PETER LANNON v. JAMES LANNON & Another.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-794

PETER LANNON

vs.

JAMES LANNON & another.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a summary process bench trial in the Housing

Court, judgment entered for the defendants, James Lannon and

Jaime Patz. On appeal, the plaintiff, Peter Lannon, contends

that the judge erred in concluding that he holds title to the

property at issue in a constructive trust for the benefit of the

defendants. We affirm.

Background. We summarize the relevant facts as found by

the judge, supplemented by uncontested facts from the record.

In 2016, James2 and his partner, Jaime Patz, sought to purchase

1 Jaime Patz.

2Because some of the individuals in this case share last
names, we refer to them by their first names to avoid confusion.
a home in Marshfield (property). Barbara and Peter Lannon,

James's parents, provided the down payment for the property and

paid the closing costs, for a total of about $130,000; these

funds were intended as a gift to help James and Patz purchase

the property. Peter offered to obtain the mortgage and title in

his name because his credit score would allow him to obtain a

more favorable mortgage rate; the defendants agreed. In 2016,

James, Patz, and their son moved into the property. On

conflicting testimony, the judge found the parties'

understanding to be that when James's credit score improved,

James and Patz would purchase the property from Peter for the

outstanding amount on the mortgage, and Peter would transfer

title to them.

Over the next several years, James and Patz paid Peter for

weekly use and occupancy of the property in amounts equal to the

mortgage, insurance, taxes, and utilities. James and Peter made

several improvements to the house, including adding a bathroom,

replacing the air conditioning, replacing windows, painting the

walls, and landscaping. Though the parties disputed the source

of funds for these renovations, Peter admitted that James

provided much of the labor, as James was a skilled carpenter and

builder.

Sometime in either 2020 or 2021, after separating from

Barbara, Peter moved into the property with James and Patz. By

2
2023, the relationship between the parties had deteriorated and

after an argument in June 2023, James and Patz withheld their

regular monthly payments. In August 2023, Peter served the

defendants with a fourteen-day notice to quit for nonpayment of

rent.3 This led to an altercation between the parties, after

which Peter moved out of the property. Peter later served the

defendants with a thirty-day notice to quit, and then a summary

process action.

After a bench trial, the judge found that strict

enforcement of the Statute of Frauds, G. L. c. 259, § 1, Fourth,

with possession of the property reverting to Peter, would result

in an unjust enrichment of Peter. The judge further found that

the down payment was a gift and that the parties had an oral

agreement that James and Patz would reside at the property and

pay the mortgage indirectly through Peter. As a result, the

judge concluded that Peter held the property in a constructive

trust for the benefit of James and Patz and entered judgment

accordingly. This appeal followed.

Discussion. "A constructive trust is a flexible tool of

equity designed to prevent unjust enrichment resulting from

fraud, a violation of a fiduciary duty or confidential

relationship, mistake, or 'other circumstances' in which a

3 At the time of trial, the defendants had paid the
outstanding amount.

3
recipient's acquisition of legal title to property amounts to

unjust enrichment." Maffei v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of

Boston, 449 Mass. 235, 246 (2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1099

(2008), quoting Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Worcester,

416 Mass. 781, 789, cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1142 (1994). "We

examine the judge's imposition of equitable remedies under an

abuse of discretion standard." Cavadi v. DeYeso, 458 Mass. 615,

624 (2011). We accept the judge's findings of fact unless they

are clearly erroneous and review his legal conclusions de novo.

Id.

1. Gift. The judge credited the testimony of James,

Barbara, and Patz that Barbara and Peter intended the down

payment to be a gift. He did not credit Peter's testimony to

the contrary. Peter contends that this was error. Because "we

give due regard to the judge's assessment of the witnesses'

credibility," we see no reason to disturb his assessment.

Andover Hous. Auth. v. Shkolnik, 443 Mass. 300, 306 (2005).4

2. Unjust enrichment. The judge found that strictly

enforcing the Statute of Frauds here would result in unjust

4We note that the judge erred in finding that Peter
attempted to characterize the $130,000 as a loan. Peter did not
refer to the $130,000 as a loan and instead characterized it as
a down payment for the property that he purchased for himself.
In any case, the judge explicitly credited the testimony of
Barbara, James, and Patz, all of whom testified that the amount
was a gift from Barbara's resources. This error does not
require reversal.

4
enrichment.5 "Unjust enrichment occurs when a party retains the

property of another against the fundamental principles of

justice or equity and good conscience" (quotation and citation

omitted). Bonina v. Sheppard, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 622, 625

(2017). Whether the benefit was unjust "turns on the reasonable

expectations of the parties" (citation omitted). Metropolitan

Life Ins. Co. v. Cotter, 464 Mass. 623, 644 (2013).

Here, Peter's retention of the property would provide him

with the benefit of the down payment that the judge concluded

was a gift, the increased value of the property based on the

improvements made to it, the increase in appreciated property

value, and the increase in the property's equity based on the

mortgage payments made by James and Patz. In light of the

parties' expectations that title would eventually transfer to

James and Patz, retention of the property by Peter would be

unjust. Thus, imposition of a constructive trust to avoid this

unjust enrichment was not error. See Cavadi, 458 Mass. at 627

5 We need not reach the issue of the Statute of Frauds,
G. L. c. 259, § 1, as we conclude that the judge properly
imposed a constructive trust. See Sullivan v. Rooney, 404 Mass.
160, 162 n.1 (1989); Nessralla v. Peck, 403 Mass. 757, 761-762
(1989). See also G. L. c. 203, § 1 ("No trust concerning land,
except such as may arise or result by implication of law, shall
be created or declared unless by a written instrument . . ."
[emphasis added]).

5
(constructive trust is "implied by law as a result of," inter

alia, "unjust enrichment").6

Judgment affirmed.7

By the Court (Blake, C.J.,
Ditkoff & Brennan, JJ.8),

Clerk

Entered: July 10, 2025.

6 Because of the result we reach, we need not consider
whether James was also entitled to a constructive trust based on
an alleged breach of a fiduciary duty.

7 To the extent the defendants seek relief based on the
imposition of a constructive trust they must do so in a court of
competent jurisdiction.

8 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

6