Tyrone Walker v. Juliane Pierre.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-566

TYRONE WALKER

vs.

JULIANE PIERRE.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In this summary process action, a judge of the Housing

Court concluded after a bench trial that the plaintiff, Tyrone

Walker, held the premises in constructive trust for the

defendant, Juliane Pierre, and ordered entry of judgment for

Pierre on Walker's claim for possession. On appeal Walker

argues that the judge erred by imposing a constructive trust,

that Pierre's defense of constructive trust is time barred, and

that the judge erred by denying Walker's motion for use and

occupancy payments pending appeal. 1 We affirm.

1Walker also appealed from the judge's orders denying his
motion for relief from judgment, his motion for full findings of
fact and rulings of law pending appeal, and his motion to
consolidate the appeals. After the respective appeals were
docketed, they were consolidated in this court. Walker's brief
Background. This is the second time this matter has come

before us. In the first appeal, brought by Pierre from a

judgment awarding possession to Walker, a panel of this court

concluded in an unpublished memorandum and order that the judge

failed to adequately address Pierre's equitable defense

regarding "the division of the value of the premises." Walker

v. Pierre, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 1113 (2023). The panel thus

remanded the case for the judge to "address whether [Pierre]

made out a claim or defense that affects [Walker's] right to

possession or otherwise warrants relief within the Housing

Court's jurisdiction." Id. Noting that Pierre "already had the

opportunity to present evidence" at the bench trial, the panel

left it to the judge's discretion whether to take additional

evidence. Id. 2

On remand Pierre requested that the judge permit further

discovery, but Walker opposed the request. At a status

conference, the judge informed the parties that she had enough

evidence to decide the issues on remand but would permit

briefing on the question of whether Pierre "made out a case for

in the consolidated appeals raises no argument regarding the
denials of the aforementioned motions, so we deem all of those
issues waived. See Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing
in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).

2 The history of the proceeding prior to the remand is set
out in detail in the panel's memorandum and order, and we do not
repeat it here.

2
constructive trust." After each party submitted a legal

memorandum, the judge heard oral argument and then issued a

decision in which she made the following factual findings.

The parties were in a long-term relationship and have two

children, who were fifteen and thirteen years old at the time of

trial. Walker purchased the premises in March 2009 for the

benefit of Pierre and their children. Pierre's mother assisted

with the purchase and owned the premises jointly with Walker

until she transferred her interest to him at some later point.

Pierre trusted Walker, and it was her belief that the premises

"was always ours; for us and the kids."

Pierre lived at the premises at all times relevant to this

action. The parties have never had an agreement regarding rent,

and Pierre does not owe any unpaid rent. Walker pays the

mortgage on the premises, and Pierre pays the electricity, gas,

cable, and internet bills. Pierre also paid the water bill

until March 2019. While Walker was in jail and while he was

unemployed, Pierre did "whatever needed to be done for the

house."

Based on these findings, the judge concluded that "the

ongoing relationship between [Walker] and [Pierre] created a

fiduciary relationship between them" and that Walker "holds the

premises as the constructive trustee for the benefit of" Pierre.

3
The judge thus ordered that judgment enter for Pierre on the

complaint for possession.

Discussion. 1. Constructive trust. "Equitable principles

impose a constructive trust on property to avoid the unjust

enrichment of a party who violates his fiduciary duty and

acquires that property at the expense of the person to whom he

owed that duty." Sullivan v. Rooney, 404 Mass. 160, 163 (1989).

We review the judge's findings on the existence and breach of a

fiduciary duty for clear error. See Michaud v. Forcier, 78

Mass. App. Ct. 11, 15 (2010). We review the judge's imposition

of an equitable remedy, such as a constructive trust, for abuse

of discretion. See Cavadi v. DeYeso, 458 Mass. 615, 624 (2011),

quoting Demoulas v. Demoulas, 428 Mass. 555, 589 (1998).

We discern no clear error in the judge's finding that the

parties' "ongoing relationship . . . created a fiduciary

relationship between them" and no abuse of discretion in her

determination that the circumstances warranted imposing a

constructive trust. A fiduciary duty need not be one "that is

established as a matter of law" but "may arise from the

circumstances," such as "from a relationship of trust and

confidence" (quotation omitted). Maffei v. Roman Catholic

Archbishop of Boston, 449 Mass. 235, 247 (2007). Here, the

parties were in a long-term relationship and had two children

together. The judge credited Pierre's testimony that Walker

4
purchased the premises for her benefit and that of the children,

that she "trusted" Walker, and that she believed that the

premises "was always ours; for us and the kids." Consistent

with that belief, Pierre lived with the children in the premises

for over a decade, paid bills, and did "whatever needed to be

done for the house" when Walker could not because of

incarceration or unemployment.

The judge was within her discretion to impose a

constructive trust based on these facts. This case is similar

to Sullivan, 404 Mass. at 161, in which the parties, an

unmarried couple in a long-term relationship, lived together in

a home that each thought "would belong to both of them" but the

defendant took title to in his name alone. When the

relationship deteriorated and the defendant claimed sole

ownership of the home, the plaintiff brought suit to obtain

title as a tenant in common. See id. at 161-162. The court

held that "[i]t would be unjust not to impose a constructive

trust" because the plaintiff "contributed her earnings and

services to the home" based on the defendant's promises that

they would own it together, and the plaintiff reasonably relied

"on those promises made by one in whom she reasonably placed

special confidence." Id. at 163-164. Similarly, here, Pierre

contributed financially to the premises and helped in

maintaining it in reasonable reliance on Walker's assurances

5
that it belonged to both of them. A constructive trust was

justified in these circumstances. See id. See also Hatton v.

Meade, 23 Mass. App. Ct. 356, 357-358, 365 (1987) (judge

properly imposed constructive trust over house that defendant

took title to alone, where plaintiff relied on defendant's

representation that they owned it together and they lived there

for years as though husband and wife).

We are unpersuaded by Walker's argument that Pierre failed

to meet her burden of proof because she did not provide

documentation to corroborate her testimony. Generally, "[a]

witness's testimony alone, without corroboration, may meet a

party's burden of proof." In re Estate of Stacy, 96 Mass. App.

Ct. 447, 460 (2019). Walker cites no authority to the contrary.

We also do not consider Walker's assertion that Pierre

"strengthened her financial position" while living in the

premises, as that assertion is based on documents that are not

part of the record.

2. Statute of limitations. Walker next argues that

Pierre's "claim" for a constructive trust is barred under the

three-year statute of limitations set out in G. L. c. 260, § 2A.

Walker did not raise this argument to the judge, however, so it

is waived. See Carey v. New England Organ Bank, 446 Mass. 270,

285 (2006). Moreover, Pierre raised the issue of constructive

trust as a defense to Walker's complaint for possession, and

6
Walker cites no authority to support the proposition that the

statute of limitations applies to defenses, as opposed to

claims. The argument is waived for this additional reason. See

Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628

(2019).

3. Use and occupancy. Likewise, Walker cites no authority

and offers no reasoning to support his contention that he, the

losing party below, is entitled to use and occupancy payments

from Pierre, the prevailing party, pending his appeal. Thus,

this argument is also waived. See Mass. R. A. P.

16 (a) (9) (A), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019).

Conclusion. The judgment is affirmed. The order dated

December 5, 2023, denying Walker's motion for relief from

judgment and motion for use and occupancy payments is affirmed.

7
The order dated February 8, 2024, denying Walker's motion for

full findings of fact and rulings of law pending appeal and

motion to consolidate appeals is affirmed. 3

So ordered.

By the Court (Meade, Shin &
Tan, JJ. 4),

Clerk

Entered: July 2, 2025.

3 In a prior order, we struck portions of Walker's brief
that included citations to nonexistent cases. We note that the
arguments raised would not have changed the outcome of the
appeal in any event.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

8