Commonwealth v. Jonathan M. Maddocks.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-851

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

JONATHAN M. MADDOCKS.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a jury trial in the Boston Municipal Court, the

defendant, Jonathan M. Maddocks, was convicted of assault and

battery on a police officer. 1 He argues on appeal that the

evidence at trial was insufficient to warrant a guilty finding,

he was entitled to a jury instruction on self-defense, and

police officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and seize

him. We affirm.

Background. 1. Commonwealth's case. The evidence put on

by the Commonwealth included the following. On May 21, 2023,

Boston Police Officers Malik Morgan and Crefton Watty-Niles were

The jury found the defendant not guilty of resisting
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arrest.
working a paid police detail investigating counterfeit

merchandise being sold during a Blink-182 concert at the TD

Garden. Both officers worked in plainclothes, but had their

badges, firearms, and radios on their persons. The officers

followed a procedure when approaching anyone during their

investigation who might be selling fake merchandise: they

identified themselves as Boston police officers, displayed their

badges, and advised that they were seeking to check the

authenticity of potential counterfeit items.

At approximately 11 P.M., the officers' attention was drawn

toward a male (subsequently identified as the defendant) and a

female (subsequently identified as the defendant's friend,

Olivia Garcia) at the intersection of Canal Street and Valenti

Way. The defendant had "balled up" T-shirts "in his arm." Upon

approaching the defendant and Garcia, both officers identified

themselves as Boston police officers, displayed their badges,

and advised that they were investigating counterfeit shirts.

The officers identified themselves and displayed their badges

multiple times. Officer Watty-Niles testified that he lifted

his shirt and showed the defendant his badge at least three

times. After the officers identified themselves, the defendant

pushed and pulled away, and attempted to move away from the

officers. The officers noticed that the defendant was

"inebriated" as he had bloodshot eyes, an odor of alcohol

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emanating from him, slurred speech, and was unsteady on his

feet. The officers repeated that they were investigating

counterfeit shirts, and the defendant stated that the shirts

were not fake, and that he had bought the shirts. As the

interaction continued, the defendant said that the officers

"were trying to rob him." One of the officers stated, "let us

see the shirts, if you did buy them, they're not counterfeit,

we'll give them right back to you." The defendant released the

shirts and, as Officer Watty-Niles examined them, the defendant

stepped behind him and "placed his arms around [the officer's]

neck." The defendant held Officer Watty-Niles in a "headlock"

or "chokehold" for approximately fifteen to twenty seconds.

Officer Morgan instructed the defendant to release the officer,

but the defendant failed to do so. Officer Morgan then sprayed

the defendant with pepper spray, after which the defendant

released Officer Watty-Niles. The officers attempted to place

handcuffs on the defendant, but he resisted. By this time,

bystanders had gathered nearby and were shouting to "just do

what [the officers] say." The officers eventually were able to

put the defendant in handcuffs and detain him. After being

placed in handcuffs, the defendant acknowledged to Officer

Watty-Niles that he had seen his badge and gun. At the close of

the Commonwealth's case, the defendant moved for a required

finding of not guilty, which the judge denied.

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2. Defendant's case. The defendant testified at trial and

stated the following. He and Garcia took an Uber to the

concert. While there, he bought four shirts and a hat at the

authorized merchandise stand within TD Garden -- the hat and two

shirts for him and one shirt for each of his children. After

the show, at around 11 P.M., they exited TD Garden, stopped and

asked a uniformed officer for directions to the Uber location as

they were not familiar with the area, and headed to the pickup

area to meet the Uber they had ordered for their return trip

home.

The defendant was wearing the new hat and carrying the

four T-shirts that he purchased inside the concert venue draped

over his shoulder. A man in plainclothes, later identified as

Officer Watty-Niles, came up next to him and said, "nice shirts,

where'd you get them?" The defendant laughed and said, "I just

got them at the show." The defendant looked back, and seeing

the officer had the shirts in his hands, the defendant said,

"What are you doing?" Officer Morgan then grabbed him by the

wrist and yelled, "Give me the shirts, give me the shirts, give

me the shirts."

The defendant testified that he believed he was being

robbed, so he held onto his shirts and tried to get away from

the men. One of the officers came between the defendant and

Garcia while the other continued pulling the shirts from the

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defendant. The defendant and Garcia both screamed for help. A

bystander called 911, as did Garcia.

The defendant tried to pull away but continued holding onto

the shirts while the men kept yelling, "Give me the shirts, give

me the effing T-shirts" and threatened him with pepper spray.

Officer Watty-Niles and the defendant were both holding the

shirts, struggling, when Officer Morgan deployed pepper spray

into the defendant's face.

The defendant testified that it all happened in seconds,

and he was in shock after being sprayed. After being sprayed,

his eyes were burning and the officers pushed him away. He

stumbled back off the curb and put his arm on the back of

Officer Watty-Niles' shoulders to catch himself from falling.

He testified that he was then dragged by the officers to a spot

across the street and it was then that Officer Morgan reached

into his front left pocket and pulled out his badge and handed

it to the defendant. The defendant then realized that the men

were police and said, "Why wouldn't you tell me that at the

beginning, why are you telling me now?"

The defendant further testified that he never put his arm

around Officer Watty-Niles' neck and that he did not know the

two men were Boston police officers until after they had

handcuffed him. He testified that when he tried to leave, the

police chief who was then on the scene said that because the

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defendant's arm touched the skin of Officer Watty-Niles, the

police were arresting him for assault and battery on an officer.

The defendant renewed his motion for a required finding of

not guilty at the close of the evidence and that motion was

likewise denied.

Discussion. The defendant argues that the evidence was

insufficient to prove assault and battery on a police officer

because the Commonwealth failed to establish that the defendant

had knowledge that Officer Watty-Niles was a police officer

engaged in the performance of his duties. See Commonwealth v.

Francis, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 576, 581 (1987). We apply the

familiar test to determine "whether, after viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the [Commonwealth], any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt" (emphasis omitted).

Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). "If, from the

evidence, conflicting inferences are possible, it is for the

jury to determine where the truth lies, for the weight and

credibility of the evidence is wholly within their province."

Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005). See

Commonwealth v. Nelson, 370 Mass. 192, 203 (1976) (evidence need

not require jury to draw inference; sufficient that evidence

permits inference to be drawn).

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Here, there was ample and repeated testimony from both

officers that they identified themselves as Boston police

officers multiple times, displayed their badges to the defendant

multiple times, and explained their reason for approaching the

defendant and asking him questions. Furthermore, Officer Watty-

Niles testified that the defendant admitted to him that he had

seen his badge and gun. This evidence was sufficient to

demonstrate the requisite knowledge element and warrant the

denial of the defendant's motion for a required finding of not

guilty. To be sure, there was also evidence supporting the

defendant's argument that he did not know that he was being

confronted by police officers. This included evidence of the

screams for help and the 911 calls. In addition, the defendant

testified to a contrary version of events, and contested the

officers' testimony in material respects. Under the Latimore

standard, however, we must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, recognizing that the jurors were

entitled to disbelieve or disregard the defendant's version of

events. See Commonwealth v. Santos, 454 Mass. 770, 777 (2009).

To the extent there was conflicting testimony it was for the

jury to determine which evidence to believe. 2 See Lao, 443 Mass.

at 779.

2 We are likewise unpersuaded by the defendant's argument
that the officers were not engaged in the performance of their

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The defendant also contends that the judge erred in failing

to provide a self-defense instruction at trial. Where the

defendant neither raised the issue below nor requested such an

instruction, our review is limited to whether there was any

error, and if so, whether that error created a substantial risk

of a miscarriage of justice. See Commonwealth v. Alphas, 430

Mass. 8, 13 (1999). Here, we discern no error. The defense in

the present case was that the defendant did not know that he had

assaulted a police officer and, in such circumstances, it was

not manifestly unreasonable not to pursue or argue a separate

defense. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Levia, 385 Mass. 345, 353-

354 (1982) (discussing strategy and tactics that are not

manifestly unreasonable when made). Moreover, the defendant

testified at trial and did not claim that he acted in self-

defense. Indeed, he claimed that he never put his arm around

the officer and never choked him. The defendant has not shown

duties because they were working under the authority of an
injunction that may have expired. Viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, there was evidence that the
officers were working a paid detail in their capacity as Boston
police officers. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. McCrohan, 34 Mass.
App. Ct. 277, 282-283 (1993). See also Commonwealth v. Montes,
49 Mass. App. Ct. 789, 793 (2000) (rejecting argument that
"making an unlawful arrest cannot constitute part of an
officer's official duties" in context of crime of assault and
battery on police officer). We also note that the defendant did
not argue at trial that the expired injunction impacted the
sufficiency of the evidence. Rather, the defense contended that
the status of the injunction "just goes to credibility." See
id. at 792, n.4.

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that it was error not to give a self-defense instruction sua

sponte where the defense did not argue self-defense at trial.

See Commonwealth v. Norris, 462 Mass. 131, 144 (2012)

(instructing on unrequested defense might "interfere[] with the

defendants' right to present their chosen defenses").

To the extent that the defendant claims that his trial

counsel's failure to request a self-defense instruction

constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, we note that the

defendant did not raise this claim through the preferred method

of a motion for new trial accompanied by affidavits. He thus

presents the claim "in its weakest form[,] . . . bereft of any

explanation by trial counsel for his actions and suggestive of

strategy contrived by a defendant viewing the case with

hindsight" (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v.

Diaz, 448 Mass. 286, 289 (2007). "Because the defendant raises

[this] claim[] for the first time on direct appeal, [its]

factual basis must appear 'indisputably on the trial record' for

us to resolve [it]." Commonwealth v. Vera, 88 Mass. App. Ct.

313, 323 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Dargon, 457 Mass. 387,

403 (2010). This is not such a case. On the record before us,

the claim is speculative and unpersuasive.

Finally, the defendant argues that the stop and seizure by

the officers was not based on reasonable suspicion. Where the

defendant did not raise this issue in the trial court, ideally

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through a pretrial motion to suppress, the argument is waived.

See Commonwealth v. Brule, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 89, 92 (2020).

While we would typically review an unpreserved claim of error

under a substantial risk standard, "because the factual record

was undeveloped at trial, any claim of error should have been

brought first in a motion for a new trial." Id. Because the

defendant did not do so, "the record does not permit such review

of this waived issue . . . . Where the Commonwealth was not put

on notice of the need to present any evidence on this issue at

trial, we must 'decline to reach the merits of the issue raised

for the first time on appeal because it depends on the

development of facts not in the record before us.'" Id.,

quoting Commonwealth v. Santos, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 781, 798

(2019). 3

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Rubin, Neyman &
Tan, JJ. 4),

Clerk

Entered: July 30, 2025.

3 To the extent we do not discuss other arguments made by
the parties, they have not been overlooked. "We find nothing in
them that requires discussion." Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332
Mass. 66, 78 (1954).

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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