Stephanie Pettee Rodrigues v. Michael Peter Rodrigues.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-205

STEPHANIE PETTEE RODRIGUES

vs.

MICHAEL PETER RODRIGUES.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

In January 2021, Stephanie Pettee Rodrigues (wife) filed a

complaint for divorce against Michael Peter Rodrigues (husband).

In May 2024, the parties entered into a partial separation

agreement, with several issues reserved for a later trial. In

October of that year, after trial, a judge of the Probate and

Family Court entered a supplemental judgment of divorce. The

husband moved to amend the supplemental judgment of divorce.

The judge allowed in part and denied in part the husband's

motion, and entered a corrected supplemental judgment of

divorce. The husband appeals from the corrected supplemental

judgment of divorce, asserting that the judge erred in equitably

dividing the marital estate and in ordering the parties to share
the cost of the children's religious education expenses. We

affirm.

1. Division of marital estate. The husband contends that

the judge erred in ordering him to pay the wife a lump sum of

$62,900 as part of the equitable division of the marital estate.

He asserts that the judge's findings regarding the lump-sum

payment were incomplete and inconsistent with the evidence, and

that the division was inequitable considering his overpayment of

child support and the wife's underreporting of her income during

the pendency of the divorce proceedings. We disagree.

Our review of a judge's equitable division of the marital

estate pursuant to G. L. c. 208, § 34 (§ 34), follows a two-step

process. "First, we examine the judge's findings to determine

whether all relevant factors in § 34 were considered." Bowring

v. Reid, 399 Mass. 265, 267 (1987). Second, we determine

whether the reasons for the judge's conclusions are "apparent in

his findings and rulings." Redding v. Redding, 398 Mass. 102,

108 (1986). "What weight any of the factors in § 34 shall

receive rests within the broad discretion of the judge."

Handrahan v. Handrahan, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 167, 168 (1989). A

judge's determination as to the equitable division of property

will not be reversed unless plainly wrong and excessive. See

Redding, supra at 107. Furthermore, a judge possesses broad

discretion to divide the marital estate equitably, see Dalessio

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v. Dalessio, 409 Mass. 821, 830 (1991), and there is no

requirement of "precise parity in the equitable division of

marital assets." Cabot v. Cabot, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 903, 905

(1984). Finally, mathematical precision is not required. See

Fechtor v. Fechtor, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 859, 861 (1989).

The marital home was the primary asset subject to division

under § 34, and the husband solely challenges the manner in

which the judge allocated the marital equity of this asset.

Here, the judge adequately considered the relevant § 34 factors

and explained the reasons for his conclusions. See Redding, 398

Mass. at 107-108. Specifically, the judge made detailed

findings addressing the equitable division of the marital home,

allowing the husband to retain the marital home and ordering him

to pay the wife a lump sum reflecting one-half of the home's

appreciation in value during the marriage. However, the judge

reduced the lump sum from $107,500 to $62,900, to account for

certain payments made by the husband during the pendency of the

divorce proceedings, including an advance of $30,500 to the

wife, $11,000 for the wife's share of guardian ad litem (GAL)

fees, and $3,100 in house repairs that were the wife's

responsibility. The husband argues that the wife's

underreporting of her income and his own overpayment of child

support requires a further decrease of this lump-sum amount. We

disagree.

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With regard to the wife's underreporting of her income

throughout the proceedings, the husband contends that the

judge's findings were incomplete and inconsistent with the

evidence. The judge found that the wife underreported her

income throughout the proceedings and, as a result, the judge

adjusted the husband's child support obligation in the final

judgment. We are not convinced that the judge's findings are

incomplete as the husband contends, where the judge made several

findings related to the wife's underreporting and, furthermore,

the judge had discretion to determine how much weight to give to

certain § 34 factors when equitably dividing the marital

property. See Handrahan, 28 Mass. App. Ct. at 168. The husband

also cites to no authority requiring a judge to make precise

findings as to how much a party underreported their income. 1

1 The husband also contends, in a footnote, that the judge
erred in determining the wife's underreporting because the judge
used the wife's "Medicare wages" reported on her W-2 forms
(reflecting certain pretax deductions from her gross pay),
rather than her true gross income before any such deductions.
We are not convinced that the judge used improper "income
levels" when considering the wife's underreporting as a factor
in fashioning the equitable division, where the judge's findings
expressly described the wife's gross annual income for 2021,
2022, and 2023. It appears that the judge utilized the wife's
Medicare wages to detail the level of her underreporting, but we
are not convinced that this materially affected the ultimate
determination of how the judge assessed the § 34 factors in
fashioning an equitable division of the marital estate. In any
event, we discern no error warranting a remand on this issue.

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The husband also argues that the judge's findings regarding

his overpayment of child support were not sufficient or complete

because the judge did not make a specific finding as to the

amount the husband overpaid. This argument, too, is without

merit. As alluded to above, the judge found that from March 18,

2021, until the date of the judgment, the husband overpaid child

support due to the wife's underreporting of income, and while

the judge ordinarily would order the wife to reimburse the

husband for the overpayment, the judge declined to do so in

consideration of the wife's overpayment of postseparation

uninsured medical expenses of the children, along with other

relevant factors under § 34. As "[t]he nature and exactness of

the findings required depends on the circumstances of the

particular case" (citation omitted), Leader v. Hycor, Inc., 395

Mass. 215, 224 (1985), here, the findings were sufficient to

support the judge's conclusions. In addition, the husband's

argument that his overpayments and the wife's overpayments

"cannot be logically or rationally considered equivalent," fails

to acknowledge that mathematical precision is not required for

equitable division of property. See Fechtor, 26 Mass. App. Ct.

at 861.

Moreover, the judge is allowed to consider noneconomic

contributions of the parties in dividing property pursuant to

§ 34, and the judge is not required to achieve precise parity in

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the equitable division of the marital estate. See Cabot, 18

Mass. App. Ct. at 905. Upon our review of the record, we are

not convinced that the overall financial award was plainly wrong

and excessive, where the judge acknowledged that he took the

underreporting of the wife's income and the husband's

overpayment of child support "into consideration, along with all

of the other appropriate factors to equitably divide the marital

estate."

2. Religious expenses. The husband also claims that he

was not given advance notice of the issue of payment of the

children's religious expenses and, therefore, the judge erred in

ordering the parties to share in the cost of those expenses. We

disagree.

Generally, due process requires notice and an opportunity

to be heard. See Adoption of Cadence, 81 Mass. App. Ct. 162,

172 (2012). A denial of due process can occur when a judge

rules on an issue without first providing the affected parties

with notice and an opportunity to be heard on that issue. See

id. Here, contrary to the husband's claim, he was placed on

notice that the expenses of the children's involvement with

religious education, specifically Confraternity of Christian

Doctrine (CCD), was an issue before the judge.

On one of the financial statements that the wife submitted

during the divorce proceedings, she listed CCD as a weekly

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expense. 2 Furthermore, the GAL report, also before the judge,

noted that there was tension between the parties regarding what

extracurriculars their children could sign up for, because some

interfered with church or religious studies. There is also a

reference in the GAL report that the husband's family attends

church. It was within the judge's discretion to credit this

evidence, to find that the husband was aware that the children

attended CCD (and was therefore on notice of the issue of

expenses for CCD), and to subsequently order the husband to

share in those expenses.

Corrected supplemental
judgment of divorce dated
December 19, 2024,
affirmed.

By the Court (Meade,
D'Angelo & Tan, JJ. 3),

Clerk

Entered: June 3, 2026.

2 We note that the cost of CCD here is de minimis.

3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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