Commonwealth v. Manuel Guerrero Escalante.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-386

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

MANUEL GUERRERO ESCALANTE.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, the defendant,

Manuel Guerrero Escalante, pleaded guilty to one count of

possession of ammunition without an firearm identification (FID)

card, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (h) (1); five counts of possession of a

large capacity firearm or feeding device without a valid license

to carry firearms, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (m); and one count of

possession of a class B substance, G. L. c. 94C, § 34. The

agreement also dismissed a separate count of possession of a

class B substance and deemed the defendant not responsible for a

motor vehicle lights violation. Before entering into the plea

agreement, the defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress any

evidence obtained during a search of his vehicle, asserting that
the stop of that vehicle was unreasonably prolonged. We agree

and therefore reverse the order denying the defendant's motion

to suppress.1

Background. "We summarize the facts as found by the motion

judge, . . . supplemented by evidence in the record that is

uncontroverted and that was implicitly credited by the judge"

(quotations and citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Jones, 100

Mass. App. Ct. 600, 601-602 (2022). To the extent the findings

rely on video from a body-worn camera, "the judge's findings

drawn from it are not entitled to deference, and we may review

such evidence de novo." Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass.

645, 656 (2018). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Monroe, 472 Mass.

461, 464 (2015).

On September 9, 2022, at approximately 7:35 P.M., State

police Trooper Tiffany DaRosa was conducting a routine patrol in

the city of Taunton. She signaled for the defendant to pull his

vehicle over, which he did without incident. The trooper

approached the passenger side of the vehicle and informed the

defendant that she had stopped him for not having his headlights

1 We need not reach the defendant's argument that he did not
give consent to search his bag freely and voluntarily. "Because
we conclude that the prolonged seizure of the defendant was
unconstitutional, any consent given during the illegal seizure
was invalid." Commonwealth v. Cordero, 477 Mass. 237, 238 n.1
(2017).

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on. After the defendant apologized and turned his lights on,

the trooper requested his license and registration. Following

minutes of searching for the requested items and conversation,

the defendant provided the trooper with his New Hampshire

driver's license, registration, and documentation of insurance

(collectively, the defendant's documents).

During their interaction, the trooper "noticed the

defendant looking at a backpack that was located on the

passenger seat while the documents [were] being produced." The

video shows that after the trooper had the defendant's documents

in hand, the trooper asked, "Got anything good in the backpack?"2

In response, the defendant said, "You can check. Go ahead."

The trooper then asked if the defendant wanted to open the

backpack for her, and he proceeded to do so. In the backpack,

the trooper observed orange medication bottles with the name and

date of birth ripped off the labels. As a result, the trooper

issued an exit order and searched the defendant's vehicle. The

trooper found another prescription bottle with the label crossed

out, a box of ammunition, several high-capacity magazines, and

several rounds of ammunition. The defendant, who claimed he had

2As the trooper finished reading the defendant's insurance
documents she specifically said, "Okay. Sounds good. Sounds
good. Okay. I'll be righ--. Got anything good in the
backpack?"

3
a gun license in New Hampshire but not Massachusetts, was then

placed in handcuffs and read his Miranda rights.

Discussion. "A routine traffic stop may not last longer

than 'reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the

stop.'" Commonwealth v. Cordero, 477 Mass. 237, 241 (2017),

quoting Commonwealth v. Amado, 474 Mass. 147, 151 (2016). "The

nature of the stop, i.e., for a traffic offense, defines the

scope of the initial inquiry by a police officer." Commonwealth

v. Buckley, 478 Mass. 861, 873 (2018), quoting Commonwealth v.

Bartlett, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 468, 470 (1996). "The scope of a

stop may only extend beyond its initial purpose if the officer

is confronted with facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion

that further criminal conduct is afoot" (quotation and citation

omitted). Commonwealth v. Tavares, 482 Mass. 694, 703 (2019).

Otherwise, "[p]olice authority to seize an individual ends 'when

tasks tied to the traffic infraction are -- or reasonably should

have been -- completed.'" Commonwealth v. Soriano-Lara, 99

Mass. App. Ct. 525, 528 (2021), quoting Cordero, supra at 242.

The defendant argues that the motion judge erred in denying

his motion to suppress because, upon production of a valid

license and registration, the trooper had no basis for any

further inquiry or detention of the defendant. We agree.

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Here, once the trooper had the defendant's license,

registration, and insurance documentation, she could have

permissibly taken the time reasonably necessary to verify their

validity. Instead, the trooper unreasonably prolonged the

interaction by inquiring about the defendant's backpack.3 The

Commonwealth correctly conceded at oral argument that based on

the relaxed interactions with the defendant to that point, the

trooper did not have independent reasonable suspicion to inquire

about the bag. The trooper had no justification to extend the

scope of the stop beyond its initial purpose -- issuing the

defendant a citation for a motor vehicle lights violation. See

Tavares, 482 Mass. at 703 (traffic stop should have concluded

when officer realized he mistakenly identified passenger as

individual who had outstanding arrest warrant, and there was no

other concern).

3 Review of the video demonstrates that the motion judge's
finding that the trooper inquired about the backpack "before she
had an opportunity to return to her cruiser and run the
defendant's information," is clearly erroneous. While the
defendant did not use the phrase "clearly erroneous" in his
brief, he did argue that the trooper had no basis for further
inquiry after the defendant produced his documents. Moreover,
the Commonwealth properly conceded at oral argument that when
the trooper asked about the defendant's backpack, she already
had all of the documents necessary to run the defendant's
license and registration at her police cruiser.

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Once the trooper received all of the defendant's documents,

she could have checked their validity and thereby completed the

investigative tasks reasonably included in a traffic stop for a

motor vehicle violation. The defendant's backpack had no

relation to that violation. Thus, the investigation into the

contents of the backpack "that followed was unreasonable unless

supported by additional justification." Cordero, 477 Mass. at

242.4 As set forth above, we conclude that it was not.

We reverse the order denying the defendant's motion to

suppress and remand the case to the District Court where the

defendant may seek further relief in accordance with the terms

of his conditional plea agreement and Mass. R. Crim. P.

12 (b) (6), as appearing in 482 Mass. 1501 (2019).

So ordered.

By the Court (Henry, Hand &
Brennan, JJ.5),

Clerk

Entered: October 6, 2025.

The Commonwealth's argument that the trooper was permitted
4

to inquire about the defendant's bag because she had not yet
completed the traffic stop is misplaced. The issue is not
whether the trooper had completed her stop; it is whether her
investigative inquiry into the defendant's backpack was
"reasonably necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop"
(citation omitted). Cordero, 477 Mass. at 241.

5 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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