Eric Legere v. Director of the Department of Unemployment Assistance.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-430

ERIC LEGERE

vs.

DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The claimant, Eric Legere, appeals from a District Court

judgment affirming a determination by the Department of

Unemployment Assistance (DUA) that he is ineligible for

unemployment benefits pursuant to G. L. c. 151, § 24 (b). We

affirm.

Background. The essential facts are not in dispute. The

claimant holds a bachelor's degree and has prior work experience

as a teacher in a variety of subject areas. Since 2008, he has

worked exclusively in part-time positions for health reasons.

Each week, he volunteers approximately twelve hours as a

minister and is self-employed working approximately five hours a

week as a tutor and a cleaner.

In June 2024, after being laid off for summer break from a

part-time teaching position in Salem, the claimant filed for
unemployment insurance benefits. Following a hearing on August

16, 2024, at which the claimant testified, a DUA review examiner

issued a written decision concluding that Legere was ineligible

for benefits because he did not meet the availability and work

search requirements of G. L. c. 151A, § 24 (b).

The examiner found that the Legere "admitted to a failure

on his part to apply for a single job since filing for

unemployment benefits" and "had no explanation" for failing to

apply to part-time jobs consistent with his work history and

qualifications. The examiner further noted that the claimant

"was cagey, evasive, and vague when describing his work search

activities," and therefore found his testimony not credible.

The examiner concluded that "due to his scheduling restrictions

and his failure to complete a single job application, the

claimant [had] effectively removed himself from the workforce."

The DUA board of review (board) summarily affirmed the

review examiner's decision, concluding that it was based on

substantial evidence and free from any error of law. Legere

then appealed the agency's decision to the District Court

pursuant to G. L. c. 151A, § 42. In a written memorandum and

order, a judge of the District Court concluded, among other

things, that the DUA's decision was supported by substantial

evidence and affirmed.

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Discussion. We review the DUA's decision based on the

standards set forth in G. L. c. 30A, § 14 (7). See G. L.

c. 151, § 42. "The agency's decision may only be set aside if

the court determines that the decision is unsupported by

substantial evidence or is arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or not in accordance with law." Coverall N. Am.,

Inc. v. Commissioner of the Div. of Unemployment Assistance, 447

Mass. 852, 857 (2006).

The burden of proving eligibility for benefits rests on the

claimant. Whether a claimant is capable of, available for, and

actively seeking work within the meaning of G. L. c. 151A,

§ 24 (b), is a question of fact. See Bellotti v. Director of

the Div. of Employment Sec., 382 Mass. 600, 601 (1981). The

board implicitly adopted the review examiner's findings and

concluded that Legere was not eligible for benefits because he

was neither available nor actively seeking work. "[O]ur duty is

to examine the record and to determine whether there is an

evidentiary basis" for those findings. Farrar v. Director of

the Div. of Employment Sec., 324 Mass. 45, 47-48 (1949). If

there is, those findings must stand. Id. at 48.

The claimant first argues that the review examiner's

conclusion that he was unavailable to work was not supported by

substantial evidence and was based on an error of law. "[I]n

order to be eligible for benefits an individual need only be

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available for suitable employment which he has no good cause to

refuse." Conlon v. Director of the Division of Employment Sec.

382 Mass. 19, 21 n.1 (1980). The Supreme Judicial Court has

recognized that "in certain circumstances, 'good cause' may

include personal reasons," and rejected the notion that a

claimant "must be willing and able to work full time on any

shift normally operated in the occupation for which [the

claimant] is suited by training and experience." Id. at 23-24.

See, e.g., Manias v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec.,

388 Mass. 201, 204 (1983) ("domestic responsibilities can

entitle a claimant to reject certain employment situations as

unacceptable and restrict . . . work availability under

§ 24 [b]").

Here, the review examiner expressly found that "[f]or the

period beginning June 30, 2024, and thereafter, the [claimant]

has not been available and prepared for full-time or part-time

work due to his mental health conditions, his religious

restrictions on his schedule, [and] his self-employment work."

As an initial matter, with respect to his self-employment

activities, Legere testified that he would have "let go" of that

work if he had been offered a job. In the absence of a specific

finding that this aspect of the claimant's testimony was not

credible, or any evidence of such activities interfering with

his willingness to accept work, the examiner's conclusion that

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Legere's self-employment played a role in rendering him

unavailable for work was not supported by substantial evidence.

It was also error for the examiner to conclude that Legere

was not available for part-time work due to his mental health

conditions where the mental health conditions at issue are the

reasons that necessitated his limitation to part-time work in

the first place. Thus, the fact that he was restricted to part-

time work did not diminish his availability for such work but

simply defined the scope of it.

It follows that the record only supports the conclusion of

unavailability insofar as it is based on the claimant's

religious activities. Testimony and documentary evidence

indicate that Legere dedicated twelve hours each week --

Fridays, Saturdays, and every other Monday -- to his volunteer

ministry and he participated in other religious activities on

Tuesday and Thursday evenings. Whether these religious

activities, standing alone, rendered him unavailable for work

was a determination that must be made by the board. See Keough

v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 370 Mass. 1, 4

(1976) (whether claimant has so restricted employability to

render themselves unavailable for work "is primarily a question

of fact that has been entrusted to the informed judgment of the

board").

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We need not remand for additional findings, however,

because substantial evidence supported the examiner's

conclusion, adopted by the board, that Legere failed to

establish that he was actively seeking suitable employment. See

G. L. c. 151A, § 24 (b). With respect to his alleged efforts to

search for jobs, the examiner declined to credit the claimant's

testimony. 1 See Manias, 388 Mass. at 205 (credibility

determinations are "for the review examiner, and not for this

court" [citation omitted]). The examiner did, however, credit

the claimant's admission that he had not submitted any job

applications despite coming across postings for jobs for which

he was qualified. When the examiner asked Legere why he had

failed to submit any applications, Legere replied, "I'll be

honest with you. I don't have a good reason why." Legere's

failure to apply for jobs without good reason was a sufficient

basis upon which to conclude that he was not making a good faith

effort to find work, as required by G. L. c. 151A, § 24 (b).

See Corrado v. Director of the Div. of Employment Sec., 325

Mass. 711, 713 (1950) (claimant "must act in good faith and make

reasonable effort to secure employment"). Because the

examiner's conclusion that the claimant failed to make a good

1 The claimant has submitted additional arguments and
evidence with respect to this issue that we decline to consider
because they were not presented to the DUA.

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faith effort to secure employment was supported by substantial

evidence and was free from legal error, we affirm the District

Court judgment affirming the DUA's determination that the

claimant was ineligible for unemployment benefits.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Walsh, Toone &
Tan, JJ. 2),

Clerk

Entered: February 9, 2026.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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