ELEFTHERIA SOILEMEZOGLOU & Another v. NATASHA VASSERMAN & Another.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1477

ELEFTHERIA SOILEMEZOGLOU & another1

vs.

NATASHA VASSERMAN & another.2

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

As paternal grandparents, Eleftheria and Antonios

Soilemezoglou (petitioners), filed a petition in 2023 in the

Probate and Family Court for visitation with the child. Having

previously adopted the child in 2019, the maternal grandparents,

Natasha and Yuriy Vasserman (respondents), moved to dismiss the

petition. Following hearings over two days, a judge (motion

judge) concluded that the petitioners lacked standing and

dismissed the petition. We affirm.

Accepting the allegations in the petition as true, we

discern no set of facts supporting the petitioners' claim for

1 Antonios Soilemezoglou.

2 Yuriy Vasserman.
relief. See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 636

(2008); Sayre v. Aisner, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 794, 796 (2001). In

2017, the child's mother died when the child was just eight

months old. Just before the child's fourth birthday in 2019, a

Juvenile Court judge issued a decree approving the adoption of

the child by the respondents pursuant to G. L. c. 210, § 6. The

child's father died two years later in 2021. In 2023, the

petitioners filed their petition for visitation in the Probate

and Family Court. They alleged that a significant relationship

existed between them and the child and further alleged that

visitation would be in the child's best interest. Following a

hearing, the motion judge dismissed the petition because the

petitioners lacked standing due to the finality of the adoption

decree.

Applying de novo review, we conclude that the respondents

lack standing. "There is no common law right to grandparent

visitation." Enos v. Correia, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 318, 323 n.11

(1995). In 1972, the Legislature established the right of

grandparents in certain circumstances to seek visitation with

minor children. See G. L. c. 119, § 39D, added by St.1972, c.

631. Amended several times since then, the statute expressly

prohibits visitation rights where the child has been adopted, as

in the circumstances presented here:

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"No such visitation rights shall be granted if said minor
child has been adopted by a person other than a stepparent
of such child and any visitation rights granted pursuant to
this section prior to such adoption of the said minor child
shall be terminated upon such adoption without any further
action of the court."

G. L. c. 119, § 39D. Because the record before us indicates

that the Juvenile Court judge allowed the respondents' petition

seeking adoption of the child and issued a final adoption

decree, G. L. c. 210, § 6, we see no basis for the petitioners

to obtain the relief that they seek under the plain language of

G. L. c. 119, § 39D. We offer no opinion with respect to the

Juvenile Court proceedings that led to the adoption as that

matter is not before us on this record.

We disagree with the petitioners' contention that the

Probate and Family Court's equity jurisdiction supersedes any

limitations established by G. L. c. 119, § 39D, or G. L. c. 210,

§ 6. "[E]quitable powers may not be used to provide relief that

is contrary to statutory or constitutional requirements."

McCarthy v. Governor, 471 Mass. 1008, 1011 (2015). A "grant of

equitable powers does not permit a court to disregard statutory

requirements." Freeman v. Chaplic, 388 Mass. 398, 406 n.15

(1983). We recognize that a statute's silence cannot be said to

limit a court's equity power, but we are not faced with such a

situation. See, e.g., E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 429 Mass. 824, 827 n.4,

cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1005 (1999) (statute granting visitation

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rights to grandparents does not preclude "visitation between a

child and one who is not a legal parent" under equity

jurisdiction). Here, the equity power of the Probate and Family

Court is unavailing where the visitation right that the

petitioners seek is expressly foreclosed by statute.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Hand, Hodgens &
Tan, JJ.3),

Clerk

Entered: November 24, 2025.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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