KHALED ABDEL-FATTAH v. MARK T. ENO & Others.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1332

KHALED ABDEL-FATTAH

vs.

MARK T. ENO & others.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In 2023, the plaintiff, Khaled Abdel-Fattah, filed a

complaint in Superior Court alleging a breach of fiduciary duty

and seeking a declaratory judgment concerning a partnership

agreement against the defendants, Mark and Christine Eno as well

as Merrimack Enterprises, LLC. After being defaulted, the Enos

and Merrimack Enterprises, LLC, successfully removed the

defaults and moved to dismiss the complaint. After a

nonevidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge allowed the

motion.2 The plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.

1Christine Eno, Merrimack Enterprises, LLC, and
KConstruction LLC.

2KConstruction LLC (KConstruction) was also a defendant in
this action. KConstruction did not join in the motion to
In 2022, New Hampshire's Hillsborough County Superior Court

adjudicated a matter between these parties, where the same or

similar claims were alleged. The defendants here prevailed

after trial in that action.3 That judgment was affirmed on

appeal by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Eno vs. Abdel-

Fattah, N.H., No. 2022-0569, slip op. at 4 (Feb. 27, 2024),

cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 781 (2024). While that matter was

pending, the plaintiff here filed a complaint in New Hampshire

that was dismissed as duplicative. The plaintiff also filed two

separate suits in the United States District Court for the

District of Massachusetts alleging the same material facts, at

docket numbers 1:20-CV-10894-RGS and 1:20-CV-10956-IT. Both of

those suits also were dismissed because the United States

District Court held that the plaintiff could not establish

personal jurisdiction over the defendants in Massachusetts.4

dismiss, but this case against KConstruction was dismissed by
the Superior Court judge as well.

3 Although Merrimack Enterprises, LLC and Christine Eno were
not technically parties to the New Hampshire action, it is
evident that the New Hampshire court adjudicated the liability
of both (as well as of KConstruction) relative to the plaintiff.

4 The judge could have also dismissed this case for lack of
personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The defendants have
not transacted any business, had any interest, or had any
domicile in Massachusetts. Contrary to the plaintiff's
assertion, Merrimack Enterprises, LLC was a New Hampshire
limited liability company, and all its members were New
Hampshire residents during the events in question. Furthermore,

2
Article IV, § 1, of the United States Constitution provides

that "[f]ull faith and credit shall be given in each state to

the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every

other state." Heron v. Heron, 428 Mass. 537, 538 (1998). Full

faith and credit requires that we give to the judgment of the

New Hampshire court the same finality that it would receive in

New Hampshire. See Id. at 538-539.

Here, the plaintiff sought a declaration from the

Massachusetts Superior Court that the judgment in the New

Hampshire case was void. In the circumstances of this case, the

judge was without the authority to do so, and she properly

dismissed the complaint under the full faith and credit clause.

the plaintiff does not allege that the defendants have
transacted any business, nor are they domiciled, in
Massachusetts. As alleged in the complaint, the causes of
action do not arise from, or relate to, any of the defendants'
conduct within Massachusetts. Finally, the claimed injury is
alleged to have occurred in New Hampshire, not Massachusetts.
See Intech, Inc. v. Triple "C" Marine Salvage, Inc., 444 Mass.
122, 125 (2005); Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 416 Mass. 763, 772-
773 (1994).

3
See Bishins v. Richard B. Mateer, P.A., 61 Mass. App. Ct. 423,

428 (2004).5

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Meade,
Ditkoff & Toone, JJ.6),

Clerk

Entered: December 9, 2025.

5 Given this resolution of the matter, there is no need to
address the plaintiff's remaining claims.

6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

4