J.R. v. K.R.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-301

J.R.

vs.

K.R.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The wife, K.R., appeals from a judgment of divorce nisi

entered by a judge of the Probate and Family Court denying

alimony and dividing the marital estate. On appeal, the wife

claims that the judge erred in assessing the wife's need,

incorrectly calculated the income of her husband, J.R.,

undervalued the "7-Eleven" franchise (7-Eleven) owned by the

husband and his parents, and improperly divided marital property

in light of the husband's potential inheritance. We affirm.

Background. We present the relevant facts and procedure as

found by the Probate and Family Court judge, "supplemented by

undisputed facts in the record and reserving certain facts for

later discussion." Connor v. Benedict, 481 Mass. 567, 568
(2019). The husband and the wife married in India in 2013 in an

arranged marriage. The wife lived in India until late 2015,

when she moved to the United States to live with the husband and

his parents. The wife spoke no English and knew no one else in

the United States. The husband and the wife had two children

together, one born in 2016 and the other in 2018. After her

first pregnancy, the wife had lingering health complications and

had "serious reservations" about having more children. She

testified that "she did not want to have a second child because

she was concerned about the effect a second pregnancy would have

on her health." Despite her concerns, the husband "forced her

into sex, resulting in her second pregnancy." The wife

"credibly testified that the [h]usband engaged in physical,

sexual, and emotional abuse of her during the marriage."

The wife was the primary caretaker of both children and

handled the cooking and cleaning for the entire household while

the husband and his parents controlled the household finances.

Despite the wife's desire to work, the husband prohibited her

from working outside the home. The husband earns his money

through "Man Mahant, Inc." ("Man Mahant"), an S-Corporation,

which owns a 7-Eleven located across from TD Garden and North

Station. The husband and his parents purchased the 7-Eleven by

"sav[ing] money for six to seven years, including four to five

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years within the marriage." The husband owns sixty percent of

Man Mahant and his parents own the remaining forty percent.

Since their separation in 2019 the husband has lived and

shared living expenses with his parents while the wife has lived

alone and works part-time as a grocery store cashier. The

wife's job opportunities are restricted by health issues from

her pregnancies and her limited English skills.

After trial and "consider[ing] all required statutory

factors" the judge awarded the wife legal custody of the

children, no alimony, and ordered the husband to pay the wife

$546.12 monthly -- representing a fifty percent share of the

marital estate -- until the full value of the estate is paid.

The judge further ordered the husband to pay an additional $372

per week in child support to the wife.

Discussion. 1. Alimony. The wife argues that the judge

erred in failing to assess the required alimony factors, in

attributing only $300 per week in "additional wages" to the

husband's income where the husband determines (and, according to

the wife), underreports his own wages, and in failing to

consider that the husband used business funds for personal

purposes. She also contends that the judge should not have

considered the property division when deciding her need for

alimony. The arguments are unavailing.

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We review the amount of an alimony award for an abuse of

discretion. See Cavanagh v. Cavanagh, 490 Mass. 398, 405

(2022). "[A] judge's discretionary decision constitutes an

abuse of discretion where we conclude the judge made 'a clear

error of judgment in weighing' the factors relevant to the

decision . . . such that the decision falls outside the range of

reasonable alternatives." See Dolan v. Dolan, 99 Mass. App. Ct.

284, 290 n.6 (2021), quoting L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass.

169, 185 n.27 (2014). In fashioning an alimony award,

"[a] judge must consider and weigh all the relevant factors
[under G. L. c. 208, § 53 (a),] but where the supporting
spouse has the ability to pay, 'the recipient spouse's need
for support is generally the amount needed to allow that
spouse to maintain the lifestyle he or she enjoyed prior to
termination of the marriage'" (citations omitted).

Cavanagh, 490 Mass. at 407-408.

Here, the judge made detailed findings reflecting careful

consideration of all relevant § 53 (a) factors for which

evidence was presented.1 The judge considered inter alia: that

the marriage was six years and eleven months long; the age of

the husband and the wife; the wife's health issues stemming from

her pregnancies, including stomach pain, vomiting, ulcers,

infections, and heart problems; the husband's income, including

wages, officer compensation, and profits from the 7-Eleven; the

1 We note the judge's comprehensive findings of fact,
rationale, and thoughtful legal analysis.

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wife's current employment; the relative employability of both

parties; the husband's financial contributions to the marriage;

the wife's contributions, including her care for the family; and

the fact that the parties "led a frugal lifestyle" throughout

the marriage.

The judge also made specific and detailed findings

regarding the husband's income. He found that the husband earns

wages from working at the 7-Eleven and reviewed the last three

years of wages reflecting pay of $59,160 in 2019, $49,400 in

2020, and $36,400 in 2021 "consistently [reflecting a weekly]

income of $500 in wages." The judge determined that the husband

could work more at the store or get another minimum wage job to

earn an additional $300 a week, thus the judge attributed $800

in weekly wages to the husband. While the wife claims that the

husband's earning capacity could be higher, the judge must

"determin[e] a fair balance of sacrifice between the parties"

and has broad discretion. Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286, 297

(2009). Where, as here, the husband's income is inconsistent

and reliant on the success of the 7-Eleven, and he has no other

skills or experience, it was within the judge's discretion to

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attribute minimum wage to the husband.2 See Crowe v. Fong, 45

Mass. App. Ct. 673, 680 (1998).

Moreover, the judge weighed other potential sources of

income for the husband. He noted, for example, that the husband

split expenses with his parents, paid his parents, and

referenced some evidence that the husband paid "personal bills

and credit cards" from accounts in the name of Man Mahant, Inc.

However, the husband claimed that his father paid for some of

the husband's personal bills, and the wife did not present

evidence concerning the source of the funds. Ultimately, it was

within the credibility determination of the judge at trial to

determine the source of the money. See Johnston v. Johnston, 38

Mass. App. Ct. 531, 536 (1995). "[T]he credibility of a

[witness] . . . who appeared at trial is quintessentially the

domain of the trial judge, in which the judge's assessment is

close to immune from reversal." Id. Thus, without additional

evidence, we cannot say the judge abused his discretion in

determining the husband's income.3

2 The judge also noted that "Man Mahant had a negative
income" in 2020 and 2021, and that insufficient credible
evidence was presented at trial to determine "whether Man Mahant
will return to profitability or continue to operate at a loss."

3 In various portions of his findings, the judge noted the
absence of credible evidence at trial regarding sources of or
amounts of income. The judge also found that neither party
presented credible evidence of the tax effect of potential

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We now turn to the wife's claim that the judge improperly

considered the property award to determine she has less need for

alimony. When determining alimony and child support the judge

must follow the three-step analysis articulated in Cavanagh, 490

Mass. at 410-411. Consistent with the Cavanagh analysis, the

judge calculated alimony first and child support second, then

child support first and alimony second. The next step in the

analysis requires the court to

"Compare the base award and tax consequences of the order
that would result from the calculations in step (1) with
those of the order that would result from the calculations
in step (2) . . . . The judge should then fashion an order
which would be the most equitable for the family before the
court, considering the mandatory statutory factors set
forth in G. L. c. 208, § 53 (a), and the public policy that
children be supported as completely as possible by their
parents' resources, G. L. c. 208, § 28, and then fashion
the order such that it reflects, or alternatively is
responsive to, those considerations. Where the judge
chooses to issue an order that does not include any award
of alimony, the judge must articulate why such an order is
warranted in light of the statutory factors set forth in
§ 53 (a)."

Id. at 410-411. Here, the judge determined that the most

equitable use of the parties' income would be to use "both

parties' gross incomes in the award of child support" because it

serves the best interest of the children and therefore no income

remained to consider for alimony. In doing so, the judge

awards of alimony and child support. The record supports these
findings.

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considered all § 53 (a) factors including the wife's ability to

maintain the frugal lifestyle experienced during the marriage in

light of the property division.

Despite the wife's assertions, the judge was correct in

considering the property division as "the adequacy and

reasonableness of an [alimony] award must be viewed in its

entirety." Johnston, 38 Mass. App. Ct. at 537. Indeed, in some

cases it is proper to deny alimony when an equitable division of

property can generate sufficient income for a spouse's needs.

Id. Here, the judge carefully considered the wife's need, "the

amount needed to allow that spouse to maintain the lifestyle he

or she enjoyed prior to termination of the marriage," and noted

that the wife lives alone in a rented apartment, regularly

attends events with the children, and that she cooks and

prepares meals in advance for herself and the children. Young

v. Young, 478 Mass. 1, 6 (2017), quoting Pierce, 455 Mass. at

296. There was, however, no other credible evidence presented

regarding the wife's current lifestyle, including that her

lifestyle needs could not be met by the property distribution.

Furthermore, the cases the wife cites confirm that alimony

determinations rest within the judge's discretion after

considering all relevant factors. See C.D.L. v. M.M.L., 72

Mass. App. Ct. 146, 160 (2008) (within judge's discretion to

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refuse to "factor" investment income); Grubert v. Grubert, 20

Mass. App. Ct. 811, 818 (1985) ("an order for division of

property cannot be viewed apart from alimony"). Accordingly,

the judge reasonably concluded, on the record before him, that

the combination of child support and the equitable property

division met the wife's needs consistent with the standard of

living established during the marriage. See Young, 478 Mass. at

8. Because the judge considered all required factors under

G. L. c. 208, § 34, and made findings reflecting consideration

of equities between the parties in light of the evidence

provided, we discern no clear error, and thus no abuse of

discretion in the alimony award.4

2. Marital property. a. Valuation of property. The wife

contends that the judge erred in valuing the 7-Eleven at

$100,000 because there was clear evidence of higher worth and

4 The wife submitted a letter pursuant to Mass. R. A. P.
16 (l), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019), to suggest that
the trial judge must consider the tax consequences of an alimony
award. See L.J.S. v. J.E.S., 464 Mass. 346, 350 (2013). This
is unpersuasive, "[i]f parties do not request the judge to
consider particular tax consequences and do not introduce
reasonably instructive evidence bearing on those tax issues, the
probate judge is not bound to grapple with the tax issues."
Jones v. Jones, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 223, 239 (2023). Here, there
was no evidence presented of the tax consequences of an alimony
award.

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there was no methodology to support his conclusion. We

disagree.

We discern no error in the judge's valuation of the 7-

Eleven based on the evidence presented at trial. "Valuation of

a business is a question of fact." Bernier v. Bernier, 449

Mass. 774, 785 (2007). When determining value, a judge may

"reject expert opinion altogether and arrive at a valuation on

other evidence" (citation omitted). Id. "Unless clearly

erroneous, the trial judge's determination of value will stand."

Fechtor v. Fechtor, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 859, 863 (1989).

Here, the rationale for the judge's conclusions is apparent

in his findings and rulings. Neither the husband nor the wife

provided a qualified expert on business valuation; the husband's

expert witness was not qualified to provide valuation of the 7-

Eleven; and the wife's expert witness did not consider the

selling prices of comparable 7-Eleven stores, or "otherwise

factor Man Mahant's status as a franchise, and its associated

limitations, into his calculation of an appropriate fair value."

Because the judge did not credit either witness, he was left to

determine the value of the 7-Eleven without expert valuation

based on the remaining evidence presented. See Lavin v. Lavin,

24 Mass. App. Ct. 929, 931 (1987) ("A trial judge enjoys wide

discretion in ruling on the qualifications of an offered

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expert"). He considered the 7-Eleven's business records, that

the business was recovering from the downturn caused by the

COVID-19 pandemic, that the husband had attempted to sell the 7-

Eleven for $150,000 and failed, that the value of the 7-Eleven

consists primarily of goodwill, that the store was not currently

making a profit, and ultimately found the fair value of the

business to be $100,000. See Lavin, 24 Mass. App. Ct. at 931-

932 (judge could value husband's equity in business despite no

ready market value). The judge weighed the evidence available

and, without other credible evidence of the value of the 7-

Eleven, the judge's findings are not "a valuation that is

materially at odds with the totality of the circumstances." See

Bernier, 449 Mass. at 785.

b. Division of property. Finally, we consider whether the

judge erred in dividing the present marital estate in half,

resulting in the wife only receiving thirty percent of the

present value of the 7-Eleven in light of the husband's

potential inheritance and the wife's contributions to the

family. We discern no error in equally splitting the property

between the husband and the wife. Our review of a judgment

pursuant to the equitable distribution statute, G. L. c. 208,

§ 34, proceeds under a two-step analysis. "First, we examine

the judge's findings to determine whether all relevant factors

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in § 34 were considered." Bowring v. Reid, 399 Mass. 265, 267

(1987). The second step requires us to determine whether the

reasons for the judge's conclusions are "apparent in his

findings and rulings." Redding v. Redding, 398 Mass. 102, 108

(1986). A judge's determinations as to equitable distribution

will not be reversed unless "plainly wrong and excessive"

(citation omitted). Id. at 107. Here, the judge made findings

addressing all the relevant § 34 factors, and the distribution

of assets reflected the judge's findings and rulings.

Indeed, the judge weighed the potential for inheritance

from the husband's parents and properly did not attribute it to

the husband. See Zeh v. Zeh, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 264 (1993)

("[potential inheritance] does not qualify as property subject

to division under G. L. c. 208, § 34," even though it may be

considered as opportunity for future acquisition). While some

future interests in property can be considered, "we have drawn a

line around certain interests that are so speculative as to

constitute nothing more than expectancies." Adams v. Adams, 459

Mass. 361, 374 (2011). See Davidson v. Davidson, 19 Mass. App.

Ct. 364, 374-375 (1985) (anticipated inheritance from living

testator unassignable to marital estate). Although the wife

maintains that her contributions to the household give her an

interest in that potential inheritance, such contributions do

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not alter the legal status of the inheritance.5 There is no

evidence in the record to suggest the husband's inheritance is

any more than an expectancy. See Adams, 459 Mass. at 374.

Accordingly, the judge did not abuse his discretion the division

of the marital estate.

Judgment of divorce nisi
affirmed.

By the Court (Meade, Neyman &
Walsh, JJ.6),

Clerk

Entered: November 21, 2025.

5 We also note that the judge did consider the wife's
contribution to the household: "[the] [w]ife handled the
domestic duties cooking and cleaning which allowed [the husband]
and his parents to work and save money."

6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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