Commonwealth v. Juan H. Rodriguez.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

23-P-187

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

JUAN H. RODRIGUEZ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

After the trial judge denied the defendant's motion for a

required finding of not guilty, a jury found him guilty of,

among other things, one count of assault and battery with a

dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b), and one count of

malicious destruction of property under $1,200, G. L. c. 266,

§ 127.1 The defendant, in this appeal, argues that the trial

judge erred in denying his motion for a required finding of not

guilty as to these two counts.2 We affirm.

1The jury also found the defendant guilty of resisting
arrest, G. L. c. 268, § 32B, and disorderly conduct, G. L.
c. 272, § 53.

2In the conclusion to his brief, the defendant asks that we
also vacate the guilty verdict on count five, wanton destruction
Facts. "We summarize the facts as the jury could have

found them, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth."

Commonwealth v. Platt, 440 Mass. 396, 397 (2003).

On February 14, 2019, Beverly police Detective Thomas Nolan

responded to a "be on the lookout" notification for the

defendant, Juan H. Rodriguez, involving effectuation of service

of an arrest warrant on him. This notification included

information about the defendant and a description of his

vehicle. Detective Nolan decided to check an area near the

defendant's residence. While in his unmarked police cruiser on

Northridge Road, which bordered a cemetery, he saw a gold Honda

Pilot in the cemetery, matching the description of the

defendant's vehicle. He stopped his cruiser on Northridge Road,

outside the cemetery, and radioed that he had located the

vehicle. He then saw a marked cruiser, driven by Officer April

Clarizia, arrive at the cemetery and begin to approach the

Honda.

Officer Clarizia testified that she stopped her cruiser

face-to-face with the Honda and within one foot of it. From

that distance, she could see the Honda's driver. She radioed

dispatch, then placed her cruiser in park and opened the door to

get out. As she did so, the Honda "lunged forward" and struck

of property under $1,200, G. L. c. 266, § 127. The jury,
however, acquitted him on this count.

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her cruiser. Officer Clarizia was still seated in the cruiser

and felt the impact of the collision. The defendant then sped

off in reverse.

To Officer Clarizia, the Honda appeared "out of control" as

it reversed; it strayed from the road, driving onto the grass at

times. She pursued the Honda, and at one point, the Honda,

still in reverse, struck a tree, then hit her cruiser again.

The Honda continued in reverse, and Officer Clarizia continued

to pursue it, eventually using her cruiser's push bar to push

the Honda into a pile of brush where it finally stopped.

After witnessing the Honda hit Officer Clarizia's cruiser,

Detective Nolan climbed the fence that separated Northridge Road

from the cemetery and pursued the Honda on foot. He eventually

reached the car and saw the defendant in the driver's seat.

Detective Nolan and other officers struggled to get the

defendant out of the car and into handcuffs. The defendant did

not respond when they told him to get out of the car and refused

to comply with a later demand by the police that he get on the

ground. The officers then wrestled him to the ground, but he

refused to give them his hands for handcuffing and kicked at the

officers. One of the officers eventually gave the defendant a

drive stun with his taser gun, and the officers were able to

handcuff the defendant.

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Officer Clarizia's cruiser was damaged and had to be towed

from the scene.

Discussion. In reviewing a denial of a motion for a

required finding of not guilty, we must determine "whether,

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."

Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979).

"Circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to meet this

burden," Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448 Mass. 207, 215 (2007),

especially when it comes to mental state elements, such as

intent, which are "often not susceptible of proof by direct

evidence." Commonwealth v. Henault, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 8, 13 n.7

(2002), quoting Commonwealth v. Casale, 381 Mass. 167, 173

(1980).

The Commonwealth may prove assault and battery with a

dangerous weapon under either an intentional theory or a

reckless theory. See Commonwealth v. Ashford, 486 Mass. 450,

460 (2020). "Intentional assault and battery by means of a

dangerous weapon requires an 'intentional, unjustified touching,

however slight, by means of [a] dangerous weapon.'" Id.,

quoting Commonwealth v. Ford, 424 Mass. 709, 712 (1997). The

theory on which the Commonwealth proceeded was that the assault

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and battery with a dangerous weapon was the initial contact

between the Honda and the police cruiser.

Where, as here, the Commonwealth proceeds under the

intentional theory, the Commonwealth must show that the

defendant intended the touching to occur, not just that the

defendant intended to take some act that led to the touching.

See Ford, 424 Mass. at 711-712; Commonwealth v. Moore, 36 Mass.

App. Ct. 455, 457-459 (1994). The Commonwealth must also prove

that the touching did not happen by accident. Ford, supra at

711. Thus, as the jury were correctly instructed, the

Commonwealth was required to prove that the defendant

"consciously and deliberately intended the touching to occur and

that the touching was not merely accidental or negligent."

To establish malicious destruction of property, the

Commonwealth must prove that "the [defendant] 'destroy[ed] or

injure[d] the personal property, dwelling house or building of

another'" and did so willfully and maliciously. Commonwealth v.

Woods, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 761, 769 (2019), quoting Commonwealth

v. Morris M., 70 Mass. App. Ct. 688, 691 (2007). See

Commonwealth v. Redmond, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 3-4 (2001). In

this context, malice means "cruelty, hostility or revenge."

Redmond, supra at 4. Again, the judge limited this count to the

initial contact between the defendant's car and the police

cruiser.

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The defendant's argument focuses on the mental state

elements of each of these crimes; he argues first that there was

insufficient evidence that he intended the touching that served

as the basis for the assault and battery with a dangerous weapon

charge. He also argues that there was insufficient evidence of

willfulness or malice, as required for the malicious destruction

of property charge.

As to the assault and battery charge, the defendant's main

argument is that he did not intend the touching because, at the

time of these events, his intent was to flee from the police.

This is unpersuasive. Even if the defendant was motivated by a

desire to escape from the police, a rational trier of fact could

still have found that he also intended to touch Officer

Clarizia's cruiser. Neither his desire to escape nor his

quickly shifting into reverse after contact compel, as the

defendant suggests, a finding that the touching was accidental.

A rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant intended to touch Officer Clarizia's

marked police cruiser given that the two cars were facing each

other, Officer Clarizia parked within a foot of his car, and his

car then "lunged forward," striking her cruiser, before speeding

off in reverse.

As to malicious destruction of property, the defendant

argues that his principal goal was to flee the scene and escape

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capture, and that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate

willfulness or malice. But this argument, too, ignores the

evidence in the record. To begin with, the evidence described

above is sufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable

doubt of willfulness. As to malice, there was evidence that the

police had arrived to effectuate an arrest warrant on the

defendant, and that, after Officer Clarizia stopped the

defendant's car, he refused to follow the arresting officer's

instructions and kicked at them as they tried to place him in

handcuffs. This is sufficient to support a finding beyond a

reasonable doubt that the initial act of driving his car into

the police cruiser was undertaken with hostility, and,

therefore, malice, toward the police, including Officer

Clarizia.

Consequently, we perceive no error in the judge's denial of

the defendant's motions for a required finding of not guilty.

Judgments affirmed.

By the Court (Rubin,
D'Angelo & Smyth, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: June 24, 2025.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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