COMMONWEALTH v. ZENO Z., a Juvenile.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-1458

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

ZENO Z., a juvenile.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

A juvenile filed this interlocutory appeal from an order

denying his motion to suppress his statements made to police

during two interviews conducted just over an hour apart. The

juvenile argues that the motion judge erred in finding: (1) he

was not subject to a custodial interrogation during the first

interview and therefore Miranda warnings were not required; (2)

he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights during the second

interview; (3) his mother, who was present during the second

interview, qualified as an interested adult; and (4) the

statements he made during the second interview, where he

confessed to unlawful possession of a firearm, were not tainted

by the illegality of the first interview and therefore did not
require suppression. The order denying the motion to suppress

is reversed as to the juvenile's statements made during the

first interview but affirmed as to the juvenile's statements

made during the second interview.

Background. The following facts are drawn from the judge's

findings, from undisputed facts in the record that she

implicitly credited, and from the video recordings (video) of

the juvenile's interactions with police, including the two

interviews pertinent to this appeal, which we have independently

reviewed. See Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 654-655

(2018); Commonwealth v. Jones-Pannell, 472 Mass. 429, 436

(2015).

On October 13, 2020, at around 9:30 P.M., police and

emergency medical services (EMS) responded to a "ShotSpotter"

activation at 83 Kingsdale Street and reported car accident at

the nearby intersection of Blue Hill Avenue, Harvard Street, and

Talbot Avenue. 1 Lieutenant Brooks (Brooks), who responded to the

scene, observed a gun on the driver's seat where the operator

had been sitting as EMS was removing the operator from the

vehicle. The operator of the vehicle had suffered a gunshot

wound to the head, and the vehicle was damaged by ballistics

fire. Due to the severity of the operator's injuries, Brooks

1 The juvenile also called 911 following the accident.

2
called "full notifications" which alerts relevant authorities to

the existence of a potential homicide.

Brooks was informed that there had been a passenger in the

vehicle and, with his badge and gun visible, approached the

juvenile who was standing at a bus stop nearby and appeared to

be interested in the accident. 2 Brooks asked the juvenile if he

was in the vehicle and the juvenile politely said that he was.

Brooks also asked the juvenile the name of the operator of the

vehicle as well as the juvenile's name, date of birth, address,

and phone number, which the juvenile provided. Brooks informed

the juvenile that "they're gonna have a couple questions for you

about everything that's going on here alright, because it seems

like it might have been a little more than a car accident

involved here." Brooks then pat and frisked the juvenile and

told him, "We're gonna have you go to the office, we'll give you

a ride, [and] talk to the detectives." A few moments later,

after Brooks had walked away, the juvenile was approached and

asked by a different officer on the scene if he had been in the

vehicle. The juvenile told that officer that he was in the

vehicle and briefly described how the shooting and the accident

transpired. A third officer standing next to the juvenile again

asked the juvenile for his personal information, and after

2 The juvenile's interaction with Brooks was recorded by a
body camera footage which we have reviewed.

3
collecting his information stated to an officer nearby, "he's

gonna come with us." 3 The third officer, along with another

officer, transported the juvenile, without handcuffs, to the

police station in the back of a marked police cruiser. While

they were en route to the station, one of the transporting

officers communicated over his radio that they were transporting

a "juvenile to HQ."

Once the juvenile arrived at the police station, he was

escorted to the second-floor homicide unit and brought to a

small interview room at 10:06 P.M. An interview of the juvenile

was then conducted by Detective Callahan and Detective

Kornetsky. At the beginning of the interview, Callahan informed

the juvenile that the interview would be audio and video

recorded and then asked the juvenile for his name and date of

birth, at which time Callahan noted that the juvenile was

seventeen years old. As a result, Callahan asked the juvenile

if his mother and father knew what was going on or where he was,

to which the juvenile responded no. Callahan then asked the

juvenile to tell him "what happened . . . that caused [the

juvenile] to come up to the unit.". The juvenile explained that

earlier that night he decided to "take a ride" with his friend

Isaiah, the victim of the shooting and operator of the vehicle,

3 This officer was wearing the body camera that captured the
footage we reviewed.

4
from their neighborhood in Randolph to his friend's aunt's home

in Dorchester. When they were slowly driving on a side street

looking for parking near the aunt's home, they were approached

by three men wearing hoodies and masks on their faces from a

driveway on the right side of the street. The juvenile stated

that one of at the masked man, wearing a COVID-19 surgical mask,

crept up along the left side of their vehicle and started

shooting at them. Isaiah, who was struck in the head by a

bullet, lost control of the vehicle, which was rolling down a

hill. The juvenile explained that because Isaiah's foot was

stuck on the gas pedal, he had to jump into the driver's seat

and attempt to control the vehicle. However, after crashing

through two gates at the end of the street, the vehicle

eventually struck a tree. The juvenile then called 911 and a

couple of bystanders came up to the car to see if they needed

help. 4 He went on to report that his ribs hurt, and his lips

were split from hitting his face on the steering wheel.

After the juvenile finished recounting the shooting and the

accident, Callahan asked the juvenile clarifying questions about

the shooting and the suspects. He also asked the juvenile

questions about, inter alia, the purpose of visiting Isaiah's

aunt's home, whether the juvenile and Isaiah were planning on

4The juvenile remained nearby and waited for emergency
personnel to arrive.

5
purchasing drugs, or whether they were involved in any gangs.

Kornetsky asked the juvenile about the last time he rode in

Isaiah's vehicle, and if he knew if anyone else drives the

vehicle. At the conclusion of the questioning, Callahan took

pictures of the juvenile so the police could later identify the

juvenile in any video footage from the area. Callahan also

informed the juvenile that they would call EMS to have the

juvenile's injuries checked out and they would allow the

juvenile to use the bathroom to get cleaned up. Neither

Callahan nor Kornetsky asked the juvenile about the firearm

recovered from the vehicle. The first interview then concluded

at 10:27 P.M.

Following the first interview, at approximately 10:45 P.M.,

two uniformed police officers began transporting the juvenile to

his mother's home in Roxbury. Approximately four minutes into

the ride, the police unit turned around and brought the juvenile

back to the police station. Officer Delahanty, who responded to

the scene of the shooting, testified at the motion hearing that

while at the scene he contacted Callahan seeking updates from

the interview and inquired of Callahan what the juvenile said

about the firearm. Callahan informed Delahanty that he "didn't

even it bring it up" and told him he was going to interview the

juvenile again in order to question him about the firearm.

Callahan then contacted the juvenile's mother and aunt.

6
At 11:42 P.M., the juvenile was interviewed again by

Callahan and Kornetsky, this time with his mother present. At

the start of the second interview, Callahan explained to the

juvenile that he had informed the juvenile's mother that Isaiah

was in very critical condition. 5 The juvenile responded that he

received a phone call that Isaiah had passed away. Callahan

then informed the juvenile that there was a firearm in the car

that the juvenile was riding in, and cautioned "I don't want you

to say a word [. . .] [w]e need to have a conversation but

because there's a gun, it's a violation of the Mass[achusetts]

General Laws. You're entitled to your Miranda warnings.

Because you're seventeen, we need a parent or interested adult

with you." Callahan explained that he first thought the

juvenile was simply "in the wrong area at the wrong time," but

given the gun found in the car he was not sure if that was still

the case and that it was now a homicide investigation and "it

looks ugly." Callahan then said, "what I'd like to do, is I'd

like to advise you of your rights, and you and your mother can

have a conversation, and then we can figure out whether you want

to talk to us or not, okay?" Callahan then presented the

juvenile and his mother with a Boston police department juvenile

5 Prior to the start of the interview, the juvenile and his
mother declined an opportunity to speak without detectives
present.

7
Miranda form and began to read the juvenile each of his rights

from the form. Callahan told the mother and the juvenile to

initial to indicate their understanding after he read each

right, and the juvenile and his mother did so. After reading

the seventh and final right listed on the form, which states

that the juvenile has had the opportunity to consult an

interested adult, Callahan stated, "If you guys need a couple of

minutes, you can take . . . as much time if you want to talk

amongst yourselves." Neither the juvenile nor his mother

responded, but both initialed the form. Callahan then asked

both the juvenile and his mother to sign and put their dates of

birth at the bottom of the form, and both did so.

After the juvenile and his mother signed the form, Callahan

again inquired whether the juvenile and his mother needed time

to speak amongst themselves or if they were okay with having a

conversation with him and Kornetsky. He also informed them that

they had the right to take a break or stop the interview at any

time of their choosing. After neither the juvenile nor his

mother responded, Callahan initiated questioning. When Callahan

asked the juvenile who the gun found in the car belonged to, the

juvenile responded "[m]e and Isaiah's." However, after

subsequent questioning, the juvenile revealed that both he and

Isaiah each possessed a firearm, and that there were two guns in

the vehicle at the time of the shooting and accident. Shortly

8
thereafter, the juvenile's mother answered a phone call during

the interview and told Callahan that the juvenile's grandparents

were outside of the building and that his grandmother said that

the juvenile should not say anything until they came up. At

this point, the detectives stepped out of the room to escort the

grandparents up to the interview room.

Prior to leaving, Callahan informed them that the audio and

video from the room would continue to record while the

detectives were gone. Nevertheless, when they were alone in the

room, the juvenile's mother asked him "why did you say that you

had a gun?" and told him that she was tapping his leg and

kicking him in an attempt to get him to stop talking. She then

encouraged the juvenile to respond to subsequent questioning by

saying "I don't know." She further explained police tactics to

him referencing how the detective kept asking about the gun and

noted, "That's what they do, that's exactly what they do." She

then left room to accompany the detective to the lobby to get

the juvenile's grandparents. The second interview was

terminated after the juvenile's paternal grandfather stated that

he did not want the detectives to ask the juvenile any more

questions until he had a lawyer. Callahan also informed the

juvenile and his family that the detectives had been in

consultation with the district attorney's office and that the

juvenile was not free to leave the homicide unit that night. He

9
was also informed that the detectives would be taking pictures

of him along with his fingerprints.

Two firearms were ultimately found in the vehicle, and the

juvenile was subsequently indicted on three offenses related to

the unlawful possession of a firearm. The juvenile moved to

suppress all statements he made to police during the first and

second interviews. The motion was denied. The juvenile now

appeals from the order denying his motion.

Discussion. 1. The first interview. "In reviewing a

decision on a motion to suppress, we accept the judge's

subsidiary findings absent clear error but conduct an

independent review of [the] ultimate findings and conclusions of

law" (quotations and citations omitted). Jones-Pannell, 472

Mass. at 431. Here, the juvenile argues that while the motion

judge correctly concluded that he was in custody during the

first interview the judge erred by finding that he was not

subject to an interrogation at that time. We agree.

It is well settled that the requirements of Miranda 6 are

triggered when a suspect is subject to custodial interrogation.

Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 792, 796 (1997). Whether a

suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes is an objective

determination involving "[t]wo discrete inquiries. . . .

6 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-445 (1966).

10
[F]irst, what were the circumstances surrounding the

interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a

reasonable person have felt he or she was at liberty to

terminate the interrogation and leave" (quotations and citation

omitted). J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 270 (2011).

See Commonwealth v. Sneed, 440 Mass. 216, 220 (2003) (critical

question in custody determination is whether, considering all

circumstances, a reasonable person in defendant's position would

have believed they were in custody). To aid in making this

determination, the Supreme Judicial Court has set forth four

indicia of custody:

"(1)the place of the interrogation; (2) whether the
officers have conveyed to the person being questioned
any belief or opinion that the person is a suspect;
(3) the nature of the interrogation, i.e., whether the
interview was aggressive or, instead, informal; and
(4) whether, at the time the incriminating statement
or statements were made, the suspect was free to end
the interview by leaving the place of the
interrogation or by asking the interrogator to leave,
or, alternatively, whether the interview terminated
with the defendant's arrest."

Sneed, supra. "There is no specific formula for weighing the

relevant factors, but rarely is any single factor conclusive"

(quotation and citations omitted). Id. An individual's age is

relevant to the custody inquiry, because age can impact how a

reasonable person "would perceive his or her freedom to leave"

(citation omitted). J.D.B., supra at 271.

11
Custodial interrogation is "questioning initiated by law

enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody

or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any

significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966);

Commonwealth v. Libby, 472 Mass. 37, 41 (2015). "[T]he term

"interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express

questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the

police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and

custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to

elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Rhode

Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980).

As an initial matter, and notwithstanding the

Commonwealth's contention otherwise, we agree with the motion

judge that a reasonable seventeen year old in the juvenile's

position would have believed he was in custody during the first

interview. See Sneed, 440 Mass. at 220.See also J.D.B., 564

U.S. at 270. Here, as the motion judge found, the juvenile was

surrounded by police officers shortly after being the victim of

a traumatic shooting and car accident. After Brooks approached

the juvenile and asked him for his date of birth and contact

information, he told the juvenile "we're gonna have you go to

the office, we'll give you a ride, [and] talk to the

detectives," and then pat and frisked the juvenile.

12
Additionally, while in front of the juvenile, one of the

officers who ultimately transported the juvenile to the police

station relayed to a fellow officer that "he's gonna come with

us." Although it was known to Brooks and the two officers that

transported the juvenile that he was a minor, the juvenile was

not asked to contact a parent or relative, nor was he asked if

he would be willing to voluntarily go with the officers to the

police station. Instead, he was informed and instructed as to

what the next steps in the investigation were going to be and

what the police intended to do with him. Then, when the

juvenile arrived at the police station, he was escorted by two

officers to a second-floor interrogation room in the homicide

unit, where Callahan directed the juvenile to sit in the corner

of the room and told the juvenile that their conversation would

be recorded. See Sneed, 440 Mass. at 220 (place and nature of

interrogation are indicia of custody). Although Callahan asked

at the start of the interview whether the juvenile had contacted

his parents, Callahan did not ask the juvenile if he would like

the opportunity to do so after the juvenile responded that he

had not. Moreover, neither Callahan nor Kornetsky told the

juvenile he was free to terminate the interview or leave the

police station at any time of his choosing. And, while not

aggressive, the first interview was not informal. Sneed, supra

at 220. As discussed below, the juvenile was asked numerous

13
pointed questions, a few of which were incriminating, and was

not simply treated as a witness to the shooting. Id. Given

these circumstances, the motion judge did not err in concluding

that the juvenile was in fact in custody during the first

interview. 7

That said, the motion judge did err in concluding that

because the questions posed to the juvenile during the first

interview were "investigatory and non-inculpatory in nature"

that the juvenile was not subject to an interrogation. To be

sure, Callahan questioned the juvenile about how the shooting

transpired and any details he had regarding the shooters.

Importantly, however, he also asked the juvenile why he was

traveling with Isaiah, if he or Isaiah were involved in any gang

activity, or if they had engaged in any drug transactions,

seemingly intending to uncover whether the shooting was targeted

and why it occurred. Furthermore, notwithstanding the

conversational tone of the first interview, Callahan was aware

that a firearm was recovered from the vehicle and his

7 The Commonwealth argues that the juvenile was not in
custody during the first interview, seizing on the nonaggressive
nature of the first interview, as well as the fact that the
juvenile was not handcuffed by police and did not decline to go
to the police station. However, the cases cited by the
Commonwealth, including Commonwealth v. Hilton, 443 Mass. 597,
611-613 (2005), Commonwealth v. Miranda, 484 Mass. 799, 835-836
(2020), and Commonwealth v. Amaral, 482 Mass. 496, 501 (2019),
are factually distinct and do not involve a juvenile defendant
who had just been subjected to a traumatic violent crime.

14
questioning could have prompted the juvenile, who had just been

the victim of a traumatic shooting, to disclose the presence of

the firearm. Regardless of the detectives' motivations,

however, the juvenile was subject to "questioning initiated by

law enforcement officers after [being] taken into custody."

Commonwealth v. Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 342 n.4 (2012), quoting

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. As such, because the juvenile was

subject to a custodial interrogation during the first interview,

his Miranda rights were violated by the detectives' failure to

furnish him with Miranda warnings prior to the commencement of

questioning. See Torres, 424 Mass. at 796. See also

Commonwealth v. Dustin, 373 Mass. 612, 614 (1977) ("Miranda

decision requires that warnings be given prior to any

questioning of a person in custody").

2. The second interview. The juvenile contends that the

motion judge erred in finding that he voluntarily waived his

Miranda rights during the second interview. In support of this

argument, the juvenile asserts that (1) he did not expressly

state that he wished to waive his Miranda rights; (2) he invoked

his right to remain silent at the start of the second interview;

and (3) that his mother lacked the capacity to serve as an

interested adult rendering his waiver involuntary. We disagree.

Where an individual "was advised of, and waived, the

Miranda rights, the issue becomes whether the Commonwealth has

15
proved the validity of a Miranda waiver beyond a reasonable

doubt" (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Melo,

472 Mass. 278, 293 (2015). The Commonwealth's heavy burden

"grows heavier still when the defendant is a juvenile, because

. . . most juveniles do not understand the significance and

protective function of the[ir] rights even when they are read

the standard Miranda warnings" (quotation and citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Smith, 471 Mass. 161, 164 (2015). "To be valid

the waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and

intelligently" (citation omitted). Melo, 472 Mass. at 293. "In

determining whether a waiver was made voluntarily, the court

must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the

making of the waiver" (citation omitted). Id. "Relevant

factors to consider include, but are not limited to, promises or

other inducements, conduct of the defendant, the defendant's

age, education, intelligence, and emotional stability,

experience with and in the criminal justice system, physical and

mental condition, the initiator of a deal or leniency (whether

the defendant or police), and the details of the interrogation,

including the recitation of Miranda warnings" (quotation and

citation omitted). Id.

Here, the totality of the circumstances indicate that the

juvenile voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Callahan read

each line of the juvenile Miranda form to the juvenile and his

16
mother, and both the juvenile and his mother initialed each

line, indicating their understanding. Callahan also explicitly

asked the juvenile if he understood the first three rights, and

the juvenile nodded affirmatively. 8 After Callahan was finished

reading the form, the juvenile and his mother signed the bottom

of the form, again affirming their understanding of the

juvenile's rights. After the juvenile was apprised of his

rights, Callahan offered the juvenile and his mother time to

speak amongst themselves, which they declined. At no time was

Callahan confrontational or coercive, and the juvenile proceeded

to answer his questions. Considering these circumstances, the

motion judge did not err in concluding that the juvenile waived

his Miranda rights despite his failure to provide an express

waiver. See Melo, 472 Mass. at 293-294 (finding valid waiver

where defendant signed notification of rights form, indicated he

understood rights, and subsequently engaged in discussion with

officers).

Additionally, although the juvenile contends that he

invoked his right to remain silent at the start of the second

interview, the juvenile admits that his initial silence was in

8 The first three rights are numbered on the juvenile
Miranda form as follows: (1) You have the right to remain
silent; (2) Anything you say can be used against you in a court
of law; and (3) You have the right to talk to a lawyer for
advice before we ask you any questions and to have him/her with
you during questioning.

17
direct response to Callahan's directive that he should not say a

word until he was first informed of his rights. This voluntary

silence, which was not in response to any questioning, does not

amount to an obvious "unwillingness to speak . . . which can be

considered tantamount to the exercise of the right to remain

silent." See Commonwealth v. Selby, 420 Mass. 656, 662 (1995),

and cases cited therein.

The juvenile also argues that his mother could not serve as

an interested adult based on testimony from the juvenile's

expert witness, Dr. Biswas, that the juvenile's mother suffers

from "significant intellectual deficits" and had an acute trauma

response at the time of the second interview due to

posttraumatic stress disorder. We are not persuaded and agree

with the motion judge that the juvenile had "a genuine

opportunity for a meaningful consultation with an interested

adult" before he waived his Miranda rights. Commonwealth v.

Leon L., 52 Mass. App. Ct. 823, 826 (2001). The judge

ultimately declined to "credit or adopt Dr. Biswas' opinion"

because, inter alia, the video of the second interview, "which

had been created contemporaneously, . . . contradicted Dr.

Biswas's conclusions." In reviewing a ruling on a motion to

suppress, we "defer to [the motion judge's] assessment of the

credibility of the testimony taken" and find no reason not to do

18
so here. 9 Commonwealth v. Regan, 104 Mass. App. Ct. 623, 626

(2024). Critically, we note that when the detectives left the

interview room, the mother reprimanded the juvenile for

admitting that he possessed a gun and advised him to respond "I

don't know" to any further questioning. She also attempted to

advise her son on the techniques employed by police when

questioning subjects in an effort to elicit inculpatory

statements. This interaction reflects that the mother was aware

of the potential consequences of the interview and had the

capacity to act, and indeed acted, as an interested adult. Leon

L., 52 Mass. App. Ct. at 826-827 (interested adult must have

capacity to appreciate situation and render advice).

3. Attenuation. The juvenile lastly argues that the taint

of the illegality of the first interview was not sufficiently

attenuated from the second interview thus infecting the second

interview as well and mandating its suppression. We are not

persuaded.

9 We also discern no error in the judge's decision not to
qualify Dr. Lahaie, who the judge noted does not specialize in
trauma, as an expert or to credit his conclusions that the
juvenile was unable to understand and voluntarily waive his
Miranda rights during the second interview because he was
suffering from an acute trauma response. See Timmons v.
Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 412 Mass. 646, 649-650 (1992)
(noting fact that witness is qualified as expert in one area
does not qualify him to give expert opinion in other area).

19
It is settled law that "[i]n this Commonwealth, there is a

presumption that a statement made following the violation of a

suspect's Miranda rights is tainted, and the prosecution must

show more than the belated administration of Miranda warnings in

order to dispel that taint" (quotation and citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Osachuk, 418 Mass. 229, 235 (1994). "This

presumption may be overcome by showing that either: (1) after

the illegally obtained statement, there was a break in the

stream of events that sufficiently insulated the post-Miranda

statement from the tainted one; or (2) the illegally obtained

statement did not incriminate the defendant, or, as it is more

colloquially put, the cat was not out of the bag." Id.

Here, notwithstanding the violation of the juvenile's

Miranda rights during the first interview, we agree with the

motion judge that the juvenile's unwarned statements during the

first interview did not incriminate him. During that interview,

the juvenile was not asked about firearms in the vehicle and the

juvenile did not mention the firearms. The juvenile also

provided the detectives with an account of the shooting and

accident that was consistent with the account he provided to the

officers at the scene. The juvenile denied any gang involvement

and denied that he was traveling with Isaiah to purchase drugs

or engage in any other suspect or criminal behavior.

Additionally, while the juvenile argues that simply admitting to

20
his presence in the vehicle where the firearm was found was

incriminating, the police were aware the juvenile was in the

vehicle virtually as soon as they arrived on the scene of the

accident. Accordingly, because the cat was not out of the bag

after the first interview, the Commonwealth overcame the

presumption that the juvenile's statements during the second

interview were tainted by the illegality of the first

interview. 10 See Osachuk, 418 Mass. at 235.

As such, the order denying the juvenile's motion to

suppress is reversed as it applies to the juvenile's statements

during the first interview and affirmed as it applies to his

statement's during the second interview.

So ordered.

By the Court (Desmond,
Grant & Hodgens, JJ. 11),

Clerk

Entered: June 23, 2025.

10The juvenile argues, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Prater,
420 Mass. 569, 580 n.10 (1995), that this is such a case where
both a break in the stream of events and a cat out of the bag
analysis is required. However, Prater instructs that "whether
one or both lines of analysis is required . . . turns on the
facts of the case." Id. We conclude that this is not such a
case where both lines of analysis are required.

11 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

21