (6) motion, Jarosz v. Palmer, 436 Mass.
526, 530 (2002), and the same de novo standard of review
applies. See Luu v. Fallon Serv., Inc., 105 Mass. App. Ct. 236,
239 (2025); Ridgeley Mgmt. Corp. v. Planning Bd. of Gosnold, 82
Mass. App. Ct. 793, 797 (2012).

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repudiation has occurred." Lattuca v. Robsham, 442 Mass. 205,

213 (2004). "Constructive knowledge is insufficient." Id. The

critical moment for accrual purposes is not when the "plaintiff

gains knowledge of any wrongdoing by the fiduciary but, rather,

. . . [when] the plaintiff gains knowledge of the particular

harm forming the basis for his or her claim." Tocci, supra at

12-13.

Here, Morrissey's alleged repudiation of trust, fraudulent

misrepresentations, and breach of duty occurred in 2006. See

Kneer v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Norfolk, 93 Mass. App. Ct.

548, 556 (2018) (trustees cannot allow own interests to

interfere with those of beneficiaries). Connell, however, did

not learn of the harm flowing from Morrissey's wrongdoing until

his divorce proceedings began. On March 16, 2020, Pamela's

attorney filed the first of several motions seeking discovery

about the Connell family trusts and other premarital assets, and

in August 2020, the attorney sought distributions from the

trusts to Pamela. At some point between March 16, 2020, and

August 2020, when Pamela sought to add the trustees of the

Connell family trusts as parties to the divorce action and

Morrissey resigned as a trustee, Connell (1) knew unequivocally

that his trust assets were being targeted "aggressively" in the

divorce proceedings and that, absent a prenuptial agreement, the

Connell family trusts and his premarital assets could be at

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risk;9 and (2) began incurring significant attorney's fees to

defend his trust and premarital assets that, until that time, he

had thought were safe. Connell's actual knowledge of the harm

forming the basis of his claims then triggered the running of

the limitations period. See Tocci, 490 Mass. at 12-13. This

action, filed on March 7, 2023, was therefore timely.

Accordingly, we disagree with the ruling that Connell's

claims accrued on the day he married Pamela in 2006 without a

prenuptial agreement. Connell certainly knew about the

importance and benefits of a prenuptial agreement and some of

Morrissey's wrongdoing at that point, such as Morrissey's

obvious conflict of interest. As he alleges the facts, however,

he was then unaware that he had been harmed by Morrissey's

advice to forgo that protection.

For two reasons, at the time of his marriage, Connell was

operating under the belief that the Connell family assets would

never be at risk in the event of divorce. First, Morrissey, a

prominent trusts and estates attorney, had been selected by

9 According to the allegations of the complaint, the Connell
family trusts and the 1989 trust, which are not in the record,
are "sole discretion" trusts. Pamela has alleged that certain
transfers to the 1989 trust were fraudulent conveyances. We
take judicial notice that the question whether the trust assets
can be reached by Pamela has not yet been decided by the
Connecticut court. The divorce case is scheduled for trial in
October 2025.

8
Connell's father to protect the family assets, and Connell

understood that "as a trustee from the outset," Morrissey knew

the terms of the trusts established to fulfill that goal.

Morrissey specifically assured Connell that, in his expert

opinion, a prenuptial agreement was unnecessary in the event of

divorce, causing Connell to reasonably believe that the

attorneys who drafted the trusts had made sure the assets were

unreachable by a spouse. Second, Connell believed that, in

marrying Pamela, he was joining another very wealthy family and

that, given Morrissey's own financial success, "Pamela would

have no reason to ever seek Connell family assets and would

never do so." As Connell alleges the facts, therefore, he was

not yet aware of the harm that he had suffered in 2006, see Doe,

446 Mass. at 255 ("Mere suspicion or mere knowledge that [a]

fiduciary has acted improperly does not amount to actual

knowledge that [a] plaintiff has suffered harm"), and the

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complaint in this case was thus not time-barred.10

The order allowing the motion to dismiss is reversed, the

judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for further

proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order.

So ordered.

By the Court (Ditkoff, Hand &
Walsh, JJ.11),

Clerk

Entered: June 11, 2025.

10We are not blind to the improbability of Connell's
prevailing on his claims where he had independent counsel and
Morrissey was representing the interests of his daughter and own
family in his discussions with Connell's counsel. Nor have we
overlooked the fact that this lawsuit is being used to gain
tactical advantage in the Connecticut divorce case.
Nonetheless, untimeliness is not among the complaint's flaws.

11 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

10