TOREY LEMONT DAVIS

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-1170

TOREY LEMONT DAVIS, petitioner.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In 2024, the petitioner filed a petition pursuant to G. L.

c. 210, § 12, to change her name to align with her gender

identity. After a trial, a judge of the Probate and Family

Court denied the petition. The petitioner contends that the

judge abused her discretion in concluding that the public

interest outweighed the petitioner's own interest in changing

her name. We affirm.

The petitioner is currently serving five years of

supervised probation after serving almost two years in prison,

following guilty pleas on charges that included two counts of

indecent assault and battery on a person with an intellectual

disability, G. L. c. 265, § 13F, intimidation of a witness,

G. L. c. 268, § 13B, assault and battery on a person with a

disability, G. L. c. 265, § 13K (a 1/2), and violation of an
abuse prevention order, G. L. c. 209A, § 7. After she filed the

petition to change her name, an order entered requiring notice

by publication. Following publication in a local newspaper, an

affidavit of objection was filed by the person whom the

petitioner had indecently assaulted because the objector has an

active abuse prevention order pursuant to G. L. c. 209A (209A

order) against the petitioner entered in the District Court.

The objection was withdrawn after the petitioner's requested

name was added to the 209A order and that order was made

permanent.

In 2025, a trial was held in the Probate and Family Court.

The petitioner testified that she "wanted to change [her] name

so it will comport more with [her] gender." She has been using

her requested name for years, and everyone she knows uses it.

She testified that she needs a legal name change because her

current name causes her difficulty in changing employment,

maintaining banking and tax records, and dealing with medical

and insurance providers. She "constantly [has] to explain and

re-explain to people" which causes her "constant anxiety." The

petitioner testified that she has criminal records in

Massachusetts, Texas, and Connecticut. To her knowledge, both

her legal and requested name are reflected in the 209A order,

are listed with the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB), and

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appear in any other criminal databases in which she might

appear.1

General Laws c. 210, § 12, allows a petitioner to secure an

"official record which definitely and specifically establishes

[their] change of name." Verrill, petitioner, 40 Mass. App. Ct.

34, 35-36 (1996) (Verill), quoting Buyarsky, petitioner, 322

Mass. 335, 338 (1948). Although "the right to change one's name

through the legal process is not absolute," Jaynes, petitioner,

88 Mass. App. Ct. 745, 746 (2015) (Jaynes), a change of name

"shall be granted unless such change is inconsistent with public

interests," G. L. c. 210, § 12. Where a petitioner is involved

with the criminal justice system, "the public interests at stake

are heightened." Jaynes, supra at 747. Consistent with that

principle, a judge may consider the "significant confusion" that

the name change could cause in the maintenance of records and

investigatory functions of law enforcement agencies. Id.,

quoting Verrill, supra at 37.

The petitioner contends that the judge erred in concluding

that these public interests outweighed the petitioner's interest

1 An attorney for the petitioner testified that she sent six
notices of the petitioner's request for a name change to various
law enforcement agencies. Although the return receipts for most
of those notices were entered in evidence, the judge noted that
the petitioner "did not provide a copy of any of the relevant
mailings, and the evidence submitted is insufficient for the
Court to determine the contents of the mailings to the various
law enforcement agencies."

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in changing her name. We review a judge's discretionary

decision for abuse of discretion, see Jaynes, 88 Mass. App. Ct.

at 747, and will affirm it unless the judge "made a clear error

of judgment in weighing the factors relevant to the decision,

. . . such that the decision falls outside the range of

reasonable alternatives" (quotation omitted), L.L. v.

Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).

The judge acted well within her discretion here. In a

thoughtful decision, she found that the petitioner had a

"sincere and understandably important reason for seeking a . . .

legal name in alignment with her gender identity." The judge

acknowledged that a legal name change would "enable the

Petitioner to update all her medical and banking records" and

"mitigate the distress of being misidentified, including

instances of deadnaming." The judge further identified the

"protection of transgender individuals from dysphoria,

misgendering, and other negative experiences" as "unquestionably

important and a significant consideration." At the same time,

the judge found that the record "paints a more complicated

picture" due to the petitioner's "extensive and serious criminal

history." The petitioner's criminal history spans thirty years

and includes eighteen convictions in Massachusetts. She also

has convictions in other states that are tied to her legal name

and other aliases, but not her requested name.

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In light of these circumstances, it was appropriate for the

judge to take into consideration the public interest in

maintaining "accuracy and consistency" in the petitioner's

criminal records. Jaynes, 88 Mass. App. Ct. at 747. The judge

found that the "full scope of local, state and federal criminal

databases that maintain a record on the Petitioner is unclear."

In particular, the judge found that the petitioner's requested

name does not appear in her criminal records in other states,

although the petitioner testified that it does. The petitioner

was "unable to confirm" that her requested name is registered in

the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Crime Information

Center. Furthermore, while the petitioner testified that, "to

her knowledge," she is registered with SORB under both names,

the only evidence to corroborate that testimony was "a computer

printout generated on an unknown date by an unknown person,"

which the judge accorded "little weight." The judge ultimately

concluded that granting the requested name change "could create

significant risks of confusion, misidentification, and errors in

the various law enforcement databases and tracking systems."

The judge's ruling was consistent with our decisions in Jaynes

and Verrill, and we do not discern "a clear error of judgment"

(citation omitted). L.L., 470 Mass. at 185 n.27.

Nor are we persuaded by the petitioner's assertion that the

judge imposed on her a duty to make a "reasonable effort to

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notify the relevant law enforcement agencies . . . of her common

law name or her name change petition." Rather, the judge took

into consideration that multiple law enforcement agencies had

not been notified of the petitioner's requested name, even

though she had gone by that name for the last five years.

Additionally, the petitioner did not list her requested name as

an alias in connection with the 209A order, despite having used

it the entire time the order had been in place. As discussed,

it was within the judge's discretion under G. L. c. 210, § 12,

to assess whether the proposed change would create confusion or

impair the petitioner's traceability within the criminal justice

system. See Jaynes, 88 Mass. App. Ct. at 747; Verrill, 40 Mass.

App. Ct. at 37.

Decree denying petition for
name change affirmed.

By the Court (Neyman,
Hershfang & Toone, JJ.2),

Clerk

Entered: May 12, 2026.

2 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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