Commonwealth v. Jonathan D. Young.

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-311

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

JONATHAN D. YOUNG.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a trial in the Boston Municipal Court, a jury

convicted the defendant, Jonathan D. Young, of several offenses,

including carrying a loaded firearm without a license (G. L.

c. 269, § 10 [n]) and discharging a firearm within 500 feet of a

building (G. L. c. 269, § 12E). On appeal, he claims that the

motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress, the trial

judge erred in denying his motion for required findings of not

guilty on these two charges, and counsel rendered ineffective

assistance. Based on the record before us, we affirm.

We discern no error by the motion judge because the facts

found by the judge warranted the stop, exit order, and patfrisk.

See Commonwealth v. Evelyn, 485 Mass. 691, 696 (2020) (motion
judge's findings are accepted absent clear error); Commonwealth

v. Mercado, 422 Mass. 367, 369 (1996) (appellate court makes

"independent determination of the correctness of the judge's

application of constitutional principles to the facts as

found").

Evidence at the suppression hearing showed that at about

8:30 P.M., on May 16, 2020, officers patrolling the Dorchester

section of Boston heard five to ten gunshots and immediately

drove toward the suspected source. In the darkness, they

spotted a vehicle exit a parking lot at a high rate of speed,

followed the vehicle onto an adjacent street, briefly lost sight

of it, and found it a short distance away parked with its

headlights off. Officers did not see any other occupied

vehicles or individuals in the area. The vehicle's physical and

temporal proximity to the gunshots, the high rate of speed, the

absence of other people or occupied vehicles in the area, and

the sudden parking with lights turned off constituted "specific

and articulable facts" supporting a reasonable suspicion for a

threshold inquiry. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). See

Mercado, 422 Mass. at 369; Commonwealth v. Doocey, 56 Mass. App.

Ct. 550, 557 (2002) (where gunshots recently fired "there is an

edge added to the calculus upon which that reasonable suspicion

may be determined").

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These circumstances, coupled with additional observations,

justified the exit order and patfrisk. See Commonwealth v.

Sweeting-Bailey, 488 Mass. 741, 744 (2021); Commonwealth v.

Amado, 474 Mass. 147, 151-152 (2016). Less than a minute after

hearing the gunshots, the officers approached the vehicle and

saw the female driver and the defendant (sitting in the front

passenger seat) raising their hands. Officers noticed a black

rubber glove on the defendant's right hand. The defendant would

not make eye contact, looked straight ahead, and appeared

"extremely nervous." Such observations, particularly the gloved

hand and nervous demeanor, made in the immediate aftermath of

gunshots fired in the dark of night warranted an exit order

based on two independent grounds -- a reasonable suspicion that

the defendant was engaged in criminal activity as well as a

reasonable suspicion that the defendant posed "a threat to

[officer] safety." Commonwealth v. Torres-Pagan, 484 Mass. 34,

38 (2020). These same reasons, as well as the defendant's lack

of response to two exit orders, justified the patfrisk based on

a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was armed and

dangerous. Id. at 38-39. Thus, the motion judge properly

denied the defendant's motion to suppress.

We disagree with the defendant's contention that the trial

judge should have allowed his motion for required findings of

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not guilty. He argues that because the firearm was not loaded

when officers found it in his hoodie pocket, jurors had no basis

to conclude that he was guilty of carrying a loaded firearm

without a license and discharging a firearm within 500 feet of a

building.

Viewing the evidence presented at trial in a light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, "any rational trier of fact,"

Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979), could have

concluded that the defendant fired all the ammunition seconds

before hiding the firearm in his pocket given that: within

sixty seconds of hearing five or more shots fired "very close"

to their location, officers found the defendant in the vehicle;

the defendant, wearing a glove on his right hand, had a nine

millimeter firearm in the front right pocket of his hoodie;

officers found the firearm in the "lock back" position,

suggesting that all the ammunition had been fired; the defendant

impressed his left palm print (from the ungloved hand) on the

side of the firearm's magazine; and, in the vicinity of the

shooting, investigators found six nine millimeter shell casings

that a ballistics expert matched to the firearm found in the

defendant's pocket. Based on this evidence, jurors could

conclude that the defendant possessed a loaded firearm, knew

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that it was loaded, and discharged it. See Commonwealth v.

Bonner, 489 Mass. 268, 275 (2022) (inferences drawn by jury

"need only be reasonable and possible and need not be necessary

or inescapable" [citation omitted]). Therefore, the trial judge

properly denied the motion for required findings of not guilty.

Finally, we decline to address the ineffective assistance

of counsel claim. The defendant argues that during cross-

examination trial counsel failed to raise an objection or move

to strike a police officer's nonresponsive answer that included

a statement from the driver admitting to the shooting but also

inculpating the defendant. At a sidebar discussion, the trial

judge noted the driver's statement was now before the jury, and

counsel did not object or move to strike. Defense counsel

responded that he "didn't want to be caught in a situation

where, at that point in time, [he] would have the jury faced

with an objection and the like." He concluded, "I was going to

come to sidebar. I haven't as yet." Counsel did not at that

point ask the judge to strike the testimony, and never returned

to the subject. Based on this exchange, counsel clearly chose

not to raise an objection or move to strike, but he never

revealed the thought process. In the absence of factual

findings shedding light on this thought process, we prefer not

to attribute a particular strategy to counsel in these

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circumstances. "[T]he preferred method for raising a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel is through a motion for a new

trial." Commonwealth v. Zinser, 446 Mass. 807, 810 (2006).

This is not a situation where the "factual basis of the claim

appears indisputably on the trial record." Id. at 811.

Accordingly, the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel is "best left for resolution in the first instance by

the trial judge on a motion for new trial" (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Adamides, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 339, 344 (1994).

Judgments affirmed.

By the Court (Rubin, Grant &
Hodgens, JJ.1),

Clerk

Entered: June 4, 2026.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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